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This report details the construct of a maritime force designed solely for the 
accomplishment of Phase Zero missions.  Accomplishment of Phase Zero missions will 
increase a region’s stability thus decreasing the spread of radical ideologies that could 
spawn large scale terrorist attacks and prevent smaller conflicts from growing into larger 
more expensive ones.  To devise this force the integrated study team had to take the 
broad idea of Phase Zero operations and determine which specific missions contribute to 
the completion of what they defined as the overall Phase Zero mission.  Based on these 
missions, the integrated study team built scenarios that were representative of the entire 
Phase Zero mission area.  These scenarios were used to establish what capabilities were 
important to a maritime Phase Zero Force.  With these capabilities in mind, the team 
constructed maritime forces and then evaluated them against the same scenarios to 
determine which ones performed better.   The recommended force can be fielded for an 
annual cost of $360 million and could accomplish all of the Phase Zero scenarios that the 
integrated study team built.   
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Introduction to the SEA-15 Integrated Project: 
 The Naval Postgraduate School’s Systems Engineering and Analysis integrated projects 
are designed to build tools that students in the Systems Engineering Analysis curriculum have 
learned over the 18 month enrollment in the program.  During this particular integrated project 
thirty-three students from the United States, Singapore, and Israel worked together for six 
months to develop a maritime force capable of accomplishing all maritime Phase Zero missions 
that could be employable by the year 2020.  One of the options had to be a force that could be 
fielded for $1.5 billion total annualized cost. 
Phase Zero Background:  
The fall of the Soviet Union in the early nineteen nineties left the United States Military 
without a formidable superpower peer competitor.  During the Cold War the primary mission of 
the U.S. military was easily discernable.  It was to deter the Soviet Union from launching a 
nuclear attack against the U.S. or its allies.  Many different smaller missions fell within this 
mission group but they mainly consisted of narrowly defined one versus one conventional 
engagements.  During this time period an easily defined adversary led to an easily defined set of 
required military capabilities.  The peer competitor void created by the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union also made it difficult for policy makers to discern required future defense capabilities.  
The new environment that the U.S. military is required to operate in is very different from the 
Cold War environment 
The original meaning of the term Phase Zero was delineated in Joint Pub 3, specifically 
the phasing diagram for joint operational planning.  This document defines Phase Zero 
operations as shaping operations which it described as: 
  
 “Joint and multinational operations — inclusive of normal and routine 
military activities — and various interagency activities are performed to dissuade 
or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends 
and allies.  They are executed continuously with the intent to enhance 
international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined 
military and national strategic objectives.  They are designed to assure success by 
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shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and allies, 
developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self defense and coalition 
operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and 
providing US forces with peacetime and contingency access. “Shape” phase 
activities must adapt to a particular theater environment and may be executed in 
one theater in order to create effects and/or achieve objectives in another.” 1 
 
This definition of shaping operations emphasizes on multinational cooperation in setting the 
conditions for effective joint operations.  This document gave the idea of Phase Zero operations 
its foundation of multinational engagement.   
During the late eighties and nineteen nineties military decision makers began to make the 
case that the military should be able to participate in several smaller low intensity engagements. 
This was largely due to local issues away from global conflicts.  The World’s landscape was 
dominated by a number of small conflicts and humanitarian crises.  Examples of these 
engagements were the U.S. interventions in Somalia and Haiti and the U.S. military support after 
hurricane Hugo. 
On September 11, 2001 Al Qaeda proved that a small non-state actor could cause severe 
damage to a large opponent by crashing airplanes into buildings.  This idea was enforced by 
follow on bombings in Africa and Europe.  A focus on Al Qaeda and terrorism identified 
regional instability as a primary enabler of the growth of radical ideologies.  Although the term 
Phase Zero already had a definition, it was through the efforts to curb the rise and spread of 
terrorism that the concept of Phase Zero operations positively influencing World security by 
increasing the stability of a region began to take hold.  General Charles F. Ward (ret) explained 
the underlying thought process when he stated, 
  
 “The Al Qaeda network inspires its operatives to disguise themselves 
among thousands of peaceful immigrants in largely unassimilated Muslim 
enclaves throughout Europe and the vast under governed spaces of North Africa 
serve as fertile recruiting grounds for fundamentalists/extremists/aspiring 
                                                 
1 Joint Publication 3-0, 17 September 2006, Joint Operations, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf, 
Accessed on 26 May 2009 
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terrorists.  To confront this growing threat, USEUCOM’s Phase Zero campaign 
places a new emphasis on theater security cooperation and capacity-building with 
our allies throughout the region.”  2 
 
Phase Zero proponents use similar rationale to make the argument that similar means can be 
employed to prevent or minimize the resources needed to quell a large scale conflict.  General 
Ward goes on to say, 
 
 “Moreover, leaders at USEUCOM also realized that the preventive focus 
of Phase Zero is less costly (in both lives and resources) than a reactive approach 
to crisis.  At the very least, Phase Zero helps set conditions for an easier location 
transition to a more comprehensive U.S. intervention in a crisis.” 3      
 
When the Department of Defense completed the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the 
importance of being able to complete these smaller and differing missions was realized.  
Although the 2006 QDR did not create a specific mission grouping for such operations, it did 
recognize that these missions were embedded within the three larger areas of homeland defense, 
war on terror/irregular warfare, and conventional campaigns.  
 
Figure 1: Balance of Missions from Naval Operational Concept 21 September 2006 
                                                 
2 WardCharles, F:  The Phase Zero Campaign, Washington D.C. International Peace Operations Association，2007 
3 WardCharles F: The Phase Zero Campaign, Washington D.C. International Peace Operations Association，2007 
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During Dr. Thomas Fedyszyn’s lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey 
CA, on President Obama’s maritime strategy, he gave a new and interesting take on the role of 
the military in this changing world.  He separated the missions of the United States Military into 
two broad categories.  The first category was made up of conventional roles of the U.S. military 
such as power projection and deterring major wars.  His second category consisted of smaller 
scale regional and cooperative engagements.   Although he only listed contribute to homeland 
defense in depth, foster and sustain cooperative relationships, and prevent or contain local 
disruptions in this category, they inherently contain many smaller actions that enable the 
accomplishment of these larger missions.  Phase Zero missions include the countless missions 
that make up this new category of military operations.   
 After reviewing many references and publications, the Integrated Project Team decided 
on the following mission description for a Phase Zero force. 
 
 A Phase Zero force will work closely with multinational, interagency and 
other partners to maintain or enhance stability, prevent or mitigate crises and set 
the conditions for access and responsive crisis intervention. 
 
Defining Mission Objectives: 
After combining the ideas above into a working mission statement for a maritime Phase 
Zero force, the integrated project team defined which smaller missions contribute to the 
accomplishment of the overall Phase Zero missions.  The integrated project team completed a 





Figure 2: Phase Zero Decomposition 
 
The bottom tier functions of the decomposition serve as the primary framework for the Phase 
Zero missions.  The Phase Zero mission list consists of the following missions: 
 
• Civil Support 
• Train the local defense force 
• Equip the local defense force 
• Build relations with foreign nations 
• Restore critical infrastructure 
• Anti-smuggling operations 
• Anti-terrorism operations 
• Anti-illegal fishing operations 
• Force protection against threats 
• Anti-piracy operations 
• Information sharing 
• Freedom of navigation 
• Non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) 
 
While this list is representative, but not exhaustive, we do believe it is comprehensive.  
Additional missions will most likely be colligated or subsumed.   
It was challenging to derive a force that simultaneously completed 13 individual 
missions.  However there are similarities in how they could be completed and in the platform and 
force characteristics that were integral to their completion.  The integrated project team used 
multidimensional scaling to determine degrees of similarities between the missions. The 
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approach was to survey subject matter experts from the integrated project team, Naval 
Postgraduate School, and Naval War College faculty.  Participants were asked to rate the 
similarity or dissimilarity of each of the thirteen missions.  Each pair was rated for a total of 
seventy eight pairs.  The result of the surveys led to three primary missions within the thirteen 
essential missions.  These primary missions are Anti-smuggling, Civil Support, and Information 
Sharing.  The missions that made up these individual groupings were similar enough to each 
other that a force that can accomplish any one of the missions can accomplish all missions.   
Deriving the Phase Zero Force: 
After defining the three primary missions we determined which attributes were important 
in the accomplishment of each of those missions.  Two mission scenarios were created to 
simulate the Civil Support and Anti-smuggling missions in the Latin American area of 
responsibility.  Latin America was chosen as the base for the mission scenarios primarily for two 
reasons.  First SOUTCHOM maintains a comprehensive archive detailing Phase Zero type 
missions that have taken place over the last decade.  This gave the modeling and simulation team 
a historical basis from which to build the mission scenarios. Secondly, Latin America is home to 
two of the most challenging Phase Zero type problems, the fight against drug trafficking and the 
response to humanitarian crises.   
The Anti-smuggling scenario was modeled using a barrier patrol concept to simulate an 
effort to quell drug smuggling along the western coast of Mexico.  The model identified the type 
of aviation elements and the size and speed of intercept vessels as the most important force 
attributes to identify and interdict drug smugglers. 
  The Civil Support scenario was modeled after the need to support the Latin American 
populace following a natural disaster.  The team looked at three severities of natural disasters in 
order to quantify force characteristics and determine which were most important to the rendering 
of aid during such events.  In all three cases the models showed that a force’s airlift capacity and 
shipboard cargo capacity were the primary factors in the accomplishment of Civil Support 
missions.   
The Information Sharing scenario provided the basis through which our developed forces 
would be able to complete the Anti-smuggling and Civil Support missions.  In both cases the 
ability to access and pass information quickly and reliably would serve as a force multiplier.   
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The force structure team created six force structures that could complete the three groups 
of scenarios.  Three force structures comprised of platforms currently in the U.S. inventory and 
three force structures comprised of platforms currently in the inventory and platforms that are 
able to be produced and delivered by 2020.  These include platforms that are under development 
and can be operational by 2020 based on procurement timelines and platforms that are currently 
being used by foreign nations.  The force structures were selected based on their ability to satisfy 
the critical characteristics identified by the models of the Anti-smuggling and Civil Support 
scenarios. Concurrently the force structures were compared with the results from a linear 
optimization to determine the optimum mix of platforms.  The result was six force structures 
satisfying the two premises of current and future forces and the three levels of mission severity.   
The force comprised solely of current platforms that could complete the Anti-smuggling 
mission and support the populace following the highest severity natural disaster was: 
• LHD 1 class 
o (4) CH-53 
o (11) SH-60B 
• (3) FFG 7 class 
o (6) SH-60B 
The force that was comprised of current and future platforms that can complete the Anti-
smuggling mission and the highest severity natural disaster was: 
• JMSDF DDH 
o (7) CH-53K 
o (6) RQ-8 
• LPD-17 
o (2) SH-60 
o (3) RQ-8 
o (2) M-80 Stiletto 
• JHSV 
• Visby 
o (3) RQ-8  
The RQ-8 Fire Scout was selected after a detailed trade study analyzing the costs and 
characteristics of current and future unmanned aerial vehicles.  The extended endurance of the 
RQ-8 over that of the SH-60 reduced the number of aerial assets needed.  
Cost analysis of the Current and Future force structures showed that the Future Force 
could accomplish the Phase Zero mission for approximately $115 million less than the Current 
Force.  Included in the force cost considerations were funding for a marine detachment to 
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provide security at potential crisis relief sights and a medical detachment to provide relief in 
support of Civil Support missions.  The overall price of the Phase Zero force composed of 
Current and Future platforms came to approximately $360 million.  The Current Force totaled 
$475 million.  Since the price benchmark set by the tasking statement was $1.5 billion, the U.S. 
government could construct four of these maritime Phase Zero forces. 
The Phase Zero Force and the World: 
The forces that result from this analysis are the most operationally effective and cost 
efficient forces that can be employed to accomplish all Phase Zero maritime missions.  The 
overall mission of a Phase Zero force is to work closely with multinational, interagency and 
other partners to maintain or enhance stability, prevent or mitigate crises and set the conditions 
for access and responsive crisis intervention.  However, it is extremely difficult to monitor  how 
much the stability of a country or region is changes in response to the efforts of a Phase Zero 
force.  It is equally as difficult to quantify how well a force is at preventing or mitigating a crisis.  
The Geneva Center for Security Policy developed a matrix of preventative measures that 
contribute to the stability of the international system.  The Geneva Center looked at several 
existing indices comprised of economic and political factors and formulated its own set of 
indicators.  The indicators were distributed across five categories - economic, environmental, 
military and security, political, and societal.  The direct links that could be drawn between the 
force and these indicators were in the military and security indicators.  However, it is reasonable 
to assume that successful accomplishment of the 13 maritime Phase Zero missions will influence 
many of the other outcome based indicators.  For example, the addition of a Phase Zero force to 
the Gulf of Aden region will definitely bolster the enforcement of the rule of law at sea but may 
also boost the societal indicator of secondary school enrollment due to the decreased profitability 
of piracy.  
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The Naval Postgraduate School’s Systems Engineering and Analysis integrated projects 
are designed to use tools that students in the Systems Engineering and Analysis curriculum have 
learned over the 18 month enrollment in the program.  During this integrated project thirty-three 
students from the United States, Singapore, and Israel worked together for six months to develop 
a maritime force capable of accomplishing all maritime Phase Zero missions that would be 
employable by the year 2020.  One of the options had to be a force that could be fielded for $1.5 
billion total annualized cost. 
A. TASKING STATEMENT 
On 27 August 2008, OPNAV N8F formulated tasking that was adopted by the Naval 
Postgraduate School Systems Engineering and Analysis Integrated Project Team – that of 
building a maritime force to complete the Phase Zero mission in the year 2020.  Specifically: 
 
Design a system of systems to employ a regional Maritime Theater Security Force to 
conduct all maritime missions associated with Phase Zero operations.  Consider current 
fleet structure and funded programs as the baseline system of systems to execute security 
and shaping missions in developing these concept of operations, then develop alternative 
fleet architectures for platforms, manning, command and control, communication, 
logistics and operational procedures to evaluate against the current program.  A complete 
redesign of a naval force capable of executing phase 0 operations, employable by 2020, 
and using total procurement and operating costs of $1.5B (FY08 constant dollars) per 
annum, should be one of the alternatives. 
B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The Integrated Project Team interpreted the tasking statement to include an analysis of 
current and future fleet architectures in completing Phase Zero operations.  The final result of the 
tasking would be a force employable by 2020 that will be able to adequately perform Phase Zero 
operations for a cost of $1.5 billion a year.  Some things to be considered in the analysis and 
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development of the fleet architecture were: platforms, manning, command and control, 
communications, logistics, and operational procedures.   
C. STATEMENT OF NEED 
Existing maritime force structures are ineffective in accomplishing Phase Zero 
operations.  This is a problem because the role of the U.S. Navy has evolved from fighting big 
ship on ship conflicts against the Soviet Union to more of a police force utilized for sustaining 
regional stability and security.  The U.S. fleet was designed to be able to project power from the 
sea and to put “bullets downrange” which is inherently not the purpose of Phase Zero.   
D. PROBLEM SOLVING APPROACH 
The initial tasking from OPNAV N81 created four challenges that were unique to this 
particular integrated project.  First, the study team developed a group of missions, instead of a 
single mission.  Second, there were differing opinions as to what constituted the set of maritime 
missions associated with Phase Zero operations.  Third, the tasking indicated a budgetary 
constraint in addition to the typical performance and schedule requirements.  Fourth, measures of 
effectiveness for the group of Phase Zero missions involve sociological theory seemingly beyond 
the scope of this project.  In order to meet the needs of the tasking, the team deviated from the 
organization used in past integrated projects.  The initial action was to create a Phase Zero 
research group to investigate the different explanations, interpretations and definitions of Phase 
Zero.  The budgetary constraint required a cost analysis group to analyze and identify the annual 
costs for every platform in the current and future U.S. fleets.  A preamble to grasping the totality 
of Phase Zero was first determining which maritime missions comprise Phase Zero operations.  
There were many considerations as to what operations should be regarded as Phase Zero.   The 
operations planning phasing document in Joint Pub 3 served as the starting point for defining 
Phase Zero.  The research revealed a range of definitions of Phase Zero. The Phase Zero team 
used systems engineering to identify three groups of operations that could likely be considered 
Phase Zero (i.e. Anti-smuggling, Civil Support and Information Sharing).  The next step was to 
determine how to model these three somewhat fluid groups of missions.  If three missions were 
different enough from each other; the force designed to combat those missions would also be 
able to accomplish any other missions that may fall under the auspices of Phase Zero.  Three 
12 
 
individual scenarios were matched to the three groups and were the catalysts to create a set of 
requirements for the maritime force.  To fulfill these requirements, both existing and non existing 
platforms and force structures were examined and considered.  Since no U.S. maritime force has 
been designed specifically for only Phase Zero type missions, the integrated study team 
examined the current multinational missions of training, humanitarian assistance missions, and 
maritime interdiction operations.  Although not inclusive of the missions that could be 
considered in the Phase Zero grouping, they provided a number of force structures to evaluate.  
The current force structures that accomplish these missions were evaluated against the three 
Phase Zero groupings.  Simultaneously, the integrated study team postulated future force 
structures that would satisfy the requirements determined by the three groupings.  The results of 
these evaluations were used to determine how effectively the current force and future force 
structures perform Phase Zero type missions.   
 The integrated study group also conducted a study to identify and evaluate the threats to 
the stability of a region in the year 2020. The threat study further delineated the requirements for 
Phase Zero force during the lifecycle of the proposed force.  The integrated project team 
constructed a detailed cost model from which to compare candidate force structures.  A key 
constraint on the proposed force structures was that one force structure needed to have a $1.5 
billion cost per year.  It was not a desired output for the force structures to be limited in 
effectiveness by the $1.5 billion dollar price tag.  Therefore, the team sought to demonstrate what 
level of Phase Zero effectiveness could be achieved for $1.5 billion as well as how much it 
would cost to achieve higher levels of effectiveness.   
1. Systems Engineering Process 
In order to derive a force that could effectively accomplish all maritime missions 
associated with Phase Zero missions, the integrated project team needed a method that could 
begin from an abstract mission and mature into a highly structured set of force requirements.  To 
facilitate deriving the force requirements, the integrated study team chose to modify the systems 
engineering Vee model by adapting the phases of the model that pertained to our project.  Below 




Figure 3: System's Engineering Vee Model 4 
 
Feasibility Study/Concept Exploration:  During this portion of the process the Phase Zero 
research team explored the broad concept of Phase Zero operations.  Topics of research included 
the origins of the Phase Zero mission area and how militaries have accomplished these type of 
missions in the past. 
System Requirements:  During this phase in the vee process the integrated study team solicited 
and received inputs from the research team and stakeholders to develop the tasks a maritime 
Phase Zero force would need to be able to accomplish.  The result of the system requirements 
phase was the development of the 13 maritime Phase Zero missions. 
High-Level Design: During this phase the integrated project team used modeling and force 
structure to develop the critical capabilities that a maritime Phase Zero force would need to 
possess. 
Detailed Design:  During this phase the integrated project team selected specific platforms to 
make up the alternative maritime Phase Zero force structures based on the critical platform 
capabilities that were identified. 
                                                 
4 U.S. Department of Transportation web site. “Overview of the Vee Technical Development”  
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/cadiv/segb/views/document/Sections/Section1/1_1.htm accessed on 15 June 2009 
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Subsystem Verification/System Validation:  During these phases the integrated project team used 
modeling to discern which force structure was the most efficient in performing the overall Phase 
Zero mission. 
E. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
 Primary inputs to the development of required missions that a maritime Phase Zero force 
would need to complete were the needs of the project’s key stakeholders.  The key stakeholders 
and their applicable inputs were as follows: 
• U.S. Navy OPNAV N8F RADM Myers and N8FB Mr. McCarthy – Original 
project tasking.  (Tasking statement)  
• U.S. component commanders – Possible roles a Phase Zero force could fill 
within their areas of responsibility. (Scope) 
• Various aid organizations – Possible roles a Phase Zero force could play in 
assistance to the rendering of aid following a disaster. (Scope) 
• Foreign navies – Coalition aspects of maritime Phase Zero operations.  
(Boundary conditions) 
• The World Bank – How accomplishing the maritime Phase Zero mission can 
enhance regional stability.  (Measures of effectiveness) 
 
The United States Southern Command became our primary stakeholder as the study progressed.  
The research team discovered that over the last 10 years, forces assigned to SOUTHCOM have 
accomplished only missions that fell within our definition of Phase Zero missions.  These were 
the Anti-smuggling and Civil Support missions.  This experience gave SOUTHCOM the most 
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II. UNDERSTANDING THE BACKGROUND OF PHASE ZERO 
Phase Zero missions cover a wide array of ideas that span governments, military, NGO, 
and civilian actions.  Phase Zero implies not only military actions but also social and economic 
actions to affect the beliefs and desires of country citizens as well as their leaders.  The historical 
view of the Phase Zero concept dealt with the shaping of the battle space.  Joint Pub 5 defines 
shaping as: 
 
The shape phase will contain military security cooperation activities to be 
coordinated with other interagency activities. When contingency and crisis action 
planning are conducted in a region with security cooperation activities, both 
military operational and security cooperation planning must be closely 
coordinated and linked with interagency plans. In addition, early flexible deterrent 
activities by all instruments of national power may begin during this phase. 5 
 
Historical Shaping: 
The Foreign Assistance and Arms Export Act of 1961 (FAA) is a continuation of the 
Marshall Plan that expired in 1951.  The Kennedy administration recognized the need for both 
military and civilian aid to help the developing world and to guarantee stability.  In 1961, 
President Kennedy said the collapse of developing countries "would be disastrous to our national 
security, harmful to our comparative prosperity, and offensive to our conscience."  6   The FAA 
evolved out of this idea as a method to provide material support governments and non-
governmental organizations.  The FAA states that:  
 
“In enacting this legislation, it is therefore the intention of the Congress to 
promote the peace of the world and the foreign policy, security, and general 
welfare of the United States by fostering an improved climate of political 
independence and individual liberty, improving the ability of friendly countries 
                                                 
5 By Peter Pace General, United States Marine Corps, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  “Joint Publication 5-0, 
December 2006,  Joint Operation Planning”, page II-8, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf 
Accessed on 26 May 2009 
6 USAID History http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidhist.html, Accessed on 30 Apr 2009 
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and international organizations to deter or, if necessary, defeat aggression, 
facilitating arrangements for individual and collective security, assisting friendly 
countries to maintain internal security, and creating an environment of security 
and stability in the developing friendly countries essential to their more rapid 
social, economic, and political progress.” 7 
 
The stated goal of the FAA is “to promote peace and security”. Section 545.777 states: 
 
“Training in Maritime Skills The President is encouraged to allocate a portion of 
the funds made available each fiscal year to carry out this chapter for use in 
providing education and training in maritime search and rescue, operation and 
maintenance of aids to navigation, port security, at-sea law enforcement, 
international maritime law, and general maritime skills.” 8 
 
The Naval Operations Concept 2006 (NOC 2006) exemplifies a major change in US 
strategies.  The NOC 2006 recognizes the changes in the world structure.  Instead of focusing 
solely on power projection the NOC identifies new strategic goals of securing the United States 
from direct attack, securing strategic access, retaining global freedom of action, strengthening 
existing and emerging alliances and partnerships, and establishing favorable security conditions.   
The NOC 2006 maintains the traditional Navy missions of forward naval presence, sea 
control, air and missile defense, counter proliferation, and deterrence.  However, it introduces a 
host of new missions including maritime security operations, security cooperation, civil-military 
operations, counterinsurgency, counter terrorism, information operations, and crisis response. 
The identification of the new missions was a response to the rise of irregular challenges from 
both state and none state actors. 
The missions identified in NOC 2006 represent operations that affect day to day 
operations by the U.S. Navy.  The goal of these operations is to promote stability and peace by 
preventing or limiting conflicts.  The general idea is to build relationships with governments and 
                                                 
7 Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2002 , JULY 2003, VOLUME I–AOF VOLUMES I–A AND I–B, Page 
236, http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/faa.pdf, Accessed on 26 May 2009 
8 Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2002 , JULY 2003, VOLUME I–AOF VOLUMES I–A AND I–B, Page 
268, http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/faa.pdf, Accessed on 26 May 2009 
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people through the provision of training, medical support, disaster relief, and infrastructure repair 
to foreign nations.  The intent is to avoid conflict by building stable governments with good will 
towards the United States and its coalition partners. 
A. NEWLY DEFINED MISSIONS BY NOC 06 
In NOC 2006, a host of missions were included in the core mission capabilities of the 
Navy in response to the evolving threats in the 21st century. These missions include maritime 
security operations, security cooperation, civil-military operations, counterinsurgency, 
counter terrorism, information operations, and crisis response.  These missions are explained 
in more detail in Appendix C.  The mission that correlates most closely to Phase Zero is Civil 
Military Operation.   
Civil Military Operations (CMO): 
 Organizationally, Phase Zero missions might benefit from the structure and activities of 
the CMO and Information Operations IO.   
“[CMO are] activities of a commander that establish collaborative relationships 
among military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations 
and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile 
operational area in order to facilitate military operations are nested in support of 
the overall US objectives. CMO may include performance by military forces of 
activities and functions normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national 
government.” 9   
Civil Military Operations (in Joint terms), also known as Civil Affairs (CA) operations in 
the Army, or generally categorized as Civil Military Relations (CMR), is anything that is done 
by the military, with any non-military organization in the effort to support stability, 
counterinsurgency and operations dealing with threats.  A typical CMO sees people from 
military (e.g. medical, engineer corp, military police, legal and civil affairs department) and non-
military organizations.  Non-military organizations can include government or non government 
entities such as the local government, law enforcement agencies, indigenous populations and 
                                                 




institutions, intergovernmental agencies, nongovernmental agencies, host nations, foreign nations 
and even private sectors providing a specific service.  
CMO is considered holistic, cumulative, integrative, and synergistic, working in the 
seams of power and gaps in organizations, phases, and processes.  CMO need to take into 
consideration the culture of the indigenous population since engaging the population and 
building relationships with the local populace involves joint, interagency, and multinational 
affairs.  At all levels, CMO use political bargaining, collaboration, consensus, and relationship-
building to create favorable situations for success. 10   
B. EXAMPLES OF PHASE ZERO ENGAGEMENTS 
 The U.S. Navy frequently deploys and operates with coalition partners.  The following 
examples of recent engagements can be construed as “Phase Zero” deployments.   
1. Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) 
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) is an annual series of bilateral 
military exercises between the United States and various Southeast Asia nations. Participants 
historically include the navies of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand. The exercises include at-sea maneuvering; command, control, and communications; 
naval gunnery; diving and salvage; visit, board, search and seizure drills; airborne maritime 
patrol; force protection/anti-terrorism; and medical and community projects.  
While the focus of the each bilateral exercise depends on the goals of the participating 
countries, the general focus of the exercise is on interoperability of the various navies in areas 
such as operational planning, command and control, tactics, logistics support and community 
service projects. The purpose of the exercise series is to improve military readiness and 
interoperability with each CARAT partner in a variety of mission areas of mutual benefit.  
2. Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT)  
SEACAT is a weeklong at-sea exercise designed to highlight the value of information 
sharing, cooperation and multi-national coordination within a scenario that gives participating 
navies practical maritime interception training opportunities. Participants include the navies of 
                                                 
10 “Joint Publication 3-57- Civil Military Operations”, 8 July 2008. 
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Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The first SEACAT 
exercise was held in 2002.  
These multifaceted exercises present participants with realistic situations involving 
criminal and terrorist threats requiring international coordination, communication and decision-
making. SEACAT also provides participants with practical maritime interception training 
opportunities to enhance the maritime security and interoperability of the participating forces. 
Commander Logistics Group Western Pacific/Commander Task Force 73, who operates 
from Singapore, is the U.S. Navy's executive agent for both CARAT and SEACAT. 
3. Africa Partnership Station (APS) 
The Africa Partnership Station (APS) is a collaborative strategy designed to work 
cooperatively with U.S. and international partners to improve maritime safety and security in 
West and Central Africa to achieve safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea as part of United 
States Africa Command’s (USAFRICOM or AFRICOM) Security Cooperation program.  The 
strategy of the U.S. Navy is to keep out undesirables by deploying a rotation of ships tasked with 
assisting West Africa's maritime forces to take control.  The United States Africa Command 
(USAFRICOM or AFRICOM) is a Unified Combatant Command of the United States 
Department of Defense that is responsible for U.S. military operations and military relations with 
fifty-three African nations - an area of responsibility covering all of Africa except Egypt.  Africa 
Command was established October 1, 2007 as a temporary sub-unified command under U.S. 
European Command, which for more than two decades was responsible for U.S. military 
relations with more than forty African nations. Africa Command was formally activated October 
1, 2008, during a public ceremony at the Pentagon attended by representatives of African nations 
posted in Washington, D.C. 
C. A LATIN AMERICAN FOCUS 
In order to develop a force that was constructed to combat threats to regional stability in 
the year 2020, the integrated study team needed to scope the problem to one region to narrow the 
possibilities of different missions in which the force would have to partake.  The team chose 
Latin America for two reasons.  First, the primary military engagements that occur in Latin 
America can be characterized as Phase Zero.  Secondly, the United States Southern Command 
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has amassed an immense library of plans and after action reports on Phase Zero operations that 
the integrated study team found to be helpful in their analysis. 
D. SEA 15 PHASE ZERO GOALS 
For the purpose of this project, SEA-15 reviewed the over arching military guidance that 
has been promulgated throughout the fleet.  The documents of particular interest are the National 
Security Strategy 2005, National Defense Strategy 2008, the Quadrennial Defense Review 2006, 
the Naval Operations Concept 2006, Joint Publications 1, and Joint Publication 3.  None of these 
documents defined what Phase Zero is in explicit terms.   Reviewing and consolidating the above 
guidance SEA-15 developed a mission statement for a Phase Zero force: 
 
A Phase Zero force will work closely with multinational, interagency and other 
partners to maintain or enhance stability, prevent or mitigate crises and set the 
conditions for access and responsive crisis intervention. 
 
The goals of the SEA-15 Phase Zero force are: 
• To enhance the stability of a region 
• To save resources and funding 
• To reduce the loss of lives and equipment 
• To build coalitions 
• To increase probability of interdiction of drug trafficking from South America 
to U.S. 
 
The SEA integrated project team performed a functional decomposition of “Perform 
Phase Zero” to identify the types of missions that contribute to accomplishing Phase Zero goals.  
While the list of possible missions is not all encompassing, it develops a well rounded force that 
meets the integrated study team’s definition of Phase Zero operations.  The missions which 
comprise Phase Zero operations are: 
 
• Civil Support 
• Train the local defense force 
• Equip the local defense force 
• Build relations with foreign nations 
• Restore critical infrastructure 
• Anti-smuggling operations 
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• Anti-terrorism operations 
• Anti-illegal fishing operations 
• Force protection against threats 
• Anti-piracy operations 
• Information sharing 
• Freedom of navigation 























III. MISSIONS OF PHASE ZERO 
 After examining the history and background of the Integrated Study group conducted a 
functional decomposition to identify the missions that can be considered Phase Zero operations 
that will need to be addressed by a Phase Zero force.   
 
 
Figure 4: Functional Decomposition of Phase Zero Mission 
 
 The integrated project team used the bottom tier of the functional decomposition to 
generate thirteen missions that a Phase Zero force would need to accomplish.  These missions 
are:  
 
• Civil Support 
• Train the local defense force 
• Equip the local defense force 
• Build relations with foreign nations 
• Restore critical infrastructure 
• Anti-smuggling operations 
• Anti-terrorism operations 
• Anti-illegal fishing operations 
• Force protection against threats 
• Anti-piracy operations 
• Information sharing 
• Freedom of navigation 




A. PERCEPTION MAPPING 
1. Multidimensional Scaling 
Problem: 
 In the early stages of the project, the sheer number of distinct missions posed a problem 
in completing an in-depth analysis of each of the thirteen missions. In addition, modeling of each 
of these missions was also unrealistic given resources and time constraints. Therefore, a method 
to narrow the scope of work without minimizing the intent of or requirement to support these 
missions was sought. Initially a non-analytical qualitative approach was used. Civil Support, 
Anti-smuggling, and Noncombatant Evacuation Operations were identified based on their 
dissimilarity to each other. If the three selected missions were drastically different then they 
should span the entire range of the thirteen missions. While this reasoning was sound, it was 
appropriate to pursue a more analytical approach.  
Approach: 
 Since the nature and breadth of the thirteen missions are extensive, they do not lend 
themselves to numerical comparison. After discussing the issue with several faculty members 
including Professor Gary Langford, multidimensional scaling was identified as a viable method 
for comparing the missions. If similarities exist between missions resulting in groupings then 
multidimensional scaling is able to identify those groupings. 
Background on Multidimensional Scaling 
 One output of multidimensional scaling is a perception map. These are also known as 
product maps, sociograms, sociometric maps, psychometric maps, stimulus-response diagrams, 
relationship maps or concept maps. 11 Perceptual maps convey information about perceived 
relationships between objects. The multidimensional scaling algorithm uses object proximities to 
build the perception map. Proximities are some measure of likeness between objects. For 
example, if a group of people were surveyed as to the similarity between tangerines, oranges, and 
broccoli then the perception map should show tangerines and oranges closer to one another than 
broccoli. The perception map itself can take on any number of dimensions although dimensions 
greater than three become difficult to visualize. Since the goal of the perception map is to convey 
information inherent in the data set, the number of dimensions was chosen appropriate to the data 
                                                 
11 Heady, Ronald B., Lucas, Jennifer L., PERMAP 11.6 Operation Manual, University of Louisiana at Lafayette, 
2007, p. 6. 
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set. In the tangerine-orange-broccoli example, one dimension (a line) is probably sufficient to 
convey the similarity information. More complex relationships or sets comprised of numerous 
objects may be represented in larger dimensional spaces.  
PERMAP Model: 
 PERMAP is a multidimensional scaling computer program. It was developed in its 
original DOS version in 1993 by Professor Ronald Heady at the University of Louisiana’s 
Department of Business Systems Analysis and Technology. The current version (v.11.7) is a free 
Windows based real time interactive program for creating perception maps. This particular 
program was chosen for its ease of use and more importantly, its price point. PERMAP takes a 
matrix of data as input and generates the perception map. To evaluate the viability of the 
PERMAP model a simple test was used. A matrix of airport distances throughout the United 
States (sourced from various websites) was input to the program. The output was a normalized 
map of those airport locations throughout the United States. The figures below show the input 
matrix (Figure 7), PERMAP output (Figure 8), and the PERMAP output overlaid on a map of the 


















  SEA LAX PHL MIA HOU DEN MSP ATL TUS CLE 
SEA 0                   
LAX 961 0                 
PHL 2384 2409 0               
MIA 2738 2352 1021 0            
HOU 1903 1394 1341 961 0          
DEN 1028 865 1562 1718 888 0        
MSP 1403 1541 983 1511 1064 683 0      
ATL 2189 1938 669 600 698 1203 912 0    
TUS 1224 453 2062 1908 948 643 1304 1546 0   
CLE 2026 2059 364 1089 1113 1204 624 559 1733 0 
Figure 5: Airport Distances Input 
  SEA LAX PHL MIA HOU DEN MSP ATL TUC CLE 
X -0.43 -0.46 0.409 0.359 0.016 -0.16 0.061 0.246 -0.32 0.277
Y 0.321 -0.03 0.084 -0.29 -0.21 0.062 0.176 -0.1 -0.11 0.103




Figure 7: Overlaid PERMAP Output 
 
PERMAP was able to regenerate the physical locations of airports based only on their 
relative distance. The slight difference in actual locations resulted from manually scaling the map 
to fit the scale of the PERMAP output and also from slightly questionable internet source data 
for airport distance. However, the utility of perception mapping and the ability of the PERMAP 
program to implement the multidimensional scaling algorithm were apparent. It was noted that 
since the goal of the program was to generate the relative distances between objects, the output 
could be flipped or rotated arbitrarily, since the program does not have any data from which to 
anchor the locations. Also note that only one half of the matrix is populated. This was because it 
is assumed that the distance between Atlanta and Houston is the same as the distance between 
Houston and Atlanta.  
Project Application of PERMAP: 
 In order to gather information for PERMAP related to the project, individuals across the 
Naval Postgraduate School were surveyed. These included members of the Operations Research 
and Systems Engineering Departments as well as the Naval War College. The team leads within 
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the project were also polled. Subjects were asked to rate the similarity or dissimilarity of each of 
the thirteen missions. Each pair was rated for a total of seventy eight pairs.  The survey that was 
distributed is shown in Appendix C. Several tools were used to make the survey robust in terms 
of data precision.  
 First, rather than providing respondents with numbers to circle, as is familiar with 
surveys, subjects were asked to mark on a line between the pairs. Providing an undifferentiated 
line scale rather than a series of boxes or numbers does not force discrete comparisons, but 
instead offers a sliding scale. 12 For example, on a number scale from 1 to 5, subjects may 
believe that there is a significant difference between a 3 and a 4.  
 Second, the two ends of the line were labeled “exact same” and “most different”. 
Providing concrete terms to the extremities on the line preclude subjects attaching different 
meanings to words like “fairly” or “somewhat”.13 Once collected, the marks were measured and 
input to a spreadsheet taking the mean of all subject data. The matrix was then input to the 















                                                 
12 Shiffman, Susan S., Reynolds, M. Lance, Young, Forrest W., Introduction to Multidimensional Scaling: Theory, 
Methods, and Applications, Academic Press, New York, NY, 1981. p.22 
13 Shiffman, Susan S., Reynolds, M. Lance, Young, Forrest W., Introduction to Multidimensional Scaling: Theory, 
Methods, and Applications, Academic Press, New York, NY, 1981. p.23 
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  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 0                         
2 56.3 0                       
3 61.1 32.1 0                     
4 53.2 17.9 31.8 0                   
5 63.6 45.4 62.1 67.7 0                 
6 60.5 22.9 46.9 36.0 75.3 0               
7 46.8 32.1 31.9 46.4 71.0 44.6 0             
8 37.5 37.1 35.9 59.6 71.3 64.4 23.4 0           
9 59.6 19.4 54.6 23.1 70.7 43.9 48.3 57.4 0         
10 76.4 19.6 62.4 45.6 63.89 73.4 66.1 75.6 52.9 0       
11 81.22 18.9 59.9 49.1 44.3 56.4 65.0 67.5 48.9 21.4 0     
12 37.4 62.8 26.5 39.1 69.3 50.6 10.4 19.6 47.4 64.5 68.0 0   
13 40.6 46.4 38.3 37.2 72.5 49.0 51.2 49.9 35.1 57.8 59.3 48.3 0 
Figure 8: Phase Zero Mission Input Data 
  FON BuildRel ATO TrainLcl NEO ShIntel Smug Fish EquipLcl Infra Civil Piracy SelfDef
X -0.18 0.04 -0.10 -0.22 0.60 -0.26 0.18 0.21 -0.27 0.09 0.25 0.07 -0.42 




Civil: Provide Civil Suppport    Infra: Restore Critical Infrastructure 
ShIntel: Share Intelligence with Partners   Piracy: Combat Piracy 
EquipLcl: Support Equipping of Local Defense Forces Fish: Prevent Illegal Fishing 
TrainLcl: Train Local Defense Forces    FON: Enforce Freedom of Navigation 
BuildRel: Build Relations with Local Governments Smug: Reduce Smuggling 
ATO: Conduct Anti-terrorism Operations   SelfDef: Provide for Force Self Defense 
NEO: Conduct Non-combatant Evacuation 
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Figure 9: Phase Zero PERMAP Output 
 
Figure 10: Phase Zero Perception Map 
 
Based on the PERMAP output, three distinct mission groups were identified. The first is 
comprised of Anti-smuggling (smug), Anti-piracy (piracy), Anti-illegal fishing (fish), and Anti-
terrorism (ATO). The second is comprised of Equipping Local Forces, Training Local Forces, 
Building Relations, and Information Sharing. The third is comprised of Restoring Critical 
Infrastructure and Civil Support. From these groups a single mission chosen selected as 
representative of that group. These three missions were termed Civil Support, Anti-smuggling 
and Information Sharing. 
Result Application: 
 Selecting the three representative missions allowed in-depth analysis of the three 
missions. The analysis of these missions fed to quantifiable requirements for the shaping of 
proposed fleet structures to carry out these missions. By grouping the missions and then forming 
the fleet structures to fit the representative missions, the resultant force should be capable of 
carrying out all thirteen missions. This enabled an acceptable study result commensurate with the 
six month period.  Several outlying missions can be seen on the perception map. In order to 
account for these outliers that were not captured by the three major groups, a cursory check was 
Civil: Provide Civil Suppport 
Infra: Restore Critical 
Infrastructure 
ShIntel: Share Intelligence 
with Partners 
EquipLcl: Support Equipping 
of Local Defense Forces 
TrainLcl: Train Local 
Defense Forces 
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with Local Governments 
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ATO: Conduct Anti-terrorism 
Operations 
Piracy: Combat Piracy 
Fish: Prevent Illegal Fishing 
FON: Enforce Freedom of 
Navigation 






made to ensure that the proposed fleets also meet the force structure needs of the outlying 
missions.  
Sources of Variability and Mitigation: 
 As with any multidimensional analysis of this nature there is inherent variability in the 
results. Since the scoring of each object is based on individual opinions, and those opinions can 
vary widely, an attempt to reduce this variability was made by gathering as many survey results 
from knowledgeable respondents as possible. The team sampled a wide breadth of demographics 
across the Naval Postgraduate School campus providing fifteen responses. Clear, simple 
directions were provided to those surveyed to minimize incomplete and unreliable responses. 
Respondents were asked to consider the context of equipment and scope of operations required 
to complete the given missions. Although PERMAP is able to accept incomplete data sets, full 
data sets were obtained to further reduce potential variability. 
B. PRIMARY MISSIONS 
1. Civil Support 
The Civil Support mission consisted of two of the key missions identified as: support 
populace life-sustenance and restore critical infrastructure.  The objectives of supporting 
populace life-sustenance were to save lives and to provide and facilitate humanitarian relief 
assistance to the victims.  The objective of restoring critical infrastructure was to assist in the 
stabilization of the affected area and restoring it to normalcy so that re-construction and 
rebuilding could follow.  A Phase Zero force must be configured and ready to respond and 
support any humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operation when called on by the 
political masters.  In a way, HADR is an instrument of diplomacy that can be used to enhance 
interaction and build relationship with allies and friendly countries globally. These missions are 
an integral component of American foreign policy, and have evolved to become a key role of the 
military besides its traditional war-fighting role. Since September 11, there has been a “rapid 
blurring between combat and disaster-relief missions”. 14 According to the U.S. military’s 
Quadrennial Defense Review, a strategy document, it states “the War on Terror requires 
                                                 





humanitarian aid.  The document ranks “diplomacy and development as tools as important as 
defense.” 15 
The two missions were closely related though they differ in terms of the time-criticality 
and priority. With respect to time criticality, Civil Support stands out as the primary priority task 
for the Phase Zero force involved in a HADR mission. In most cases, the first few days and 
weeks after a major disaster are usually the most critical when it comes to saving lives. Water, 
food, medical supplies and shelter are needed by the victims during this period.  Providing and 
delivering what is needed challenges external parties.  Hence, in order to be effective in 
delivering the necessary aid and assistance to people in the affected area, the Phase Zero force 
must possess the requisite capabilities and resources to perform the mission. The next stage that 
follows in a major disaster is the stabilization stage.  Critical infrastructure support needs are 
restored to return life to normalcy in the affected areas. It is an essential follow-on phase of the 
overall HADR effort to remain in theatre for an extended period, perhaps an estimated, up to six 
months. This is important in some situations to prevent a deterioration of the conditions in the 
affected area, which may result in another human disaster.  
It is recognized that both missions can be grouped into a single cluster based on their 
relatively similar demands. However, the difference in priority between the two missions placed 
the Civil Support mission as the primary driver and main consideration for the capability 
requirements in developing the force structure of the Phase Zero Force.  
In order to successfully accomplish the HADR mission a Phase Zero Force required 
ample cargo space to carry relief supplies and short term infrastructure support that would be 
needed in the event of a disaster.  Secondly, that force required an organic means to be able to 
transfer the necessary goods to the scene of the disaster. When dealing with disasters that occur 
in littoral regions, it is prudent to place a higher value on the ability to airlift relief supplies and 
personnel into the region than the ability to transfer goods and personnel by sea.  This is due to 
the possibility that any port infrastructure would be damaged in the event of a natural disaster.   
Both mission requirements called for somewhat similar capabilities in the Phase Zero 
force, in terms of storage capacity, airlift capability and specialized equipment and personnel to 
support HADR operations. If the Phase Zero Force was configured to support the primary 
mission of Civil Support, it could easily be modified to support the Restoring Critical 




Infrastructure mission without a major change in force structure. In order to respond effectively 
and timely in times of need, the Phase Zero force must be ready to be in theater at a moments’ 
notice with the necessary resources and capability to move the critical supplies to the affected 
population in a timely manner.  
The increasing importance of humanitarian assistance mission to the military placed a 
premium on the ability of a Phase Zero to accomplish the Civil Support mission. “ In 2006, U.S. 
military commands planned 556 humanitarian projects in 99 countries. U.S. forces are improving 
water supplies in Ecuador, flood barriers in Bangladesh, a medical clinic in Uganda and schools 
in Kyrgyzstan.  Military experts train local residents to remove land mines in Nicaragua and 
Vietnam. By year-end, the U.S. military will have delivered 300,000 daily-rations packages 
overseas.  Soldiers will have dug wells, built schools, and transported hospital equipment to 
villages from Croatia to Colombia.  The Army will have trained officials from 11 African 
countries – Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt, Eritrea, Djibouti, Seychelles, Burundi, Congo, Uganda, 
Rwanda and Tanzania – to respond to disasters and deliver medical care.” 16  
“The U.S. military has the capability to help after natural disasters and can promote the 
health and economic well-being of suffering populations. That capability and that commitment 
are fueling military humanitarian aid in places where U.S. forces have had no historic role.” 17  
On 8 October 2005, an earthquake near Muzaffarabad, Pakistan killed 87,000 people and caused 
thousands to be stranded in the region’s remote mountainous areas. The US Army was called to 
support the rescue mission with its Chinook helicopters. They stayed there for five months and 
flew some 3,000 flight hours, moved 5,000 refugees and delivered 18 million pounds of supplies. 
With its capabilities, the military was also called to move equipment and supplies quickly. 
Examples were during the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami in South East Asia and the devastating 
mudslide in Guatemala that occurred in 2005 killing over fourteen hundred people.  According to 
the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “the Pentagon spends roughly $58 million a year on 
humanitarian aid overseas; in 2005, it spent an additional $117 million.” 18 
                                                 







Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. military has looked for ways to minimize the spread 
of extremist ideologies.  The U.S. Government is beginning to recognize the benefits of 
providing humanitarian efforts overseas.  Developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National 
Military Strategic Plan for the war on terrorism lists humanitarian assistance as a key method for 
helping to establish conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism.  “The considerable 
capabilities of the armed forces of the United States to alleviate suffering in times of hardship 
provide opportunities to influence the way people perceive their situation and their 
environment,” says the Strategic Plan. “These efforts are often key to demonstrating benevolence 
and good will abroad, reinforcing support for local governments and mitigating problems that 
extremists exploit to gain support for their cause.” 19 
These basic necessities for rendering Civil Support are outlined in the following list: 
 
• Water  
• Food  
• Clothing 
• Medical supplies 
• Shelter 
 
However, the list of can evolve beyond the basic necessities. In Nicaragua and Vietnam, the U.S 
military had deployed military experts to train local residents to remove land mines, and in 
Bangladesh, the U.S. military helped build flood barriers in an attempt to keep the flooding 
waters from taking more lives. Hence, the U.S military should be adequately equipped for many 
different types of humanitarian aid missions.  
a. Restore Critical Infrastructure 
The mission of restoring critical infrastructure is to help local government or populace to 
restore essential assets in times of need, such as after any natural or man-made disaster.  At the 
onset of any disaster, as part of Phase Zero operations, it is of paramount importance to bring 
normalcy and in turn, stability to the area.  The U.S. Government may authorize U.S. forces in 
the region to help put in place a system that would assist the local government in the restoration 
of critical infrastructure, specifically: shelter, power, and sanitation.  The U.S. Government 
                                                 
19http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2007/March/20070306101755MVyelwarC0.5818292.html (dated 
March 6, 2007) 
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defines critical infrastructure with a comprehensive picture including:  agriculture and food, 
water (potable and waste), public health, emergency services, government, defense industrial 
base, information and telecommunications, energy (production, transmission, and distribution), 
transportation, banking and finance, chemical industry, post, national monuments, and critical 
manufacturing. 20  It is also important to note that permanent shelter is omitted as planning since 
the building of permanent shelter is a long term project that should be the responsibility of the 
local government once it has been established.  
In addition to bringing immediate aides such as food, water, blankets and medical 
supplies, U.S. forces can also provide two other kinds of assistance: security and planning 
assistance. 
Security: 
This could mean security for own troops, security for people in need, or security for key 
installations such as government buildings or any critical infrastructure.  It means deploying 
armed troops in the area of concern to instill order and prevent any unlawful outbreaks (such as 
looting or riots).  U.S. forces would help plan the actual security plan or physically standing 
guard. 
Planning assistance: 
Since there are limited U.S. troops and capabilities, there are really only two main assets 
that the military brings: firepower and manpower.  The objective is to help the local government 
establish their basic needs (ensuring that the local government can do what they need to do).  A 
general method was outlined in the following steps:  identifying the critical infrastructure, 
establishing a security perimeter, ensuring smooth operation of the facility, ensuring that external 
assistance was being contacted, ensuring supplies were distributed properly, and ensuring these 
same supplies were safe and have not been corrupted. 
To rebuild the remainder of the critical infrastructure, the key was to encourage 
government and business cooperation.  The government did not hold all the resources, 
manpower, and skills necessary to do all the restoration.  Thus, the only way was to work with 
the local businesses.  U.S. forces could help by ensuring that no further damage was done to the 
existing infrastructure and bringing in U.S. experts if needed. 




While completing the mission to restore critical infrastructure, U.S. troops were also 
indirectly involved in Civil Support.  By assisting the local population, U.S. troops could win the 
hearts of the local populace and earn the trust of the local governing body.  At the very least, 
U.S. troops could begin to understand the local people and government better, which could prove 
useful for operations planning and future strategies.  By exchanging information with local 
governments, the U.S. troops could provide manpower and expertise on how to perform security 
routines and city planning.  Both have been are extremely important for the stability of a region 
as shown in section VII of this report. 
2. Anti Smuggling Mission Group 
Maritime crime poses a threat to regional and global security and potentially could 
impede international trade.  Transnational criminals and terrorist groups frequently use the seas 
to operate out of the reach of land-bound law enforcement and military authorities.  The Eastern 
Pacific presents an inviting opportunity to both criminals and terrorists for several reasons.  
Important international shipping lanes pass through the territorial waters of several states in the 
Latin American region.  Other problems such as border discrepancies, enforcement failures such 
as lack of capacity or resources and poor levels of governance often encourage maritime 
criminals to exploit the cracks in the integrity and operations of the various states’ national 
security apparatuses.  Hence, understanding the modus operandi of maritime crime, together with 
international cooperation, will be crucial for restoring and maintaining maritime security in the 
region.    
 The prevalence of maritime crime is attributed to interlinked factors such as failures of 
governance, poor social-economic conditions, and technological and geographical factors.  
Technological and geographical factors, in particular, have increased opportunities for 
smugglers, pirates, and sea robbers in recent years.  Maritime criminals have access to high-
speed boats, satellite navigation, cell phones and the internet, as well as to automatic and heavier 
weapons.  At the same time, geographical features such as narrow waterways, small islets, 
shallow littoral regions, and riverine access provide smugglers and pirates with a fertile 
environment in which to exploit these technological capabilities. 21   
                                                 
21 Securing Southeast Asia’s Sea Lanes: A Work in Progress, Ian Storey 
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 Maritime operations by the United States in the constabulary role, which is to prevent 
unauthorized incursions and maintenance of good order, target maritime crime such as 
smuggling (illegal immigration, weapon and drug smuggling), illegal fishing, piracy and 
maritime terrorism.  These maritime organized crimes had many similarities in terms of their 
modus operandi.  Hence, tactics for combating these maritime crimes would be similar since the 
anticipated type of threat faced was similar but of varying levels.  Narcotics smuggling poses the 
greatest single threat to Latin America in terms of frequency, scale of serious organized criminal 
involvement, the illegal proceeds secured, and the overall harm caused.  Moreover, the varied 
methods employed by drug smugglers pose great challenges to counter drug activities.  As a 
result, counter smuggling was perceived as the representative mission for this cluster of 
missions: anti-piracy, anti-IUU fishing and anti-terrorism.   
 Smuggling, also known as trafficking, is the clandestine transportation of goods or 
persons past a point where prohibited such as across an international border or in violation of the 
law or other rules. 22  Drugs and human smuggling activities have been prevalent in the Eastern 
Pacific, particularly in the Gulf of Mexico where the smuggling vessel of choice is the go-fast 
boat.  In recent years, drug smugglers have traded speed for stealth, using semi-submersibles or 
homemade vessels that travel just below the ocean’s surface to move tons of drugs towards the 
United States.  Columbian authorities believe that up to 70 percent of cocaine leaving the 
country’s Pacific coast is packed aboard semi-submersibles.  Unlike the go-fast boat which travel 
up to 80 miles per hour and leave huge wakes, and hence making them easily detectable, the 
semi-submersible powered by 200 or 300 horsepower diesel motor moves about 10 miles per 
hour and has a resulting wake so small that detection is possible only within 3,000 yards. 23  
Besides having a low profile, these vessels also produce very small radar signature. This 
emerging sophistication and innovation of drug traffickers poses a challenge to U.S. regional 
counter drug activities.               
a. Anti-terrorism 
Terrorism is a criminal act that influences an audience beyond the immediate victim; 
anti-terrorism is defensive, intended to reduce the chance of an attack using terrorist tactics at 
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specific points, or to reduce the vulnerability of possible targets to such tactics. 24  Terrorists 
have traditionally leveraged opportunities to hit and run, rather than to engage in direct conflict.  
Terrorism at the sea includes the threats of attacks, and attacks on shipping, the threat of 
ships being used as weapons, and the threat of ships being used to deliver concealed weapons of 
mass destruction (in containers or within the ship’s superstructure). 25  The overlap between 
piracy and maritime terrorism was greatest not only because of the level of violence involved.  It 
was also due to the devastating impact these acts can have upon the safety of people and 
international maritime navigation and trade.  However, terrorism was distinct from piracy 
because maritime terrorism is motivated by political goals beyond the immediate act of attacking 
or hijacking a maritime target.  Terrorist acts also have the potential to cause large scale 
economic consequences.  Piracy on the high seas is a universal crime and can be repressed by 
any nation while repression of terrorism on the high seas is confined legally to particular nations 
and circumstances. 26  Unlike pirate networks, maritime terrorism, such as the attack on the USS 
COLE, is usually carried out by worldwide network of criminals who can be of any gender and 
are usually well-educated and intelligent, and possess strong will power.  Terrorists prefer to 
hijack passenger crafts to use the passengers as human shields and the planning to hijack a 
specific ship is done meticulously.  Terrorists are generally more fearless as they are ready for 
suicide missions.        
 There was some overlap between maritime terrorism and the most serious forms of 
piracy.  Hijacking or permanent seizure of the ship which is at the high end of the spectrum of 
risk, potential return, violence, and level of organization, is also attractive to terrorists 
considering similar actions for political purposes.  There is currently no clear evidence that 
piracy is directly linked to international terrorism but it is known that some terrorist groups have 
resorted to piracy (and arms smuggling) to raise funds for their action. 27  Following September 
11, 2001, the issue of piracy has become conflated with terrorism.  Security analysts have 
perceived two of the most popular maritime terrorism scenarios involving terrorists: either 
conspiring with pirates or adopting piratical tactics to commit politically motivated crimes  
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Although with differing motivating factors, piracy and terrorism did overlap in the tactics 
of ship seizures and hijacking, and the conditions, which allow them to flourish.  Examples of 
these conditions were poverty, political instability, permeable international boundaries and 
ineffective enforcement.  Hence, the tactics for combating maritime terrorism and piracy in the 
short term were quite similar but long-term solutions required different approaches.   
b. Anti-illegal Fishing 
Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing on the high seas is a form of 
transnational organized crime that has many similarities with other transnational crimes such as 
piracy, arms trafficking, illegal immigration, smuggling and narcotics trafficking.  Fishing 
vessels engaged in illegal fishing are generally larger in size (> 23 meters in length) and travel 
between 8-17 nautical miles per hour and hence, are more easily detected. 28  However, many 
drug smugglers have also used commercial fishing vessels to transport illicit drugs to the U.S.  
These vessels typically have capacities for large shipment and are equipped with sophisticated 
navigation and communication equipment. 29  Consequently, they do not require refitting that 
would indicate the vessel’s role in smuggling operations.  Fishing vessels are also able to stay at 
sea for weeks at a time and can travel thousands of nautical miles.  Additionally, fishing vessels 
are difficult to monitor and the tight-knit fishing communities made infiltration by drug law 
enforcement officers difficult.  In addition, fishing vessels were able to blend into the local 
environment.  More recently, narcotics traffickers have also explored using fishing vessels to tow 
submerged torpedoes filled with cocaine. 30  Similar to counter smuggling mission, effective 
monitoring and surveillance, coupled with enforcement will be the key to the success of 
combating IUU fishing.  
Illegal fishing takes place where vessels operate in violation of the laws of a fishery.  
This can apply to fisheries that are under the jurisdiction of a coastal state or to high seas 
fisheries regulated by regional organizations.  Unreported fishing is fishing that has been 
unreported or misreported to the relevant national authority or regional organization, in 
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contradiction to applicable laws and regulations.  Unregulated fishing generally refers to fishing 
by vessels without nationality, or vessels flying the flag of a country not party to the regional 
organization governing that fishing area or species. 31  Industry observers think that IUU fishing 
occurs in most fisheries and accounts for up to 30% of total catches.32  
The types of IUU fishing include illegal fishing (poaching) in Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) waters, unregulated fishing in areas of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations 
(RFMOs) either by parties to those RFMOs or by non-parties to them, and fishing in high seas 
areas not subject to RFMOs.  Some of the more common reported IUU fishing activities include 
vessels licensed in another country moving over the border; vessels fishing in closed areas; 
vessels fishing in high seas waters moving over the 200 nm boundary into EEZ waters; and 
misreporting or underreporting of catches by licensed vessels. 
IUU fishing is a global problem, requiring international cooperation to halt this theft of 
natural resources.  Illegal fishing, together with counter-narcotics and illegal maritime 
trafficking, continues to be areas of emphasis for U.S. relations with developing countries, 
particular in the western Pacific and West Africa.   The most obvious economic impact of IUU 
fishing on developing countries is the direct loss of the value of the catches that could be taken 
by local fishermen if the IUU fishing was not taking place.  These losses include not only the 
loss to GNP, but revenue from landing fees, license fees and taxes payable by legal fishing 
operators. In addition, there are indirect impacts in terms of loss of income and employment in 
related industries; any loss in income will also have impacts on the consumer demands of 
families working in the fishing industry.   Besides economic impact, IUU fishing usually has a 
significant environmental impact on the sustainability of both the targeted species and the 
ecosystem.  Fishing generally has the capacity to damage fragile marine ecosystems and 
vulnerable species such as coral reefs, turtles and seabirds.  In fact, all eight sea turtle species are 
now endangered, and illegal fishing and hunting are two major reasons for their destruction. 
Regulating legitimate fisheries is aimed at mitigating such impacts, but IUU fishers rarely 
comply with regulations. This is likely to reduce productivity and biodiversity and create 
imbalances in the ecosystem.  This in turn may lead to reduced food security in communities 
heavily dependent on fish as a source of protein.  
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Similar to many other types of international environmental crime, pirate fishers have a 
strong economic incentive.  Many species of fish, particularly those which have been 
overexploited and are thus in short supply, are of high value.  IUU activities are also particularly 
prevalent in regions of the world due to failure of governments to regulate adequately or to 
enforce national and international laws.  Analysis has shown a strong relationship between the 
level of governance of a country and its vulnerability to IUU fishing.33   Good governance 
appears to go hand in hand with good Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) systems and 
procedures; the political will to enforce regulations; cooperation with neighbors on surveillance; 
the elimination of possibilities for IUU activity; and active participation in regional and sub-
regional fisheries agreements. 33 
 Illegal and unreported fishing (2 components of IUU fishing) essentially arise from a 
failure to adequately enforce existing national and international laws.  There are, however, many 
factors underlying enforcement failure, including lack of capacity or resources and most notably, 
poor levels of national governance.  There are also obvious problems/difficulties with enforcing 
fisheries regulations on the high seas, including locating and apprehending the pirate ships.  
However, solutions are available, chiefly through improved monitoring and surveillance systems.  
The monitoring and surveillance system can be cooperatively used together with offshore patrol 
and licensing schemes within exclusive economic zones.   
The main role of the United States in combating IUU fishing worldwide is to assist  
developing countries in enforcement of international laws for legitimate fishing activities.  
Besides using ships and aircraft to perform monitoring and surveillance operations, and 
interception of pirate fishers, this Phase Zero operation will also include strengthening the local 
capacity to manage fisheries and combat IUU.  Helping local authorities develop institutional, 
management and technical Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) capacity to effectively 
control their own vessels throughout the world and foreign fishing vessels fishing in their waters, 
including specific cases of targeted offshore patrol facility and effective licensing schemes and 
providing training programs for local observers and inspectors, are some of the roles that the 
U.S. can play.  Furthermore, the U.S. can leverage on military technology to share information 
on satellite-based survey activities.  The U.S. should continue to build relations with these 
countries to encourage active and effective participation in international fisheries governance and 
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also possibly developing regional management, surveillance cooperation, and organizations to 
address specific country issues while at the same time attempting to avoid the pushing of the 
IUU problem elsewhere.     
c. Force Protection against Threats  
Force protection missions typically describe preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile 
actions against coalition personnel and their family members, resources, facilities and critical 
information. 34  Force protection involves measures taken before, during, and after a hostile 
action to aid in force presentation.  Such measures range from personal protection tactics and 
equipment to perimeter security, area surveillance, and hostile target identification.  In Phase 
Zero operations, Force Protection is relevant in all areas where there are coalition personnel and 
property involved.  As described in our definition of Phase Zero operations, engagements can 
range from peace-keeping missions up to and including hostile actions against pirates and the 
force preservation of our troops as they carry out humanitarian missions.  The operational theater 
is becoming complex as threats to coalition personnel become increasingly embedded within the 
social structure of the local populace.  Terrorists, guerillas, and non-uniformed insurgents 
operate seamlessly among civilians, making threat identification difficult.  As such, it is 
extremely important that there are measures in place to mitigate the potential hostile actions 
taken against coalition personnel and property should those actions occur.  Notwithstanding the 
threat from the natural environment, such as natural disasters, sound tactics and proper 
equipment will enable coalition personnel to perform their functions in the safest possible way. 
Tactics have evolved to the extent that troops find themselves increasingly operating in 
relatively small groups over large, dispersed areas with the best equipment available to them to 
enhance their operational efficiency and effectiveness.  This puts the troops at a greater risk, due 
to the lack of security in numbers as well as being in close proximity to possible threats lurking 
within the local population.  As such, Force Protection is becoming a highly complex, stand-
alone mission and is a primary concern of mission planners. 
In Phase Zero operations, winning the trust, hearts and minds of the local populace 
continues to play an important role in protecting troops from possible aggression and hostile 
actions.  Once convinced of the coalition’s good intent and purpose, the local populace will be 
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less likely to launch an unprovoked attack against coalition personnel and property but 
insurgents, terrorists, and guerrillas might. For this reason, the importance of information 
operations tailored to mold the thinking of the local populace cannot be overlooked.  However, it 
must be kept in mind that, by definition, “Force Protection” are ways to “mitigate” hostile 
actions, and thus does not involve any defensive measures prior to the occurrence of the hostile 
act by a threat.  Despite the definition, it should be noted that Force Protection is an “end-state” 
and should encompass all measures to be taken prior, during, and after a hostile action to achieve 
the end-state of force preservation. It is in this spirit that “Force Protection” missions must be 
planned and executed.  
Technology and material protection remain important factors in enhancing the protection 
of troops.  However, this technology and protection should not be the end-all for protection. 35  It 
is necessary to continue investing in good training of personnel so they can be better adapted to 
rapidly changing circumstances and actions of dangerous adversaries who are equally, if not 
more, adaptable.  Good situational awareness on the part of the troops and good decision making 
on the ground at the tactical level usually determine the difference between the good and bad 
force protection statistics in relation to a particular mission.  This means there is a need for 
continued focus on leadership development and training, professional military education to 
enhance small unit effectiveness, troops’ cultural awareness, and tactical intelligence.  
In Phase Zero operations, the main threats will continue to come from insurgents, 
terrorists, and guerrillas and small sabotage groups trying to infiltrate sensitive installations, 
blocking lines of communications, and attacking prime strategic targets.  Waging an effective 
counter-insurgency campaign demands highly developed technologies and combat experienced 
adaptive tactics at all operational levels. 
Force protection is immediately relevant to the three aggregate missions of Phase Zero 
operations (Civil Support, Information Sharing and Anti-smuggling) because the litmus test is 
simple; where there are coalition personnel and property involved; there is a need for force 
protection measures regardless of its form and degree.  
In Civil Support and Anti-smuggling operations, where there is usually heavy troop 
involvement, there is a need to look at the threat environment in totality to include both human as 
                                                 




well as the natural environment.  Measures should then be put in place to determine the level of 
protection measures (tactics, size of troops, material, and technology) that should be employed in 
order for Coalition personnel to perform their missions safely and thus enhance mission success.  
Where there is minimal (minimal does not equate to none) troop involvement in an 
operation, such as information sharing, continued efforts must be made to secure the information 
resources.  As the adversary continues to evolve in sophistication, information assurance 
measures must continue to evolve as well so they are robust, secure, and responsive to the threat.  
The demographics of Coalition adversaries have changed. Adversaries are increasingly 
becoming better educated and more influential in the social strata.  They have more financial and 
intellectual resources than before, and thus pose a larger threat to troops than ever before.  As 
such, Force Protection at Phase Zero levels should encompass all aspects of material, property, 
and personnel protection and should include both mitigating actions as per conventional 
definitions as well as priori actions of aligning the population to set the stage for Coalition’s 
operations in unfamiliar territories.  
d. Anti-piracy  
Maritime piracy or sea robbery, according to the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982, consists of any criminal acts of violence, detention, or 
depredation committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or aircraft 
that is directed on the high seas against another ship, aircraft, or against persons or property on 
board a ship or aircraft. 36   
According to Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, piracy 
consists of any of the following acts: 
 
• any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed 
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private 
aircraft, and directed: 
o on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or 
property on board such ship or aircraft; 
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o against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State; 
• any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft 
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
• any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in 
subparagraph (a) or (b). 
 
And Article 103 defines a pirate ship as ship intended by the persons in dominant control 
to be used for the purpose of committing one of the acts referred to in Article 101. The same 
applies if the ship has been used to commit any such act, so long as it remains under the control 
of the persons guilty of that act. 37  
Piracy must be committed on the high seas or in a place outside the jurisdiction of any 
state.  A criminal attack with weapons on ships within territorial waters is an act of armed 
robbery and not piracy.  Unlike most smuggling and illegal fishing activities, piracy generally 
involves some form of violence at sea whereby an attack using weapons is conducted.  Piracy 
encompasses a wide spectrum of criminal behavior ranging from in-port pilferage, to hit-and-run 
attacks, to temporary or long term seizure of the ship. 38  In the most serious form of piracy, 
permanent seizure or hijacking, the pirates will need to sell its cargo, dispose the ship and its 
crew.  In some cases, the seized ship can be repainted and re-flagged to be used for smuggling.  
The UN has cited clear links between piracy and illegal maritime activities such as illegal fishing 
and smuggling in certain regions of the world, example Somalia. 39  Similar to maritime crimes 
like smuggling and illegal fishing, piracy is a crime often, but not always, motivated by greed 
and thus predicated on immediate financial gains.  The attack boats used by pirates are similar to 
the go-fast crafts used by drug smugglers.  These attack boats are small wood or fiber-glass 
fishing skiffs of 20-60 feet outfitted with dual engines up to 85 hp and travel at speeds of more 
than 30 knots. 40  They are often carried and launched by “mother ship”, usually fishing trawlers 
that were commandeered or purchased by the pirates.  The “mother ships” use GPS devices, 
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satellite phones and some have acquired equipment that enables them to pick up Automatic 
Identification Signals (AIS) required by commercial vessels.  Each attack boat or skiff contains 
three to seven pirates and attacks are conducted in groups of two or three.  The attack boats often 
fire automatic weapons and RPGs at the vessel and ships that stop are more likely to be captured.  
The pirates then use grappling hooks and ladders to board.  A ransom will then be demanded for 
the release of the ship and its crew.  The crew is generally not harmed.  Piracy is usually carried 
out by local criminals and restricted to certain regions only.  Sea pirates are usually poor and 
less-educated males.  Pirates also prefer to capture cargo ships and its valuable cargo because of 
smaller crews to resist the attack.  Attack is carried out starting with the sighting of a ship, 
usually with little planning.  Pirates can be repelled by light arms fire or even non-lethal weapons 
such as Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD).  However, there is usually little or no intelligence 
and warnings on pirate attacks.  Since armed pirates operate on fast crafts, an effective anti-
piracy interception mission would require the use fast patrol crafts or similar class vessels.  The 
vessel used for interception should be equipped with automatic machine guns or non-lethal 
weapons to fire warning shots as well as for self-defense.  
Anti-Piracy is the action and effort to prevent or reduce maritime piracy.  On the high 
seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate 
ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy or under the control of pirates and arrest the 
persons and seize the property on board.  A seizure on account of piracy may be carried out only 
by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being 
on government service an authorized to that effect.   
In his 2008 RAND study entitled “The Maritime Dimension of International Security: 
Terrorism, Piracy and Challenges for the United States”, Peter Chalk described the dangers 
associated with contemporary piracy as complex and multifaceted. As the most basic level, 
attacks constitute a direct threat to the lives and welfare of the citizens of a variety of flag states. 
Piracy also has a direct economic impact in terms of fraud, stolen cargos, and delayed trips, and 
could potentially undermine a maritime state’s trading ability. 41 
Politically, piracy can play a pivotal role in undermining and weakening regime 
legitimacy by encouraging corruption among elected government officials. Finally, attacks have 
                                                 




the potential to trigger a major environmental disaster, particularly if they take place in crowded 
sea-lanes traversed by heavily-laden oil tankers.  
Chalk also noted a growing speculation that a tactical nexus could emerge between piracy 
and terrorism. One of the main concerns is that extremist groups will seek to overcome existing 
operational constraints in sea-based capabilities by working in conjunction with or 
subcontracting out missions to maritime crime gangs and syndicates.  
Anti piracy is important to Phase Zero operations because a critical limiting factor of 
conducting operations in foreign countries is access to these countries via international waters. 
With the presence of these pirates, humanitarian aid and non-military organizations traveling to 
the Phase Zero operation area might be subjected to a piracy attacks where cargo is stolen, trips 
are delayed, or the crew or passengers of the vessel are subject to murder.  Anti piracy efforts 
also provide security and stability to the surrounding civilian and commercial populations in the 
area on a day to day basis. 
In conclusion, of the following mission areas; Anti-smuggling, anti-piracy, anti-IUU 
fishing, anti-terrorism, and force protection, the mission of Anti-smuggling is the mission best 
suited for covering all of the other mission areas.  The reason is that the Anti-smuggling mission 
is the most difficult of all the grouped missions and therefore if the force is designed to engage in 
Anti-smuggling mission, it would be suitable for all other missions in the perception mapped 
grouping.  For the Anti-smuggling mission we are dealing with a variety of smuggling vessels; 
go-fast, semi-submersible, and commercial disguised vessels.  The semi-submersible and 
commercial disguised vessels posed the greatest detection challenge, while the go-fast vessels 
pose the greatest interception challenge.  
 Since all of the vessels we are interested in intercepting are engaged in the illegal 
activities of smuggling, piracy, terrorism, and IUU-fishing, and may be opposed to our force 
intercepting them, there is a good chance they will try to defend their activities. The use of 
weapons to defend their activities poses a force protection threat to our force, therefore we need 
to have our force able to complete the mission of force protection. If the vessels used for Anti-
smuggling are of the semi-submersible classification, they can be difficult to detect when 
compared with vessels that are used for piracy and IUU-fishing. Therefore, if our force is 
designed to detect surface and semi-submersible vessels, it should have more than the capability 
required to detect vessels used in other illegal activities. On the other hand, the vessels used for 
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smuggling, piracy, and terrorism operations may be of the go-fast classification, while they may 
be easier to detect, they will be more difficult to intercept due to their high speeds.  However, it 
is not that likely they would be used in illegal fishing. Therefore, if our force is designed to 
intercept go-fast vessels smuggling vessels, then it should be capable of intercepting pirate and 
terrorist vessels, and more than capable of intercepting IUU-fishing vessels. 
3. Information Sharing 
The “Share Information and Intelligence” mission was grouped, based on the PERMAP tool, with 
the mission cluster consisting of:  “Build Relationships”, “Equip Local Forces” and “Train Local Forces”. 
Share Information was selected as the representative mission for that group.   
Information and intelligence sharing is a critical Phase Zero task, which is inherent in any 
Phase Zero mission being conducted.  But it is of special importance when forging relationships, 
building coalitions, or engaging in any work that requires thorough and timely communication.  
The committee that makes up the National Research Council (NRC) has presented an excellent 
summary of the art of building Maritime Security Partnerships (MSP) and emphasizes the key 
role that information and intelligence sharing plays in these partnerships. 42    
According to the NRC committee, information sharing is both a unifying concept and a 
key enabler for MSP.  Many critical maritime enterprises are impeded severely by the lack of 
adequate information sharing networks.  Information sharing is also a vulnerable choke point for 
those who would wish to disrupt Phase Zero activities and an attack against the free flow of 
information can disrupt trade and free enterprise, as well as facilitate illicit activities.  The 
establishment of good information sharing systems and the strengthening of those already in use 
are critical to building effective regional partnerships.  Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is 
not possible without these information sharing systems and frameworks.  In many cases, the 
current arrangements for promoting MDA are inefficient and lack broad application.  Many 
excellent capabilities do exist, but do not have the necessary coordination to be used by joint or 
international coalitions. 
The Phase Zero mission environment entails the possibility of being faced with a problem 
or mission that no personnel on the force have been faced with before.  The only way to solve an 
entirely new problem is through the ability to access correct information quickly either from 
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publications or by interfacing with subject matter experts.  This requirement placed several 
constraints on any command and control architecture tailored to the Phase Zero mission.  The 
first constraint was that of flexibility.  The c2 architecture would have to be flexible enough to 
work with different force make-ups and seamlessly with coalition partners.  Secondly, the 
architecture would have to be capable of providing information instantaneously. 
Industry is continually making advances in the capabilities of computers, 
communications links and satellites.  Investigation of some of the latest patents on record reveal 
that nearly half of them relate to advances in communications capabilities, but even the most 
impressive advances will not bring together a broadly distributed maritime security force without 
intentional oversight to link the capabilities.  Information dissemination may still suffer when 
there is exceptional infrastructure but poor integration.  This explains the role of information 
sharing as a unifying concept. 
As a key enabler of MSP, information sharing is pivotal for building trust and provides 
the basis for planning, decision-making and action.  In essence, global security is improved 
through information dissemination between partner nations.  This improvement extends to 
regions, sub-regions and beyond, because threats to security usually cross over regional 
boundaries.  
Both the system architecture for sharing intelligence and information and the information 
itself must share certain key attributes.  The first of these is a focus on sharing unclassified 
information via the use of readily available, commercial, internet based mechanisms.  These 
mechanisms must be affordable to all partners.  Strengthened information sharing will enhance 
coordination between maritime partners.   
The effort of creating new MSPs is based on some important assumptions.  The first of 
these is, essentially, that “we can do better”.  The current practices and organization of the U.S. 
government are insufficient to pursue the quality MSP programs it desires.  The National 
Research Council had to allow for the fact that the U.S. is not popular in many places in the 
world and needs to pay special attention to the needs and sensitivities of those nations with 
which they wish to partner.  Many current and would-be partners believe that the U.S. only 
desires intelligence for its own purposes and does not have the same transparency with its allies.  
Finally, many of our partners believe that the U.S. has an unbalanced obsession with terrorism 
and nuclear proliferation, and is not concerned about local problems in the areas in which it 
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operates.  The Phase Zero force has the unique distinction of being engaged specifically for this 
type of problem, and may be very instrumental in changing world views about the motives and 
actions of the United States. 
To build successful partnerships and enhance the effectiveness of missions involving 
information sharing, participating nations must have reasons to participate in the coalition and 
must perceive that they are considered integral equals in the partnership.  Technology barriers 
must not be emplaced by requiring nations to take part only if they have technology that is out of 
their reach fiscally or kept from them because of trade or security limitations.  Finally, the 
objective of building trust must be an inherent and continuing facet of every Phase Zero mission, 
especially that of sharing information and intelligence.  Building trust and building relationships 
should be synonymous, but that is not always a reality.  It would be naïve to think that nation 
partners will ever trust each other completely, because each nation does have the agenda of 
pursuing their own interests.  But the goal in building trust can and should be that of continual 
improvement.  The fact is that even partner nations and allies observe each other and use both 
open and clandestine means to stay aware of each other.  It is also a fact that some nations are 
more or less trusted by the United States, and vice-versa.  Contrast the relationships between the 
U.S. and Canada to the U.S. and Venezuela, for instance.  There is room for improvement in 
every nation-state relationship, and some more than others; but improvement of every 
relationship is the goal, and is the hallmark of successful Phase Zero friendships.  
Leaders should pursue the objective of information and intelligence sharing, but at the 
same time, they cannot afford to sacrifice security.  Force Protection, another critical Phase Zero 
mission, could be in direct conflict with the objective of information sharing.  But the 
identification of this quandary is frequently the end of the information sharing effort.  That must 
not be the case for future Phase Zero operations.  Leaders and managers must include this 
problem in their planning effort and look for acceptable solutions and affordable compromises.  
They must also realize there is not a standard solution for this dilemma, and must consider the 
local factors and regional differences unique to each operation, decisions and the needs for 
support vary on a case by case basis.  This is where understanding of the real threat is critical. 
Recent technology trends have led to more and more networking, and the threat has also 
become networked.  Terrorists, pirates, and insurgents have gradually replaced their hierarchal 
52 
 
command structures by disintermediated command hierarchies. 43 Because the threat can be 
organized as a network, the organizations that will combat the threat must also be organized as a 
network to be responsive.  Every component and location of the friendly network cannot be 
simultaneously protected, and so network analysis must be employed in protecting the 
information sharing networks.  It is this strategy of network analysis and protection that will 
enable more efficient and extensive information sharing between coalition partners. 
In his book, “Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security”, Professor Ted 
Lewis identified seven major challenges:  The vast size of networks, overlapping command 
structures, the hoarding rather than the sharing of information, lack of knowledge as to how to 
protect information infrastructure, complex network interdependencies, inadequate protective 
tools, and the nature of asymmetric conflicts.  Again, while mitigating the threat, it is important 
not to look for a “one size fits all” solution.  Different connectivity architectures can be 
employed for different partnerships.  Determination of what this architecture should be, as well 
as determination of whom the partners will be, is a key planning factor.  Leaders of a planned 
Phase Zero operation must be involved up front in the assessment of what to share and what to 
protect.  Because of the importance of planning and pre-selection of adequate systems 
architecture, the Share Information and Intelligence mission must be system engineered. 
The issue of sharing information was selected by the Capstone team as a critical Phase 
Zero mission.  It that it is being viewed as an objective for Phase Zero work, rather than one of 
the challenges.  At the same time, the remaining challenges must be addressed continually, as 
technology evolves and the threats that disrupt stability adapt to those advances. 
Regardless of the scale of an operation, a Common Operating Picture (COP) is invaluable 
for allowing leaders to see the real time battle space, and react in a timely manner to the changes, 
attacks or improvements within that battle space.  In a Phase Zero environment, awareness of the 
battle space is replaced by an equally important need to be aware of the Current Operating 
Environment (COE).  Stability and support operations rely heavily on this ability, and the same 
infrastructure that can provide the COP in times of war can provide the COE during times of 
peace.  For this reason, leveraging advanced technology research is beneficial for both agendas.  
The same research dollars spent to improve information and intelligence sharing for Phase Zero 
                                                 
43 Lewis, Ted G., “Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security”, Wiley-Interscience Press, 2006 
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work, also contrive to improve command and control for war fighters in the event that situations 
move beyond Phase Zero and into conflict.   
 The grouping of information sharing with the equipping and training of local forces was a 
reasonable outcome of the PERMAP process.  It is true that every Phase Zero mission must have 
good information sharing as part of the command and control necessary for action.  However, 
equipping and training our partner forces requires direct interaction, which makes effective 
information sharing all the more critical.  Nothing will alienate and disenfranchise a potential 
partner force faster than being told they do not have access to the information they need.  Doing 
this also erodes trust, which was why the mission of building relationships was also closely 
linked to the information sharing mission.  To avoid the erosion of trust without compromising 
security, decision makers must evaluate the information needs prior to offering a national 
partnership.  They must determine what intelligence will be required for the operation, and vet 
potential partners to determine their trustworthiness for access to that data, before inviting those 
nations to join the Phase Zero force.  Once again, this requires inclusion of the information 
sharing mission in planning stages, and the treatment of information and intelligence sharing as a 
mission rather than an obstacle. 
a. Train the Local Defense Force 
The requirement for the intervention of foreign forces in operations typically assigned to 
local defense forces implies that the local defense force is deficient in its ability to successfully 
complete the operation and that the foreign force has some expertise in combating the issues.  As 
the presence of foreign forces is temporary, often subjected to political, social and economic 
pressures, there is a need to impart skills to the local defense forces for them to be independent 
and to negate the opportunity of the same issue from once more escalating to a point where 
foreign intervention is required and requested.  Therefore, the key objective in undertaking the 
training of Local Defense Forces (LDF) would be to equip its members with the necessary skills 
to be self-sufficient in the prosecution of defense-related missions.  The term, local defense 
forces, encompasses two unique groups each traditionally associated with a particular domain.  
The Police are mainly involved with domestic threats and the Military is directed toward external 
threats.  While there are differences in the skill sets, there is little difference in the expressed 
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need of mitigating certain operational gaps; the term LDF is often used to describe both 
collectively. 
  For training to be labeled under the auspices of a Phase Zero mission, the personnel 
involved or the supported country represented must not be involved in a conflict.  The ranges of 
activities are considerable in variety and scope.  Training could be divided into basic and 
advanced types at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.  Training could be conducted in-
country, whereby trainers are brought into the region of interest to conduct courses, or additional 
spaces where courses are conducted in the sponsor’s location.  Training could be vocational in 
nature, e.g. trade specific courses, or academic in nature, e.g. higher education courses (FMS for 
NPS).  All these activities are aimed at raising the level of proficiency of the supported forces.  
There are also secondary benefits influencing the development of foreign military institutions 
where the roles of individuals in democratic societies are outlined to assist the combating of 
terrorism, amongst others. 44 
The training mission supports other Phase Zero mission areas.  Training would include, 
but is not limited to general police work.  It would involve the preparation of local defense 
forces, particularly the local coast guard forces, in the prosecution of Anti-smuggling missions.   
Training would also include internment facility management skills, and interrogation skills for 
intelligence gathering, amongst others.   
The US has been actively engaged in providing training to foreign partners, in fact, 
“Successive U.S. administrations have long viewed training of and assistance to armed forces 
around the world as important instruments of U.S. national security policy.” 45  Programs such as 
the International Military Education and Training (IMET) are leveraged to provide this training. 
Partners can also seek training through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.   
b. Equip the Local Defense Force 
 
                                                 
44 Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement Activities of Interest, 2007, US Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2007/index.htm, viewed 01 May 2009. 
45 U.S. Foreign Military Training, May 2002, Lora Lumpe, International Peace Research Institute, 
http://www.fpif.org/papers/miltrain/index_body.html, viewed 01 May 2009. 
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“We will expand the community of nations that share principles and interests with 
us, and we will help partners increase their capacity to defend themselves and 
collectively meet challenges to our common interests.” 46 
 
Building partnerships is one of the five goals established in Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency (DSCA) Strategic Plan 2006-2011, in support of DoD Security Cooperation Guidance. 47  
It is also at the core of Navy international efforts to bring order and stability to the world’s 
ungoverned and under-governed seas as emphasized in Navy’s “Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower” as it acknowledges the prevention of wars is just as important in winning 
them. 48  There is a new sense of urgency to be able respond to disasters and provide 
humanitarian assistance, as well as assuring maritime security around the world.  Security 
cooperation activities are an essential means to this end of which DoD has defined the building 
up of allied and friendly nations’ local defense capabilities as one of them.  The United States 
Government has long played its role by supporting the equipping of these nations, along with the 
other training and cooperative development programs.    
The equipping of the local defense forces is primarily done through the Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS) program, i.e. the government-to-government method for selling U.S. defense 
equipment, services, and training.  Under FMS, the U.S. government procures defense articles 
and services on behalf of the foreign customer. 49  Countries approved to participate in this 
program may obtain defense articles and services by paying with their own national funds or 
with funds provided through U.S. government-sponsored assistance programs. In certain cases, 
defense articles, services, and training may be obtained on a grant basis.  The DSCA administers 
the FMS program for DoD; while the President designates countries and international 
organizations eligible to participate in FMS, and the Department of State approves the individual 
programs.  Currently some 160 countries are eligible to participate in FMS, and their entering 
into a major FMS program represents the beginning of a long-term relationship with the U.S. 
                                                 
46 ‘National Defense Strategy’, March 2005, extracted on 29 April 2009 from          
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government and military.  This includes access to joint training and doctrine and increased 
opportunity for interoperability should U.S. and foreign forces need to operate together in 
military operations. 
Equipping could also be supported through direct commercial sales (DCS) where 
Department of State would grant U.S. companies commercial export licenses that would allow 
them to negotiate directly with foreign customers. 50  As with FMS, all DCS are subject to the 
approval of the Department of State, the U.S. Congress, and applicable U.S. export laws and 
regulations.  However, DCS has no direct U.S. military involvement or the related benefits as 
cited under the FMS arrangement.   
As is evident by the rising prominence of security cooperation programs in U.S. theater 
engagement efforts, the equipping support is especially well suited to growing security 
relationships, which meets our Phase Zero mission objectives.  It does so by building partner 
capacity, strengthening bilateral defense relations, supporting coalition building, and enhancing 
interoperability between U.S. forces and the military forces of the cooperating nations.  
Specifically, equipping coalition forces with common U.S. defense equipment will help to 
minimize compatibility issues between weapon and communication systems, allowing for better 
info sharing and integrated system capabilities to be carried out in Anti-smuggling or Civil 
Support operations.  With the buildup capabilities, the local forces will also be more capable of 
handling domestic/regional issues without foreign aid to prevent or limit situations escalating to 
a conflict.  A prime example is Djibouti, where a small nation strategically located at the straits 
between the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden is now capable of patrolling that critical choke point in 
defending the Bab el Mandeb with the two 55-foot boats added to its Navy through the support 
of the U.S. sponsored programs. 51 
c. Build Relations with Local Governments 
Building relations with foreign governments continues to be United States policy and is a 
primary responsibility of the U.S. State Department, which states: 
                                                 
50 ‘The FMS Advantage: Frequently Asked Questions About Foreign Military Sales’, extracted on 29 April 2009 
from http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/fmsadvantagev2.pdf 
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“There is no country in the world that is not touched by America, and there is no country 
that does not touch us in some way.  American principles of democracy, freedom, 
tolerance, and opportunity inspire people throughout the world.  Increased recognition 
and understanding of these common values increases trust among nations and peoples 
and betters the chances of resolving differences and reaching agreements.” 52 
Building relations is a part of diplomacy, which is one of the best ways to protect the 
United States and the American people.  The State Department uses diplomacy with other 
nations of the world to deal successfully with a number of challenges that cross national 
boundaries and affect us here in the United States, including:  
• Terrorism   
• The threat of weapons of mass destruction   
• HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases   
• Dangers of illegal drug trafficking and crime   
• Humanitarian needs of migrants and refugees  
• Environmental degradation 53 
 
While building relations is a prime responsibility of the State Department, the Navy can 
be considered a critical tool in the relation building process.  The use of the Navy as a tool to 
build relations dates back to the mid-18th century, when President Millard Fillmore turned to the 
Navy when he charged Commodore Matthew Perry with the mission to carry a letter to the 
Japanese Emperor, thus resulting in the historic opening of Japan in 1854. 54 
During a Current Strategy Forum at the U.S. Naval War College in 2007, Dr. Donald C. 
Winter, Secretary of Navy stated:  
 
“We enjoy advantages that the State Department is not designed to possess, and, indeed, 
the Department of the U.S. Navy, in many aspects, acts as the operational arm of the 
diplomatic corps.  There are a number of reasons why the Navy enjoys advantages in the 
diplomatic arena that have resulted in its prominent role as an effective instrument of our 
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policy of engagement with other nations.  Navies have been naturally inclined to 
cooperate and communicate with each other throughout history, with the code of the 
mariner imposing a duty on all the Sailors to help a fellow Sailor in distress, friend or foe.  
Our history of cooperative ventures with mariners of other nations is combined with a 
unique international presence that our port visits represent.  Together they have resulted 
in a long track record of successful Naval involvement on the diplomatic front, with 
many initiatives that continue to bear fruit.” 55 
 
While the Navy can be a critical tool in building relations and an operational arm of the 
State Department, it must however rely on the State Department to ensure the Navy has access to 
the countries of interest.  Once access for the Navy is granted, the Navy in return can work to 
build relations with the country to help maintain continued access.  Building relations would be 
important for Phase Zero operations because it would allow for continued access.   
As a grim reminder of how important access can be for humanitarian assistance missions 
consider the relief efforts for tropical cyclone Nargis, where over 10,000 Myanmar citizens 
perished and several hundred thousand people had been left homeless and without drinking water 
across a broad swath of the country, the U.S. military along with other foreign nations were 
prevented initial access by the Myanmar government to provide humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief.56  Even though the U.S. had assets in the vicinity of Myanmar that were fully 
capable of providing medical support, food, water, and supplies, they were deemed useless at the 
initial response phase for relief because relations were not built beforehand.  Some countries will 
continue to block relation building attempts by the U.S. no matter how hard the State Department 
tries, and therefore access by the Phase Zero force may not be possible.  However, in the event of 
a natural disaster or humanitarian crisis, the Phase Zero force must be ready to respond and have 
the ability to withstand the access delays if they exist.  
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4. Freedom of Navigation 
Exercising and securing Freedom of Navigation (FON) continues to be a primary role of 
the U.S. Navy.  Specifically, it is U.S. Policy to: 
 
“Exercise and assert its navigation and over flight rights and freedoms on a worldwide 
basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the 
convention. The United States will not, however, acquiesce in unilateral acts of other 
states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in 
navigation and over flight and other related high seas uses.” 57 
 
Maintaining open sea lanes is vital to national and world economic and defense interests.  By 
challenging excessive claims, the U.S. ensures equal protection under the Sea if the Law 
Conventions for all parties.  Since 1979, the U.S. has maintained a FON program in order to 
exercise its FON rights in waters claimed in manners inconsistent with the UN Law of the Sea 
Convention.  This program maintains open sea lanes for the benefit of the U.S. and its allies.  In 
response to continued diplomatic protests and to preserve the Law of the Sea, the U.S. must 
operate regularly in contested waters. This normally involves ships or aircraft transiting claims 
protested by the U.S. government.  
The U.S. protests claims made by governments all over the world ranging from countries 
such as Canada, China, and Sri Lanka.  The U.S. has objected to more than 140 excessive claims 
by more than 80 costal states since 1948.  Historically, every year the U.S. has exercised its 
navigation rights in contested water of more than 35 countries. 58 Routine actions include 
specific missions to assert FON claims in addition to routine transits of international passages 
such as the Straits of Hormuz, Gibraltar and Malacca, and the Indonesian and Philippines 
archipelagos. 59  In FY2007, specific FON operational assertions were conducted in the waters of 
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eight countries multiple times.60  Going forward, FON operations will continue to require that 
ships and aircraft be available to assert our rights. 
The U.S. recognizes territorial sea claims out to 12 miles from the recognized baselines as 
defined in the Law of the Sea Convention. The U.S. specifically protests claims such as: 
 
• unrecognized historic water claims; 
• improperly drawn baselines for measuring maritime claims; 
• territorial sea claims greater than 12 miles; 
• other claims to jurisdiction over maritime areas in excess of 12 miles, such as 
security zones, that purport to restrict non-resource related high seas 
freedoms;  
• contiguous zone claims at variance with Article 33 of the LOS Convention; 
• exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claims inconsistent with Part V of the LOS 
Convention;  
• continental shelf claims not in conformance with Part VI of the LOS 
Convention; and 
• archipelagic claims inconsistent with Part IV of the LOS Convention. 61 
 
The U.S. also protests restrictions on operations in territorial seas and EEZs that are not 
found in the Law of the Sea Convention. Protested restrictions include those which require the 
advance notice of innocent passage for warships and restrictions on the passage of nuclear-
powered warships. 
The 2005 Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 
(SUA) Conference adopted a new article on boarding at Sea.  Notable points of the Article 
include: 
 
• If a State Party that has reasonable grounds to suspect that an offense is being 
or is about to be committed involving a ship flying its flag, it may request the 
assistance of other States Parties in preventing or suppressing that offence. 
The States Parties so requested shall use their best endeavors to render such 
assistance within the means available to them. 
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• If the ship is flying the flag of another State Party, and there is reasonable 
grounds to suspect that an offense being committed, a request must be made to 
the Flag State confirm the claim of nationality. 
• If the flag party confirms the claim of nationality, the requesting Party shall 
ask the flag State for authorization to board and to take appropriate measures 
with regard to that ship which may include stopping, boarding and searching 
the ship, its cargo and persons on board, and questioning the persons on board. 
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Freedom of Navigation would be important for Phase Zero operations because a critical 
limiting factor of conducting operations in foreign waters would be access to these same foreign 
waters.   It would not only be the access for the U.S. Naval forces but also the access for our 
allies.  Without the ability to access these areas, operations could not be conducted.  
5. Non-combatant Evacuation Operations 
A non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) is an operation conducted to evacuate a 
country's civilians from another country due to a deteriorating security situation.  According to 
United States Military Joint Publication 3-07.5:  
 
"Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are conducted to assist the Department of 
State (DOS) in evacuating noncombatants, nonessential military personnel, selected host-
nation citizens, and third country nationals whose lives are in danger from locations in a 
host foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven and/or the United States.” 63 
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IV. A SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH TO THREAT ANALYSIS 
A. DEFINITION OF THE THREAT 
The integrated study team defined a threat as an event, process, or action which has the 




 The threat exists in several spheres of influence.  Threats change over time, and have 
unique variances from location to location.  There are also some specific functions, such as 
bombings or kidnappings, which are more prevalent in some regions than others.  In order to 
capture all aspects of threat variance, the analysis has been conducted from five distinct angles:  
Functional, Physical, Chronological, Regional and Organizational. 
 
C. THREAT ANALYSIS METHOD 
The integrated study team determined an approach for identifying threats to the Phase 
Zero force, by looking at the ideology and behavior that might be expected from potential 
disruptors. 
 
1. Match ideology to acceptable types of force 
o Adhere to acceptable behavior of own tribe, clan, organization 
o Adhere to rules of organization 
2. Determine resources needed 
o Determine persons needed 
o Determine materials needed 
o Determine tool needed 
o Determine funding needed 
3. Determine act to employ 
o Select target that has relevance to cause 
o Select action that has relevance to cause 
4. Determine desired effect 
o Predict possible backlash for action 
o Predict the publicity gained by action 
5. Acquire funding 
o Collect funding from state sponsor (if applicable) 
o Collect funding from private sympathetic sponsors 
6. Organize for desired effect 
o Organize to carry out threat actions 
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o Organize to minimize own loss and survive. 
 
1. Functional Threat Analysis 
Decomposition of the specific activities carried out by threat agents, each of which were 
decomposed to gain a thorough understanding of the actions that could be carried out against 
Phase Zero forces.  Some examples of these were smuggling, suicide bombings, piracy or 
targeting of airplanes and helicopters.  This is an extensive list, and would grow as disruptors 
continued to search for new methods of imposing their ideology as broadly as possible. 
 
2. Physical Threat Analysis 
Analysis of the functions employed by threat agents led to a description of the physical 
medium used to carry out those functions.  For example, disruptors wishing to destroy a 
helicopter (functional) may employ a shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile (physical).  Examples of 
physical threats, then, are small arms, improvised weapons or backpack bombs. 
 
3. Chronological Threat Analysis 
A Phase Zero force launched in 2020, with a typical, average service life of 30 years, 
would phase out of operation in the year 2050.  A study of the threat in the past decades and in 
the present was useful in projecting threats forward through 2050.  Historical trend analysis, 
open source data-mining and the application of scaling laws were used to conduct a 
chronological analysis.  Some factors that impacted the future threat were world and local 
economy, population trends, regional stability and global weather.   
The chronological threat analysis was a combination of research and analytical trending.  
There was no standard formula to project uniformly every identified threat forward to 2020 or 
2050.  There were however, standard scaling laws to assist with this effort.  Each threat was 
considered with its unique factors, and scaled forward using the standard laws. 
 
4. Regional Threat Analysis 
A broad analysis of the current regional threat for the area of the 4th Fleet is presented 
first.  Then, country studies for the 39 countries and territories within the 4th Fleet area of 
responsibility are presented in detail (Appendix F).  Each country study is a nested application of 
the analysis, as it presents the functional and physical threats that dominate that country’s 
culture, and details the key disruptor organizations and historical threat patterns. 
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5. Organizational Threat Analysis   
This analysis describes the major organizations currently carrying out acts of terror, 
sabotage, unlawful acts and other societal disruptions.  This analysis is both broad and specific in 
nature, and is applicable in general and as described for a specific region. 
The 4th Fleet is responsible for the geographical region that includes the Caribbean, 
Central America and South America, and oversees 31 ports in Florida and throughout Area of 
Operation (AO).   
In the first phase of the Red Team analysis, each country in the 4th Fleet AO was 
described with background information and basic open source facts, and then characterized 
according to the five threat categories:  Functional, Physical, Organizational, Chronological, and 
Regional.  Regional threat was inherent in the country studies, by definition.  In conducting the 
country studies, direct quotes from single, open sources were avoided.  Rather, team members 
developed a strategy of compiling and studying seven common sources of information, and then 
reporting the threat based on that research.  Although this list is not all-inclusive, the sources that 
proved most useful for this study and report process were: 
 
• The CIA World Factbook 
• U.S. Department of State Travel Advisories 
• Online news reporting sites such as BBC and CNN 
• The Center for Disease Control (CDC) 
• Wikipedia, the online open encyclopedia 
• Online weather agencies, such as Weather.com and Wunderground 
• National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
 
Phase two of the threat study considered how threats to stability were tied to the thirteen 
critical Phase Zero operations conducted by the Phase Zero force.  The threat influence was 
quantified using the CARVER model.   
CARVER was developed by Homeland Defense to allow peace officers and other 
agencies responsible for stability and support types of operations to make comparisons between 
stability disruptor defenses.  CARVER is an acronym for the factors that feed into the model, and 
is a good choice for analyzing Phase Zero threats.  The acronym stands for Criticality, 
Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect on Population and Recognizability.  The 




E. IMPLICATIONS OF THE THREAT TO A PHASE ZERO FORCE 
 
From the functional decomposition of the tasks and activities that a Phase Zero force 
would undertake, thirteen tasks were identified as critical missions.  These were: 
 
• Civil Support 
• Train the local defense force 
• Equip the local defense force 
• Build relations with foreign nations 
• Restore critical infrastructure 
• Anti-smuggling operations 
• Anti-terrorism operations 
• Anti-illegal fishing operations 
• Force protection against threats 
• Anti-piracy operations 
• Information sharing 
• Freedom of navigation 
• Non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) 
 
The CARVER model was developed to provide quantitative data to Homeland Defense 
decision makers.  It was useful in streamlining massive volumes of data into a relatively simple 
and easy to use form.   
• C – Criticality: 
Scaled 1 to 10, where 1 was least critical and 10 was most critical.  Criticality was 
defined as the importance (to the Phase Zero force) of a system, subsystem, complex, or 
component.  A target is critical when its destruction or damage had a significant, negative impact 
on the mission of the targeted system, subsystem, complex, or component.   
• A – Accessibility: 
Scaled from 1 to 10, where 1 was the least accessible and 10 was the most accessible.  
Accessibility was defined as the ease with which a (Phase Zero) target could be reached, either 
physically or by fire.  A target was deemed accessible when a threat element could physically 
infiltrate the target, or if the target could be hit by direct or indirect fire.  Static platforms such as 
ports tended to be more accessible unless extreme measures were taken to preclude it.  This 
differed from “vulnerability”.  Accessibility focused on the targets properties (location, defenses) 
and vulnerability depended on the disruptor’s capabilities against the target. 
67 
 
• R – Recuperability: 
Scaled 1 to 10, where 1 represented the greatest ease of recuperability and 10 represented 
the most difficult recuperability.  Recuperability was defined as a measure of the time required to 
replace, repair, or bypass the destruction or damage inflicted on the target by a disruptor. 
• V – Vulnerability: 
Scaled 1 to 10, where 1 was the least vulnerable and 10 was the most vulnerable.  
Vulnerability was defined as a measure of the ability of the (specified) threat to damage the 
(specified) target using available human and material assets. A target was deemed vulnerable if 
the threat had the means and expertise to successfully attack it.  This differed from accessibility 
primarily because the focus was on the ability of the disruptor to cause damage. 
• E - Effect on Population: 
Scaled 1 to 10, where 1 was a very positive effect, 5-6 was a range of neutral or minimal 
effect, and 10 was a very negative effect.  The model did not handle negative numbers.  Effect on 
Population was defined as the positive or negative influence on the population as a result of the 
action taken by the threat. Effect considered public relations in the vicinity of the target, but also 
considered the domestic and international reactions as well.  Another consideration in the effect 
was whether the response to the threat weakened or strengthened the support for the disruptor 
organization.  Response that caused damaging backlash to a disruptor group by its own 
stakeholders was considered as a positive effect on the population, since the population was 
harmed by the actions of the disruptor group. 
• R – Recognizability 
Scaled 1 to 10, where 1 indicated that the potential Phase Zero target was stealthy or 
unrecognizable, and 10 indicated that the potential Phase Zero target was the most easily 
recognizable.  Recognizability was defined as the degree to which a target could be recognized 
under varying weather, light, and seasonal conditions without confusion with other targets or 
components.  Factors which influenced recognizability included the size and complexity of the 
target, the existence of distinctive target signatures, and the technical sophistication and training 
of the attackers. 64 
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The CARVER model provided the means to allow the integrated study team to reduce 
thousands of papers, documents and segments of open source information into numbers that were 
useful in describing and summarizing the threat for the Phase Zero force decision makers.  For 
this reason, the integrated study team built a CARVER model that served two primary purposes.  
First, it allowed for the organization and quick retrieval of hundreds of pages of disjointed 
information.  The first portion of the matrix was a book-keeping contrivance.  The fully 
populated model could be sorted in Microsoft Office Excel, to list data by threat, by mission, by 
country, or ranked by the threat score.  Secondly, CARVER was initially developed as a tool to 
identify risk from threats, which was why it was used for many years by the Department of 
Homeland Security and a number of other organizations.  The matrix tool allowed peace officers 
and law enforcement agencies to identify and classify the risks from threats prevalent in their 
operational environment.  This made it a good fit for Phase Zero type operations, which have 
many similarities to peace-keeping efforts.    
The model had both advantages and disadvantages.  The primary advantage is that it was 
a simple tool to understand and use.  It did not require the users who populated the data to learn a 
new program, because it was structured in a basic matrix.  Another advantage was that a 
common software tool, Excel, was used to build the matrix, which avoided the cost of buying a 
dedicated software package.  And finally, the tool had a proven track record for aiding law 
enforcement agencies in classing and ranking threats.  The primary disadvantage was that there 
was room for bias on the part of the analysts.  However, this is true of many risk-based models.  
At some point, raw data had to be converted into some scale or subjected to the metrics 
established by the builders of the model, and this part of the process was subjective inherently.   
In the case of the CARVER model developed for analyzing threats to regional stability, 
the scales for the six defined factors of criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, 
effect on the populace, and recognizability have already been defined.  In order to more closely 
align the matrix with standard risk ideology, the CARVER portion was made to represent the 
“consequence” from threat events and actions, and the “likelihood” was determined based on the 
research effort.   The sensitivity of the model sprung from the fact that this likelihood, or 
prevalence of threat, was scaled for high, medium, and low on a one to three scale.  The use of 
the one-two-three scale resulted in threat scores that fell easily into high, medium and low risk 
impact, which was more suited for the modeling and force structure team members to apply.  If a 
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one to ten scale had been used, then specific definitions would be needed to define each level of 
one through ten to keep the matrix standard.  Because data was collected for 39 countries, 13 
critical Phase Zero missions and for each of the 16 most common threats, the job of defining 
these scales became larger than the scope of this project.  The one to three prevalence scale was 
thoroughly defined for each of the most common threats that surfaced during the research effort.   
As the analysts collected data and began to populate the CARVER matrix, sixteen threats 
to regional stability were observed to occur most frequently.  These most prevalent threats were:  
Arms Smuggling, Crime (Murder/Assault/Rape/Robbery), Disease (other than AIDS), Drug 
Smuggling, Environmental Issues/Lack of Resources, HIV/AIDS, Human 
Smuggling/Trafficking, Illegal, Unregulated, Unreported (IUU) Fishing, Kidnapping, Lack of 
Communications Infrastructure, Lack of Human Rights/Freedom, Money Laundering, Natural 
Disasters, Piracy, Social Instability and Terror Organizations. 
Metrics for each of these most common threats were thoroughly defined for low, medium 
and high prevalence.  For risk defined as the product of likelihood and consequence, this became 
the likelihood portion of the threat risk formula.  The consequence portion of the threat risk 
formula, the six-part CARVER section of the matrix, has been used before and the Department 
of Homeland Security has already published well defined scales for these six threat factors.  We 
adopted their one to ten scale, as defined, and also followed their convention of applying the 
additive property to the six factors.  The highest possible CARVER score, then, was 60, and the 
highest possible prevalence score was three.  The product resulted in an overall threat risk score, 
and a highest possible raw score, of 180.  In order to make the final threat score simple to 
visualize comparatively, the raw scores were then normalized to produce a final result between 
zero and 100. 
As discussed above, models of this type are always subject to bias in the data generation 
stage.  In an attempt to counter this, each entry to the model was vetted by the other members of 
the team.  Independent work was done, region by region, by the individual analysts.  Weekly 
sessions were held in which the derived CARVER numbers were reviewed and challenged by the 
rest of the team.  The integrated study team also sought a second opinion from NPS instructors 
associated with the Homeland Defense Department.   
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Additionally, the integrated study team participated in a joint effort to define clearly the 
prevalence factors for the major threats.  This helped to standardize the use of the model.  The 
“high (3), medium (2), low (1)” justifications for the threats are as follows: 
The following table is a summary, by mission, of the CARVER matrix results. 
 
 




Arms smuggling was difficult to apply metrics to, because the offenders make their best 
efforts to avoid detection and certainly do not keep records that are readily available.  One way 
of gauging the scope of the problem was to base it subjectively on the number of press reports of 
drug cache seizures.  Although the CIA and other agencies may keep databases, these were not 
available in the public domain.  There were also several annual reports, such as the one published 
by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which did publish information about exposed 
black market transactions, but not statistical data.  For this reason, the prevalence score for arms 













Disease (other than AIDS) 12
Terror Organizations 12
Environmental Issues 11
Lack of Human Rights 11
IUU Fishing 7
Kidnapping 7






3 Common reporting of arms smuggling; coverage easy to find; frequent reports 
about large scale problems and large seizures 
2 Fewer reports about arms smuggling incidents; infrequent reports are about 
large scale problems and large seizures 
1 Infrequent reporting of arms smuggling incidents; reports are about small 
scale operations and small seizures of arms caches 
Table 2: Prevalence Score for Arms Smuggling 
 
Crime (Murder/Assault/Rape/Robbery): 
The CIA World Fact book was one of seven sources commonly used in developing the 
country studies.  One of the factors commonly reported was various crimes, particulary murder 
rates, as a ratio per 100,000 of the population65.  Research from other law enforcement sources 
and reporting agencies revealed that the average for these types of crimes in Central/South 
America is a little less than 30 per 100,000.  Using this average, a list was compiled to rank the 
ratios from high to low.  The highest score (for the region) was 58 per 100,000, and the lowest 
score was 14 per 100,000.  For comparison, the US reports 16 or 17 occurrences per 100,000, 
and Singapore has the second lowest crime rate in the world, at 0.4 per 100,000.  This range and 
median were used to provide our scale for this project. Using this metric, below-average rates of 
crime did not cause a country to list in the CARVER matrix for the threat of “Crime”. 
 
SCORE DESCRIPTION 
3 51-60 occurrences per 100,000 of the population 
2 41-50 occurrences per 100,000 of the population 
1 30-40 occurrences per 100,000 of the population 
Table 3: Prevalence Score for Crime 
                                                 





Disease (other than AIDS): 
The CIA Factbook has already flagged countries for the presence of disease other than 
AIDS.  They used a scale in which any threat from disease that was less than average was 
considered low and the country under study was not identified for disease health risks.  For 
countries that did pose a moderate to severe threat of disease, they identified three above average 
levels of threat, which we transposed into the 1-2-3 threat prevalence in our CARVER model. 
 
SCORE DESCRIPTION 
3 Risk is “Very High” 
2 Risk is “High” 
1 Risk is “Intermediate” 
Table 4: Prevalence Score for Disease 
 
Drug Smuggling: 
Drug smugglers do not keep publicly available records of the actual movement of illicit 
drugs.  Several sources, such as press agencies, governmental policy agencies and law 
enforcement agencies have published country by country illustrations of the severity of the drug 
smuggling problem.  There were also some facts available about which nations were the top 
producers, cultivators and movers of illegal drugs.  Without specific, validated statistics or 
rankings, the integrated study team chose to classify the prevalence of this threat by certain 
indicators that surfaced in many publications.  The highest prevalence applied to countries that 
produced, processed, and shipped illegal drugs.  The next highest ranking applied to nations that 
did not produce copious amounts of drugs, but were referred to in more than one source as a 
“major transshipment points”.  The lowest prevalence applied to nations classed as “minor 
transshipment points”.  The drug smuggling problem was identified as one of the most common 
and severe threats to stability within the 4th Fleet AO, and a large percentage of the 39 countries 






3 Large scale production, processing and shipment 
2 Major transshipment point 
1 Minor transshipment point 
Table 5: Prevalence Score for Drug Smuggling 
 
Environmental Issues/Lack of Resources: 
There are numerous studies available regarding specific environmental factors.  Only one 
major study, the Environmental Performance Index (EPI), considered an exhaustive list of 
damaging environmental effects66.   Integrated study team research indicated that there were 
threats not only from environmental corruption issues, but also from the scarcity of 
environmental resources, particularly water and vanishing rainforests.  For this reason, the 
prevalence scaling was based on the number of the following specific issues that a nation was 
experiencing.  These ten factors were:  water scarcity, deforestation, overfishing, over-mining, 
fresh water fouling, lack of waste disposal, soil erosion, reef erosion, lack of agricultural 
capabilities and lack of resources for livestock.  With a few exceptions (like ozone index), the 
EPI factors were broadly covered.  It should be noted that some environmental problems lead to 




3 Seven or more factors present 
2 Significant presence of five or six factors 
1 Significant presence of three or four factors 
Table 6: Prevalence Score for Environmental Issues/Lack of Resources 
 
                                                 






Because this integrated project focused on the 4th Fleet AO, the AIDS rates that are more 
generalized for global comparisons were used, non-inclusive of the higher rates for Africa.  That 
would allow these prevalence factors to be used for any other region than Africa.  This is 
inescapable for any model, because AIDS rates in Africa, which can be as high as one in four 
adults infected, are not comparable to anywhere else in the world. 
 
SCORE DESCRIPTION 
3 Greater than 1% of adult population infected 
2 Between 0.75% and 1.0% of the adult population infected 
1 Between 0.5% and 0.75% of the adult population infected 
Table 7: Prevalence Score for HIV/AIDS 
 
Human Smuggling/Trafficking: 
Congress requires annual reports on the status of human trafficking around the globe, to 
include a three tier listing of the worst offender nations, with Tier 3 being the worst case.  The 
integrated study team used the completed report to Congress for 2007 and 2008, prepared by 
CRS, to identify these countries. 67  More thorough information about trafficking issues was 
included in the individual country studies, but the CARVER prevalence assessment was based 
directly on the tier lists, used by many U.S. government agencies, including the State Department 







                                                 
67 "CRS Report for Congress:  Trafficking in Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean"; Clare M. Ribando, 




3 Tier 3 
2 Tier 2 
1 Tier 1 
Table 8: Prevalence Score for Human Smuggling/Trafficking 
 
Illegal, Unregulated, Unreported (IUU) Fishing: 
The very fact that IUU fishing is by definition “unreported” made it difficult to establish 
a solid metric for determining prevalence.  The integrated study team relied on studies already 
conducted by the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF). 68  The EJF listed the seven worst 
offenders for IUU fishing, and identified five countries which further the problem through the 




3 Practices IUU; worst offender and issues FOC 
2 Practices IUU; worst offender list 
1 Some mention of IUU; not ranked as worst offender by EJF 
Table 9: Prevalence Score for Illegal, Unregulated, Unreported (IUU) Fishing 
 
Kidnapping: 
The United Nations survey of criminal trends is published annually and is available in the 
public domain. 69 This report lists rankings among nations of the number of kidnappings that 
occur each year.  This data was used to determine a (global) weighted average, as well as high, 
median and low values to establish a range for the 4th Fleet AO.  As with other range and median 
                                                 
68 "Pirates and Profiteers:  How Pirate Fishing Fleets are Robbing People and Oceans"; EJF Report by Steve Trent, 
Juliette Williams and Louis Buckley; May 1, 2009 




scales employed with the CARVER, only above average levels were recorded as threats.  From 
the last reported data set, the low value in the region under study was eight kidnappings, in 
Uruguay, and the most extreme value for the high range occurred in Peru, with 491 occurrences.  
The median for South and Central America, then, was 109.  Of the six South and Central 
American nations listed in the global top 30, Peru skewed the average considerably.  So, relying 
on the median rather than the mean, the prevalence rating became: 
 
SCORE DESCRIPTION 
3 More than 50 occurrences 
2 Between 25 and 50 occurrences 
1 Less than 25 occurrences, but listed in UN “top 30” 
Table 10: Prevalence Score for Kidnapping 
 
Lack of Communications Infrastructure: 
The United Nations intermittently issues a national ranking of access to communications 
and technology.  Access to communications infrastructure is one of their measures of quality of 
life, which factors into their overall report on human development.70  Each nation is given a 
score between 0 and 1, 1 being the best infrastructure.  The integrated study team used the most 
recent raw scores for nations considered to have low quality infrastructure, to construct a scale 
for 4th Fleet countries.   
 
SCORE DESCRIPTION 
3 Score of 0.15 or lower 
2 Between 0.15 and 2.0 
1 Score greater than 0.2, but listed as “low” on UN ranking 
Table 11: Prevalence Score for Lack of Communications Infrastructure 
                                                 




Lack of Human Rights/Freedom: 
Human rights abuses are monitored by United Nations committees, national institutions 
and governments, and by many independent non-governmental organizations, such as Amnesty 
International or the International Federation of Human Rights.  Organizations such as these 
collect evidence and document alleged human rights abuses.  They also apply pressure to enforce 
human rights laws. There are a wide variety of databases available which attempt to measure 
exactly what violations governments commit against those within their territorial jurisdiction. 
One ranking, by country, already in place, with data analysis through 2007, was done by an 
organization called “Privacy International”.  Their methodology and rankings could be accessed 
in the public domain. 71 Countries were given a mean score by the application of 14 criteria, such 
as constitutional protection, privacy enforcement, surveillance and workplace monitoring.  
Because the data analysis process was well defined and covered many key performance factors, 
the integrated study team adopted the scores for use in determining severity of the threat of 
“Lack of Human Rights”.  The team also used rankings available in the public domain from the 
United Nations. 72 Creating a matrix with data from both organizations painted a fair picture of 
how the nations ranked in terms of human rights and freedoms, because one targeted 
constitutional protections – the actions a government took to protect citizens, and the other 
considered what human rights abuses that nations committed. The scores for the applicable 4th 
Fleet countries were extrapolated from the overall matrix, and scaled by range and median.  The 
median was 6.24 and the maximum (Colombia) scored 16.9. Of the top ranked 100 human rights 
offenders in the world, 23 are located in the 4th Fleet, AO, and 11 score above median. 
 
SCORE DESCRIPTION 
3 Score greater than 13 
2 Score between 10 and 13 
1 Score greater than 6.5 and less than 10 
Table 12: Prevalence Score for Lack of Human Rights/Freedom 
                                                 
71 http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd%5B347%5D=x-347-559597; Dec 28, 2007; accessed Apr 
21, 2009 





A geographical risk assessment methodology was developed and applied by Promontory 
Compliance Solutions, and has been used by the State Department to identify risks from money 
laundering for the purpose of supporting and funding terrorism. 73 This work resulted in an anti-
money laundering atlas which has since been published in the public domain.  The integrated 
study team relied on this documentation to create prevalence rankings for money laundering 
within Latin America. 
 
Natural Disasters: 
The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, a non-profit organization 
based in Brussels, has maintained records of 30 years of natural disasters, tracking both the 
number of casualties and the number of catastrophic events. 74  Because Phase Zero work 
focuses on the stability of the population, human casualty records were brought to bear in 
determining the threat prevalence in the region.  Overall numbers of disaster-related deaths and 
injuries determined the prevalence rating, falling into a high-medium-low scale for above 
average casualties in the 4th Fleet area.  High-casualty events certainly skewed this data, but 
these are real numbers of real deaths in the region and so are considered relevant.  For example, 
the flooding in Venezuela that killed 30,000 people caused Venezuela to rank in the Top 10 
worst disasters over the 30-year study period, and so also placed them high on the prevalence 
ranking.  But since this type of disaster is indigenous to the area, and there is no certain 
procedure for determining the likelihood of a reoccurrence in the next 50 years, the data stood.  
Using the high of 48.9 million, a low of 0.003 million and a median of 35 million, the threat 
prevalence scale for above average occurrence is as shown in table below. For comparison, the 
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3 36 to 50 million killed or affected 
2 21 to 35 million killed or affected 
1 5 to 20 million killed or affected 




Piracy is a definite, established global threat to security, but the majority of acts of piracy 
take place in regions other than the Latin America, and the worst pirate problems, which would 
merit the ranking of three for threat prevalence; do not typically take place in the area of focus 
for our model.  However, each of the 39 Fourth Fleet nations was subjected to an internet search 
with keywords of “country” and “piracy”, and there were two nations that returned search hits 
with newswire reporting.  Using this information, and subjectively based on the volume and 
severity of news reporting, the CARVER prevalence scores were rated for piracy threat were: 
 
SCORE DESCRIPTION 
3 Ongoing, well-documented problem; extensive press coverage 
2 Press coverage indicates more than one-time or sporadic pirate activities 
1 Press coverage of isolated or unique pirate attacks 
Table 14: Prevalence Score for Piracy 
 
Social Instability: 
Social instability and unrest are important threats to overall regional stability.  However, 
the symptoms of social unrest; poverty, racial tension, unemployment and illegal immigration, 
stem from larger core issues.  An unstable economy leads to joblessness.  Lack of law 
enforcement needed to patrol borders leads to immigration issues.  In order to rank an issue as 
subjective and dynamic as social instability, the integrated study team used the three root factors 
of economic, financial, and political risk to classify the threat prevalence.  A risk organization, 
80 
 
AM Best, published their analysis, country by country, for these three risk factors, and further 
sorted the countries by a three tier scheme. 75  Each country was rated low (1.0), moderate (2.0), 
high (3.0) and very high (4.0) risk for these indicators.  The integrated study team used the 
average of these factors, to conduct the same range and median analysis that was applied to the 
other threats.  For example, the Dominican Republic was scored as 3.0, 3.0 and 4.0, respectively, 
for economic, political, and financial risk, which led to an average score of 3.3.  After compiling 
all the country data, this led to a prevalence scale for implementation in the CARVER tool:  
 
SCORE DESCRIPTION 
3 Greater than 3.0 
2 Between 2.5 and 3.0 
1 Between 2.0 and 2.5 
Table 15: Prevalence Score for Social Instability 
 
Terror Organizations: 
Terrorism can happen anywhere, and by its very nature, long term predictions of terror 
incidents are difficult.  However, the conditions that allow terrorism to thrive, such as offering 
safe haven, lack of the rule of law which allows terror groups to perpetuate, or the presence of 
groups that conduct terror as a form of political or social protest, can be indicators of increased 
terror threat.  The Department of State travel advisories offered clues as to which nations had 
these conditions.    Finally, country background information from the CIA Factbook denoted the 
presence of internal, domestic terror groups when those groups existed.  Using these conditions 





                                                 





3 Listed as “State Sponsor”; State Department travel advisory 
2 Domestic terror groups active in country 
1 Reports of terror training cells or recruitment activity 
Table 16: Prevalence Score for Terror Organizations 
 
Using CARVER, detailed current threats associated with the thirteen critical missions 
were determined and are presented below.  The three bolded missions were the representative 
missions used to develop models.  The two italicized missions were the outliers. 
The first cluster of related missions was comprised of:  Share Information and 
Intelligence, Build Relationships, Equip Local Forces and Train Local Forces.  The 
representative mission for this cluster was Share Intelligence and Information. 
The second cluster of related missions was comprised of:  Humanitarian Assistance for 
Disaster Response and Build Infrastructure for Disaster Response.  The representative mission 
for this cluster was Humanitarian Assistance for Disaster Response. 
The third cluster of related missions was comprised of:  Anti-smuggling, Anti-Piracy, 
Anti-IUU Fishing, Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection.  The representative mission for this 
cluster was Anti-smuggling. 
The two outliers were:  Maintain Freedom of Navigation and Non-combatant Evacuation 
Operations. 
D. CURRENT (2009) THREATS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PHASE ZERO 
CRITICAL MISSIONS 
1. Share Information/Intelligence 
Specific threats which would adversely affect the mission:  The fully populated 
CARVER matrix was used to filter the threats specific to the “Share Information/Intelligence” 
mission.  The threats that would affect this particular mission were:  arms, drug and human 
smuggling, crime, AIDS and other diseases, environmental issues and lack of resources, IUU 
fishing, kidnapping, lack of communications infrastructure, money laundering, natural disasters, 
piracy and terror organizations. 
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Likelihood that these threats would be encountered by the Phase Zero force or would 
have a detrimental effect on their ability to conduct stability operations:  Threats specific to this 





Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, French Guinea, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela 
Arms Smuggling 
Bahamas, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Puerto 
Rico 
Human Trafficking Belize, Cuba, Jamaica, Panama, Venezuela 
IUU Fishing Belize, Honduras, Panama 
Money Laundering 
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Venezuela 
Crime Colombia 
Natural Disasters Colombia, Haiti, Nicaragua 
Terror Organizations Colombia, Haiti, Venezuela 
HIV/AIDS Bahamas, Dominican Republic 
Lack of Communications  
Infrastructure 
Haiti 
Natural Disasters Jamaica 
Table 17: Most Likely Threats to the "Share Information/Intelligence" Mission 
 
Consequences of the threat being carried out:  The CARVER score is the aggregate of the 
six consequence factors.  The three highest consequence scores were for the threats of:  crime, 
disease, and kidnapping.  The three 4th Fleet AO nations with the highest consequence scores 




THREAT COUNTRY CARVER SCORE 
Disease Peru 55 
Crime El Salvador 54 
Kidnapping Colombia 52 
Table 18: Threats to the "Share Information/Intelligence" Mission with the Highest 
CARVER Consequence Score 
 
2. Build Relationships 
Specific threats which would adversely affect the mission:  The fully populated 
CARVER matrix was used to filter the threats specific to the “Build Relationships” mission.  The 
threats that would affect this particular mission were:  arms, drug and human smuggling, crime, 
AIDS and other diseases, environmental issues and lack of resources, IUU fishing, kidnapping, 
lack of communications infrastructure, lack of human rights and freedoms, natural disasters, 
piracy, social instability, and terror organizations. 
Likelihood that these threats would be encountered by the Phase Zero force or would 
have a detrimental effect on their ability to conduct stability operations:  Threats specific to this 
















Drug Smuggling Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, French Guinea, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela 
Arms Smuggling Bahamas, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Puerto Rico 
HIV/AIDS   Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominican Republic, 
Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad 
Human Trafficking Belize, Cuba, Jamaica, Panama, Venezuela 
IUU Fishing Belize, Honduras, Panama 
Kidnapping Chile, Peru 
Crime Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Peru, Haiti 
Lack of Human Rights Colombia, Mexico 
Disease other than AIDS French Guinea, Honduras, Peru 
Lack of Communications 
 Infrastructure 
Haiti 
Natural Disasters Nicaragua 
Table 19: Most Likely Threats to the "Build Relationships" Mission 
 
Consequences of the threat being carried out:  The CARVER score is the multiplicative 
aggregate of the six consequence factors.  The three highest consequence scores were for the 
threats of:  crime, disease, and terror organizations.  The three 4th Fleet AO nations with the 
highest consequence scores were:  Colombia, El Salvador, and Peru. 
 
THREAT COUNTRY CARVER SCORE 
Disease Peru 55 
Crime El Salvador 54 
Kidnapping Cuba 54 





3. Equip Local Forces 
Specific threats which would adversely affect the mission:  The fully populated 
CARVER matrix was used to filter the threats specific to the “Equip Local Forces” mission.  The 
threats that would affect this particular mission were:  drug smuggling, disease, money 
laundering, natural disasters and terror organizations. 
Likelihood that these threats would be encountered by the Phase Zero force or would 
have a detrimental effect on their ability to conduct stability operations:  Threats specific to this 




Money Laundering Antigua, Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela 
Natural Disasters Colombia, Haiti, Jamaica, Nicaragua 
Drug Smuggling Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru 
Table 21: Most Likely Threats to the "Equip Local Forces" Mission 
 
Consequences of the threat being carried out:  The CARVER score is the aggregate of the 
six consequence factors.  The three highest consequence scores were for the threats of:  natural 
disasters, and money laundering.  The three 4th Fleet AO nations with the highest consequence 
scores were:  Nicaragua and Jamaica. 
 
THREAT COUNTRY CARVER SCORE 
Natural Disasters Nicaragua 49 
Natural Disasters Jamaica 48 
Money Laundering Jamaica 47 





4. Train Local Forces 
Specific threats which would adversely affect the mission:  The fully populated 
CARVER matrix was used to filter the threats specific to the “Train Local Forces” mission.  The 
threats that would affect this particular mission were:  crime, AIDS and other diseases, drug 
smuggling, kidnapping, social instability and, terror organizations. 
Likelihood that these threats would be encountered by the Phase Zero force or would 
have a detrimental effect on their ability to conduct stability operations:  Threats specific to this 




HIV/AIDS   Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominican Republic, 
Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad 
Kidnapping Chile, Peru 
Crime Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Peru 
Terror Organizations Colombia, Haiti, Venezuela 
Disease other than AIDS French Guinea, Honduras, Peru 
Drug Smuggling Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru 
Table 23: Most Likely Threats to the "Train Local Forces" Mission 
 
Consequences of the threat being carried out:  The CARVER score is the aggregate of the 
six consequence factors.  The three highest consequence scores were for the threats of:  disease, 
crime, and kidnapping.  The three 4th Fleet AO nations with the highest consequence scores 









THREAT COUNTRY CARVER SCORE 
Disease Peru 55 
Crime El Salvador 54 
Kidnapping Colombia 52 
Table 24: Threats to the "Train Local Forces" Mission with the Highest CARVER 
Consequence Scores 
 
5. Humanitarian Assistance for Disaster Response 
Specific Threats which would adversely affect the mission:  The fully populated 
CARVER matrix was used to filter the threats specific to the “Humanitarian Assistance for 
Disaster Response” mission.  The threats that would affect this particular mission were:  crime, 
AIDS and other diseases, environmental issues or lack of resources, human trafficking, lack of 
human rights and freedoms, natural disasters, and social instability. 
Likelihood that these threats would be encountered by the Phase Zero force or would 
have a detrimental effect on their ability to conduct stability operations:  Threats specific to this 




Environmental Issues Antigua 
Human Trafficking Belize, Cuba, Venezuela 
Crime  Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Peru 
Lack of Human Rights Colombia, Mexico 
Natural Disasters Colombia, Haiti, Jamaica, Nicaragua 
HIV/AIDS Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Panama 
Disease other than AIDS French Guinea, Honduras, Peru 





Consequences of the threat being carried out:  The CARVER score is the aggregate of the 
six consequence factors.  The three highest consequence scores were for the threats of:  crime, 
disease, and human trafficking.  The three 4th Fleet AO nations with the highest consequence 
scores were:  Cuba, El Salvador and Peru. 
 
THREAT COUNTRY CARVER SCORE 
Disease Peru 55 
Crime El Salvador 54 
Human Trafficking Cuba 51 
Table 26: Threats to the "Humanitarian Assistance for Disaster Response" Mission with 
the Highest CARVER Consequence Score 
 
6. Build Infrastructure for Disaster Response 
Specific threats which would adversely affect the mission:  The fully populated 
CARVER matrix was used to filter the threats specific to the “Build Infrastructure for Disaster 
Response” mission.  The threats that would affect this particular mission were:  disease, 
environmental issues and lack of resources, social instability, and natural disasters. 
Likelihood that these threats would be encountered by the Phase Zero force or would 
have a detrimental effect on their ability to conduct stability operations:  Threats specific to this 




Environmental Issues Antigua 
Natural Disasters Colombia, Haiti, Jamaica, Nicaragua 
Disease other than AIDS French Guinea, Honduras, Peru 
Table 27: Most Likely Threats to the "Build Infrastructure for Disaster Response" Mission 
 
Consequences of the threat being carried out:  The CARVER score is the aggregate of the 
six consequence factors.  The three highest consequence scores were for the threats of:  disease, 
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environmental issues and lack of resources, and natural disasters.  The three 4th Fleet AO nations 
with the highest consequence scores were:  Peru, Antigua, and Nicaragua. 
 
THREAT COUNTRY CARVER SCORE 
Disease Peru 55 
Environmental Issues Antigua 49 
Natural Disasters Nicaragua 49 
Table 28: Threats to the "Build Infrastructure for Disaster Response" Mission with the 
Highest Consequence Scores 
 
7. Prevent Unlawful Acts:  Anti-smuggling 
Specific threats which would adversely affect the mission:  The fully populated 
CARVER matrix was used to filter the threats specific to the “Prevent Unlawful Acts:  Anti-
smuggling” mission.  The threats that would affect this particular mission were:  arms, drug and 
human smuggling, crime, and money laundering. 
Likelihood that these threats would be encountered by the Phase Zero force or would 
have a detrimental effect on their ability to conduct stability operations:  Threats specific to this 
















Drug Smuggling Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, French Guinea, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela 
Arms Smuggling Bahamas, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Puerto Rico 
Human Trafficking Belize, Cuba, Jamaica, Panama, Venezuela 
Money Laundering Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela 
Crime Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Peru 
Table 29: Most Likely Threats to the "Prevent Unlawful Acts: Anti-smuggling Mission 
 
Consequences of the threat being carried out:  The CARVER score is the aggregate of the 
six consequence factors.  The three highest consequence scores were for the threats of:  crime, 
drug smuggling, and human trafficking.  The three 4th Fleet AO nations with the highest 
consequence scores were:  Cuba, El Salvador, and Jamaica. 
 
THREAT COUNTRY CARVER SCORE 
Crime El Salvador 54 
Drug Smuggling Jamaica 52 
Human Trafficking Cuba 51 
Table 30: Threats to the “Prevent Unlawful Acts:  Anti-smuggling” Mission with the 
Highest CARVER Consequence Scores 
 
8. Force Protection 
Specific threats which would have adversely affected the mission:  The fully populated 
CARVER matrix was used to filter the threats specific to the “Force Protection” mission.  The 
threats that would have affected this particular mission were:  arms and drug smuggling, crime, 
AIDS and other diseases, kidnapping, money laundering, natural disasters, piracy, social 
instability and terror organizations. 
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Likelihood that these threats would have been employed against the Phase Zero force or 
would have had a detrimental effect on their ability to conduct stability operations:  Threats 




Money Laundering Antigua, Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela 
Drug Smuggling Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, French Guinea, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela 
Arms Smuggling Bahamas, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Puerto Rico 
HIV/AIDS   Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominican Republic, 
Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad 
Kidnapping Chile, Peru 
Crime Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Peru 
Terror Organizations Colombia, Haiti, Venezuela 
Disease other than AIDS French Guinea, Honduras, Peru 
Natural Disasters Jamaica 
Table 31: Most Likely Threats to the “Force Protection” Mission 
 
Consequences of the threat being carried out:  The CARVER score is the aggregate of the 
six consequence factors.  The three highest consequence scores were for the threats of:  crime, 
disease, and terror organizations.  The three 4th Fleet AO nations with the highest consequence 







THREAT COUNTRY CARVER SCORE 
Crime Peru 54 
Drug Smuggling El Salvador 52 
Human Trafficking Cuba 51 
Table 32: Threats to the “Force Protection” Mission with the Highest CARVER 
Consequence Scores 
 
9. Prevent Unlawful Acts:  Anti-terrorism 
Specific threats which would have adversely affected the mission:  The fully populated 
CARVER matrix was used to filter the threats specific to the “Prevent Unlawful Acts:  Anti-
terrorism” mission.  The threats that affected this particular mission are:  arms and drug 
smuggling, disease, money laundering, and terror organizations. 
Likelihood that these threats would have been encountered by the Phase Zero force or 
would have had a detrimental effect on their ability to conduct stability operations:  Threats 
specific to this mission with the locations having the highest prevalence rating of “3” were 
tabulated and are shown below: 
 
THREAT COUNTRY 
Money Laundering Antigua, Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela 
Arms Smuggling Bahamas, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Puerto Rico 
Drug Smuggling Colombia 
Terror Organizations Colombia, Haiti, Venezuela 
Disease other than AIDS French Guinea, Honduras, Peru 
Table 33: Most Likely Threats to the “Prevent Unlawful Acts:  Anti-terrorism” Mission 
 
Consequences of the threat being carried out:  The CARVER score is the aggregate of the 
six consequence factors.  The three highest consequence scores were for the threats of:  drug 
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smuggling, disease, and terror organizations.  The three 4th Fleet AO nations with the highest 
consequence scores were:  Cuba, Colombia, and Peru. 
 
THREAT COUNTRY CARVER SCORE 
Disease other than AIDS Peru 55 
Terror Organizations Cuba 54 
Drug Smuggling Colombia 48 
Table 34: Threats to the “Prevent Unlawful Acts:  Anti-terrorism” Mission with the 
Highest CARVER Consequence Scores 
 
10. Prevent Unlawful Acts:  Anti-piracy 
Specific threats which would have adversely affected the mission:  The fully populated 
CARVER matrix was used to filter the threats specific to the “Prevent Unlawful Acts:  Anti-
piracy” mission.  The threats that affected this particular mission are:  arms, drug and human 
smuggling, money laundering, piracy, and terror organizations. 
Likelihood that these threats would have been encountered by the Phase Zero force or 
would have had a detrimental effect on their ability to conduct stability operations:  Threats 
specific to this mission with the locations having the highest prevalence rating of “3” were 
tabulated and are shown below: 
 
THREAT COUNTRY 
Money Laundering Antigua, Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela 
Arms Smuggling Bahamas, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Puerto Rico 
Human Trafficking Belize, Cuba, Jamaica, Venezuela 
Table 35: Most Likely Threats to the “Prevent Unlawful Acts:  Anti-piracy” Mission 
 
Consequences of the threat being carried out:  The CARVER score is the aggregate of the 
six consequence factors.  The three highest consequence scores were for the threats of:  human 
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smuggling, and terror organizations.  The three 4th Fleet AO nations with the highest 
consequence scores were:  Cuba and Bolivia. 
 
THREAT COUNTRY CARVER SCORE 
Terror Organizations Cuba 54 
Human Trafficking Cuba 51 
Human Trafficking Bolivia 50 
Table 36: Threats to the “Prevent Unlawful Acts:  Anti-piracy” Mission with the Highest 
CARVER Consequence Scores 
 
11. Prevent Unlawful Acts:  Anti-IUU Fishing (Illegal, Unregulated and 
Unreported Fishing) 
Specific threats which would have adversely affected the mission:  The fully populated 
CARVER matrix was used to filter the threats specific to the “Prevent Unlawful Acts:  Anti-IUU 
Fishing” mission.  The threats that would have affected this particular mission were:  
environmental issues and lack of resources and IUU fishing. 
Likelihood that these threats would have been encountered by the Phase Zero force or 
would have had a detrimental effect on their ability to conduct stability operations:  Threats 
specific to this mission with the locations having the highest prevalence rating of “3” were 
tabulated and are shown below: 
 
THREAT COUNTRY 
IUU Fishing Belize, Honduras, Panama 
Table 37: Most Likely Threats to the “Prevent Unlawful Acts:  Anti-IUU Fishing” Mission 
 
Consequences of the threat being carried out:  The CARVER score is the aggregate of the 
six consequence factors.  The three highest consequence scores were for the threats of:  
environmental issues and lack of resources and IUU fishing.  The three 4th Fleet AO nations 




THREAT COUNTRY CARVER SCORE 
Environmental Issues Bolivia 43 
Environmental Issues Dominican Republic 43 
IUU Fishing Belize 42 
Table 38: Threats to the “Prevent Unlawful Acts:  Anti-IUU Fishing” Mission with the 
Highest CARVER Consequence Scores 
 
12. Conduct Non-combatant Evacuation Operations 
Specific threats which would have adversely affected the mission:  The fully populated 
CARVER matrix was used to filter the threats specific to the “Conduct Non-combatant 
Evacuation Operations” mission.  The threats that affected this particular mission were:  AIDS 
and other diseases, human trafficking, kidnapping and natural disasters. 
Likelihood that these threats would have been encountered by the Phase Zero force or 
would have had a detrimental effect on their ability to conduct stability operations:  Threats 
specific to this mission with the locations having the highest prevalence rating of “3” were 
tabulated and are shown below: 
 
THREAT COUNTRY 
HIV/AIDS   Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominican Republic, 
Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad 
Kidnapping Chile, Peru 
Natural Disasters Jamaica, Nicaragua 
Table 39: Most Likely Threats to the “Conduct Non-combatant Evacuation Operations” 
Mission 
 
Consequences of the threat being carried out:  The CARVER score is the aggregate of the 
six consequence factors.  The three highest consequence scores were for the threats of:  AIDS, 
natural disasters, and kidnapping.  The three 4th Fleet AO nations with the highest consequence 




THREAT COUNTRY CARVER SCORE 
HIV/AIDS Bahamas 49 
Natural Disasters Nicaragua 49 
Kidnapping El Salvador 48 
Table 40: Threats to the “Conduct Non-combatant Evacuation Operations” Mission with 
the Highest CARVER Consequence Scores 
 
13. Freedom of Navigation 
Specific threats which would have adversely affected the mission:  The fully populated 
CARVER matrix was used to filter the threats specific to the “Maintain Freedom of Navigation” 
mission.  The threats that affected this particular mission were:  IUU fishing, piracy, and terror 
organizations. 
Likelihood that these threats would have been encountered by the Phase Zero force or 
would have had a detrimental effect on their ability to conduct stability operations:  Threats 
specific to this mission with the locations having the highest prevalence rating of “3” were 
tabulated and are shown below: 
 
THREAT COUNTRY 
IUU Fishing Belize, Honduras, Panama 
Table 41: Most Likely Threats to the “Maintain Freedom of Navigation Mission 
 
Consequences of the threat being carried out:  The CARVER score is the aggregate of the 
six consequence factors.  The three highest consequence scores were for the threats of:  terror 
organizations and IUU fishing.  The three 4th Fleet AO nations with the highest consequence 
scores were:  Cuba, Belize, and Panama. 
 
 
THREAT COUNTRY CARVER SCORE 
Terror Organizations Cuba 54 
IUU Fishing Belize 42 
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IUU Fishing Panama 40 
Table 42: Threats to the “Maintain Freedom of Navigation” Mission with the Highest 
CARVER Consequence Scores 
 
E. ANTICIPATED THREATS TO A PHASE ZERO FORCE OPERATING IN 2020-
2050 
An important consideration for the integrated study team was the threat environment that 
may be present when the fleet is placed in service, and which threats would endure during the 
force’s lifecycle.  While it would have been imprudent to neglect this question, it was also a 
difficult question to answer.  The unexpected does happen.  The removal of the Berlin Wall, the 
fall of the Soviet Republic and the Trade Center tragedy in New York were all events that did not 
fit neatly into trends and would have been difficult to imagine even a year before they occurred.  
That said, one must have some basis for planning and preparing for the future, with the 
understanding that the turn of events could require the need to reassess threat projections at any 
time.  Barring these unique and major happenings, the integrated study team reviewed each of 
the 16 most common threats in the 4th Fleet Theater of operations now, and used a combination 
of available statistical information, estimates from defense and security experts and trending 
techniques to project the status of the 16 threats for the 2020 to 2050 timeframe. 
1. Arms Smuggling 
Estimates of the number of illegal weapons in South and Central America varied widely.  
Firearms which are illegally owned today stem from a number of sources.  Many of the weapons 
are purchased or smuggled from the US, and in many cases, nations such as the US, UK, France 
or Holland sent the weapons for valid purposes.  For example, in the 1980s, the US sent 30,000 
assault rifles to El Salvador for the civil war.  The US government has also shipped an 
unspecified number of weapons to Colombia to aid in the war against drugs.  This led to a 
second source of illicit weapons transfers, which is corrupt police, military, and government 
officials who abused their positions to traffic small arms for profit.   
One good measure of the number of illegal firearms and the scope of arms smuggling 
was the prevalence of violent crime.   
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A leading small arms survey postulated in 2000 that for every legally owned and 
registered weapon in the region, there were one or two illegally smuggled and sold, and that 
illegal firearms outnumbered law enforcement weaponry five to one76.  The UN Office on Drugs 
and Crime, in 2008, published a ratio of legal to illegal weapons of 1.6 to 1, so the suspected 
ratio has not changed between 2000 and 200877. 
For this reason, the integrated study team estimated that unless other countries take steps 
to reduce small arms, illegal weaponry will continue to outnumber legally registered weaponry, 
and small arms sales and smuggling will remain a lucrative and tempting trade for criminals and 
corrupt officials indefinitely. 
2. Crime (Murder/Robbery/Rape/Assault) 
Murder rates are the most readily available statistic for gauging violent crime, and were 
used to establish a trend for violent crime in the 4th Fleet AO.  Due to gaps in tabulated 
information available from the State Department and individual government sites, numerous 
sources were referenced to populate a table of the murder rates from 2000 to present, for the ten 
Latin American and Caribbean nations that had the highest murder rates.  Murder rates are 
reported as homicides per 100,000 of the population.  The average in the 4th Fleet AO was 30 
per year.  The nations with the ten worst murder rates in the region had rates between 26.7 and 
49.9.   
                                                 
76 The DISAM Journal, 2008; "Central America and the Merida Initiative", by Thomas A. Shannon; May 8, 2008 




























Figure 11: Trend for Ten Highest Homicide Rates in the 4th Fleet AO 
The correlation coefficient for this plot was r=+0.85, demonstrating a mostly linear, 
positive trend.  The slope of the best fit line indicated an additional 9 persons (per 100,000) a 
year could die as a result of homicide.  Should that trend continue through the years 2020 and 
2050, the ten worst nations may have as many as 500 to 800 murders per 100,000 of the 
population each year.  That would correspond to an increase in the murder rate from the current 
0.03% to 0.8%.  Most news and government sources that were studied for this project did note 
that crime in general is increasing in the region, although quantifiable percentages were not 
given.  
3. Disease other than AIDS 
The World Health Organization publishes basic health indicators annually.  One of their 
indicators is the number, per 100,000 persons of the population, of persons who die from 
infectious disease each year.  For the Latin America and Caribbean region, the team extracted 
data from reports for the last five years and graphed the results.  In years prior to 2004, the data 


































Figure 12: Trend for Deaths from Disease in the 4th Fleet AO 
 
Year by year, the numbers alternatively improved and worsened, most likely because the 
effort to vaccinate and find cures for new strains of influenza and other communicable diseases 
lags just behind the emergence of those new strains.  For communicable diseases, influenza was 
identified as the number one killer both in the 4th Fleet region and throughout the world, taking 
more lives annually than AIDS, malaria, or dengue fever. 
The integrated study team was reluctant to offer a long term prediction based on only five 
years of data points.  But in general, new diseases will continue to develop and mutate, and 
advances in medical cures and practice should also continue to improve.  Major pandemics occur 
sporadically and are not readily predictable from historical data.     
4. Drug Smuggling 
Volumes of information, statistics and data were found regarding the global drug 
epidemic.  Statistics particular to South America focused primarily on the production of cocaine 
products and the smuggling of cocaine.  Heroin and marijuana are also produced in Latin and 
South America, but their production and use is dwarfed by the cocaine trade in mass.  It was 
almost unnecessary to plot drug movement, production or seizures to see the scope of the 
problem.  The United States military has been involved aggressively, since the 1980s, in an effort 
to reduce the transshipment of drugs into the US.  A recent GAO report called into question the 
most current statistics and numbers produced by government agencies, which show a slight 
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reduction trend for drug seizures, claiming that the numbers were the result of pressure to show 
indications of progress.   
In general, a Phase Zero force operating between 2020 and 2050 can certainly expect to 
be confronted with the drug trade, and with smuggling operations of all kinds.  The slowing of 
smuggling of contraband into the U.S. has been a difficulty since the nation came into existence, 
and 30 years of active involvement to counter drugs has done little to stop the demand for drugs 
or the production and shipment of illicit drugs.  Many of the small increases and decreases in the 
volume of production and seizures during the last three decades have been a result of the 
destruction of drug fields by fumigation.  These actions are followed by the quick replanting of 
those fields, with full operation resuming within about two years.  Other factors such as drought, 
weather patterns, and natural disasters also cause slight variations in the volume of production. 
The plot below shows the non-linearity of the volume of seizures of drugs.  The volume 
of drugs shipped successfully into America is not known, but seizures from the three largest 




















Figure 13: Trend for Cocaine Seizures in the 4th Fleet AO 
 
The correlation coefficient for this plot was only 0.7, so the conclusion of a linear trend 
was not justified.  However, even if the scale of the problem were decreasing slightly, the drug 
scourge in South America is such an immense problem, that it may take several more decades 
before clear improvement can be shown.  The force being assembled for Phase Zero work 
through 2050 should be equipped to continue the effort. 
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5. Environmental Issues/Lack of Resources 
Numerous environmental issues could significantly impact a future Phase Zero force.  
The issues that would likely have the greatest impact on operations in the 4th Fleet AO are 
atmospheric and oceanic temperature increases, fresh water shortages, and deforestation.  The 
warming pattern around the globe has the potential to threaten littoral regions if water levels rise, 
and because more than 65% of the Latin American population lives near the coast, this factor 
should be considered.  Water shortages have the potential to lead to increased migration, border 
and land disputes, mob violence and the domino effect of food shortages.  Deforestation impacts 
both local and global populations as valuable and irreplaceable natural resources are diminished 
at an alarming rate.  Of these three issues, deforestation was the most widely discussed and most 
often mentioned in the materials used for research, and appears to currently be the most critical 
environmental issue in the region. 
Global temperature patterns are the subject of much study and much debate, and the 
debate led to a great deal of difference in the analysis.  With no attention paid to either extreme, 
and simply considering the mean surface temperature between 1960 and 2000, there did appear 
to be a 0.4 degree Celsius increase to the earth’s surface.  Phase Zero planners should be aware 
of the possibility of rising ocean levels if the warming trend continues, but the likelihood of 
extreme changes between 2020 and 2050 is low.  However, some studies indicated that severe 
weather could worsen in that time, as a result of warmer oceans. 
Studies have also shown that water fouling is a result of heavy deforestation, and so the 
remaining factors, water scarcity, and deforestation, are considered together by tracking the trend 
in deforestation.   Between 2000 and 2005, the highest deforestation rates in the region were in 
Brazil, Venezuela, and Bolivia.  In these three countries alone, an average of 4.35 million 
hectares each year have been deforested, a five year total of 21.75 million hectares.  That equates 
to 84,000 square miles, over two times the total size of the state of Ohio.  As for trending, this is 
expected to turn around.  The current rate cannot continue, simply because if it did, the resource 
would be completely exhausted.  A full 50% of the Amazon forest has been lost in only the last 
20 years.  So between 2020 and 2050, the team anticipates that the results of heavy deforestation 
rather than deforestation itself will be the prevailing issue. 
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6. HIV/AIDS   
The HIV virus and disease of AIDS were relatively new in the early 1980s and reliable 
documentation and tracking of new cases prior to 1980 was not available.  In 2000, the Joint 
United Nations Program on AIDS published a chart with the number of new HIV cases each 
year, broken down by region.  Additionally, an estimate of the numbers of cases world-wide and 
by region was made by an independent agency not affiliated with the UN, which gave a data 
point for 2000 that was consistent for more than just a single source.  Using the estimate for 
2000, and the given number of cases per year, the team was able to backfill a trend table to the 
year 1980.  UN regional statistics were also available for year 2003, resulting in another data 
point.    
The Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) has conducted a risk projection of AIDS prevalence 
in Latin America for 2015, and came to an estimate of three million cases.  This data point was 
used as a comparison after taking the trend forward as a linear slope from the most current, 
validated data, for 2003.  The values for the KFF projection and the integrated study team 



















Figure 14: Trend for HIV/AIDS Cases in 4th Fleet AO 
 
Based on this, the number of AIDS infections in the 4th Fleet AO in 2020 should be 
between 3.2 and 3.4 million, there could be as many as 5.3 million cases in 2050. 
This trend considers the continuance of current conditions.  If an effective vaccine or cure 
is produced prior to 2020 or 2050, the data would need to be reassessed.  It should also be noted 
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that the AIDS prevalence rate in the Caribbean is considerably higher than that in Central and 
South America; this trend analysis was for the combination of both.  Also, the global AIDS rate 
is not equalized, either, with Africa leading the number of new infections at a rate about 20 times 
greater than the Americas. 
7. Human Smuggling/Trafficking 
Globally, between 0.6 and 0.8 million persons are trafficked across international borders 
each year.  The majority are destined for enslavement in the sex industry, while the others are 
placed into forced labor.  In South and Central America, a number of nations are making some 
effort to curtail this atrocity.  Because of the illegal nature of the problem, statistics are based on 
those persons rescued rather than making guesses at how many were not.  Despite the efforts 
these countries are making, the number of persons rescued, and so arguably, the number of 
persons trafficked, continues to increase.  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, 
and Peru have all reported the number of persons rescued, sheltered and taken out of the human 
trafficking system.  The team consolidated and plotted these numbers to look for a trend.  The 




































Figure 15: Trend for Human Trafficking in the 4th Fleet AO 
 
If the present trend continues within the region of Latin and Central America, by the year 
2050, there could possibly be as many as ten times the present number of persons indentured into 
forced labor and sexual exploitation.  An increase is likely, because few countries are attempting 
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to end the practice, and those who have made efforts have not been able to diminish the flow of 
illegally trafficked persons.   
8. Illegal, Unregulated, Unreported Fishing 
Trending statistics were difficult to come by.  Greater attention has been placed on the 
problem of over-fishing and illegal fishing in recent years, but long term tracking of the scope of 
the problem could not be found.  Organizations who are policing the problem have studied how 
this trade is conducted.  Those who engage in IUU fishing are essentially poachers.  
Unfortunately, several Central and South American countries contribute to the problem through 
the issuance of flags of convenience (FOC), whereby they allow poachers to fly their flag and 
conduct fishing operations.  The flying of the flag fraudulently indicates that the operation is 
regulated and licensed, when in reality they are not, and the catches are not reported.  FOCs can 
bring government officials hundreds or thousands per issuance, depending on the species the 
poachers are after.   
The best recommendation for Phase Zero planners is to assume similar conditions 
through 2020 and 2050.  With no statistical data to form a trend, we must evaluate the problem in 
light of current conditions.  The fact that several nations continue to ignore and contribute to the 
problem balances with the increase in international attention and pressure to stop the practice of 
FOCs.  Disputes over fishing rights have also been regular occurrences and are likely to continue 
and grow as fishing stocks become more depleted. 
9. Kidnapping 
In Latin America, it is important to distinguish between types of kidnapping and the 
motives.  The human sex slave trade is one source of kidnapping, and is addressed as a separate 
threat.  Groups such as FARC use kidnapping of persons as a way to increase revenue.  60% of 
the FARC income is from the 500 billion dollar a year “kidnapping industry” in Colombia.  The 
kidnapping of wealthy locals and foreigners for large monetary rewards is a more specialized 
crime, and of the three types, is the best documented.  Of the ten countries in the world with the 
highest reported numbers of kidnapping for ransom, five of them were located in the 4th Fleet 
AO:  Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela.  The integrated study team used these 
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figures to create an aggregate of the five countries and do a decade long trend of the number of 

























Figure 16: Trend for Kidnapping in the 4th Fleet AO 
 
Reports in more recent years showed other countries to have sharply increasing 
kidnapping rates, namely Peru, Bolivia, and Paraguay, but did not distinguish between the high 
profile kidnap-for-ransom cases and the much more numerous human trafficking cases. 
The linear correlation coefficient of the plotted data is +0.89, so the assumption of an 
increasing trend is reasonable.  Many factors could contribute to changing this current trend 
between now and 2020 or 2050, and would require a new analysis.  But with no other changing 
influences, the worst case scenario for the number of persons kidnapped for ransom each year 
could triple by 2020, and then double again by 2050. 
10. Lack of Communications Infrastructure 
No specific trend was evident while researching this issue, other than the fact that 
globally, nations continue to gradually improve their technology and communications networks.  
More affluent nations make these improvements at a faster rate than developing nations.  There 
are a handful of nations, mostly in Africa, which showed little or no signs of development.  In 
the 4th Fleet AO, the nations with the slowest rate of progress in improving the communications 
infrastructure were Haiti, Nicaragua, and Honduras.  The integrated study team felt it was 
important for a Phase Zero force to know where these problems exist.  However, they would 
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minimally affect a well-equipped force which has brought its own communications capability 
with them.  But because it affects the quality of life of the population, and contributes to stability, 
the effects of poor communications infrastructure on overall regional stability should not be 
overlooked. 
11. Lack of Human Rights/Freedom 
 The UN Human Development Index, which was also used to show the prevalence of 
human rights abuses in Latin America, did not list any 4th Fleet AO nations in the lowest tier.  
However, there were a few which ranked in the medium, or “lower than average” tier.  Index 
scores which were based on a number of human rights factors were collected over the period 
from 1980.  The UN does not present trends, but the integrated study team used data from the 























Figure 17: Trend for Human Rights in the 4th Fleet AO 
 
Based on the average scores for the seven nations of Peru, the Dominican Republic, 
Paraguay, El Salvador, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Haiti, a trend was evident of a very slow but 
steady improvement in human rights.  They were grouped together in the figure above, because 
when they were plotted in individual series, the plots overlaid each other in an indistinguishable 
consolidated line, with no outliers. 
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If the present trend should continue, equivalent scores for 2020 and 2050 would be about 
0.72 and 0.75, respectively.  While the number itself is only a linear projection, it has some 
meaning in reflecting that there should be an overall regional improvement.  It is not possible, 
however, to foresee whether any particular nation will encounter unique events that would derail 
the current progress. 
12. Money Laundering 
There are several circumstances that made it difficult to find data for money laundering.  
Obviously, criminal organizations are going to work hard to avoid detection, and so the known 
incidents of money laundering are likely to be indicators of a much larger problem.  
Additionally, most traffickers in human smuggling, either for forced labor and prostitution, or as 
paid illegal migrant facilitators, launder their own money by exploiting the very persons they are 
smuggling.  For example, a person kidnapped to be sold as a prostitute will be forced to open the 
account that accommodates their own sale. 
The Financial Action Task Force has provided an excellent paper about the measures of 
money laundering, and the best indicator they suggest for estimating the volume of money 
laundering is something called Alternative Remittance Systems (ARS).  These are basically tools 
used to transfer cash between parties in back to back transfers, and the associated fees and pay-
outs can be an indicator of fraudulent exports and imports.  Many professional money launderers 
also front mock insurance agencies as another tool for masking the movement of monies.    
Because of the scarcity of available data, the integrated study team had only a 15 year 
period of ARS reporting for Latin America and the Caribbean, a major remittance corridor for 
these types of transactions.  A plot of billions of US dollars per year yielded a trend line with two 
distinct slopes.  The first decade, 1990 to 2000, was almost perfectly linear, with an average 
annual uptick of 1.44 billion.  The period following 2000 had a much more positive slope of 4.41 
billion per year.  With no other visible trend, then, the team used the strategy of applying the 
greater slope to each decade through 2050, as a possible projection of the scope of money 





















Figure 18: Trend for Money Laundering Activity in the 4th Fleet AO 
 
Based on this estimation scheme, the potential amount of US dollars that will change 
hands in the Caribbean and Latin American remittance corridor in 2020 is 138 billion.  The year 
2050, should the trend continue, would be marked by ASR transfers of 535 billion dollars. 
13. Natural Disasters 
The cause for the increase in natural disasters during the 20th century has been the source 
of a great deal of political and scholastic debate.  However, despite the underlying causes, the 
trend is real.  The integrated study team used the available statistics regarding the number of 
natural disasters reported annually, back to 1950.  Data was available as far back as about 1900, 
but reporting was more sporadic prior to 1950, and even that data set was sufficient to show a 
definite increasing trend.  The reasons for this change do matter when making a projection, 
because one must consider whether those conditions are likely to change.  There is a global push 
to turn back the negative effects of carbon emissions, waste disposal, the depletion of the ozone 
layer and deforestation, all of which may be making a contribution to the global changes 
happening today.  However, there are those who argue that there are also natural causes 
contributing to global changes, and that these effects have long term cycles which have not yet 
been proven in even a century of record keeping.  In an effort to find middle ground, the 
integrated study team plotted the current trend, which was a linear slope of about 10 more natural 
disasters occurring each year than occurred the previous year.  Then, realizing both that positive 
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changes take time, and allowing that there are some natural patterns at play which could possibly 
exhibit a natural cyclical decline in events, a factor was applied to model a 10% improvement 


























Figure 19: Trend for Natural Disasters in the 4th Fleet AO 
 
Following the current trend with no intervention would lead to about 750 predicted 
(global) natural disasters in 2020 and 1,040 in the year 2050.  Applying a factor for successful 
intervention, the trend would be for about 730 and 910 natural disasters, respectively, for 2020 
and 2050.  There are two other useful planning facts.  One is that, on average, the region of the 
4th Fleet experiences roughly 17% of the global natural disasters in any given year.  And the 
other is that the region of the 7th Fleet is the location where the greatest numbers of casualties 
per disaster tend to occur. 
14. Piracy 
Several independent and government data sources were combined to tabulate and then 
plot the overall number of piracy incidents per year, for the years 1995 through 2008.  
Comparing multiple sources allowed the team to use several datasets to validate the others, as 
well as to fill in gaps between what was left out of reporting by individual sources. 
Once the data was plotted, a linear trend was not evident, but the data plot showed a 
cyclical pattern of increasing and decreasing piracy activity. 
No Improvement 





















Figure 20: Trend for Piracy in the 4th Fleet AO  
 
Using this method, the anticipated number of piracy incidents in 2020 and 2050 cannot 
be firmly predicted.  This represents the trend only if current conditions were to continue.  If 
international attention causes security forces to bear down on the pirates, the number of incidents 
would likely fall off, at least temporarily.  In the brief data collection period of 15 years, the 
“peaks” in numbers of pirate attacks appeared at roughly five year cycles, which may be a result 
of the increase of security followed by periods of decreasing patrols.  These ebbs and flows in 
nation’s response to piracy and the impact on pirate activity appeared to follow this generally 
cyclical pattern.  A slight downward trend is obvious in several individual data sources, and if 
maritime patrols remain vigilant, this trend will likely increase. 
15. Social Instability 
A calculation of social instability would be characterized by a very complex formula, 
with dozens of terms and factors.  To keep a viable scope for this trending, the team focused first 
on the global patterns of war and other major catastrophes that displace indigenous people and 
result in large numbers of refugees.  This was then compared to other factors, such as quality of 
life, access to modern infrastructure for communications and hygiene, and gender equity.  For 
the Latin American and Caribbean arena, these factors have not shown a downward or upward 
trend for over a decade, and since their inclusion did nothing to change this trend, they were not 
included in the trend data.  The factors with the most significant impact on social stability, 
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according to the National Intelligence Center (NIC) are internal conflicts stemming from state 
repression, religious and ethnic grievances, increasing migration pressures and/or indigenous 
protest movements.  Again, these factors were more prevalent in the 4th Fleet AO than in other 
parts of the world, but have remained steady within the region.  So because only the global data 
reflected a trend, the team used a combination of two factors:  the number of occurrences that 





































Figure 21: Trend for Global Social Instability 
 
Given current conditions, and the continuance of potentially volatile regions in the 4th 
Fleet AO where the current peace is tenuous, the integrated study team was not prepared to 
predict a marked improvement for the region during the lifecycle of the Phase Zero fleet.  
Another look at the actual data showed a definite bimodal distribution about a mean of 39.6 
million refugees.  By affiliating this mean with the 1st and 3rd quartiles, we established a range 
of variance about the mean, which was a possible interpretation of the limited data we had for 
this evaluation.  This yielded a range between 35.64 million and 43.56 million.   Optimistically, a 
small improvement in social stability may be achieved, as there are serious efforts underway by 
many nations and organizations to effect this, but it is more likely that the current stability levels 
will endure for some time in Central and South America.  
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16. Terror Organizations 
There were various open source databases and applications that gave some information 
about terrorism, usually with a lot of prefacing about the uncertainty of the statistics.  This 
uncertainty was also evident when different sources presented widely different numbers.    
Research indicated that government sources typically published higher numbers of both attacks 
and casualties, although even government agencies showed some variance in their reporting.  
Blogs and civil organizations sometimes postulate that numbers provided by government sources 
are inflated in order to justify what they consider to be exorbitant funding to counter terrorism, 
and their numbers are consequently much lower.  The integrated study team combed through 
open source information to find numbers of attacks per year and/or number of casualties per 
year, either globally or in the 4th Fleet region, covering any and all years between 1980 and 
2008.  In the few cases of conflicting reports, the lowest number provided by a government 
source was used in order to find the middle ground.  After compiling figures from numerous 
sources into a single spreadsheet, the team only had a full set of numbers for the global number 



























Figure 22: Trend for Global Terror Attacks 
 
It is of note that the increase in global terrorism that coincided with the commitment of 
troops in Iraq and then Afghanistan, was about tenfold.  The trend above cannot predict whether 
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sleeper cells are in place or are planning more large scale attacks in the future, but that threat 
cannot be overlooked or discounted.   
Additionally, there was a limited amount of information available specifically about the 
Latin American region, provided by the US State Department.  During the years 1998 to 2003, 
South America had the greatest number of terror attacks, but the fewest casualties.  After the US 
invaded Iraq in 2003, the greatest number of both attacks and casualties shifted to the region of 
the Middle East, and has remained so.  The plot of attacks verses casualties in Latin America, 



























Figure 23: Trend for Terror Attacks and Casualties in 4th Fleet AO 
 
Because of the volatile and changing nature of terrorism, the integrated study team did 
not attempt to predict the specific number, type or severity of attacks in the 2020 to 2050 
timeframe, but rather offered some useful planning facts. 
 
• Terror incidents in developing South American and Caribbean nations are 
typically unsophisticated and small scale.  They are usually directed at local 
political opponents and their following. 
• Terror attacks in developing South American and Caribbean nations are likely 
to produce a small ratio of casualties to attacks. 
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• The regional rate of incidents annually tends to remain relatively stable, and 
spikes in the number of global incidents are seldom caused by terror activity 
in the 4th Fleet AO. 
• Spikes in the number of attacks per year in the 4th Fleet AO usually coincide 
with other local stability indicators, such as political instability, martial law, 
and economic uncertainty. 
• Anti-American sentiment in Latin America and the Caribbean is low 
compared to other parts of the world, although there are obvious exceptions 
such as Venezuela, Cuba, and parts of Mexico.  Americans are more likely to 
be targeted by opportunists than terrorists, as in the case where three 
American contractors were held for over a decade while their captors 
demanded ransom. 
• Vigilance in employing standard force protection measures, as well as 
common sense, will generally be sufficient when conducting Phase Zero 
operations in the 4th Fleet AO.  Additional measures, based on the local 
threat, should be evaluated during individual mission planning. 
 
The integrated study team independently analyzed the 16 threats which have an impact, 
in one way or another, on our Phase Zero force.  Certain threats were correlated with each other, 
either positively or negatively, but this did not necessarily mean they depended on each other and 
hence had a causal relationship between them, (known as "regression" in statistical terminology).  
For example, arms smuggling and money laundering were two distinct threats which the team 
identified, and they can be seen to be positively correlated in that they both show increasing 
trends to each other within the time frame being discussed.  However, they probably did not have 
a direct causal relationship, such as the use of smuggled arms to conduct money laundering 
activities.  Further analysis may be possible, which is beyond the scope of this report, to establish 
casual factors; for example, a relaxation in policing efforts which results to an increasing trend 
for both.  This distinction between correlation, or trending behavior, and regression, cause and 
effect, should be kept in mind whenever a mission is being affected by a multitude of threats.  
This allowed the number of threats to be narrowed down into a smaller number, to be addressed 
in order to facilitate the force structure development and subsequent successful execution of our 
Phase Zero operations.  Nevertheless, it is sufficient to say that although many of the threats 
discussed here may have been caused by a common set of disfunctionalities; political, social, law 
enforcement efforts; not all of them will had a regressive relationship to each other.   
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V.  FORCE STRUCTURE METHODOLOGY 
 
Figure 24: Force Structure Inputs 
 
The figure above illustrates how the Force Structure team took inputs from the Modeling, 
Threat Analysis, Phase Zero Research and System’s engineering teams to develop the Phase 
Zero force.  The selection of the final force structure was based on the comparing of a Current 
Force using platforms that were in the inventory with a Future Force which could use a mix of 
both current platforms and future platforms that could be fielded by the year 2020.  To develop 
these forces a method was used that could be broken down into six phases.  The phases were: 
1. Consolidate Background information required for modeling and force structure.  
Inputs were combined from the definition of Phase Zero, the requirements derived 
from the 3 mission groups, the threat study, and the cost estimation group. To do this 
the current and future platform capabilities were determined.  A study was conducted 
during this phase to determine the most appropriate Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) 
that could be utilized by the future force. 
2. Develop modelling scenarios and models to determine mission requirements.  
Perform cost analysis of current and future platforms.  Research was conducted to 
develop a Marine force to be used for security during Civil Support mission to 
include the special equipment they would require.   
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3. Perform a gap analysis on forces currently used to execute Phase Zero operations to 
develop lessons learned that could be applied to the development of an appropriate 
future force structure. 
4. Develop Current and Future Force structures that could meet all requirements of each 
mission for the lowest cost while taking into account information presented in the 
threat study. 
5. Use modelling to fine tune the Current and Future Force structures, through 
optimization, to produce the final current and future force structures.  
6. Conduct a study to determine the logistical requirements of the finalized force 
structures. Compare the capabilities and cost of the current force and the future force 
to establish a recommend regional security force capable of conducting Phase Zero 
operations for less than $1.5 billion per year procurement and operating cost.   
  
During the first phase of force structure selection information on current platform 
capabilities (Appendix A) and future platform capabilities (Appendix B) were gathered from 
numerous sources.  The Littoral Combat ship, DD(X) and the High Speed Vessel were 
considered only as future ships.  The LCS 1 was commissioned in November 2008 78 however, 
had not yet been fully integrated into the fleet.  The DD(X) program was underway with an 
uncertain future and had not yet produced a ship that was currently serving in the fleet.  HSV-2 
Swift was serving with the Navy under a lease agreement but was not yet being built for the 
Navy.  The Joint High speed vessel had been contracted out but not yet produced.  Because the  
The platforms considered in Appendix A were platforms which were currently in the fleet 
or are under construction.  The platforms included were: LHD 1 Wasp Class, LHA 1 Tarawa 
Class, LPD 4 Austin Class, LPD 17 San Antonio class, LSD 49 Harpers Ferry Class, LSD 41 
Whidbey Island Class, CVN 68 Nimitz Class, CG 47 Ticonderoga Class, DDG 51 Arleigh Burke 
Class (Flight I/II/IIA), FFG 7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class, LCS 1 Freedom Class, LCS 2 
Independence Class, DDX Zumwalt Class, MCM 1 Avenger Class, LCC 19 Blue Ridge Class, 
PC 1 Cyclone Class, T-AKE Lewis and Clark Class, T-Ao 187 Henry J. Kaiser Class, TAOE 6 
Supply class, SH-60B, SH-60F, HH-60H, MH-60S, MH-60R and CH-53E.  With the exception 
of LCS 1, LCS 2 and DDX these platforms were considered for the current force.   
                                                 
78 USS Freedom history, http://www.freedom.navy.mil/site%20pages/history.aspx, accessed on 21 May 2009 
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The platforms considered in Appendix B were platforms which were not currently being 
built in the United States for the Navy however, where determined to be producible, capable of 
being fielded by 2020, and capable of having a positive impact on the Phase Zero mission.  The 
platforms included were:  LHA(R) (Based on current LHA 6 America design), HSV(based on 
HSV 2 Swift characteristics), Visby Class corvette, Green Water patrol craft, M80 Stiletto, Fast 
Response Cutter, and the CH-53K. 
To be considered a future platform, the ship or aircraft had to be capable of being fielded 
by the year 2020.  Ships of other nations were taken into consideration.  The procurement costs 
of these foreign ships were assumed to be the same as the procurement cost paid by the 
originating nation.  Several programs were deemed to have a low probability of being produced 
and out in the fleet by 2020, thus were not included in the force.  A number of these platforms, if 
considered, would have had an impact on the recommended Future Force.  One of these 
platforms in particular was the Afloat Forward Staging Base concept.  It was not considered as a 
future platform because the ship was only in concept development and no funding for any of its 
multiple designs had been allocated. 
Also during this initial information gathering phase, research was conducted on UAVs to 
select the most appropriate ones for the future force.  This study focused on the capabilities of 
each UAV option, that could be fielded by 2020, as well as the ability of the aircraft to be 
supported by the future force.  It was assumed that any UAV used would be required to deploy 
with the force and therefore would not be able to use a land base.  The selection of a UAV in this 
phase allowed a model developed that focused on the use on one UAV type in order to determine 
the number required. 
The second phase of force structure selection was to develop mission scenarios and 
models to determine the mission requirements.  Three missions were selected from the thirteen 
original Phase Zero mission based on the results of perception mapping.  Detailed scenarios were 
developed for these three missions and the mission requirements were developed through the use 
of analytical models as well as simulation.  Also during this phase, a cost analysis was performed 
to determine the annualized cost of each platform.  This cost consisted of the procurement cost, 
corrected to 2008 dollars, and the operational and support costs.  
With the requirements developed for the three missions, a gap analysis was performed for 
the historic force.  The force looked at was the Partnership of the Americas 2007 (POA 2007) 
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which deployed to conduct Phase Zero-like operations.  This force consisted of one LSD 49 
class, one DDG 51 class, and two FFG 7 class ships.  From this analysis, capability gaps and 
excess capabilities were determined to develop lessons learned that could be applied to the force 
selection process. 
The fourth phase of force structure selection was to develop Current and Future Force 
structures that could meet all mission requirements for the lowest cost, while taking into account 
the information contained in the future threat study.  With the requirements for the Civil Support 
mission having been broken down into three severities, three possible force configurations were 
developed for both the force utilizing only current platforms and for the force utilizing current 
and future platforms.  This gave a total of six force structures each of which would be able to 
completely fulfill all mission requirements for the Civil Support, Anti-smuggling, and 
Information Sharing missions.  The two outlying missions (Non-combatant Evacuation and 
Freedom of Navigation) were considered and integrated into the requirements. The annualized 
cost of each of these forces was then determined and compared. 
During fifth phase of the force structure selection process, the preliminary force structure 
developed in phase three was fine tuned by using models.  An optimization was developed to 
attempt to find the optimal mix of platforms that fulfilled all mission requirements.  The lessons 
learned from this optimization were taken into account to develop the final force structure. 
The final phase of the force selection was a comparison of the final force using only 
current platforms and the final force using a mix of current and future platforms.  This was 
performed to determine if the new platforms under development were a beneficial addition to the 
future Phase Zero force or if the mission could be carried out efficiently using only current 
platforms.  This analysis looked at the cost of each option and the capabilities that each force 
brought to the Phase Zero mission environment.  During this phase logistical requirements for 
the forces were developed and compared.  This information was used to determine the resupply 
frequency required by the potential forces. 
A. MISSIONS, SCENARIOS AND METHODOLOGY 
1. Project Methodology and Choice of Missions 
Phase Zero missions encompass a wide range of military 




Mission 2 Mission 3 
Phase 0 Triangle 
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aspects produced 3 representative missions, which together try to span the 
majority of Phase 0 missions (“Phase 0 Triangle”). This project was then 
scoped to include only these three prominent and representative missions 
the force is likely to face in the near future.  
As a result of perception mapping, the missions chosen  
are Anti-smuggling, Civil Support, and Information Sharing. Current force structure will be 
revised to optimally handle just these 3 missions in order to stay focused and productive, while 
the final conclusions will extend to the full breadth of Phase 0 missions based on the preliminary 
missions analysis. 
2. Missions and Scenarios construction methodology 
In order to make any significant progress and to produce applicative analysis, the chosen 
3 missions were defined, and several specific scenarios must be agreed on. We elaborated on 
each of the 3 missions, to include the general mission description, characteristic parameters of 
each mission, and possible values each parameter can assume. A number of specific scenarios 
will then be constructed for each mission by simply assigning a value for each parameter. 
The general structure is of the following form: 
 
I. Mission 1 Title 
a. Mission Description 
b. Mission Parameters 
1. Parameter 1 (possible assigned values) 
2. Parameter 2 
2.1 Parameter 2.1 (possible assigned values) 
2.2 Parameter 2.2 (possible assigned values) 
3. Parameter 3 (possible assigned values) 
II. Mission 2 Title 
a. … 
 
B. THE 3 MISSIONS 
1. Civil Support 
a. The Phase Zero force is required to provide emergent Civil Support in the 
context of natural disasters. This is not intended as complete civil relief but 
rather a temporary critical support while a more suitable and substantial force 
can be formed and dispatched. Examples of critical support are limited food 
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delivery, limited clean water supply, and limited electrical power (portable 
generation for hospitals, etc.) 
b. Mission Parameters 
1. MOE 
1.1 Supplied Delivered 79 
1.1.1 Food: 2.5lbs per person per day 
1.1.2 Water: ½ gal per person per day 
1.1.3 Shelter: 50% of population affected 
1.2 Personnel 80 
1.2.1 Affected population assisted: Tri(50k,100k,150k) 
1.2.2 Seriously injured medical assistance: 5% of affected 
2. MOP 
2.1 Supplied Delivered 
2.1.1 First supplies delivered within 24 hours 
2.1.2 All supplies delivered within 5 days 
2.2 Personnel 81 
2.2.1 “Camp” sites provide for 20k displaced personnel 
2.2.2 One doctor and four nurses for every 400 injured  
2.2.3 One surgeon and 2 assistants for every 800 injured in  
addition to doctors and nurses  
2.2.4 50% of doctors accessed off site via telecommunications 
2.3 Overall 82 
2.3.1 Five day endurance prior to subsequent force arrival 
2.3.2 50 mile penetration inland from the sea 
2.3.3 Sea based command center with 200nm communications 
range 
2.3.4 Adequate communications capability to support operations 
including remote doctor telecom 
3. Constraints 
3.1 Food: 25lb 10 meal case occupies 1.02 ft^3, 1237lbs and 58.1 ft^3 
per pallet 83 
3.2 Water:  Transported via collapsible bladders.  Each bladder has a 
1000 gallon capacity, can be collapsed and stored 2 ft3 , each 
bladder can be reused 75% of the time.  Bladders can be filled less 
than max capacity for airlift weight restrictions. 84 
3.3 Water Treatment:  All water supplied ashore will be supplied from 
the ships water treatment system.  Since these treatment systems 
require a minimum standoff from shore to preclude ingestion of 
                                                 
79 “DOD Humanitarian Daily Ration” 
www.dsca.mil/programs/HA/2009/HUMANITARIAN%20DAILY%20RATIONS.pdf accessed 18 May 2009 
80 “Em-Database” Disasters in Latin America http://www.emdat.be/ accessed 1 April 2009 
81  Study of historic disaster response 
82 Derived from NOC 2006  
83 “DOD Humanitarian Daily Ration” 




brackish near-shore waters, an acceptable standoff location for ship 
station location was set at 5Nm. This assumes a worst case situation 
where portable water purification capability is not available. 
3.4 Transportation to shore:  All supplies will be transported from Sea 
to Shore via air assets that are organic to the force during daytime 
hours only.  
3.5 Storage on ship:  Storage should be in one of the containers listed in 
3.8.  Ideally, at least 95 percent of all cargo should be palletized. 
Care must be exercised to ensure standard 40 inch x 48 inch 
military pallets be used and should not exceed the height of 52 
inches in order to use the conveyor system. 85 
3.6 Storage space Utilization:  Assume a combat loading utilization 
factor of 0.8 for cargo storage. 
3.7 Conversion of Vehicle space to Cargo space:  The vehicle storage 
spaces can be utilized for storage of standard Milvan and Conex 
containers.  Assume a maximum of 0.5 deck space utilization factor 
for conversion of vehicle space due to access requirements.  Milvan 
and Conex containers cannot be stacked in vehicle storage spaces. 
3.8 Containers: The Department of Defense has purchased containers to 
better transport equipment and supplies. There are several types of 
containers starting from the smallest to the largest. 86 
(1) Insert- 10"x17"x45" 
(2) Palcon-40"x48" 
(3) Quadcon- 82"x57.5"x96 
(4) Halfcon-8'x8'x10 
(5) Sixcon -4'x6' 
(6) Milvan- 8'x8'x20' 
(7) Conex-8'x8'x40' 
3.9 Transportation and security on shore:  Transportation and security 
on shore will be provided by Non Government Organizations and 
Interagency support.  If capacity available, the Phase Zero force 
will support the transportation and security on shore however, this 
will not be a mission the force will be designed to complete.   
3.10 Air assets:  Only MV-22, MH-60 and CH-53 will be considered as 
capable of transporting supplies and will have an availability of 
85%. 
3.11 MV-22:  Has a maximum sling capacity of 10,000 lbs and can 
transport 24 passengers.  Maximum speed with sling load 100 knts, 
maximum speed without sling load 241 knts.  These numbers are as 
started in Appendix A, Current Force Capabilities. 
3.12 SH-60S:  Has a maximum sling capacity of 4,500 lbs and can 
transport 12 passengers.  Maximum speed with sling load 80 knts, 
                                                 
85 United States Marine Corps logistics operation school, Marine Corps combat service support school, “Load cargo 
on ships student outline” 
86 United States Marine Corps logistics operation school, Marine Corps combat service support school, “Load cargo 
on ships student outline” 
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maximum speed without sling load 147 knts.  These numbers are as 
started in Appendix A, Current Force Capabilities. 
3.13 CH-53K:  Has a maximum sling capacity of 27,000 lbs and can 
transport 55 passengers.  Maximum speed with sling load 80 knts, 
maximum speed without sling load 170 knts.  These numbers are as 
started in Appendix B, Future Force Capabilities. 
3.14 Shelter: “Camp” site requires 150klbs packaged in 6 standard 
shipping containers 
3.15 Doctors/nurses: require 3klbs of supply equipment 
3.16 Surgeons/assistants: require 5klbs of supply equipment 
4. Location 
4.1 Region: Any 
4.2 Country: Any 
4.3 Weather/Tide consideration: Area specific 
4.4 Ships position:  5 miles off the cost 
4.5 Penetration range: up to 50 miles inland 
4.6 Port availability: No port facilities available 
4.7 Water depth: Navigable open water with shallow littoral 
5. Resistance  
5.1 Government: Civil instability, no government assistance 
5.2 Naval capability: None 
c. Desired modeling output 
1. Required amount of ship internal storage required to accomplish 
mission (ft3) 
2. Number and type of aircraft required to transport material and 
personnel from sea to shore.  
3. Number of personnel supported onboard ships. 
 
2. Anti-smuggling 
a. Based on reference research, the SEA-15 Anti-smuggling study will focus on 
the Eastern Pacific vector of cocaine smuggling. The path is from Columbia to 
numerous points on the western coast of Mexico. The cocaine then travels by 
several conveyances, primarily land based to the United States. SEA-15 will 
focus solely on the maritime and air component in the Eastern Pacific. 
b. Mission Parameters 
1. MOE 
1.1 50% reduction in cocaine shipments (tonnage) 
1.2 Seizure of cocaine is a public relations goal, secondary to reduction 
2. MOP 
2.1 Interdiction to correspond with cocaine reduction goal 
2.2 Monthly tactics adaptation based on intelligence collected (steady 
reduction rather than initial reduction followed by opposition 
reconfiguration) 
2.3 Apprehension of smugglers is secondary to reduction goal  




3.1 Area: Eastern Pacific Vector.  Area is 250 miles wide.  All targets 
will travel 90orelative to asset axis.  
3.2 Country: Columbia → Mexico 
3.3 Weather/Tide consideration: all nominal conditions 
3.4 Penetration range: maritime only, assume Mexican cooperation, 
therefore limit is coastline 
3.5 Port availability: Operation from CONUS with Mexican port 
support 
3.6 Water depth: IAW with regional parameters 
3.7 Territory: unlimited due to Mexican cooperation 
4. Shipping 
4.1 Traffic density: nominal 
4.2 Type: commercial and pleasure craft 
5. Opposition 
5.1 Go Fasters 
5.1.1 Speed: Tria(25,50,80) kts 
5.1.2 Capacity: Tria(1/4,1/2,1) tons 
5.1.3 RCS: 0 
5.1.4 Visual detection by ship: linear decreasing with range up to 
14kyds.  This detection range is based on visual horizon and 
average ships height of eye. 
5.1.5 Visual detection by aircraft: Based on Triangular 
distributed lateral range curve taking into account aircrafts 
search altitude. 
5.1.6 Range: 400nm 
5.1.7 Acoustic source level: Tria(130,140,150) dB @ 1 yd 
5.1.8 Modus Operandi: Speed Run 
5.1.9 Weapons: Small arms 
5.1.10 Hostility: Evasion, possible on interdiction 
5.1.11 Sensors: Optical, commercial search radar, GPS 
5.1.12 Intelligence: Highly adaptive 
5.1.13 Identification:  All contacts will be identified based on 
contacts actions and characteristics (i.e. speed).  All contacts 
identified as Go Fasts will be intercepted.  Identification is 
100% accurate. 
5.1.14 Boarding:  Boardings were not specifically addressed in the 
context of this study. Previous studies have been conducted 
(e.g. SEA-15: MIO in Logistically Barren Environments).  
5.2 Self Propelled Semi-Submersible(SPSS) semi submersible of narco 
sub 
5.2.1 Speed: Tria(4,10,12) kts  Based on information by the Joint 
Interagency Task Force South fact sheet on SPSS. 
5.2.2 Capacity: Tria(2,4,15) tons.  Based on information by the 
Joint Interagency Task Force South fact sheet on SPSS. 
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5.2.3 RCS: 0.  Based on information by the Joint Interagency 
Task Force South fact sheet on SPSS. 
5.2.4 Visual detection by ship: linear decreasing with range up to 
3kyds.  This detection range is based on visual horizon and 
average ships height of eye. 
5.2.5 Visual detection by aircraft: Based on Triangular 
distributed lateral range curve taking into account aircrafts 
search altitude.   
5.2.6 All aircraft (MV-22, SH-60, CH-53K, MQ-8) are equal at 
detection 
5.2.7 Range: 2000nm.  Based on information by the Joint 
Interagency Task Force South fact sheet on SPSS. 
5.2.8 Acoustic source level: Tria(130,160,180) dB @1yd 
5.2.9 Modus Operandi: Evasion by stealth 
5.2.10 Weapons: None, small arms possible 
5.2.11 Hostility: Evasion 
5.2.12 Sensors: Optical, possible commercial search radar, GPS 
5.2.13 Intelligence: Highly adaptive 
5.2.14 Identification: Detection equals identification 
5.3 Light Aircraft (modeled as Gulfstream G650) 87 
5.3.1 Speed: 488kts 
5.3.2 Capacity: Tria(1/4,3/2,3) tons 
5.3.3 RCS: Tria(1,10,50) m^2 
5.3.4 Range: 7000nm 
5.3.5 Altitude: 20,000’ 
5.3.6 Modus Operandi: Speed 
5.3.7 Weapons: None, small arms possible 
5.3.8 Hostility: Evasion 
5.3.9 Sensors: Optical, Radar, GPS 
5.3.10 Intelligence: Highly adaptive 
5.3.11 Detection:  Based on radar coverage of Area with air 
contacts being uniformly distributed across the area. 
5.3.12 Identification: VHF hail, transponder squawk, local 
intelligence, filed flight plan, course 
5.4 Overall Breakdown 
5.4.1 Total cocaine smuggling: 2000 tons.  Based on information 
presented in the National Drug Threat Assessment by the 
National Drug Intelligence Center the quantity of cocaine 
smuggled from South America was extrapolated by looking at 
past trends. 
5.4.2 Eastern Pacific vector accounts for 69% 88 
5.4.3 Composition: 10/50/40 split between go fasters/semi-
submersibles/light aircraft 
                                                 
87 Gulfstream company, Gulfstream G650 Technical Specifications http://www.gulfstream.com/gulfstreamg650/ 
accessed 6 May 2009 
88 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center “National Drug Threat Assessment 2009” 
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5.4.4 Range from coast: Tria(50,250,500) nm 
5.5 Constraints 
5.5.1 Interdiction: RHIB required if ownship is large (>DDG).  
Only surface vessels can perform interdiction.  
5.5.2 Helo/UAV cannot board 
5.5.3 No shots fired 
5.5.4 Only track and ID light aircraft.  Interdiction will be done 
by local authorities after a handoff from the Phase Zero force.  
This handoff is 100% effective. 
6. Local government 
6.1 Status: stable, moderate corruption of authorities 
6.2 Stand: active counter-smuggling operations, cooperative with U.S. 
Navy (USN) and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), intergovernmental and 
interagency support 
6.3 Capabilities: coastal and naval craft, land based radar 
c. Desired modeling output 
1. Speed of interceptors desired 
2. Radar range desired for detection of Air contacts 
3. Number of aircraft required 
3. Information Sharing 
a. The Phase Zero force is required to share information among USN assets as 
well as with partner nations and organizations.   This information sharing is 
critical to the successful completion of several other missions such as the 
handoff required between the Phase Zero force and local authorities in anti 
smuggling and getting assistance from doctors via video teleconference for 
Civil Support.  To accomplish this capability, hardware and software 
infrastructure is required.  The C2 architecture described in Section VI 
describes the implementation of C2 objectives.  
b. Mission Parameters 
1. MOE 
1.1 100% data handling of critical mission traffic  
2.1 Number of critical data packets lost due to poor connectivity 
3.1 Secured communications for intelligence sensitive information 
4.1 Space available and hardware present on platform for information 
analysis work center 
5.1 100% of reportable events shared 
2. MOP 
1.1 Data bandwidth 
2.1.1  Email: 
2.1.1.1 Light Exchange: Average message size is 20KB; 
10 sent per hour 
2.1.1.2 Medium Exchange:  Average message size is 50 
KB;  30 sent per hour 
2.1.1.3 Heavy Exchange:  Average message size is 50 
KB;  60 sent per hour 
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2.1.2 Peer to Peer: 
2.1.2.1 Light Exchange:  Average message size is 200 
MB;  2 sent per hour 
2.1.2.2 Medium Exchange:  Average message size is 500 
MB;  5 sent per hour 
2.1.2.3 Heavy Exchange:  Average message size is 500 
MB;  15 sent per hour  
2.1.3 UAV 
2.1.3.1 Total required per UAV based on situational 
Awareness senor parameters.  Transfer rate will 
be required from the time the aircraft takes off 
until it lands and will be the sum of the 
parameters. 
2.1.3.2 Situational Awareness Sensor data transfer 
information contained in Table 1. 
2.2 Information collected 
2.2.1 Electronic Sensors 
2.2.1.1 RADAR – cover area up to 500 NM2 and 
maintain 200 contacts 
2.2.1.2 EO/FLIR – process images from 12 sources 
simultaneously 
2.2.1.3 ES – collect information from entire RF band 
from all ships in the force  
2.2.2 Human intelligence – share all applicable reports 
2.2.3 Data Fusion – reports from differing sources will be to 
merged to represent one overall picture   
3. Constraints 
1.1 Data throughput during Anti-smuggling operations:  During an 
intercept there will be light exchange volume, between intercepts 
medium exchange volume 
2.1 Data throughput during Civil Support missions:  Medium volume 
exchange from zero hour to hour 24.  Heavy exchange volume 
from hour 24 until mission complete. 
3.1 All communications within the force will principally be line of 
sight communications. 
4.1 SATCOM can be used to communicate between stations out of 
line of sight and to ground stations. 
5.1 UAVs can be used as a communications node for sea to shore 
communications utilizing UHF/VHF and L-band for data transfer 
6.1 As number of connected users increases, possible connections 
increase at a factorial rate  
7.1 Sharing information with allies using adaptable interfaces 
8.1 Local storage of information limited to shipboard capabilities 
4. Location 




1.1 Regional communications denial technologies 
a. Narrowband Jammers 
b. Denial of Service type attacks 
c. Attempted unauthorized connections 
 
 
Table 43: Situational Awareness Sensor Data Rate 89 
 
C. UAV TRADE STUDY 
Phase Zero missions required that the force have knowledge of its surrounding 
environment. To gain maritime domain awareness, the Phase Zero force needed airborne 
surveillance assets to increase its sensor range beyond the horizon viewable from shipboard 
sensors.  Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) provided a cost effective method to extend sensor 
surveillance and maintain awareness.  UAVs ranged in complexity from small hand launched 
devices to the 116 ft wingspan RQ-4 Global Hawk.   The inventory of UAVs were broken down 
into two large general categories:  complex long range UAVs and smaller short range tactical 
UAVs.    The larger class of UAVs included the MQ-1 Predator and RQ-4 Global Hawk.  These 
platforms had unrefueled ranges of several hundred to several thousand miles and were capable 
of performing prolonged surveillance and imagery missions. 90  The MQ-9 Reaper, an updated 
                                                 
89 http://www.unsysinst.org/html/bandwidth_charts.html accessed on 18 May 2009. 





version of the Predator had weapons delivery capabilities. 91  Small tactical UAVs had similar on 
station times to their larger brethren, but were generally payload limited to less the 100 pounds.   
A specialized subset of UAVs included those that could be operated from ships.  Since 
launching and recovering aboard ship presented unique challenges, most land-based UAVs were 
not considered modifiable to operate from ships.  The larger Predators and Global Hawks 
required thousands of feet of runway. 92  The smaller tactical UAVs such as Pioneer and Dragon 
Eye were simple to launch but usually required complex arresting gear to land.  Since their 
payloads were already limited, adding hardware to allow the UAV to track and fly and intercept 
a moving target would have further reduced their usefulness. 
The RQ-8 Fire Scout was designed with shipboard operations in mind.  Three folded RQ-
8s fit in the folded footprint of one SH-60 which allowed maximal use of current shipboard 
space.  Sensors for the RQ-8 included the BRITE Star II FLIR/EO system, allowing the Fire 
Scout to locate and identify various targets.  Targets could be identified out to 100 NM and 
detected with classification out to 150NM.  This airborne capability greatly extended the sensor 
reach of the shipboard platform.  With the planned addition of a maritime multimode RADAR, 
the Fire Scout was capable of maintaining awareness over an expansive maritime area. 93 
  Because of its unique design features, the Fire scout was chosen as the UAV for the 
Phase Zero force.  The larger Predator and Global Hawk UAVs were capable of performing 
required detection and identification, but because they could not operate from ships, were 
excluded from consideration.  The small UAVs lacked the payload capacity to carry FLIR and 
RADAR which is required for our missions. 
D. MODELING AND SIMULATION 
 Of the three missions selected by the multidimensional scaling process, the Civil Support 
and Anti-smuggling missions lent themselves to more extensive quantitative analysis. The goal 
of modeling and simulation was to translate the nebulous overarching concepts into quantifiable 
requirements that could be used by the force structure team to generate force structures capable 
                                                 
91 US Air Force Fact File MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System.  Available online 
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=6405 accessed on 19 May2009 
92 US Air Force Fact File.  Available online http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/index.asp accessed on 
19May2009 
93 RQ-8 Firescout February 2009. USN Multi-Mission Tactical Air Systems Program Office. Available 
onlinehttp://www.navair.navy.mil/pma266/brief/FINAL%20Fire%20Scout%20Public%20Release%20Brief%20020
409.pdf  accessed on 19May2009 
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of completing Phase Zero. The first task in this process was to assign quantitative values onto the 
mission specifications. These parameters are outlined in Missions, Scenarios, and Methodology 
(Section V.A).  
1. Civil Support  
Since the Civil Support parameters were based on linear relationships and multiplicative 
factors there was no need to use a complex simulation based approach to extract requirements. 
This lent it to simple spreadsheet based computation. The basis for the three mission severities 
were the varying numbers of affected population. Also of note is that the penetration distance 
also varied among the three mission severities with the most severe mission having the greatest 
penetration distance. From these parameters physical characteristics about potential forces were 
extrapolated.  
Concept of Operations and Lift Assumptions: 
 Civil Support provisions are stored aboard ship and transported to the relief site via air 
transport. Although the Navy possessed assets capable of transporting supplies over water the 
relief site (e.g. LCU, LCAC, etc.), these platforms were not used since we took a worst case 
scenario approach to all assumptions. Water provided was to be produced aboard ship by either 
organic or specially equipped water purification equipment and then transported by aircraft to the 
relief site. All supplies were required to be delivered as under slung loads below the air asset. 
This was the standard modus operandi for U.S. Navy VERTREP (vertical replenishment) 
operations. This method allowed more rapid sortie turnover since the air asset was not required 
to land, chock, and chain to the supporting platform deck. The force was required to deliver the 
first supplies after twenty-four hours notice. Since it was be expected that the Phase Zero force is 
able to sustain 100% capacity instantaneously, the assumption was made that supply rates would 
ramp up to full capacity over a five day period. The total amount of supplies delivered was then 
simply the integral of the rate curve over the total of five days. While this ramp up period made 
logistical and operational sense, it also reduced the total quantity delivered and thus the stress on 




Figure 26: Daily Rate Schedule 
 
 The factors detailing the specifications to breakdown food into storage and weight 
requirements are described in Missions, Scenarios, and Methodology (Section V.A.). These 
specifications were used to generate ship storage and transportation requirements. Since all water 
was generated aboard ship, the only storage requirement for water was from the storage required 
for collapsible water bladders used to transport the water ashore. Weight requirements for water 
were based on eight pounds per gallon nominal fresh water density. 
 The number of medical personnel were based on ratios related to the total number of 
expected injured population outlined in the Missions, Scenarios, and Methodology section 
(V.A.). Transporting of personnel did require landing of the air asset resulting in a longer loading 
and unloading time requirement on personnel sorties.  
 Equipment sorties were also under slung loads. Many references were made in source 
documents to “standard” shipping containers. The “standard” shipping container was taken to be 
8’ x 8’ x 20’94. Military Quadcons were used for transporting Marine support equipment and 
were based on one quarter (hence Quadcon) of a standard 20’ shipping container. High Mobility 
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), floodlights, and generator sets were also deemed 
necessary for shore support. For airlift purposes, we determined that two pieces of these 
                                                 
94 http://www.srinternational.com/standard_containers.htm, accessed May 01, 2009 
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equipment could be under slung from either the Super Stallion Multipurpose Helicopter (MH-
53K) or the Multipurpose Tilt-Rotor Osprey aircraft (MV-22). This was based on the lift 
capacity of the platforms but more importantly the bulk that must be netted, chained or otherwise 
gathered in order to sling the load. For example, the MH-53K had a significant lift capacity that 
could carry up to six HMMWVs. However, it was not practical to expect such a bulk load to be 
carried. Suggestions toward these limitations were presented and evaluated by experienced 
surface warfare officers and aviators within the project. The SH-60 was also assumed to carry no 
HMMWVs. Although a light weight HMMWV variant was used and that weight was slightly 
under the SH-60 rated capacity, subject matter expert input caused this option to be dismissed. 
Sortie Parameters and Assumptions: 
 Return speeds from the relief site back to the naval platform were assumed to be the 
nominal cruise speed of the aircraft. Cargo delivery speeds with under slung loads were 
estimated by subject matter expert input taking into account aerodynamic factors and platform 
flight characteristics. For passenger sorties, the cruise speeds were used for both legs of the trip 
since there was no under slung load. Availability was estimated to be 0.85 for all aircraft. Much 
debate surrounded this availability estimate though overall it was accepted, most importantly by 
officers with flight experience. In the absence of detailed aircraft maintenance data this estimate 
was determined to be sufficient for analysis purposes. To determine total flying hours per day, 
the assumption was made that aircraft would only fly during daylight hours (approximately 12 
hours). This was for three reasons. First, since the VERTREP process is inherently dangerous we 
determined that adding the dark of night as a further obscurant to operations was an undue risk. 
Second, the flight crews require rest time. To force a 24 hour schedule would require additional 
personnel to rotate through the aircraft as well as maintenance and shipboard support personnel. 
Third, the aircraft would be rapidly taking supplies off of the ship’s deck therefore new 
provisions for transport would have to be brought up from storage areas and prepared. This 
preparation would benefit from having the night between flight operations to prepare for the next 
day and ensure that the throughput was limited by the organic helicopter assets and not by 
shipboard logistics. Three hours were set aside for helicopter platforms to account for refueling 
and other non-mission operations. Two hours were set aside for the MV-22 rather than three due 
to its lower fuel consumption in aircraft mode.  
Civil Support Results: 
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 Using all of the above assumptions and relationships, cargo sortie, personnel sortie and 
equipment sortie numbers were extrapolated.  From these sortie numbers, flying hours, and 
availability the total number of each type of aircraft for each mission severity were derived.  The 
numbers presented on the bottom line of each aircraft type were rounded up to the nearest whole 
integer.  In the table below, the SH-60 is shown to carry the HMMWV. This was for illustration 
and comparison purposes only and was not factored into force structure formation.  From purely 
a heavy lift perspective, the MH-53K was the clear choice for this specific scenario.  However, 
all three options across the three mission severities were presented to the force structure team for 
consideration. 
 
Parameters   Scenario Severity Low Mean High 
Number affected:   50,000 100,000 150,000 
Number injured:   2,500 5,000 7,500 
Number of "camp" sites: 3 5 8 
Number of "camp" sites containers 15 30 45 
Penetration:   0 25 50 
Time to full capacity (days): 5 5 5 
      
Total Delivered Scenario Severity Low Mean High 
Food (lbs):   312,500 625,000 937,500 
Food (ft^3):  12,750 25,500 38,250 
Food (pallets):  219 439 658 
Water (gal):  62,500 125,000 187,500 
Bladders:     84 167 250 
      
Maximum rate Scenario Severity Low Mean High 
Food (lbs/day):  125,000 250,000 375,000 
Water (gal/day):  25,000 50,000 75,000 
Water (lbs/day):  207,500 415,000 622,500 
Other (Medical, Camp sites lbs/day): 81,100 160,900 240,700 
Total (lbs/day):   413,600 825,900 1,238,200 
      
Medical   Scenario Severity Low Mean High 
Doctors:   7 13 19 
Nurses:   25 50 75 
Surgeons:   4 7 10 
Assistants:  7 13 19 
Total Medical Personnel: 43 83 123 
      
      
Marines   Scenario Severity Low Mean High 
Devil Dogs:   127 209 383 
Quadcons:     8 10 12 
HMMWVs:   11 18 31 
Floodlight Sets:   6 10 16 
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Generator Sets:   6 10 16 
      
Storage   Scenario Severity Low Mean High 
Food (lbs):   312,500 625,000 937,500 
Camp sites (lbs):  375,000 750,000 1,125,000 
Doctors/nurses (lbs)*:  10,500 19,500 28,500 
Surgeons/assistants (lbs): 20,000 35,000 50,000 
Total (lbs):     718,000 1,429,500 2,141,000 
Food (ft^3):  12,750 25,500 38,250 
Camp sites (ft^3)**:  19,200 38,400 57,600 
Doctors/nurses (ft^3):  428 796 1,163 
Surgeons/assistants (ft^3): 816 1,428 2,040 
Water Bladders (ft^3):  168 334 500 
Total (ft^3):   33,362 66,458 99,553 
      
"Vehicle" Storage Scenario Severity Low Mean High 
Marine Quadcon (ft^2): 320 400 480 
HMMWVs (ft^2):  1,540 2,520 4,340 
Floodlight Sets (ft^2):  180 300 480 
Generator Sets (ft^2):  180 300 480 
Total (ft^2):   2,220 3,520 5,780 

















     
Asset Parameters   SH-60S MV-22 MH-53K 
Slung Lift Capacity (lbs): 4,50095 10,00096 27,00097 
Delivery Speed (kts):   80 100 100 
Return Speed (kts):   14698 24199 170100 
Hookup/Dropoff Time (mins): 1 1 1 
PAX capacity:   12101 24102 55103 
                                                 
95 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/sh-60b-specs.htm, accessed May 01, 2009. 
96 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/v-22-specs.htm, accessed May 01, 2009. 
97 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/h-53-specs.htm, accessed May 01, 2009. 
98 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/sh-60b-specs.htm, accessed May 01, 2009. 
99 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/v-22-specs.htm, accessed May 01, 2009. 
100 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/h-53-specs.htm, accessed May 01, 2009. 
101 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/sh-60b-specs.htm, accessed May 01, 2009. 
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PAX Pickup/Dropoff Time (mins): 5 5 5 
Availability:   0.85 0.85 0.85 
Total flying hours/day:   9 10 9 
      
SH-60S   Scenario Severity Low Mean High 
Cargo Trip Time (hrs):  0.13 0.61 1.10 
Cargo Sorties/day:  92 184 276 
Personnel Trip Time (hrs): 0.24 0.58 0.92 
Personnel Sorties/day:  3 5 9 
Equipment Trip Time (hrs): 0.13 0.61 1.10 
Equipment Sorties/day***: 7 10 15 
Number required:   2 16 43 
MV-22        
Cargo Trip Time (hrs):  0.10 0.46 0.81 
Cargo Sorties/day:  42 83 124 
Personnel Trip Time (hrs): 0.21 0.42 0.62 
Personnel Sorties/day:  2 3 5 
Equipment Trip Time (hrs): 0.10 0.46 0.81 
Equipment Sorties/day***: 4 5 8 
Number required:   1 5 13 
MH-53K        
Cargo Trip Time (hrs):  0.11 0.51 0.91 
Cargo Sorties/day:  16 31 46 
Personnel Trip Time (hrs): 0.23 0.52 0.81 
Personnel Sorties/day:  1 2 2 
Equipment Trip Time (hrs): 0.11 0.51 0.91 
Equipment Sorties/day***: 4 5 8 
Number required:   1 3 7 
Table 44: Civil Support Mission Requirements 
 
Sources of Error for Civil Support Requirements: 
 Several major sources of error existed in the initial input to the Civil Support mission. 
The greatest sources of error in the analysis above were in the rate schedule and aircraft 
availability.  Changes in the assumed rate schedule would drastically affect the storage 
requirements of the fleet.  For instance, if the maximum rate were assumed to be achieved on day 
one then the total storage requirement would be doubled. Aircraft availability changes would 
have a drastic impact on the total number of aircraft required.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
102 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/v-22-specs.htm, accessed May 01, 2009. 




Table 45: Comparison of Total Goods Delivered at a Constant vs. Ramp Rate 
 
Table 46: Effect of Aircraft Availability on Number Required 
2. Anti-smuggling 
The general approach for determining the Anti-smuggling fleet requirements was based 
on creating a barrier to identify smugglers and a second barrier to intercept those smugglers. 
After some rudimentary calculations it was easy to determine that aircraft rather than ships were 
best suited for the identification barrier. This was due greatly to their increased height of eye 
compared to a surface asset. Two types of smuggling vessels were considered. They were the 
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conventional “go-faster” cigarette boat and the increasingly prevalent and difficult to detect 
semi-submersible low profile vessel (SSLPV).  
Assumptions: 
 Several key assumptions were used to build an Anti-smuggling simulation model. 
Aircraft were used only to detect and identify possible smugglers. All intercepts were to be 
carried out by surface vessels. In the past the Mexican government has utilized manned aircraft 
to disable smuggling vessels by direct fire. Since this project is constrained to the Phase Zero 
realm, direct fire actions were considered escalation beyond Phase Zero and were not used. The 
intercept vessel had to be of sufficient speed and size to intercept the smuggler or have organic 
rigid high speed inflatable boat (RHIB) capability. Intercept was defined as closing with the 
target. Maritime intercept operations (MIO) and boardings were not the focus of this study. 
Specifics into MIO methods have already been discussed and analyzed in depth by other SEA 
projects (e.g. SEA-13: MIO in Logistically Barren Environments). This is not to say that the 
Phase Zero force does not conduct boardings. However, the boarding process was not included in 
the model. A barrier distance between aircraft identifiers and surface intercept assets was 
established. This barrier enabled time for the intercept asset to travel tangent to the targets path 
and thus reduce the maximum speed requirement of the surface intercept asset.  
 The targets were assumed to travel at right angles to the identification and intercept 
barriers. Targets were randomly and uniformly distributed across the barriers. Targets did not 
alter course as they transited the barrier. Identifiers moved back and forth across the section of 
the barrier that they were responsible for. The length of the responsible section was determined 
by the length of the barrier and number of identifiers. For example, for a barrier of length 250nm 
and two detectors, each detector was responsible for a 125nm length of the barrier. Once 
identified, the information was relayed from the identifier to the interceptor and the interceptor 




Figure 27: Barrier Identification 
 
Since manned platforms and unmanned platforms were considered, the distance from the 
identifier to the interceptor barrier was chosen as the nominal mission radius of the RQ-8 Fire 
Scout, 110nm.104 Identifier sweep widths were divided into manned and unmanned platforms as 
well as target type. SSLPVs have extremely low radar cross section (RCS). In this scenario they 
were assumed to have zero RCS. Therefore, identification of SSLPVs was limited to optical, 
electro-optical (EO), or infra-red (IR) methods. The target speed of the SSLPV was assumed to 
be 12kts. 
For the unmanned platforms, the aircraft were assumed to operate at an identification 
altitude of 11 thousand feet mean sea level (MSL), a speed of 92kts, and with an electro-
optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensor utilizing a 30 degree field of view (FOV).105 These parameters 
were used to define the maximum ranges (rm) of a triangular lateral range curve. The lateral 
range curve was converted into a “cookie cutter” sweep width. This was done by integrating 
from –rm to rm and dividing by two times rm. Since the lateral range curve was triangular the 
overall result is a sweep width equal to the max range. This resulted in an EO/IR UAV sweep 
width of 5nm.  
                                                 
104 MQ-8B Fire Scout Public Release Brief, February 2009. 
http://www.navair.navy.mil/pma266/international/briefs/FSPressConfSAS.pdf, accessed May 01, 2009. 
105 MQ-8B Fire Scout Public Release Brief, February 2009. 




Figure 28: Translating Lateral Range Curve to Sweep Width 
 
Manned aircraft search was based on standard SAR practices provided by subject matter 
experts. The parameters used were an altitude of 500’ MSL, a speed of 60kts, and four personnel 
(2 pilots and 2 air crew) scanning the horizon. Each person scanned a 90 degree sector dividing 
the total horizon as follows; starboard pilot 0-90 degrees relative, starboard crew 45-135 degrees 
relative, port crew 225-315 degrees relative, and port pilot 270 to 0 degrees relative. As some of 






Figure 29: Manned Aircraft SAR FOV Arcs 
 
The sweep width for manned aircraft was determined in the same manner as unmanned 
aircraft with a triangular lateral range curve. This yielded a manned optical sweep width of 
9.6nm.  
 Detection of “go-fast” smugglers was not limited to EO/IR sensors. For “go-fast” targets 
it was determined that radar was an acceptable detection mechanism. Radar performance for the 
manned and unmanned platforms was taken to be equivalent. This performance was based on the 
air to surface maritime radar carried by the RQ-8 Fire Scout. Since identification required more 
information than detection, the triangular lateral range curve was once again employed so as to 
penalize the maximum range of the radar for identification considerations. This led to a radar 
sweep width of 37.5nm 106 for both the manned and unmanned aircraft. The target speed of the 
“go-fast” vessel was assumed to be 80kts. Although this was an extremely high speed, the worst 
case scenario was sought. 
 
                                                 
106 MQ-8B Fire Scout Public Release Brief, February 2009. 
http://www.navair.navy.mil/pma266/international/briefs/FSPressConfSAS.pdf, accessed May 01, 2009. 
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Analytical Methods for Anti-smuggling: 
 The Simulation was a fairly straight-forward time-based MATLAB simulation, 
describing a 2D scenario with the Blue force barrier as the horizontal X-Axis (bottom of the 
screen). The Blue single detector moved along the X-axis, starting at (0,0) moving right with a 
determined speed Vd, going back in the reverse direction once hitting the edge of the barrier 
(0,250). The Red smuggler, named “The target”, started at a random position in the domain, 
when instances of 2 independent uniformly distributed random variables were being used to 
characterize the random nature of the smugglers choice of time and location of attempting to 
outrun the blue force. The red target moved at a constant speed and heading towards the barrier 
until it managed to successfully cross the barrier without being detected or until the Blue detector 
managed to detect it. The Detection model was a “Cookie-Cutter” model with given detection 
radius (depending on the scenario and the choice of aircraft & detection method). The simulation 
was not a “Real-time” loop implementation of a time-based model but a set of fully analytical 
closed-form matrices calculations to calculate the geometrical location of each entity at a given 
time-step vector and the distance between the two (with a small enough chosen time-step to 
insure accuracy and avoiding the case where the target “skips” the barrier and the detector 
between 2 consecutive time steps). The scenario was then run for ten thousand trials in order to 
gather statistics for identification probabilities. The main output of this simulation was a vector 





Figure 30: Example MATLAB Output 
 
Anti-smuggling Results: 
Each of the three scenarios was analyzed using the methodology above. Upon 
examination of the output, an 80% probability of identification still seemed acceptable in terms 















































1 0.14 0.19 0.22
2 0.29 0.35 0.40
3 0.41 0.51 0.57
4 0.52 0.64 0.71
5 0.62 0.74 0.82
6 0.70 0.83 0.91
7 0.80 0.90 0.96
8 0.85 0.95 0.99
9 0.91 0.98 1.00
10 0.94 0.99  
11 0.98 1.00  












13 1.00    
Table 47: Anti-smuggling Identification Results 
 
 From the model results it can be seen that the most limiting case was identification of 
SSLPVs for both manned and unmanned aircraft. This required either seven UAVs or six 
manned aircraft platforms on station continuously.  A threshold probability of identification of 
80% was chosen for the simple reason that NAVAIR used this metric for its test and evaluation 
of the RQ-8B Fire Scout.  
Refueling Considerations: 
 Since the air assets identified in the results section above were required to be on station 
continuously and had to traverse an 110nm barrier stand-off, it was clear that additional aircraft 
would be required in order to keep those aircraft on station.  Before an aircraft reached the end of 
its on station endurance, another aircraft had to be launched in order to relieve the on-station 
aircraft and maintain the barrier. Initially it was thought that only one additional aircraft would 
be required to be en route so long as the aircraft initially on station staggered their arrival times. 
In order to validate this assumption, a manual discrete event-based simulation was used. Each of 
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the aircraft initially on station were staggered according to their total on-station endurance and 
relief aircraft were dispatched with sufficient time to arrive in time to relieve the on station 
aircraft at the expiration of their endurance. The simulation ended when the first aircraft on-
station was able to return to the launching platform, refuel and then return to the barrier. Mission 
endurance for the SH-60 and refueling time was input from subject matter experts. On-station 
times were generated by subtracting off transit times to and from the barrier from the total 
mission endurance.  
SH-60     Firescout    
Mission Endurance (hrs): 3.5  Mission Endurance (hrs):   
Cruise Speed (kts):   120  Cruise Speed (kts):   92
Barrier Range (nm):   110  Barrier Range (nm):   110
Refuel time (hrs):   0.25  Refuel time (hrs):   0.25
Number of aircraft on station: 6  Number of aircraft on station: 7
          
Onstation Time (hrs): 1.67   Onstation Time (hrs): 5.21107
Trip Time (hrs):   0.92   Trip Time (hrs):   1.20
           
Time Event  Time Event 
0.00 #1 on station    0.00#1 on station   
0.28 #2 on station    0.74#2 on station   
0.56 #3 on station    1.49#3 on station   
0.83 #4 on station    2.23#4 on station   
1.11 #5 on station    2.98#5 on station   
1.39 #6 on station    3.72#6 on station   
1.67 #1 off station, #7 relieves #1  4.47#7 on station   
1.94 #2 off station, #8 relieves #2  5.21#1 off station, #8 relieves #1 
2.22 #3 off station, #9 relieves #3  5.96#2 off station, #9 relieves #2 
2.50 #4 off station, #10 relieves #4  6.41#1 lands    
2.58 #1 lands     6.66#1 launches   
2.78 #5 off station, #11 relieves #5  6.70#3 off station, #10 relieves #3 
2.83 #1 launches    7.15#2 lands    
2.86 #2 lands     7.40#2 launches   
3.06 #6 off station, #12 relieves #6  7.44#4 off station, #11 relieves #4 
3.11 #2 launches    7.85#1 earliest on station 
                                                 
107 MQ-8B Fire Scout Public Release Brief, February 2009. 





3.14 #3 lands     7.89#3 lands    
3.33 #7 off station, #13 relieves #7  8.14#3 launches   
3.39 #3 launches    8.19#5 off station, #1 relieves #5 
3.42 #4 lands     8.60#2 earliest on station 
3.61 #8 off station, #14 relieves #8  8.64#4 lands    
3.67 #4 launches    8.89#4 launches   
3.70 #5 lands     8.93#6 off station, #2 relieves #6 
3.75 #1 earliest on station  9.34#3 earliest on station 
3.89 #9 off station, #1 relieves #9  9.38#5 lands    
3.94 #5 launches    9.63#5 launches   
4.03 #2 earliest on station  9.67#7 off station, #3 relieves #7 
4.17 #10 off station, #2 relieves #10  10.08#4 earliest on station 
4.31 #3 earliest on station  10.42#8 off station, #4 relieves #8 
4.44 #11 off station, #3 relieves #11  10.83#5 earliest on station 
4.58 #4 earliest on station  11.16#9 off station, #5 relieves #9 
4.72 #12 off station, #4 relieves #12         
4.86 #5 earliest on station         
5.00 #13 off station, #5 relieves #13          
             
Number required (85% avail): 17  Number required (85% avail): 12
Table 48: Aircraft Barrier Relief Schedule 
 As can be seen from the above simulation, the initial assumption of one additional 
aircraft was not correct. A significant number of additional aircraft were required in order to 
maintain the given number of aircraft on-station continuously. An availability factor of 85% was 
also added similar to the Civil Support mission. Although only six manned aircraft platforms 
were initially required to support the barrier, a total of seventeen SH-60s were required to keep 
that barrier in place. In the case of UAVs, seven were required to support the barrier extending 
out to a total of thirteen in order to maintain the barrier. The difference in the two results was a 
function of the on-station time. Since the UAV was considerably lighter than the manned 
aircraft, this enabled it to stay on-station for a considerably longer time than manned aircraft and 
thus make it more suitable for the barrier mission.  
Surface Intercept Barrier: 
 The number of surface assets required for intercept was a factor of the barrier distance, 
target speed and intercept speed. The barrier distance combined with the target speed dictated the 
amount of time available for the intercept platform to interdict the target once identified at the 
identification barrier. Since the intercept platforms moved tangent to the target path, this yielded 
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a linear relationship for intercept probability. These relationships were analyzed in a spreadsheet. 
The chart below shows the interceptor speed and number comparison for the worst case 80kts 
target speed. 
 
Figure 31: Probability of Intercept for Number and Speed of Assets 
 
 As the chart shows, increasing the number of interceptor or increasing the speed of the 
interceptors increased the probability of intercepting the target platform. Of particular note is the 
30kts limit shown on the chart. Typical maximum speed of a surface asset that could potentially 
serve as an interceptor was around this figure. The curve for three ships nearly intersects with the 
30kts limit. Although by inspection this configuration of three ships capable of 30kts seemed to 
be an optimal selection, all of the data was available to the force structure group for platform 
selection.  
E. MARINE SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
1. Need for Marine 
When natural disasters occur, the Phase Zero force will be required to provide emergent 
Civil Support to the local populace before a more suitable and substantial support force can be 
formed and dispatched. The intensity of the Phase Zero operations was categorized into low, 





mainly on providing limited supplies (food, water and shelter) and medical aid to the affected 
population. During the course of conducting Civil Support operations, the safety of the Phase 
Zero force could be threatened by unsatisfied local populace or even terrorists. Marines would be 
required to provide security for the Phase Zero force operating on land during Civil Support 
operations. 
2. Phase Zero Force Operating on Land 
During the conduct of Civil Support operations, the Phase Zero force ground component 
would be dispersed and concentrated mainly at the landing sites, supply distribution centers and 
medical centers. Ideally all three of these would be co-located at a camp site to minimize the 
ground transportation requirement.  The medical teams consisting of doctors and nurses would 
man the various distribution/medical centers to provide medical support to the injured populace. 
Logistic teams would also be at the centers to distribute water, food and shelters to the populace. 
Another group of logisticians would have to transport supplies from the landing site to the 
distribution/medical centers whenever required. Supplies to be transported to the 
distribution/medical centers would be temporarily stored at the landing site after they were 
unloaded from the ship. The main bulk of the supplies that would not be ready for distribution 
would continue to be stored in the ship. 
3. Marine Force Area of Operations 
The Marine force would set up its Headquarters (HQ) at the landing site for efficient 
command and control of its soldiers. A Marine force would be assigned to secure a perimeter of 
at least 500m x 500m, so that the personnel were away from small arms’ firing range.  It would 
also offer protection to the temporary storage area that houses the supplies unloaded from the 
ship. Marines would deploy to the various distribution/medical centers to protect the medical and 
logistic teams operating there. Mobile Marine forces would escort the transportation of supplies 
from the storage area to the distribution/medical centers. When they were not escorting the 
supplies, they would act as the mobile reserve force to reinforce the Marine force at the 
distribution/medical centers during emergency.  
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4. Marine Force Breakdown and Job Description 
For low intensity Civil Support operations, a Company of Marines (127 soldiers) would 
be required to protect the Phase Zero force operating on land. 108  At the landing site, a platoon 
(41 soldiers) would secure the Company HQ, and protect the logisticians and supplies in the 
temporary storage area. The platoon would rotate shifts to set up the perimeter (with barb wire if 
necessary), perform sentry duties, and patrol the landing site. There were 3 distribution/medical 
centers, and 1 squad of Marines (13 soldiers) that were required to protect the medical and 
logistic teams operating in each center in shifts. Thus, a total of 3 squads (or 1 platoon) was 
required to secure the distribution/medical centers. Another platoon would be responsible for 
escorting the transportation of supplies from the landing site to the various centers. Only 2 of the 
3 squads would perform escort duties at any one time, so that the 3 squads would rotate shifts. 
The squad(s) not performing escort duty would be the reserve force to reinforce the Marine force 
at the distribution/medical centre(s) in the event of emergency.  
Scaling up the requirements up for medium intensity Civil Support operations, a 
company(++) of Marine (209 soldiers) would be required to protect the Phase Zero force 
operating on land. There would be 5 distribution/medical centers, and the number of squads 
escorting transportation of supplies would be increased from 3 to 6. Similarly, for high intensity 
operations with 8 distribution/medical centers, a Battalion(-) of Marine (~383 soldiers) were 
required to protect the Phase Zero force operating on land. 
5. Logistic Requirements 
As a rule of thumb, 200 Marines in a 5-day operation would require 8 Quadcon Type I 
containers’ worth of equipment. 2 Quadcon Type I containers could be connected together to 
create a 10’ ISO container. 109  The M998 HMMWV (High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 
Vehicle) 110 was proposed to transport the Marines and their equipment.  
For low intensity operations, the Company HQ would be equipped with 2 HMMWVs.  
The platoon escorting transportation of supplies would have 3 HMMWVs, two for escort duties 
and the third HMMWV would be used for reinforcing a centre during emergency.  Therefore, a 
total of 10 HMMWVs were required. Similarly for medium intensity operations, the Battalion 
                                                 
108 http://www.marines.cc/content/view/82/56/, accessed 17 May 2009 
109 http://www.cmci-containers.com/CMCI/Products/Military/Quadcons/Quadcon1.htm, accessed 29 April 2009 
110 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m998.htm, accessed 29 April 2009 
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HQ and 3 Company HQs would have to be allocated 2 HMMWVs each to provide command 
presence and emphasis.  Thus, a total of 20 HMMWVs were required. Similarly for high 
intensity operations, a total of 32 HMMWVs were required to provide mobility to the Marines. 
6. Summary 
In order to safeguard the Phase Zero force conducting Civil Support operations on land, a 
Marine force would be required to secure the landing site and distribution/medical centers. It 
would also be required to escort the logistic teams transporting supplies from the landing site to 
the various centers. The size of the force and logistic requirements of the Marine Force would 
vary with the intensity of operations, and are summarized in the table below: 
 
Parameters  Low  Medium  High  
No of populace affected  50,000  100,000  150,000  
No of distribution/medical 
centers  
3  5  8  
No of Marine required  Company 
(127)  
Company (++) 
 (209)  
Battalion(-) 
(383)  
Logistic capacity for 5 days 
operation  
8 x Quadcon  10 x Quadcon  12 x 
Quadcon  
No. of HMMWV required 6 for centers 
+ 3 for 
escorts   
+ 2 for HQ 
= 11  
10 for centers + 
6 for escorts  
+ 2 for HQ 
= 18 
16 for 
centers + 9 
for escorts  
+ 6 for HQs  
=31 
Table 49: Force and Logistics Requirements of the Marine Force 
 
F. COST ESTIMATION OF FORCES 
1. Project Tasking Interpretation 
 The project tasking statement is the source guidance for cost analysis. The tasking states, 
“…using total procurement and operating costs of $1.5B (FY08 constant dollars) per annum…” 
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Many key aspects of the cost analysis portion of the project can be extrapolated from this 
statement.  
2. Procurement Cost 
The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) defined procurement cost as, “Equal to the 
sum of the procurement cost for prime mission equipment, the procurement cost for support 
items, and the procurement cost for initial spares.”111 By contrast, the DAU defined acquisition 
cost as, “Equal to the sum of the development cost for prime mission equipment and support 
items; the procurement cost for prime mission equipment, support items and initial spares; and 
the system specific facilities cost.”112 Attempting to find accurate procurement cost data was 
perhaps the most difficult task in the cost analysis. Many sources cited cost differently. For 
example they may have stated “at a cost of”, “unit replacement cost”, “total program cost”, or 
“awarded at” among many others. The point is that many sources of cost data did not qualify the 
statement by declaring what type of cost data was provided. In many cases the meaning of non-
specific terms had to be inferred based on judgment. The best source of cost data was found to be 
General Accounting office (GAO) reports. These provided detailed breakdowns of program cost 
including items for research and development, procurement, initial spares, etc. GAO reports were 
also taken to be a most reputable source of data as contractor estimates and service branch 
estimates were often found to be skewed in one direction or another. For those reasons, GAO 
reports were the chosen source above others. However, detailed GAO reports were only begun 
around 2004. Older GAO reports provided good insight but detailed cost breakdowns were 
sometimes absent.  
3. Operating Cost 
 Extensive use of the Navy Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Cost 
(VAMOSC) management information system was used for obtaining operating cost data. There 
were two methods to gather data from VAMOSC, either an e-mail query or database access. Due 
                                                 
111 Defense Acquisition University, Department of Defense, “Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and 
Terms”, Defense Acquisition University Press, July 2005, 
http://www.dau.mil/pubs/glossary/12th_Glossary_2005.pdf, accessed May 01, 2009. 
112 Defense Acquisition University, Department of Defense, “Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and 
Terms”, Defense Acquisition University Press, July 2005, 
http://www.dau.mil/pubs/glossary/12th_Glossary_2005.pdf, accessed May 01, 2009. 
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to the large amount of data collected, the access method proved invaluable. The data could also 
be selected to output in constant FY2008 dollars. Operating and support cost data was obtained 
for each of the ships currently in the U.S. fleet. When possible, the operating cost selected from 
VAMOSC was for the fleet average. Many of the future ships considered were either not 
currently in the fleet or of foreign origin. Consequently, these ships did not have operating cost 
data available from VAMOSC. In order to fill this gap, a linear regression based on current ship 
operating cost was constructed to estimate the operating cost of these future ships. Several 
physical aspects of ships were considered to form the basis of the regression such as length, 
displacement, personnel, beam, draft, and speed. The strongest correlations for operating cost 
predictor were found to be displacement and personnel with an adjusted R square value of 0.976. 
The coefficients yielded the following expression for operating cost: 
 
4. FY2008 Corrections 
 The predominance of sources did not use FY2008 as their base year for cost estimates. In 
these cases costs were converted from then-year dollars to FY2008. In order to do this, inflation 
rates were computed from the consumer price index (CPI) back to 1950. A factor was then 
derived to correct then-year dollars to FY2008 dollars. These factors were then applied to all 
costs not associated with FY2008. An example is shown below. 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
3.38 2.83 1.59 2.27 2.68 3.39 3.24 2.85 3.85Rate113 
0.0338 0.0283 0.0159 0.0227 0.0268 0.0339 0.0324 0.0285 0.0385
Factor 1.24501 1.2043 1.17116 1.15283 1.12724 1.09782 1.06182 1.0285 1
Table 50: CPI Then-Year to FY2009 Conversion 
5. Platform Cost Results 
 The following table shows the consolidated cost information for the platforms of interest. 
The final amortized procurement, operating and support cost (PO&S) was used when 
considering forces. 
                                                 
113 Historical Consumer Price Index Data 1913 to Present, 
http://inflationdata.com/inflation/Consumer_Price_Index/HistoricalCPI.aspx, accessed May 01, 2009. 
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     FY2008 Dollar 
  















$1,000,000,000118 1999 1.27 $1,272,274,042 $59,068,119 40  $3,634,998,802 $90,874,970
DDG-51 
Burke 
$1,031,667,188119 2001 1.20 $1,242,439,806 $41,951,110 40  $2,920,484,206 $73,012,105
FFG-7 Perry $194,230,769120 1978 3.42 $665,102,975 $26,929,123 20  $1,203,685,435 $60,184,272
LCC-19 Blue 
Ridge 
$341,818,182121 1965 6.69 $2,287,780,267 $81,404,132 45  $5,950,966,207 $132,243,693
LHA-1 
Tarawa 
$223,380,000122 1973 4.97 $1,108,840,343 $126,899,444 42  $6,438,616,991 $153,300,405
LHD-1 Wasp $319,933,333123 1991 1.59 $507,973,217 $134,722,405 45  $4,549,645,367 $101,103,230
LPD-17 San 
Antonio 
$1,750,000,000124 2009 0.96 $1,685,833,333 $35,246,107 40  $2,743,216,543 $68,580,414
LPD-4 
Austin 



















$113,833,333128 1989 1.75 $199,680,551 $10,764,864 30  $522,626,471 $17,420,882
                                                 
114 In the absence of better information, based on year ordered. 
115 Based on inflation rate derived from the consumer price index back to year 1950. 
116 O&S Information obtained from Navy VAMOSC online query, http://www.navyvamosc.com/, accessed May 01, 
2009. Future ship O&S based on linear regression of VAMOSC available O&S. Miscellaneous equipment O&S cost 
approximated as 5% of procurement cost 
117 In the absence of better information, 30 and 20 years assumed for ships and aircraft respectively. 
118 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/cg-47-mod.htm, accessed May 01, 2009. 
119 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/ddg-51-build.htm, accessed May 01, 2009. 
120 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/ffg-7.htm, accessed May 01, 2009. 
121 Substituted Austin Class procurement in 1965. 
122 http://archive.gao.gov/f0302/096128.pdf, accessed May 01, 2009. 
123 http://archive.gao.gov/d23t8/142320.pdf, accessed May 01, 2009. 
124 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34476.pdf, accessed May 01, 2009. 
125 http://warfare.ru/?compare=true&linkid2=2542&linkid=1752&catid=272, accessed May 01, 2009. 
126 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/lsd-41-unit.htm, accessed May 01, 2009. 
127 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/lsd-49-unit.htm, accessed May 01, 2009. 




     FY2008 Dollar 
  















$19,400,000129 2004 1.13 $21,868,471 $2,227,924 10  $44,147,711 $4,414,771
AOE-6 
Supply 
$684,000,000130 1998 1.29 $883,724,094 $18,511,977 40  $1,624,203,184 $40,605,080
MV-22 
Osprey 









$30,810,000134 1994 1.46 $44,234,867 $3,753,531 20 $119,305,491 $5,965,275
USCG FRC $41,600,000135 2007 1.03 $42,785,600 $6,282,408 40 $294,081,920 $7,352,048
LCS-1 
Freedom 
$253,428,571136 2009 0.96 $244,136,190 $17,009,404 30  $754,418,310 $25,147,277
JHSV $177,625,000137 2009 0.96 $171,112,083 $8,387,630 30  $422,740,983 $14,091,366
LHA-6 
America 
$3,069,600,000138 2009 0.96 $2,957,048,000 $124,500,821 45  $8,559,584,945 $190,212,999
HMS 
Invincible 
$259,055,000139 1982 2.28 $591,306,644 $78,664,662 30  $2,951,246,504 $98,374,883
JMSDF 
DDH Hyuga 
$1,060,000,000140 2004 1.13 $1,194,875,214 $47,943,312 35  $2,872,891,134 $82,082,604










$184,000,000142 2006 1.06 $195,375,506 $8,292,886 30  $444,162,086 $14,805,403
                                                 
129 http://www.gao.gov/htext/d0510.html, accessed May 01, 2009. 
130 https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1030/mr1030.appc.pdf, accessed May 01, 2009 
131 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09326sp.pdf, accessed May 01, 2009. 
132 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09326sp.pdf, accessed May 01, 2009. 
133 MH-53K annual operating and support cost approximated by MH-53E 
134 http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/showthread.php?t=952, accessed May 01, 2009. 
135 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06764.pdf, accessed May 01, 2009. 
136 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09326sp.pdf, accessed May 01, 2009. 
137 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08467sp.pdf, accessed May 01, 2009. 
138 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09326sp.pdf, accessed May 01, 2009. 
139 Procurement cost is the proposed sale price to the Australian Government in 1982. 
140 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/ddh-x.htm, accessed May 01, 2009. 
141 http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,128418,00.html, accessed May 01, 2009. 
http://www.gizmag.com/go/5151/, accessed May 01, 2009. 
142 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/visby-specs.htm, accessed May 01, 2009. 
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$12,193,785143 2008 1.00 $12,193,785 $2,167,944
144
20  $55,552,661 $2,777,633
M996 
HMMWV 

















$25,063147 2008 1.00 $25,063 $1,253 5  $31,329 $6,266
Table 51: Platform Procurement, Operating and Support Cost Data 
6. Sources of Error for Platform Cost Data 
 The greatest source of procurement cost error was from poor description in source 
documents as described above. These documents also failed to qualify with which fiscal year 
dollars the costs were associated. In the absence of fiscal year data, the lead ship year ordered 
was used. Since procurement cost was amortized across the lifecycle of the ship, the second 
greatest source of error was the estimated life of the ship. In the absence of data for ship 
lifecycle, thirty years was used. In the absence of aircraft lifecycle, twenty years was used. Many 
ships were also undergoing lifespan extension programs that involved additional investments to 
extend that lifespan. These costs were not included in the procurement estimate while the 
extended lifespan was used. VAMOSC operating cost data did capture depot modernization 
periods, overhauls and availabilities but lifecycle program upgrades were not specifically 
included. Operating costs also varied with the age of the ship. For example, the FFG-7 class had 
a slightly higher amortized cost than a LPD-17 class due to the age of the FFG-7 class.  
 After the initial force structures were formed, several other items were considered that 
required cost data. Security for provision distribution on land was deemed necessary requiring, a 
                                                 
143 http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/am/sar/2008-SEP-SARSUMTAB.pdf, accessed May 01, 2009. 
144 RQ-8 O&S cost approximated by program goal of ½ F/A-18C/D O&S Cost obtained from Navy VAMOSC 
145 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m998.htm, accessed May 01, 2009. 
146 http://www.generatorjoe.net/product.asp?0=0&1=0&3=2644, accessed May 01, 2009. 




complement of Marines. VAMOSC was called upon once again to obtain operating and support 
costs for these forces. The online VAMOSC query yielded operating and support cost across 
each pay grade and specialty for the entire Marine Corps. The assumption was made that the 
composition in terms of pay grade breakdown within our security forces would follow the 
general demographic of the Marine Corps. Consider the following example; the entire Marine 
Corps is comprised of 100 personnel with 50 E3s, 30 O1s, and 20 O3s; our force is comprised of 
a total of 10 personnel; therefore in our force there would be 5 E3s, 3 O1s and 2 O3s. This 
method was used to scale each of the three scenario forces and provide associated cost data. Our 
force also made use of doctors, surgeons, nurses and assistants. For these medical personnel, 
AQD (additional qualification designator) numbers were selected representative of these 
specialties. Field Medicine Marine Corps Medical Officer (AQD 6FA) O3-O8, Trauma Surgeon 
(AQD 6CM), general E5, and Field Medical Marine Corps Medical Officer (AQD 6FA) O1-O2 
were selected for doctors, surgeons, nurses, and assistants respectively. Costs for food, medical 
supplies and tents commensurate with the scenario severity were also factored into the scenario 
cost. The resultant total additional personnel cost is shown in the figure below.  
 












E1 13909 $21,820 0.06405   8.13384 $177,481 17.67669 $385,706 24.52961 $535,237
E2 24141 $27,805 0.11116   14.11726 $392,532 30.68003 $853,062 42.57411 $1,183,778
E3 49494 $30,516 0.22790   28.94368 $883,248 62.90122 $1,919,499 87.28684 $2,663,653
E4 41826 $39,063 0.19260   24.45971 $955,464 53.15653 $2,076,441 73.76431 $2,881,438
E5 33237 $50,191 0.15304   19.43666 $975,546 42.24029 $2,120,085 58.61606 $2,942,002
E6 16647 $63,832 0.07665   9.73504 $621,408 21.15647 $1,350,461 29.35844 $1,874,010
E7 9157 $74,613 0.04216   5.35492 $399,545 11.63746 $868,303 16.14909 $1,204,928
E8 4088 $84,924 0.01883   2.39086 $203,043 5.19589 $441,258 7.21024 $612,325
E9 1744 $104,912 0.00803   1.02002 $107,012 2.21674 $232,562 3.07612 $322,722





Total  Low  Medium  High 
O1 3116 $57,259 0.01435  1.82225 $104,341 3.96017 $226,756 5.49546 $314,666
O2 3118 $79,777 0.01436  1.82352 $145,475 3.96293 $316,150 5.49928 $438,715
O3 5998 $98,425 0.02762  3.50733 $345,207 7.62222 $750,214 10.5772 $1,041,058
O4 4520 $113,455 0.02081  2.64305 $299,868 5.74396 $651,681 7.97079 $904,325
O5 2824 $122,975 0.01300  1.65140 $203,080 3.58886 $441,340 4.98020 $612,439
O6 1111 $147,917 0.00512  0.64995 $96,138 1.41248 $208,930 1.96007 $289,928
O7 46 $188,084 0.00021  0.02685 $5,050 0.05835 $10,976 0.08098 $15,231
O8 27 $208,314 0.00012  0.01569 $3,269 0.03410 $7,104 0.04732 $9,858
157 
 
O9 16 $230,035 0.00007  0.00911 $2,096 0.01980 $4,556 0.02748 $6,322
O10 4 $240,551 0.00002  0.00239 $574 0.00519 $1,248 0.00720 $1,732
W1 348 $76,992 0.00160  0.20370 $15,683 0.44269 $34,084 0.61431 $47,297
W2 795 $80,990 0.00366  0.46486 $37,649 1.01024 $81,820 1.40190 $113,540
W3 598 $93,507 0.00275  0.34985 $32,713 0.76030 $71,094 1.05506 $98,655
W4 311 $108,480 0.00143  0.18167 $19,708 0.39482 $42,830 0.54789 $59,434
W5 96 $126,632 0.00044  0.05638 $7,140 0.12253 $15,517 0.17004 $21,532
Subtotal 22928              
USMC 
Total 217172 Scenario Marine Subtotal 127 $6,033,272 276 $13,111,677 383 $18,194,827
O/E Ratio 8.472              
     Low  Medium  High 
Doctors $156,616    7 $1,096,311 13 $2,036,006 19 $2,975,701
Surgeons $159,331    4 $637,325 7 $1,115,319 10 $1,593,313
Nurses $50,191    25 $1,254,776 50 $2,509,553 75 $3,764,329
Assistants $96,276    7 $673,932 13 $1,251,589 19 $1,829,245
           
  Scenario Medical Subtotal 43 $3,662,345 83 $6,912,466 123 $10,162,588
           
     Low  Medium  High 
Food Packs148 $4.50    125,000 $562,500 250,000 $1,125,000 375,000 $1,687,500
Medical 
Supplies149 $3.77    50,000 $188,692 100,000 $377,384 150,000 $566,076
Tents150 $4,027    480 $1,932,806 960 $3,865,613 1,440 $5,798,419
           
  
Scenario Supplies 
Subtotal   $2,683,998   $5,367,997   $8,051,995
           
     Low  Medium  High 
  Scenario Total   $12,379,615   $25,392,140   $36,409,410
Table 52: Additional Personnel and Supplies Cost 
7. Sources of Error for Additional Personnel 
 By taking the entire Marine Corps as a demographic of our mission force, the integrated 
study team included certain personnel that may not actually be in the force. For example it is 
clear that the Commandant of the Marine Corps would not be stationed on the Phase Zero force 
however, the high side mission includes 0.0072 O10 pay. This can be dismissed if one considers 
                                                 
148 World Food Programme, “Emergency Field Operations Pocketbook”, 
http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/WFP_manual.pdf, accessed May 01, 2009. 
149 Based on $7,000,000 worth of pharmaceutical and medical supplies delivered to Aceh Province, Indonesia 
assisting 1,854,876 people, http://www.projecthope.org/media/pdf/BestPracticesIndonesia.pdf, accessed May 01, 
2009. 
150 Based on 24sqft per person housed in 50ft square "solar system" tents, 
http://nsc.natick.army.mil/media/print/Smartbook_Web.pdf, accessed May 01, 2009. 
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that a fraction of the Commandant’s day may be spent dealing with the Phase Zero mission, 
however small that fraction may be. This rationale could also be extended to the rest of the ranks 
that may or may not be present in the force. The use of military doctors also was a point of 
contention. The doctors and surgeons were initially idealized as civilian and may have incurred 
larger costs as a result. Conversely, the doctors responding to the 2004 Indonesian tsunami were 
all volunteers.151 Overall, this method of additional personnel cost estimation seemed 
reasonable.  
G. HISTORIC GAP ANALYSIS 
Partnership of the Americas 2007 (POA 2007) was a multi-month mission throughout 
Latin America and the Caribbean, which focused on enhancing relationships with regional 
partner nations through a variety of exercises and events at sea and on shore. 152  POA 2007 was 
commanded by Commander Destroyer Squadron 40 and consisted of the USS Pearl Harbor 
(LSD 52) with embarked units of the 24th Marine Regiment and Assault Craft Unit 1, USS 
Mitscher (DDG 57), USS Samuel B Roberts (FFG 58) with Helicopter Anti-Submarine 
Squadron Light (HSL) 48 detachment 7, and Chilean frigate Almirante Latorre (FFG 14) with 
one SH-32 “Super Puma”. 153   
Units Assigned to Partnership of the Americas 2007 focused on operating in the multi-
national environment while preparing to deal with unconventional threats such as illicit 
trafficking, and improving training levels in a variety of mission areas. 154  Participating ships 
also made a variety of port visits designed to promote goodwill and friendship with nations in the 
region distributing Project Handclasp materials to the citizens. 155  Project Handclasp received 
                                                 
151 Project Hope, “Humanitarian Assistance and Beyond-Indonesia”, 
http://www.projecthope.org/media/pdf/BestPracticesIndonesia.pdf, accessed May 01, 2009. 
152 United States Southern Command, Destroyer Squadron Four Zero, “Chilean Frigate Joins Partnership of the 
Americas” Press Release 16 Mar. 2007. http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/news.php?storyId=167 accessed on 30 
Apr. 2009 
153 United States Southern Command, USS Pearl Harbor Public Affairs, “USS Pearl Harbor Joins Partnership of the 
Americas” Press Release 29 Mar. 2007. http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/news.php?storyId=192 accessed on 30 
Apr. 2009 
154 United States Southern Command, Partnership of the America’s 2007, 
http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/factFiles.php?id=7 accessed on 30 Apr. 2009 
155 United States Southern Command, Destroyer Squadron Four Zero, “U.S. Navy ship completes goodwill visit to 




support from donors around the United States.  Contributions include supplies such as medical 
kits, toys, hygiene products, sewing machines, and food items. 156 
The deployment had three stages: 157 
• Stage 1 consisted of the participation in the Atlantic and Pacific phases of 
exercise UNITAS, and the Chilean exercise Teamwork South.  Both series of 
exercises were designed to train participating navies in a variety of maritime 
scenarios, with each operating as a component of a multinational force to 
provide the maximum opportunity to improve interoperability.   
• Stage 2 involved a variety of Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) events in 
the Caribbean and Central America. TSC encompasses military-to-military 
cooperation, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, combined training, 
exercises and operations, intelligence sharing and maritime security assistance 
within the region to achieve common goals.   
• Stage 3 concluded the deployment with participation in FA PANAMAX 
2007, which is an annual exercise designed to assist the government of 
Panama in protecting the sovereignty and security of the Panama Canal. 
 
 The force put together under Task Force 40 for Partnership of the Americas 2007 was 
designed to conduct many of the Phase Zero missions identified in this report.  By taking a closer 
look at the force’s ability to carry out these missions we gained valuable insights into the 
compositions and capabilities required by a future force. 
Civil Support: 
 The first of the missions that was explored was Civil Support.  As part of this mission it 
was determined that a force would need to be able to perform in a humanitarian assistance role 
following a disaster.  A full list of the requirements for this mission can be found in the Civil 
Support mission scenario.  These requirements, such as being able to perform the mission for 5 
days unsupported were combined with the assumed severity of the disaster.  The disaster severity 
was determined by the number of personnel affected with 50,000 affected being the low severity, 
100,000 affected being the mean severity and 150,000 affected being the high severity.  This 
produced the requirements in the tables below.  The available capacity was determined from the 
capabilities for the ships as listed in the current force capabilities appendix.  From this it was 
                                                 
156 United States Southern Command, Destroyer Squadron Four Zero, “U.S. Navy ship completes goodwill visit to 
El Salvador” Press Release 9 Aug. 2007. http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/news.php?storyId=622 accessed on 30 
Apr. 2009 
157 United States Southern Command, Partnership of the America’s 2007, 
http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/factFiles.php?id=7 accessed on 30 Apr. 2009 
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possible to determine how well the POA 2007 force would have fulfilled the mission 
requirements. 
 
  Required Available Deficit 
Requirement 
Met 
Cargo Capacity 99,553 ft3 40,560 ft3 58,993 ft3 40.74% 
Aircraft Lift Capacity 1,238,200 lbs/day 622,694  lbs/day 615,506 lbs/day 50.29% 
Water Production capacity 75,000 gal 61,388 gal 13,612 gal 81.85% 
Table 53: POA 2007 High Severity Civil Support Mission Requirement Gap 
 
  Required Available Deficit 
Requirement 
Met 
Cargo Capacity 66,458 ft3 40,560 ft3 25,898 ft3 61.03% 
Aircraft Lift Capacity 825,900 lbs/day 622,694 lbs/day 203,206 lbs/day 75.40% 
Water Production capacity 50,000 gal 61,388 gal -11,388 gal 122.78% 
Table 54: POA 2007 Mean Severity Civil Support Mission Requirement Gap 
 
  Required Available Deficit 
Requirement 
Met 
Cargo Capacity 33,362 ft3 40,560 ft3 -7,198 ft3 121.57% 
Aircraft Lift Capacity 413,600 lbs/day 622,694 lbs/day -209,094 lbs/day 150.55% 
Water Production capacity 25,000 gal 61,388 gal -36,388 gal 245.55% 
Table 55: POA 2007 Low Severity Civil Support Mission Requirement Gap 
 
As shown in the above tables the Partnership of the America’s 2007 force would have 
been able to complete the low severity Civil Support mission however, it would have been ill 
equipped to carry out the mean and high severity missions.  The main gap in this force’s 
capabilities would have been in the airlift requirement.  Through modeling and analysis, the 
required number of each type of helicopters required for each mission severity was determined, 
as shown in the table below. 
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Scenario Severity Low Mean High 
SH-60's required: 2 17 43 
MV-22's required: 1 5 13 
CH-53's required: 1 3 7 
Table 56:  Number of Air Assets Required for Civil Support Mission 
 
Table 56 shows the number of aircraft required to completely meet the air lift mission 
assuming a 85% availability.  For example the aircraft required for the Low severity Civil 
Support mission was 2 SH-60, or 1 MV-22, or 1 CH-53.  POA 2007 deployed with 2 SH-60 and 
one SH-32, meeting only the number of aircraft required for the low severity mission.   The force 
deployed with one SH-32 “Super Puma” onboard the Chilean frigate Almirante Latorre.  The 
SH-32 gave the force a relatively heavy lift capability of 7500 lbs.  This would have allowed the 
force to under sling one HMMWV or other equipment such as generators or flood lights.  This 
was a critical capability that the SH-60 alone could not meet.  The low severity mission requires 
115 Marines with 11 HMMWVs and therefore requires some heavy lift capability. 
Anti-smuggling: 
As shown in Modeling and Simulation (Section V.D.), 17 SH-60 helicopters were 
required to meet the Anti-smuggling requirement of 80% identification.  In addition to this 
helicopter requirement, three intercept ships were also required.  POA 2007 deployed with two 
Frigates and one Destroyer which met the number of intercept ship requirement however, it fell 
well short of the number of SH-60’s required for 80% identification along the assumed 250 nm 
barrier width.      
The POA forces deployed with some capabilities that would be of limited usefulness 
during Phase Zero operations.  One of these was the Aegis weapons system.  This system 
provided the force with a powerful air defense system however, in a Phase Zero atmosphere, this 
would be of little use.  Instead the extra cost associated with an Aegis equipped destroyer could 
be saved by replacing the destroyer with another frigate.  The frigate offered near equal speed 
and equal aircraft storage capability for approximately $13 million less per year. 
The key lessons learned through this gap analysis were: 
• The number of aircraft required for airlift was the limiting capability in the 
Civil Support mission area. 
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• The number of SH-60’s required was the limiting capability in the Anti-
smuggling mission area 
• In Phase Zero there was little additional capability an Aegis destroyer or 
cruiser brought to the force over a frigate therefore it was more cost effective 
to substitute the more expensive destroyer or cruiser for a frigate. 
H. OPTIMIZATION MODEL 
The project team constructed a mixed-integer linear program for the Civil Support and 
Anti-smuggling missions to recommend an optimal force structure that fulfils the mission 
requirements while minimizing cost. In the first section, we discussed the formulation of an 
optimization model for the Civil Support mission and present the results of the model. In the 
second section, we discussed the formulation of an optimization model that combines both the 
requirements of the Civil Support and Anti-smuggling mission. The Anti-smuggling mission 
force structure components were outputs from a separate analytical model stating the number and 
type of platforms required. Thus the linear optimization model was used to select the appropriate 
platform and the respectively number of entities required to perform both missions while 
minimizing cost. Each of the mission areas were considered individually and then combined into 
a single output.  
1. Civil Support Optimization 
The delivery of aid and support to a disaster area consists of 2 stages: The first stage 
requires the transportation of all required supplies and personnel via a ship platform near the 
disaster site; stage 2 involves the ship-to-shore transportation of personnel, logistics and 
equipment through the use of helicopters to the affected area. To model stage 1 of the operations, 
it was necessary to translate the mission requirements into units that can be contrasted with the 
platform capabilities. Hence the food, medical and other Civil Support supplies were translated 
into cubic feet (ft3) to ensure that the volume requirements (i.e. typical measure used for ship 
storage space) of the supplies were met by the respective ship platform under considerations. On 
the other hand, the vehicle storage space which was typically measured by the floor space 
occupied was translated into square feet (ft2). To model Stage 2 of the operations, it was 
necessary to translate the mission requirements into units that could be contrasted with the 
platform capabilities. There were two key categories of requirements, i.e. the daily max rate 
supply required and the total supply required over the 5-day mission period.  Given that the daily 
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max rate supply imposed a higher demand, satisfying it would enable the force to meet the total 
supply required over the 5-day mission period as well.  For items where daily max supply rate 
was not specified, the average (over the 5-day period) could be used to work out the overall daily 
demand that had to be met for the mission. 
 Based on the operational practice of using the external sling for cargo/vehicle lifting 
(without internal load) and transporting passengers using cabin space (without external load) for 
transfer efficiency, the maximum daily sorties achievable for each platform was computed and 
summarized in the table below.  The calculation took into consideration the above-mentioned 
platform capability, types of load that the platform could carry, penetration distance (i.e. distance 
of disaster area from the shoreline) and supply requirements for the respective severity scenarios.  
Airlift Platform Type S/N 
 
Scenario Severity 
SH-60S MV-22 MH-53K 
A. For General Supply     
1. Low 52 70 59 
2. Mean 12 17 14 
3. High 6 10 8 
A. For Equipment Supply     
1. Low 70 59 




C. For Passenger      
1. Low 24 29 24 
2. Mean 11 17 12 
3. High 7 12 8 
Table 57: Maximum Daily Sorties for Probable Airlift Platforms 
Model Development: 
Sets: 
I: Set of ships available for force structure selection { CG-47 Ticonderoga, DDG-51 
Burke, FFG-7 Perry, LCC-19 Blue Ridge, LHA-1 Tarawa, LHD-1 Wasp, LPD-17 San 
Antonio, LPD-4 Austin, LSD-41 Whidbey Island, LSD-49 Harpers Ferry, USCG FRC, 




J: Set of helicopters available for force structure selection { MV-22 Osprey, MH-53K 
Super Stallion, SH-60 Seahawk } 




i Ship  
1 CG-47 Ticonderoga 
2 DDG-51 Burke 
3 FFG-7 Perry 
4 LCC-19 Blue Ridge 
5 LHA-1 Tarawa 
6 LHD-1 Wasp 
7 LPD-17 San Antonio 
8 LPD-4 Austin 
9 LSD-41 Whidbey Island 
10 LSD-49 Harpers Ferry 
11 USCG FRC 
12 LCS-1 Freedom 
13 JHSV 
14 LHA-6 America 
15 M-80 Stiletto 
16 JMSDF DDH Hyuga 
17 Visby 
j Aircraft  
1 RQ-8 Fire Scout 
2 MV-22 Osprey 
3 MH-53K Super Stallion 
4 SH-60 Seahawk  
k Airlift Sortie  
1 Sortie to support passenger lifting 
2 Sortie to support general supply 
3 Sortie to support equipment supply 






S/N Data Unit 
1. Ship_cargo_ capacityi   ft3 
2. Ship_ vehicle _storagei ft2 
3. Ship_ passenger_ capacityi  Pax 
4. Sortie_ general_supply_ daily _capacityj Lbs 
5. Sortie _ equipment_supply_ daily _capacityj Sets 
6. Sortie _ passenger_ daily _capacityj Pax 
7. Number_aircraftjk # aircraft 
8. Number_aircraft_per_shipij # aircraft per ship 
Table 59: Data for Mission Support Operations 
 
Decision Variables: 
Xi :  Number of ships of type i [ # of ships] 
Yj :  Number of aircraft of type j [ # of aircraft] 
Yij:  Number of organic aircraft of type j for ship type i [ # of aircraft] 
Zjk :  Number of sortie of type k for aircraft of type j [ # of aircraft sortie] 
Formulation: 
Min      
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Additional Assumptions: 
 Some additional assumptions were made to properly compare platforms for 
consideration. The mix of organic air platforms for each ship type had a linear relationship based 
on the capacity defined in Table 2.  For example, given the CG-47 can house either 6 RQ-8 or 2 
SH-60, we inferred that it could house 3 RQ-8 and 1 SH-60 concurrently (i.e. using a 3:1 
conversion ratio). The time taken to reconfigure the air platform for different load-lifting was 
insignificant to have an impact on the defined maximum sorties per day rates established in 
Table 6 on the basis that it would be done infrequently. 
Results: 
 The above model was run on a trial version of classic LINDO158 for the following 6 
scenarios: Run#1 – Low Severity Scenario using Current Force Assets only, Run#2 – Mean 
Severity Scenario using Current Force Assets only, Run#3 – High Severity Scenario using 
Current Force Assets only, Run#4 – Low Severity Scenario using Current and Future Force 
Assets, Run#5 – Mean Severity Scenario using Current and Future Force Assets, Run#6 – High 









                                                 
158 LINDO, A program for linear and integer programming, 






Platform Current Force Future Force Cat LINDO 
Index Severity Scenarios  Low Mean High Low Mean High 
X_1 CG-47 Ticonderoga - - - - - - 
X_2 DDG-51 Burke - - - - - - 
X_3 FFG-7 Perry - - - - - - 
X_4 LCC-19 Blue Ridge - - - - - - 
X_5 LHA-1 Tarawa - - - - - - 
X_6 LHD-1 Wasp - 1 1 - 1 1 
X_7 LPD-17 San Antonio - - - - - - 
X_8 LPD-4 Austin 1 - - - - - 









X_10 LSD-49 Harpers Ferry - - - - - - 
X_11 USCG FRC N.A N.A N.A - - - 
X_12 LCS-1 Freedom N.A N.A N.A - - - 
X_13 JHSV N.A N.A N.A 1 - - 
X_14 LHA-6 America N.A N.A N.A - - - 
X_15 M-80 Stiletto N.A N.A N.A - - - 
















Y_1 RQ-8 Firescout N.A N.A N.A - - - 
Y_2 MV-22 Osprey 
 
- - - - - - 
Y_3 MH-53K Super Stallion 
 
















Y_4 SH-60 Seahawk  
 
1 2 1 1 2 1 
Total Cost (US$M) 93.671 132.519 165.526 88.255 132.519 165.526
Table 60: Results for Civil Support Mission Only 
 
For the low severity mission using current force assets, the recommended force structure 
consisted of 1 LHD-4, 1 MH-53K Super Stallion and 1 SH-60 Seahawk at a cost of $93.671 
million dollars. With the introduction of future force assets, the cost was reduced to $88.255 
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million dollars by replacing the LHD-4with the existing LSD-41 and the JHSV. The JHSV 
platform essentially provided the additional facility required to support the organic air platform 
operation.  
The Future Force assets did not contribute to the medium and high severity mission 
support. The existing force assets could be deployed to provide the optimal force structure to 
support the medium and high severity mission at a cost $132.519 million dollars and $165.526 
million dollars respectively. The recommended force structure for the medium severity mission 
consisted of 1 LHD-1, 2 MH-53Ks, and 2 SH-60s and for the high severity mission, 1 LHD-1, 6 
MH-53Ks and 1 SH-60. 
Across all the 3 different levels of severity, a single ship is sufficient, the LHD-1 was 
sufficient.  However for stage 2 of the operation where personnel and supplies are airlifted to the 
affected area, the number and type of helicopters required differs from mission to mission with 
the number required increasing with the level of severity. The following table summarizes how 
the airlift platforms should be deployed for the different load types and the respective number of 
sorties involved as recommended by the optimization model.  A difference in the MH-53K Super 
Stallion and SH-60 Seahawk sortie distribution for high severity mission (Current vs. Future 
force) was observed, though the number of aircraft for both scenarios was the same. This was 
due to the spare lift capacities in the optimal solution and that the model was optimized for 
















Platform Current Force Future Force LINDO 
Index Severity Scenarios  Low Mean High Low Mean High 
Y_2 MV-22 Osprey - - - - - - 
Z_21 - Sorties for Passenger Lifting  - - - - - - 
Z_22 - Sorties or General Supply  - - - - - - 
Z_23 - Sorties for Equipment Supply  - -  - - - 
Y_3 MH-53K Super Stallion 1 2 4 1 2 4 
Z_31 - Sorties for Passenger Lifting  1 - 1 1 - 2 
Z_32 - Sorties or General Supply  7 28 46 16 28 46 
Z_33 - Sorties for Equipment Supply  3 5 7 3 5 5 
Y_4 SH-60 Seahawk  1 2 1 1 2 1 
Z_31 - Sorties for Passenger Lifting  - 6 4 - 6 - 
Z_32 - Sorties or General Supply  50 16 - - 16 - 
Z_33 - Sorties for Equipment Supply  Not Capable 
Table 61: Recommended Air Platforms and Number of Sorties for Civil Support Only 
 
2. Combining Civil Support Anti-smuggling Missions 
The Anti-smuggling mission force structure components were outputs from a separate 
analytical model stating the number and type of platforms required. Thus the linear optimization 
model was used to select the appropriate platform and the respectively number of entities 
required to perform both missions while minimizing cost. The output of the analytical model 
provided the following constraints on Anti-smuggling operations. A total of 17 aircraft were 
required to provide the sensor coverage in fulfilling the Anti-smuggling objectives. The MH-53 
was not considered for selection. A factor of 1.214 was applied to the RQ-8 to account for its 
longer endurance in providing the sensor coverage. A set of interceptors were required to provide 
interception for the detected targets in fulfilling the Anti-smuggling objectives. The number 
required for each ship platform type, was pre-defined based on the number-speed chart provided 
in the interceptor discussion above. This imposes additional constraints on the original model 
formulated strictly for the Civil Support missions. These constraints were formulated accordingly 
and added to the original model so that an optimal force structure that could fulfill both missions 






































Platform Current Force Only Current & Future Force Cat LindoI
ndex Severity Scenarios  Low Mean High Low Mean High 
X_1 CG-47 Ticonderoga - - - - - - 
X_2 DDG-51 Burke - - - - - - 
X_3 FFG-7 Perry - - - - - - 
X_4 LCC-19 Blue Ridge - - - - - - 
X_5 LHA-1 Tarawa - - - - - - 
X_6 LHD-1 Wasp 1 1 1 - 1 1 
X_7 LPD-17 San Antonio - - - - - - 
X_8 LPD-4 Austin - - - - - - 









X_10 LSD-49 Harpers Ferry 4 4 4 - - - 
X_11 USCG FRC N.A N.A N.A - - - 
X_12 LCS-1 Freedom N.A N.A N.A - - - 
X_13 JHSV N.A N.A N.A 3 - - 
X_14 LHA-6 America N.A N.A N.A - - - 
X_15 M-80 Stiletto N.A N.A N.A - 3 3 
















Y_1 RQ-8 Firescout N.A N.A N.A 14 13 6 
Y_2 MV-22 Osprey 
 
- - 2 - - 9 
Y_3 MH-53K Super Stallion 
 
















Y_4 SH-60 Seahawk  
 
17 17 15 1 2 1 
Total Cost (US$M) 424.387 424.387 427.459 155.329 186.753 219.108
Table 62: Results for Civil Support and Anti-smuggling 
 
The following table summarizes the revised airlift platform deployment for the mission 
support operation taking into consideration of their capability in support for the Anti-smuggling 










Platform Current Force Only Current & Future Force LINDO 
Index Severity Scenarios  Low Mean High Low Mean High 
Y_2 MV-22 Osprey - - 2 - - 9 
Z_21 - Sorties for Passenger Lifting  - - 3 - - 17 
Z_22 - Sorties or General Supply  - - 14 - - 107 
Z_23 - Sorties for Equipment Supply  - - - - - - 
Y_3 MH-53K Super Stallion 1 1 1 1 2 1 
Z_31 - Sorties for Passenger Lifting  1 - - - - - 
Z_32 - Sorties or General Supply  16 14 8 59 28 8 
Z_33 - Sorties for Equipment Supply  3 5 5 3 5 5 
Y_4 SH-60 Seahawk  17 17 15 1 2 1 
Z_31 - Sorties for Passenger Lifting  - 6 - 23 6 7 
Z_32 - Sorties or General Supply  - 197 105 - 17 - 
Z_33 - Sorties for Equipment Supply  Not Capable 
Table 63: Recommended Air Platforms and Number of Sorties 
 
The suggested “mother” ships for the respective air platforms were summarized in the 
following table.  In most of the force structures proposed, the air platforms were housed in one 
common “ship” except for the mean and high severity scenarios using the Current Force assets 
only whereby the SH-60s were split across the LHD-1 and LSD-49.  Further analysis showed the 
LHD-1 capable of housing all the SH-60s together with other air platforms. A difference in sortie 
distribution for Civil Support missions was observed in the Current Force model for the low and 
mean scenarios. Again, this was due to the spare lift capacities in the optimal solution and the 
fact that the model was optimized for platform annualized lifecycle cost rather than aircraft 
sortie-level costs. 
 
Platform Current Force Only 
(# Air Platforms / “Mother” Ship) 
Current & Future Force 
(# Air Platforms / “Mother” Ship) 
Severity Scenarios  Low Mean High Low Mean High 
RQ-8 Firescout Not Applicable 14 / JHSV 13 / LHD-1 6 / LHD-1 
MV-22 Osprey - - 2 / LSD-49 - - 9 / LHD-1 
MH-53K Super Stallion 1 / LHD-1 1 / LHD-1 1 / LSD-49 1 / JHSV 2 / LHD-1 1 / LHD-1 
SH-60 Seahawk  17 / LHD-1 8 / LSD-49 9 / LHD-1 
2 / LSD-49 
13 / LHD-1 1 / JHSV 2 / LHD-1 1 / LHD-1 
Table 64: Recommended "Mother" Ships for Respective Air Platforms 
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3. Optimization Outputs 
Using linear optimization and the previously mentioned constraints, the current and 
future force structures were derived.  These optimized force structures were used as an input to 
develop the final recommended for structures.   
a. Current Force Structure 
For the low and mean severity scenarios, the linearly optimized force structure consisted 
of 1 LHD-1s, 4 LSD-49s, 1 MH-53K and 17 SH-60s at a cost of $424.387 million dollars. The 
SH-60s were chosen for smuggling detection and the LSD-49s were chosen in place of the M-
80s. These differences contributed significantly to the higher costs for current force structure. 
For the high severity mission, the linearly optimized force structure consisted of 1 LHD-1, LSD-
49s, 2 MV-22 Ospreys, 1 MH-53K and 15 SH-60s at a cost of $427.459 million dollars. 
Similarly, in replacement of the M-80, the LSD-49s was selected to be the interceptors for the 
Anti-smuggling mission. However we can see that for the higher severity scenarios, the number 
of MV-22s increased as it was more suited for the Civil Support mission (and cheaper than the 
MH-53K) while the number of SH-60s, which were more cost effective for the Anti-smuggling 
mission, decreased, indicating effective sharing of air assets across mission. 
b. Future Force Structure 
For the low severity mission, the linearly optimized force structure consisted of 3 JHSVs, 
14 RQ-8Bs, 1 MH-53K and 1 SH-60 at a cost of $155.329 million dollars. For the medium 
severity mission, the linearly optimized force structure consisted of 1 LHD-1, 3 M-80s, 13 RQ-
8Bs, 2 MH-53Ks and 2 SH-60s at a cost of $186.753 million dollars. For the high severity 
mission, the linearly optimized force structure consisted of 1 LHD-1, 3 M-80s, 6 RQ-8Bs, 9 MV-
22s, 1 MH-53K and 1 SH-60 at a cost of $219.108 million dollars.  As with the Civil Support-
only model, the number of air platforms required increased with scenario severity. When 
requirements of the Civil Support and Anti-smuggling missions were combined, we saw that the 
number of RQ-8Bs, which were used solely for the Anti-smuggling mission, decreased for 
higher severity scenarios.  
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I. CURRENT AND FUTURE FORCE STRUCTURES 
The third and fourth phases of force structure selection were to develop current and future 
force structures that could meet all mission requirements for the lowest cost while taking into 
account the information contained in threat study and to use optimization to fine tune the force 
selection.  With the requirements for the Civil Support mission being broken into three severities 
three possible force configurations were developed for both the force utilizing only current 
platforms and for the force utilizing current and future platforms.  This produced a total of six 
force structures, each of which completely fulfilled all requirements for the Civil Support, Anti-
smuggling, and Information Sharing missions.   
1. Current Force Structure Selection 
The selection of the current force was based on the following assumptions: 
• Will only be required to perform Civil Support mission or Anti-smuggling 
mission at a given time. 
• Force must meet all mission requirements. 
• LCS and JHSV are considered to be future ships. 
• Total annual cost of the force will be for procurement and operating costs of 
the ships and aircraft. 
• Must have at least one heavy lift helicopter in force. 
• Must have at least one SH-60 in force. 
• Heavy lift helicopters cannot perform Anti-smuggling mission. 
• Force will be able to resupply from normal forward deployed supply ships and 
does not require a dedicated supply ship. 
• Aircraft have an 85% availability. 
 
During the force selection process it became clear that several key parameters were going 
to have a large impact on the force selected.  The first and the most critical of these parameters 
was the number of SH-60 helicopters required to perform the Anti-smuggling mission.  From 
modeling it was determined that 17 SH-60 helicopters would be required to maintain six 
helicopters on the barrier at any given time.  This requirement drove the force to include a large 
deck amphibious ship.  Despite the relatively large cost of the LHD/LHA it was more cost 
effective to use this ship vice the larger number of smaller ships that would be required to base 
the aircraft.  The next largest ship, the LPD 17 class, was only designed to support four SH-60 
helicopters.  With the of basing several SH-60s on intercept vessels, the force required at a 
minimum three LPD 17 class ships which had a greater annualized cost than an LHD or LHA.  
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The number of intercept vessels required for the Anti-smuggling mission was the second 
force driving requirement.  The number of intercept ships required was based on the speed of the 
intercept ship and the barrier distance as detailed in the modeling section.  To meet the 
requirement the forces needed three ships that could travel at 30kts. 
The number and type of aircraft required to meet the airlift requirement was the third key 
parameter.  This requirement further necessitated the use of a large deck platform.  The table 
below shows the number of aircraft required based on the mission severity.  The number of 
aircraft listed in the table fulfill the lift requirement with only that type of platform.  For example 
the numbers of aircraft needed to meet the airlift requirement for the high intensity Civil Support 
mission were 43 SH-60s, or 13 MV-22s, or 7 CH-53s.  There was no requirement that the force 
consist of only one type of aircraft and a combination of these three platforms could have been 
utilized. 
 
Scenario Severity Low Mean High 
SH-60's required: 2 17 43 
MV-22's required: 1 5 13 
CH-53's required: 1 3 7 
Table 65:  Number of Air Assets Required for Civil Support Mission 
 
The fourth key parameter was the cargo capacity required for the Civil Support mission.  
In most cases this parameter was less of a driving factor than the three parameters above.  The 
relatively large amount of cargo, extra medical personnel, and marines that needed to be 
transported made it necessary for the selection of at least one amphibious ship to be included 
with the current force structures.  
These four parameters were not the only parameters taken into consideration for the 
development of the force structures, however, they were the most limiting.  Some other 
parameters taken into consideration were the amount of excess water production needed for Civil 
Support mission, vehicle space requirements, on board medical facilities, self defense capability, 
and the ability to perform all thirteen missions.   
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a. Current Force Structure, High Severity: 
In the high severity case the force selection was primarily driven by the number of 
aircraft required to carry out the Anti-smuggling and Civil Support mission.  The most 
economical plan for the selection of aircraft was to utilize the 17 SH-60 helicopters required for 
the Anti-smuggling mission in both the Anti-smuggling mission and the Civil Support missions.  
The remaining lift requirement was fulfilled by inserting the required number of CH-53 
helicopters.  In the high severity case this required four CH-53 helicopters in addition to the 17 
SH-60 helicopters.   
With the number of air assets set, the mix of surface platforms was primarily determined 
by the amount of flight deck and hangar space available for the required aircraft and the number 
of intercept vessels required.  Three FFG 7 class frigates were chosen to fulfill the intercept 
vessel requirement.  The FFG 7 had approximately the same top speed of a DDG 51 class ship 
and the same size flight deck and hangar space, which in the Anti-smuggling model made the 
ships equal for intercept purposes.  The FFG 7 was chosen because each FFG 7 costed $13 
million less per year than a DDG 51.  
With six of the required 17 SH-60 helicopters assigned to the three FFG 7 class ships, the 
remaining 11 SH-60 and four CH-53 helicopters had to be based on the other ships selected for 
the force.  Several possible combinations of ships were considered, however, the large number of 
aircraft made the LHD 1 class the most economical choice.  The LHD 1 class with its large cargo 
capacity, vehicle space, troop space, and command and control systems allowed for all other 
mission requirements to be filled with a single hull. 
The need for a large deck amphibious ship was confirmed by the optimization done 
during the modeling phase.  The optimization used one LHD 1 class ship with four LSD-49 class 
ships.  In the optimization the LSDs were used as intercept vessels instead of three FFGs.  In the 
final force structure selected for the High severity mission three FFG 7 class ships were utilized 
due to the cost savings over four LSD 49 class ships.  
The aircraft mix developed through optimization was one CH-53, two MV-22s and 15 
SH-60Bs.  The reduced numbers of SH-60s was due to the two MV-22s ability to be used for 
both heavy lift and barrier patrol.  The MV-22 was not equipped with a surface search radar or 
Forward Looking Infrared system and was therefore not as well adapted for this mission as the 
SH-60B.  Also considered was the increased logistical concerns placed on the force by having an 
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additional type of aircraft in the force structure.  The final factor that drove the recommended 
aircraft mix was that the mix of aircraft developed through optimization did not fully meet the 
daily maximum lift requirement.  The final mix of aircraft recommended was four CH-53s and 
17 SH-60Bs. 
 
The force selected for the high severity case using only current platforms was as follows: 
• LHD 1 class 
o (4) CH-53 
o (11) SH-60B 
• (3) FFG 7 class 
o (6) SH-60B 
The following table shows the forces ability to fulfill some of the selected mission requirements. 
 
Parameter Requirement Capability Fulfillment rate
Storage Requirement (ft3): 99,553 109,000 109% 
Vehicle Storage Requirement (ft2): 6,080 20,900 344% 
Water production(gal/day): 75,000 131,761 176% 
Medical/Marine personnel 491 1685 343% 
Airlift capability: 
(lbs/day):                                            
Personnel/day:                                   
Equipment/day: 
1,238,200      
99                 
16 
1,453,500 
99             
16 
117%                 
100%                 
100% 
SH-60 required for Anti-smuggling 17 17 100% 
Table 66: Current Force, High Severity Requirement Fulfillment 
 
The annualized procurement and operating costs for this force was $422 million as shown 
in the table below.  This was based on the cost analysis presented in the cost section of this paper 
which took into account the number of each platform required.  The cost of medical personnel 
required for Civil Support, Marines required for security during a Civil Support mission, and 
Civil Support mission specific supplies and equipment costs which were independent of the force 
selected but also had to be taken into account for the total cost of the Phase Zero force.  The total 
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annual cost of the force including support personnel and equipment for the Civil Support mission 





LHD-1 Wasp 1 $101,103,230 
FFG-7 Perry 3 $60,184,272 
SH-60 Seahawk  17 $5,965,275 
MH-53 Super Stallion 4 $9,742,892 
 Total $422,037,218 
Table 67: Current Force, High Severity Annual Cost 
 
b. Current Force Structure, Mean Severity: 
The most constraining mission requirements for the force were the number of aircraft and 
intercept ships required for Anti-smuggling.  As with the high severity force structure the 17 SH-
60 helicopters necessitated the selection of an LHD 1 class ship.  With 17 SH-60 aircraft, only 
one heavy lift helicopter was required to transport vehicles, personnel, and equipment.  The mix 
of ships selected was the same as the high severity case.  The difference between the high 
severity and mean severity cases were the number of aircraft required. 
The optimization agreed with the force structure for the mean severity mission with the 
exception of the intercept vessels.  Similarly to the high severity scenario, the optimization 
suggested the use of four LSD-49 class ships as the intercept vessels.  The recommended force 
structure consisted of three FFG-7 class vessels for this role for the reasons as stated under the 
high severity scenario. 
 
The force selected for the mean severity case using only current platforms was as follows: 
• LHD 1 class 
o (1) CH-53 
o (11) SH-60B 
• (3) FFG 7 class 









Storage Requirement (ft3): 66,458 109,000 164% 
Vehicle Storage Requirement (ft2): 3,880 20,900 539% 
Water production(gal/day): 50,000 131,761 264% 
Medical/Marine personnel 359 1685 469% 
Airlift capability: 
(lbs/day):                                            
Personnel/day:                                   
Equipment/day: 
825,900         
72                  
11 
1,575,500 
72             
11 
191%             
100%             
100% 
SH-60 required for Anti-smuggling 17 17 100% 
Table 68:  Current Force, Mean Severity Requirement Fulfillment 
 
The annualized procurement and operating costs for this force was $392.8 million as 
shown in the table below.  The total annual cost of the force including support personnel and 





LHD-1 Wasp 1 $101,103,230 
FFG-7 Perry 3 $60,184,272 
SH-60 Seahawk  17 $5,965,275 
MH-53 Super Stallion 1 $9,742,892 
 Total $392,808,605 
Table 69:  Current Force, Mean Severity Annual Cost 
c. Current Force Structure, Low Severity: 
The force selected for the low severity case was the same as the force selected in the 
mean severity case.  The use of a large ship such as an LHD appeared excessive when looking at 
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the requirement fulfillment rate.  However, due to the constraint that the force must meet 100% 
of all requirements, the LHD proved to be the most economical platform.  The optimization also 
selected the same force for both the mean and low severity missions. 
 
The force selected for the low severity case using only current platforms was as follows: 
• LHD 1 class 
o (1) CH-53 
o (11) SH-60B 
• (3) FFG 7 class 
o (6) SH-60B 





Storage Requirement (ft3): 33,362 109,000 327% 
Vehicle Storage Requirement (ft2): 2,080 20,900 1005% 
Water production(gal/day): 25,000 131,761 527% 
Medical/Marine personnel 158 1685 1066% 
Airlift capability: 
(lbs/day):                                            
Personnel/day:                                   
Equipment/day: 
413,600         
32                  
6 
3,942,000 
32             
6 
953%             
100%             
100% 
SH-60 required for Anti-smuggling 17 17 100% 
Table 70:  Current Force, Low Severity Requirement Fulfillment 
 
The annualized procurement and operating costs for this force was $392.8 million as 
shown in the table below.  The total annual cost of the force including support personnel and 









LHD-1 Wasp 1 $101,103,230 
FFG-7 Perry 3 $60,184,272 
SH-60 Seahawk  17 $5,965,275 
MH-53 Super Stallion 1 $9,742,892 
 Total $392,808,605 
Table 71:  Current Force, Low Severity Annual Cost 
d. Recommended Current Force Structure: 
The recommended force utilizing only current platforms was the force which was capable 
of performing the high severity mission for a total annual cost of $460 million.  The small 
increase in cost over the other two lower severity scenarios was outweighed by the increase in 
capabilities. 
• LHD 1 class 
o (4) CH-53 
o (11) SH-60B 
• (3) FFG 7 class 
o (6) SH-60B 
2. Future Force Selection 
The selection of the future force was based on the following assumptions: 
• Will only be required to perform Civil Support mission or Anti-smuggling 
mission at a given time. 
• Force must meet all mission requirements. 
• Total annual cost of the force will be for procurement and operating costs of 
the ships and aircraft. 
• Must have at least one heavy lift helicopter in force. 
• Must have at least one SH-60 in force. 
• Heavy lift helicopters cannot perform Anti-smuggling mission. 
• Force will be able to resupply from normal forward deployed supply ships and 
does not require a dedicated supply ship. 
• Platforms currently built by other nations may be selected. 
• Force may be composed of current platforms as well as future platforms. 
• If platform is currently produced in another nation it can be produced and 
procured in this nation for approximately the same cost. 
• Platform must be capable of being produced and fielded by 2020. 
• Future aircraft will have an 85% availability rate. 
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By using a force consisting of both current and future ships more flexibility was added to 
the selection process.  As shown in the modeling portion of this report, the increased endurance 
of an unmanned aerial vehicle reduced the number of aircraft required for the Anti-smuggling 
mission.  The RQ-8 Fire Scout was selected as our Phase Zero force’s UAV at the completion of 
a detailed trade study.  The RQ-8 was considerably smaller than the SH-60, which greatly 
reduced the amount of flight deck and hangar space required by the force.  The ability to spot 
three RQ-8s in place of one SH-60 removed the need for a large deck ship from all the three 
severity categories.  The disadvantage that the integrated study team identified in using the RQ-8 
that the Fire Scout was not able to carry cargo and therefore could only be used as a 
communications relay and airborne surveillance platform during the Civil Support mission. 
The number of aircraft required for Anti-smuggling remained a key parameter in the 
future force selection but with the selection of the RQ-8, was no longer the most limiting on the 
force.   This importance was shifted to the number of aircraft required to achieve the desired lift 
rate for the Civil Support mission.  With a smaller number of CH-53Ks required than MV-22s or 
SH-60s, the CH-53K was selected as the primary helicopter for Civil Support.  While 
considerably fewer numbers of these aircraft were required, making them more cost effective, 
their large size reduced the number of ship classes that can support them. 
The removal of the large deck ship placed a premium on cargo space in the future force.   
The Joint High speed vessel was used to supplement the cargo capacity of the force.  The JHSV 
had a reconfigurable mission deck that could be used to store standard cargo containers which 
increased the force’s cargo capability. 
The future force also had more flexibility in the types of intercept vessels used.  The 
requirement remained at three intercept ships however the replacement of the SH-60s with the 
RQ-8s allowed smaller, faster, and less expensive ships to be considered.   
a. Future Force Structure, High Severity:  
The selection of a future force was driven by the large airlift requirement for the Civil 
Support mission.  The need to support a minimum of seven CH-53 helicopters drove the 
selection of surface forces.  The most cost effective variation of this force utilized a helicopter 
destroyer built by Japan.  While this ship was technically classified as a destroyer it could house 
up to eight CH-53 helicopters or up to 18 SH-60 helicopters making it what many would classify 
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as a light (20,000 tons) aircraft carrier.  The Japanese DDH also had a 16 cell vertical launch 
system with a phased array radar.  While the vertical launch system would be of little use in 
Phase Zero operations it could serve as a powerful self defense weapon.  The large flight deck 
and hangar allowed all seven of the CH-53s required for the Civil Support mission to be based 
on the DDH as well as up to six of the RQ-8 Fire Scouts required for the Anti-smuggling 
mission. 
Little information was available about the cargo capability of the Japanese DDH or the 
excess water production capability; therefore, it was assumed that the ship would only be able to 
carry enough supplies for the operations of the personnel and aircraft based onboard.   It was also 
assumed that the ship would only be capable of producing 30,000 gallons per day of excess 
water.  To increase the cargo carry capability of the force a JHSV was added.  The JHSV would 
deploy with no organic helicopters but could support operations as required.  To add more water 
production capacity a Tactical Water Purification System (TWPS) was added to the force’s 
equipment list.  The TWPS was capable of producing 900 gallons per hour in extremely salty 
water, and up to 2000 gallons per hour in less salty water.  This system was also transportable by 
a CH-53 and took up approximately 100 square feet of vehicle space.  In keeping with the base 
assumptions it was assumed that all water would be required to be supplied from the ships and 
transported to shore.  In the event that water could be produced on shore the daily lift 
requirement for the force would decrease significantly. 
A LPD 17 was also added to the force.  This ship would be able to add cargo capacity to 
the force in order to meet the minimum volume required and add flight deck space for the force’s 
two SH-60 helicopters and three RQ-8 Fire Scouts.  The LPD 17 was also equipped with a 188 
foot long well deck capable of supporting two M-80 Stilettos.  The M-80s would serve the role 
of intercept platforms.  The M-80 was a flexible weapons platform with a 50+ knot top speed and 
the ability to launch a RHIB.  These two M-80 boats would fill the requirement for two of the 
three intercept ships needed for the Anti-smuggling mission. 
The third intercept vessel was a Visby class corvette.   The capabilities of the Visby were 
based on the Visby+ model which had a slightly larger flight deck making it capable of landing a 
SH-60 or supporting up to three RQ-8 Fire Scouts.  These three Fire Scouts along with the six 




Through optimization it was determined that the best platform to be utilized as an 
intercept vessel was the M-80 Stiletto.   The optimization also highlighted the need for a large 
deck platform capable of supporting a large percentage of the air assets.  The optimization chose 
the LHD to fill this role.  However, after further analysis of the costs for the later ships in the 
LHD 1 class, it was determined that using several of the smaller platforms such as the JMSDF 
DDH, LPD 17 and JHSV were the more cost effective. 
 
The force selected for the high severity case using current and future platforms was as 
follows: 
• JMSDF DDH 
o (7) CH-53K 
o (6) RQ-8 
• LPD-17 
o (2) SH-60 
o (3) RQ-8 
o (2) M-80 Stiletto 
• JHSV 
• Visby 
o (3) RQ-8  
The following table shows the forces ability to fulfill some of the selected mission requirements. 
 
Parameter Requirement Capability Fulfillment rate
Storage Requirement (ft3): 99,553 100,000 100% 
Vehicle Storage Requirement (ft2): 6,080 28,250 465% 
Water production(gal/day): 75,000 77,486 103% 
Medical/Marine personnel 491 880 179% 
Airlift capability: 
(lbs/day):                                            
Personnel/day:                                  
Equipment/day: 
1,238,200            
99                        
16 
1,377,000             
99                         
16 
111%                 
100%                 
100% 
RQ-8 required for Anti-smuggling 12 12 100% 




The annualized procurement and operating costs for this force was $305.1 million as 
shown in the table below.  The total annual cost of the force including support personnel and 





JMSDF DDH Hyuga 1 $82,082,604 
LPD-17 San Antonio 1 $68,580,414 
JHSV 1 $14,091,366 
HMS Visby Class 1 $14,805,403 
M-80 Stiletto 2 $6,040,437 
RQ-8 Firescout 12 $2,777,633 
SH-60 Seahawk  2 $5,965,275 
MH-53 Super Stallion 7 $9,742,892 
 Total $305,103,049 
Table 73:  Future Force, High Severity Annual Cost 
b. Future Force Structure, Mean Severity: 
The first step in the deriving the force to meet the mean severity scenario was to 
determine the number and type of air assets required to fulfill the airlift requirement for the Civil 
Support mission.  It was determined that a mix of two CH-53 helicopters with two SH-60 
helicopters would be capable of meeting this requirement.  This relatively small number of air 
assets made it possible to eliminate the Japanese DDH from the mean severity scenario.  The air 
assets would be based onboard the LPD 17 class ship and the JHSV.  The JHSV would support 
two SH-60s and the LPD 17 would support two CH-53Ks.  The JHSV would also support three 
of the RQ-8 Fire Scouts required for the Anti-smuggling mission.   
With little flight deck space available for more aircraft the remaining nine RQ-8 Fire 
Scouts needed to be supported from the three required intercept vessels.  This requirement led to 






The force selected for the mean severity case using current and future platforms was as follows: 
• JHSV 
o (2) SH-60 
o (3) RQ-8 
• LPD-17 
o (2) CH-53K 
• (3) Visby 
o (9) RQ-8 
The following table shows the forces ability to fulfill some of the selected mission requirements. 
 
Parameter Requirement Capability Fulfillment rate
Storage Requirement (ft3): 66,458 100,000 150% 
Vehicle Storage Requirement (ft2): 3,880 21,138 545% 
Water production(gal/day): 50,000 58,948 118% 
Medical/Marine personnel 359 880 245% 
Airlift capability: 
(lbs/day):                                            
Personnel/day:                                  
Equipment/day: 
825,900               
72                        
11 
855,000               
72                        
11 
103%                 
100%                 
100% 
RQ-8 required for Anti-smuggling 12 12 100% 





















The annualized procurement and operating costs for this force was $191.8 million as 
shown in the table below.  The total annual cost of the force including support personnel and 





LPD-17 San Antonio 1 $68,580,414 
JHSV 1 $14,091,366 
HMS Visby Class 3 $14,805,403 
RQ-8 Firescout 12 $2,777,633 
SH-60 Seahawk  2 $5,965,275 
MH-53 Super Stallion 2 $9,742,892 
 Total $191,835,918 
Table 75:  Future Force, Mean Severity Annual Cost 
c. Future Force Structure, Low Severity: 
With the required airlift capability further reduced from two CH-53s to one CH-53 the 
LPD 17 was able to be replaced by another JHSV.    A JHSV can support up to one CH-53 on its 
flight deck.  The JHSV did have an aircraft bunker available on the same level as the flight deck, 
however, the CH-53s length precluded it from being fully covered.  In this force one JHSV 
would support two SH-60s and three RQ-8 Fire Scouts as in the mean severity case.  The second 
JHSV would support the single CH-53.  The three Visbys which served as intercept vessels were 
again required to support three RQ-8 Fire Scouts each.  
The optimization confirmed the use of the JHSV but called for three of them.  It called 
for a JHSV to also fill the role of an intercept vessel.  The difference in speed between the Visby 
and the JHSV required the JHSV to carry an additional 6 RQ-8 Fire Scouts.  This negated any 







The force selected for the low severity case using current and future platforms is as follows: 
• JHSV 
o (2) SH-60 
o (3) RQ-8 
• JHSV  
o (1) CH-53K 
• (3) Visby 
o (9) RQ-8 
 
Parameter Requirement Capability Fulfillment rate
Storage Requirement (ft3): 33,362 68,000 204% 
Vehicle Storage Requirement (ft2): 2,080 28,240 1358% 
Water production(gal/day): 25,000 25,600 102% 
Medical/Marine personnel 158 210 133% 
Airlift capability: 
(lbs/day):                                            
Personnel/day:                                  
Equipment/day: 
413,600               
32                       
6 
1,300,000            
32                        
6 
314%                 
100%                 
100% 
RQ-8 required for Anti-smuggling 12 12 100% 
Table 76:  Future Force, Low Severity Requirement Fulfillment 
 
The annualized procurement and operating costs for this force was $127.6 million as 
shown in the table below.  The total annual cost of the force including support personnel and 














JHSV 2 $14,091,366 
HMS Visby Class 3 $14,805,403 
RQ-8 Firescout 12 $2,777,633 
SH-60 Seahawk  2 $5,965,275 
MH-53 Super Stallion 1 $9,742,892 
 Total $127,603,978 
Table 77:  Future Force, Low Severity Annual Cost 
d. Recommended Future Force Structure: 
The overall recommend future force structure was the one constructed for the high severity 
mission.  This force was the most flexible force capable of being scaled and adapted to meet the changing 
requirements placed on a Phase Zero force.  It would be capable of defending its self and be able to 
quickly adapt and support the transition to follow on phases should the need arise.  
 
The Recommended future force structure was: 
• JMSDF DDH  
o (7) CH-53K 
o (6) RQ-8 
• LPD-17    
o (2) SH-60 
o (3) RQ-8 
o (2) M-80 Stiletto 
• JHSV 
• Visby 
o (3) RQ-8  
` 
J. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE PHASE ZERO FORCE 
To sustain its operations, the Phase Zero force required food for its personnel, fuel for 
ships, and aviation fuel for the helicopters. The personnel included ship’s crew, helicopter crew 
(including shipboard support personnel), Marines (to offer protection to Phase Zero force 
operating on land), and medical personnel. This section is comprised of three parts to address the 
logistic support for food, ship fuel and aviation fuel. 
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For aviation fuel requirements, the future force proved to be more fuel efficient than 
current force, with the highest consumption rate when operating in the high intensity category of 
the Civil Support mission.  It was estimated that re-supply of aviation fuel had to be conducted 
every 9 days.  This was based on not going below 70% aviation fuel reserve for the supporting 
vessels.  For medium and low intensities, the re-supply period could be extended to 10 days. 
For ship fuel requirements, the future force designed for high intensity operations 
conducting the Anti-smuggling mission required re-supply of ship fuel every 7 days, before any 
of the ships consumed more than 30% of its fuel capacity leaving a 70% fuel reserve. To conduct 
Civil Support operations, the re-supply period could be extended to 16 days. 
For food requirements, the current force structure operating in high intensity comprised 
the most number of personnel, thus consumed the highest amount of food per day.  It was noted 
that the future force would consume about 53% of the amount of food that the current force 
would consume in the same period of time. As the limiting logistic requirement lay with fuel, the 
re-supply frequency was determined by the rate of ship fuel consumption.  
Based on the limiting constraint of ship/aviation fuel consumption, re-supply for the 
future force operating in high intensity was estimated to be required every 7 days for conducting 
Anti-smuggling operations, or 9 days for conducting Civil Support operations.  
 
Type of Mission for Future Force operating in High 
Intensity 
No. of Days before Re-
supply 
Anti-smuggling 7 
Civil Support 9 
Table 78: Future Force Logistical Endurance Summery Conclusions 
 
1. Ship Fuel Support 
Background: 
A chief resource in the support of the specified missions was that of ship’s fuel for 
mother ships. The mother ships served as the primary means of transporting the helicopter, 





The fuel load per day required was derived based on each ship travelling at: (a) 7 knots 
for Civil Support mission based on a ship normal operation of steaming in a box. And (b) 15 
knots for Anti-smuggling mission based on the fact that the ship may have some short high speed 
sprints, followed by longer period of relatively slow speed operations, thus taking their average.  
Re supply of fuel will be carried out once the ship exhausted 30% of its capacity leaving a 70% 
fuel reserve.   
 
The fuel consumption numbers (tons per nm) for the mother ships in use were: 
No. Ship Type Displacement
Fuel 
Consumption in 
tons per nm 
Estimated Fuel 
Consumption in tons per 
nm (from Plot) 




class 4100 0.14 - 
3 
LPD-17 SAN 
ANTONIO Class 24900 - 0.4 
4 
Joint High Speed 
Vessel (JHSV). 1464 - 0.06 
5 Visby 600 - 0.05 
6 JMSDF DDH 20,000 - 0.34 




Figure 32:  Ship Fuel Consumption Regression 
 




Estimated Ship Fuel 








4100 587 - 
LPD-17 SAN 
ANTONIO Class 
24900 - 3500 
Joint High Speed 
Vessel (JHSV). 
1464 - 210 
Visby 600 - 85 
JMSDF DDH 20,000 - 3000 
M80 45 - 7 
Table 80:  Ship Fuel Capacity 

















































Plot of Fuel Capacity vs Displacement
 
























Total Fuel Requirements Per Day: 
For the current force, the fuel requirements per day for both Civil Support and Anti-smuggling 





Severity Ship Type 
Ship 
Quantity
Per day fuel 
consumption 
(@7knots = 
168nm per day) 
Total Fuel 
consumption(tons) 
per Ship Type  
LHD-1 Wasp 
class 
1 109.64 109.64 
High  FFG-7 OLIVER 
HAZARD 
PERRY-class 





1 109.64 109.64 
Low/Medium FFG-7 OLIVER 
HAZARD 
PERRY-class 

























Per day fuel 
consumption(@15knots 
= 360nm per day) 
Total Fuel 
consumption(tons) 







































For the future force, the fuel requirements per day for both Civil Support and Anti-smuggling 








Per day fuel 
consumption (@7knots 
= 168nm per day)
Total Fuel 
consumption(tons) 
per Ship Type 




Joint High Speed 
Vessel (JHSV). 1 3.36 3.36
Visby 3 1.68 5.04
127.68







Visby 3 1.68 5.04
70.56
Joint High Speed 
Vessel (JHSV). 2 3.36 6.72



















Per day fuel 
consumption (@15knots 
= 360nm per day)
Total Fuel 
consumption(tons) 
per Ship Type 




Joint High Speed 
Vessel (JHSV). 
1 7.20 7.20
Visby 3 3.60 10.80
M80 2 0.36 0.72
285.12







Visby 3 18.00 54.00
219.60
Joint High Speed 
Vessel (JHSV). 
2 21.60 43.20

























Number of days that ship can operate based on 30% fuel capacity: 
For current force, the number of days that ship can operate based on 30% fuel capacity for both 

















LHD-1 Wasp class 1 109.64 1860.00 16.96
FFG-7 OLIVER 
HAZARD PERRY- 3 23.48 176.10 7.50




























LHD-1 Wasp class 1 234.95 1860.00 7.92
FFG-7 OLIVER 
HAZARD PERRY- 3 50.31 176.10 3.50









Table 86: Current Force Number of Days of Unsupported Operations, Anti-smuggling 
Mission 
For the future force, the number of days that ship can operate based on 30% fuel capacity for 

















JMSDF DDH 1 57.12 900.00 15.76
LPD-17 SAN 
ANTONIO 
1 62.16 1050.00 16.89
Joint High Speed 
Vessel (JHSV). 
1 3.36 63.00 18.75
Visby 3 1.68 25.50 15.18
*LPD-17 + 4 67.20 1075.50 16.00
Joint High Speed 
Vessel (JHSV). 




1 62.16 1050.00 16.89
Visby 3 1.68 25.50 15.18
*LPD-17 + 4 67.20 1075.50 16.00
Joint High Speed 
Vessel (JHSV). 
2 3.36 63.00 18.75
Visby 3 1.68 25.50 15.18
*JHSV+Visby 5 5.04 88.50 17.56
*LPD-17+Visby = Visby fuel will be resupply by LPD-17





































JMSDF DDH 1 122.40 900.00 7.35
LPD-17 SAN 
ANTONIO 
1 133.20 1050.00 7.88
Joint High Speed 
Vessel (JHSV). 1 7.20 63.00 8.75
Visby 3 3.60 25.50 7.08
M80 2 0.36 2.10 5.83
*LPD+Visby+M 6 144.72 1077.60 7.45
Joint High Speed 
Vessel (JHSV). 




1 133.20 1050.00 7.88
Visby 3 3.60 25.50 7.08
*LPD+Visby 4 144.00 1075.50 7.47
Joint High Speed 
Vessel (JHSV). 
2 7.20 63.00 8.75
Visby 3 3.60 25.50 7.08




*LPD+Visby+M80 = Visby and M80 fuel will be resupply by LPD-17







































High 15.76 JMSDF DDH
Medium 16.00 *LPD-17 + Visby
Low 17.56 *JHSV+Visby
High 7.35 JMSDF DDH









Table 89:  Force Mission Endurance Summery based on Ships Fuel 
Note: All figures are derived from specifications as recorded in www.globalsecurity.org 
2. Aviation Fuel Support 
Background: 
A chief resource in support of the Civil Support and Anti-smuggling mission scenarios 
was aviation fuel. Helicopters served as the primary means of transport of personnel, cargo and 
equipment between the supporting vessels and the site of a disaster. Helicopters also served as 
the main means of intelligence gathering as well as for surveillance purposes in support of Anti-
smuggling and information sharing missions. 
 
Helicopter Fuel Consumption: 
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The fuel load per day required was derived based upon each helicopter being loaded up to 
its maximum capacity, flying at cruising speed, and operational for a minimum of 9 hrs per day. 
The calculated fuel consumption for each helicopter was as follows: 
 





Table 90:  Aircraft Fuel Consumption Rate 
Note: The fuel consumption rate for the MH-53 was based on subject matter expert input and based on aircraft 
weight as compared to the SH-60B 
 
Mission Aviation Fuel Requirements: 
The fuel requirements per day were calculated based on the total number of aviation 




Where X was the number of a specific helicopter i, Y was the number of operational hours per 









                                                 
159 Sikorsky UH-60, Economy-point.org, http://www.economy-point.org/sikorsky-uh-60/p1.htm, accessed on 25 
May 09 
160 Fire Scout VTUAV, Naval-technology.com, http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/firescout/specs.html 




The table below shows the worst case mission for the current or future force: 
 
Mission Type Fuel Requirement (lbs) 
Current Force Structure  
Low / Medium 171000 
High 225000 




Table 91:  Aircraft Fuel Requirement per Mission 
 
Resupply: 
In determining the maximum operational duration based on organic supplies, only 
aviation fuel stored on-board either the resident LPD, or LHD equivalent for the stated force was 
used and where no more than 30% of the fuel could be expended at any one time. The aviation 
fuel capacity for the each force global fleet station equivalent was as follows.  The exact aviation 
fuel capacity for the Japanese DDH was not available therefore the capacity was based on 1/3 the 
aviation fuel capacity of the LHD 1. 
 
Ship Type Capacity (lbs)161 
LPD-17 628320 
JMSDF DDH  870297 




Based upon each force structure, the resupply time required is as follows: 
                                                 




Mission Type Fuel Resupply Time (days) 
Current Force Structure  
Low / Medium 5 
High 3 




Table 93:  Force Mission Endurance Based on Aircraft Fuel 
Note: At low intensity, the fuel requirement will not exceed that for a medium intensity mission. 
 
Supportability: 
It is clear that the future force structure was more efficient in its use of aviation fuel 
(152700 lbs for Future High vs 225000 lbs for Current High). This translated to a corresponding 
decrease in the amount of resupply required. (9 days for Future High vs 3 days for Current 
High). 
3. Food Requirements 
Introduction: 
In order to carry out its mission, the Phase Zero force would have to carry food supplies 
on-board its ships so as to feed its personnel. The food supplies on-board the ships must be able 
to last till the next re-supply. Unlike fuel, the main bulk of the food supplies could be stored in 
ships with bigger storage capacity, and re-distributed easily to other ships when required. 
Number of Personnel: 
The total number of the Phase Zero force’s personnel was calculated for the different 
missions (high, medium and low intensities). The total number of personnel was also estimated 
for the future Phase Zero force structure. The number of personnel included ship’s crew, 
helicopter crew (including ground technicians), marines (to offer protection to Phase Zero force 
operating on land), and medical personnel. 
Amount of Food Required: 
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Using data gathered for the Civil Support mission, a person was assumed to consume 
2.5lb of food per day, which is further converted to 0.102ft3 of food per day.  
For current force structure operating in high intensity mission, the total number of Phase 
Zero force’s personnel and the calculated amount of food consumed per day were as follows: 
 
Current Force (High) QuantityNo. of Officers & Troops/unit Total no. of Personnel
LHD 1 1 1129 1129 
CH-53 5 28 140 
SH-60B 11 28 308 
FFG 7 Class 3 235 705 
SH-60B 6 28 168 
Total No. of Marines   383 
Total No. of Medical Personnel   43 
Total No. of Personnel   2876 
Total amount of food (lbs) per day 2.5 2876 7190 
Table 94:  Current Force Personnel Food Requirement, High Severity 
 
Similarly, for current force structure operating in low/medium intensity mission, the total 
number of Phase Zero force’s personnel and the calculated amount of food consumed per day 










Current Force (Low/Medium) QuantityNo. of Officers & Troops/unit Total no. of Personnel
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LHD 1 1 1129 1129 
CH-53 1 28 28 
SH-60B 11 28 308 
FFG 7 Class 3 235 705 
SH-60B 6 28 168 
Total No. of Marines   209 
Total No. of Medical Personnel   83 
Total No. of Personnel   2630 
Total amount of food (lbs) 2.5 2630 6575 
Table 95: Current Force Personnel Food Requirement, Low/Mean Severity 
 
For future force structure operating in high intensity mission, the total number of Phase 
















Future Force (High) Quantity No. of Officers & Troops/unit Total no. of Personnel 
JMSDF DDH 1 40 40 
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CH-53K 7 28 196 
RQ-8 6 10 60 
LPD-17 1 357 357 
SH-60 2 28 56 
RQ-8 3 10 30 
M-80 Stiletto 2 3 6 
JHSV 1 40 40 
Visby 3 43 129 
RQ-8 9 10 90 
Total No. of Marines   383 
Total No. of Medical Personnel   123 
Total No. of Personnel   1510 
Total amount of food (lbs) 2.5 1510 3775 
Table 96: Future Force Personnel Food Requirement, High Severity 
 
For future force structure operating in medium intensity mission, the total number of 












Future Force (Medium) Quantity No. of Officers & Troops/unit Total no. of Personnel 
JHSV 1 40 40 
208 
 
SH-60B 2 28 56 
RQ-8 3 10 30 
LPD-17 1 357 357 
CH-53K 2 28 56 
Visby 3 43 129 
RQ-8 9 10 90 
Total No. of Marines   209 
Total No. of Medical Personnel   83 
Total No. of Personnel   1050 
Total amount of food (lbs) 2.5 1050 2625 
Table 97: Future Force Personnel Food Requirement, Mean Severity 
 
For future force structure operating in low intensity mission, the total number of Phase 
















Future Force (Low) Quantity No. of Officers & Troops/unit Total no. of Personnel 
209 
 
JHSV 1 40 40 
SH-60B 2 28 56 
RQ-8 3 10 30 
JHSV 1 40 40 
CH-53K 1 28 28 
Visby 3 43 129 
RQ-8 9 10 90 
Total No. of Marines   127 
Total No. of Medical Personnel   43 
Total No. of Personnel   583 
Total amount of food (lbs) 2.5 583 1457.5 




Conclusion and Analysis: 
















Table 99:  Force Personnel Food Requirement Summary 
 
As can be seen in Table 99, the determined current force structure operating in high 
intensity comprised the most number of personnel, and consumed the largest amount of food per 
day. The amount of food (in ft3) required for 30 days was also calculated.  The future force 
would have consumed about 53% of the amount of food that the current force would have 
consumed in 30 days. 
K. DISCUSSION OF FUTURE AND CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURES  
Both the current and future force structures were developed by following the selection 
methodology described earlier in this section with no pre-conceived notional force structure.  
The desire was not only to develop a force structure for 2020 Phase Zero operations but also test 
the global fleet station concept as a contender.  Both forces developed utilized the global fleet 
station concept with forces similar to that presented and developed by the Systems Engineering 
and Analysis 12 (SEA-12) group project.  Due to the large aviation requirement for the current 
force a LHD was used in this role.  In the future force structure, due to the size of the RQ-8 Fire 
Scout, the aviation requirement was reduced allowing a smaller ship such as the LPD 17 to be 
utilized in this role.  The future force was easily scalable and customizable by the commander to 
be able to adapt to the unique needs in the region. 
The future force met all of the requirements of the three missions modeled for Phase Zero 
for $343.9 million annually a savings of $78.9 million or approximately 20% over the optimized 
current force.  The two forces were nearly identical in cargo storage capacity and vehicle storage 
 Total no. of Personnel
Total amount of 
food (lbs)/day







Current Force (High) 2876 7190 215700 8800.56 
Current Force 
(Low/Medium) 2630 6575 197250 8047.8 
Future Force (High) 1510 3775 113250 4620.6 
Future Force (Medium) 1050 2625 78750 3213 
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capacity.  Also the air lift capabilities of the two forces were nearly identical.  Even with the 
similarities in some key capabilities there were some large differences between the forces and 
tradeoffs that must be made to realize this cost savings. 
The first of these differences is in onboard medical facilities.  The LHD 1 class ship had a 
very large medical suite with six operating rooms, a 36-bed ward and a surge capability of up to 
a 600-bed ward. 162  The medical facilities onboard the LPD 17 selected for the future force was 
considerably smaller with only two operating rooms, 24-bed ward and a surge capability of up to 
a-100 bed ward. 163  The assumptions in Civil Support mission were that all medical treatment 
would be conducted on the shore therefore this difference in on board medical facilities would 
have little impact on the force’s ability to carry out the mission. 
Another difference is in the water production capability.  The current force with the LHD 
1 class ship was capable of producing a large amount of water beyond the needs of the ship.  In 
the future force the water production available for the Civil Support mission was primarily 
produced on the LPD 17.  The Japanese DDH would be able to produce some water beyond its 
own consumption however, that number was unknown and therefore assumed to be small.  The 
future force required a Tactical Water Purifier system (TWPS) to make enough water to meet the 
mission requirement.  This system was relatively inexpensive with an annualized procurement 
and operating cost of $40,500.  This system would be capable of being airlifted and set up ashore 
to reduce the total airlift requirement however, for the mission analysis a worst case was 
assumed which required all water to be transported ashore from the ships. 
The current and future forces had different logistical concerns.  The current force 
structure was limited by the amount of aviation fuel that it could carry.  Based on maintaining 
70% fuel capacity the current force would be required to take on aviation fuel every three days of 
operations during the Anti-smuggling mission.  Due to the use of the RQ-8 Fire Scout the future 
force was not limited by aviation fuel.  The future force was limited by the amount of ship’s fuel 
that could be carried maintaining 70% fuel capacity.  This force was required to take on fuel 
every seven days during its most limiting mission of Anti-smuggling.  The future force was 
                                                 
162 USS Kearsarge LHD 3 Ship’s loading characteristics Pamphlet, http://www.fas.org/man//dod-
101/sys/ship/docs/slcp-lhd-3/index.html accessed on 01 May 2009 
163 Norman Polmar, Naval Institute guide to the ships and aircraft of the U.S. Fleet Eighteenth edition, Naval 
Institute Press Annapolis, Maryland, 2005 
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required to resupply considerably less often then the force comprised of only current ships and 
aircraft and therefore had a smaller logistical foot print. 
There was also a difference in flexibility between the two forces.  The future force had a 
16 cell vertical launch system as well as a phased array radar system.  Both forces were capable 
of basic self defense.  However, the future force had the ability to transition more easily from 
Phase Zero to follow on phases.  This ability was due to the adaptability of the ships themselves.    
The Visby had several modules available and the JHSV’s mission deck could be fitted to support 
many different missions including anti-mine warfare and anti surface warfare.   Both forces had 
air assets capable of carrying hellfire missiles.  However, the RQ-8 employed by the future force 
had considerably longer mission endurance.   Both forces had an anti-submarine warfare 
capability but only the future force had the capability for offensive action with the missile 
systems onboard the Japanese DDH and the Visby corvette.   The future force was adaptable and 
gives the commander more options of employment in varying phases of armed conflict. 
The current and future forces requirement fulfillment tables are included below. 
 
Parameter Requirement Capability Fulfillment rate 
Storage Requirement (ft3): 99,553 109,000 109% 
Vehicle Storage Requirement (ft2): 6,080 20,900 344% 
Water production(gal/day): 75,000 131,761 176% 
Medical/Marine personnel 491 1685 343% 
Airlift capability: 
(lbs/day):                                                 
Personnel/day:                                        
Equipment/day: 
1,238,200          
99                      
16 
1,453,500    
99                
16 
117%                     
100%                     
100% 
SH-60 required for Anti-smuggling 17 17 100% 
Annual Cost= $422.8 Million 












Parameter Requirement Capability Fulfillment rate
Storage Requirement (ft3): 99,553 100,000 100% 
Vehicle Storage Requirement (ft2): 6,080 28,250 465% 
Water production(gal/day): 75,000 77,486 103% 
Medical/Marine personnel 491 880 179% 
Airlift capability: 
(lbs/day):                                            
Personnel/day:                                  
Equipment/day: 
1,238,200            
99                        
16 
1,377,000             
99                        
16 
111%                 
100%                 
100% 
RQ-8 required for Anti-smuggling 12 12 100% 
Annual Cost= $343.9 Million 
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VI. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
The world’s maritime forces spend the vast majority of their time and efforts in the 
waters, seas, and oceans engaging in uninterrupted actions to maintain stability, prevent or lessen 
situations, and facilitate other operations should the need arise.  We term these aggregate 
activities as Phase Zero operations.  Phase Zero operations is founded on the premises of 
cooperative partnerships which engage in law enforcement, relief and recovery operations, and 
assistances to local governments.  Whether the cooperative partnerships are premised on 
bilateral, multilateral, or ad-hoc agreements, a Phase Zero force should share their awareness, 
assessments, and responsibilities for action.  Further, this Phase Zero force should operate with 
particular awareness of local culture, accepted practices, and norms.  Phase Zero operations 
should support social calm and civility. 
Bringing together partnerships underscored by cooperation requires both formal and 
informal arrangements, processes, and activities.  These arrangements are designed to 
communicate goals, coordinate and plan to develop objectives, agree on actions and resolutions 
to issues, and engender trust.  Collaboration implies working together on the basis of exchanged 
knowledge to accomplish a shared goal.  The architecture must support the acquisition of 
information, the management of information, the advancement of information, the application of 
information, and the integration of information to build a base of knowledge.  Therefore it is key 
to develop an architecture for managing (i.e., provide the command and control).  
Command and control are functions, but they are sub-functions of the function ‘to 
manage’.  In general, the six functions of managing are planning, organizing, communicating, 
team building, commanding, and controlling.  
• ‘to command’ is perform art of assigning missions; providing resources 
(analyze, prioritize); directing subordinates (guide, set policy, focus the force 
to accomplish clear objectives); analyze risk (identify, assess). 
• ‘to control’ is to define limits; negotiate; deal with constraints; determine 
requirements; allocate resources; report; maintain performance (monitor, 
identify, correct deviations from guidance). 
 
Command is different from control – and they are often performed by different people. 
The premise for Phase Zero operations to provide the knowledge that supports the highest level 
of decision fitness.  
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Decision fitness is the multiplicative merging of knowledge, perspective, logic, and 
action.  The quality of a decision is only as good as the weakest link in this chain.  Knowledge is 
framed within a particular context; creative, doable alternatives are built up from the coalition’s 
wisdom, meaningful, reliable information is collected, developed, and shared; trade-offs are 
based on clear values and goals; logically correct reasoning is applied to select an alternative and 
plan for action; and finally action is adjudicated and taken.   
To support decision fitness for managing Phase Zero operations, four primary functions 
of operations are defined.  First, build a body of knowledge that can be rapidly and accurately 
updated and disseminated; second, to provide a force that has sufficiency to maintain stability; 
third, apply acceptable and appropriate force to accomplish the intended objective; and fourth, to 
build an operational architecture that is responsive and scalable to the needs through 2050. These 
top four Phase Zero functions and their sub-functions are illustrated in the figure below. 
 












We have identified thirteen primary missions for Phase Zero operations. These are listed below: 
• Ensure freedom of navigation (FON) 
• Build relations with local government (BuildRel) 
• Conduct anti-terrorism activities (ATO) 
• Assist in training local defense forces (TrainLcl) 
• Evacuate non-combatants (NEO) 
• Access and share intelligence and information (Shintel) 
• Reduce smuggling (Smug) 
• Support anti-illegal fishing operations (Fish) 
• Aid in equipping local defense forces (EquipLcl)) 
• Assist in restoring critical infrastructure (Infra) 
• Help save lives through sustenance and transport (Civil) 
• Carry out anti-piracy operations (Piracy) 
• Protect against threats (SelfDef) 
 
Figure 35:  Overview of Phase Zero force architecture (business-end) 
Larger Phase Zero Force Ships:  
Smaller Phase Zero Force Ships:   
Smallest Phase Zero Force Ships:  
Type 1 Phase Zero Force Airships:  
Type 2 Phase Zero Force Airships: 
Target vessels: 
The overriding criterion for the Phase Zero force architecture is to provide just-in-time 
information (JITI). “When the information is needed, the information is provided”.  This is in 
stark contrast to the philosophy, “When the information is needed, the information can be 
requested”. JITI eliminates the need to query for information.  Information that is known to be 
required (i.e., satisfying both the conditions of necessary and sufficient) is sent with the highest 
priority first-in.  Next priorities are staged and sent according to either a push model (that 
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anticipates the rate of need, based on indicators (e.g., % of buffer memory) or heuristics (e.g., 
temporal); or a pull model (that calls for the “next” package of information that has been queued. 
The result of JITI is to eliminate wasteful (e.g., time intensive) “guess-again” strategies that 
force the formulation of non-productive questions of which there are no answers.  
Layered into this JITI architecture are a network of computers that act as nodes in a 
distribution and assimilation of information.  Each computer has a front-end processing unit 
(FEP) and a back-end processing unit (BEP).  The FEP is designed to communicate to other 
FEPs, whereas a BEP only communicates with its associated FEP.  Should a BEP fail, the FEP 
continues to support the network activities.  
 
Figure 36:  Business end (Front-end and back-end processing) 
Front-End Processor (FEP) 
Back-End Processor (BEP) 
Indigenous Autonomous Processor (IAP) 
 
It is highly desirable (and a primary feature of the Phase Zero force architecture) that 
information flow from all sources into the Phase Zero knowledge network.  The PUBLIC END 
of the architecture will be open to all electronically distributed sources, including the World 
Wide Web, the Internet, digital and analog telephone, fax, digital and analog television, 
broadcast radio (AM and FM), short-wave radio, citizen-band radio, and radio-telephones (by 
example).  The objective of the PUBLIC END is to encourage all sources of data production. 
This includes individuals who may be involved in peer production and its associated 
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environments, public network broadcasting, government sources, non-government sources, and 
individual reportings. In the years between 2020 and 2050, the use of cyberspace will dominate 
exchange of information. Cyberspace can be considered unconstrained and interactive.  The 
Phase Zero force will need to integrate all modes of communication to better accommodate the 
cultures, perform more effectively, and gain the cooperative support needed to be efficient. 
Connections: 
A primary system goal is to connect all users to as many potential sources as feasible.  
Increasing the number of connections will ensure that the operators have sufficient information 
to make a fit decision.  The system must easily accept connections from diverse input sources as 
well as ensure that all members of the force are integrated together. 
Connection can be made either via radio point to point connection or Satcom radio 
connection. Both connection modes serve different mission operations or situations.  Example, a 
ship within allied controlled waters may be able to transmit via point to point connection 
whereas ships in a hostile environment may require Satcom connection.  Point to point 
connection offers near real time transmission whereas Satcom connection has a time lag issue 
that can be as large as a few seconds due to transmission distance.  Bandwidth over Satcom 
connection is more limited than that of point to point connection which translates to slower 
speed.  Encryption has to be carried out on both connection modes to prevent red force 
eavesdropping.  To summarize, point to point connection offers a better connection in terms of 
speed, time, bandwidth but limited to controlled areas whereas Satcom connection compensate 
for this short fall but not the best in terms of speed, time, bandwidth.  To maximize its 
usefulness, the C2 system will have to use both connections efficiently as required by the 
situation. 
The C2 system should reconnect seamlessly lost connections when the link becomes 
available again as information flow is critical during a decision making process. A bad decision 
can occur without a good update of the situation awareness through a healthy connecting system.  
When a reconnection is made, the system will have to orderly bring the reconnecting unit’s 
knowledge base up to a point consistent with the rest of the force’s.  Since this could potentially 
be a large amount of information for a unit that experienced a long disconnection, the 





Sensors are critical in our C2 system as they are the main source of information feed. 
Sensors types can come in a form of hardware equipments such as radars, cameras, satellite 
imagery etc or can be human sources such as informants or users.  They provide valuable 
information to assist Phase Zero force in carry out their respective mission.  The information 
collected from these sensors will be stored for current and future usage in a local database and 
access via global database.  Hardware sensors such as cameras can provide excellent situation 
awareness near coastal area whereas radar/satellite imagery can provide open sea situation 
awareness.  Information from human sensor can be gathered via an open input source such as 
Internet. Informants are no longer restricted to a small group size; anyone in any part of this 
world can provide valuable information.  Example, information identifying smuggling ships, 
illegal fishing activities, etc. 
Modular Interface: 
Changes are inevitable in a development, thus any modifications to the command and 
control model at system level as to constantly enhance the overall system must always be ready 
and easy to implement. Thus, it should be modular model as any changes made to one part of the 
model should not affect other parts.  This modularity allows for parallel development of models 
and greatest flexibility. However, being modular, means more development effort and 
components which equals to higher cost.  To create a modular system, it will use exchangeable 
interfaces to interact without side sources.  The interfaces will act as an intermediary between 
inputs and the actual mechanics of the system.  Since these interfaces can be adapted to interact 
with a vast array of differing system types, the system can be employed by many different users.  
This will allow it to connect with allied forces as they participate with the U.S. in Phase Zero 
operations. 
 
Figure 37:  Four node network diagram 
 The figure above shows the typical connections for four interface system. Each system 







C = Communicator 
P = Processor 
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communications processor dedicated solely to manage the network connections.  The processing 
module communicates with the communications module to interact with other users.  Each node 
maintains directional control links and bidirectional data links with all the other know nodes.  To 
do this in a wireless network, individual channels will be allocated for each communication link.  
The diagram shows four nodes, but more can be added in the same manner. 
 A token is used to control the network work.  It is constantly passed between peers to 
ensure that the connection remains open.  If a reply is not received after a fixed time, the node is 
assumed to be unavailable and is disconnected from the network.  Changing the timeout time can 
increase or decrease the physical size of the network.  To rejoin the network, a broadcast is sent 
form a node and connections are established when a reply is received.  Bidirectional channels are 
used to exchange data on an as needed basis.   Since the control message is small, bandwidth can 
be saved and used dynamically creating and efficient system.  This creates a robust system with 
redundant transactions preventing the loss of data. 
 Adding nodes to the network increases reliability since more paths are available for data 
transmission.  The figure below shows the increasing trend.  Reliability increases linearly with 
the addition of the first node and then exponentially after that.  Since the number of connections 
increases exponentially, it follows that the overall system reliability increases exponentially. As 
even more nodes are added, the reliability asymptotically approaches a finite limit.  This limit 







Figure 38:  System reliability 
Processing: 
When individual is connected to the network (access granted), the network will load min 
necessary information into the user system and bring the user up to the same information 
awareness as the rest of the network user before the user can starts to contribute. However, in 
special cases (when information is considered vital), the network will upload user critical 
information (depending on trust level) and update other users in the network.  
When a user that was previously connected in the network and disconnected and get 
connected again, the network will upload him the delta information (when user is away) and 
bring up his information awareness.  
The system will evaluate information as it arrives based to compare information from 
varying sources.  Since information from differing sources may conflict, the system needs a 
method to determine which data will create fit decisions.  The data will be measured based on its 
timeliness with a preference given to more recent information.  Past accuracy of the data source 
will also be used to determine its relevance.  Using these two metrics to compare information as 
it enters the system will ensure that the best available information is used to make decisions. 
Inference Engine: 
The inference engine is a very powerful, intelligent, high processing speed processor.   It 
is responsible for organizing the vast amount of data feed to the system.  The engine will 
prioritize the information so that it can alert the user to vital information.  Each inference engine 










able to sniff out the information that is required from all the information that it is receiving from 
the network and present it timely to the user thru a max 3 touch GUI. The inference engine is self 
learning and updating always keeping the user with the latest information.  
Implementation difficulties:  
It is hard to implement the inference engine on current processor chip that runs on a 
synchronous clock, which has lots of idle time. This calls for a change in the architecture to 
something that runs on asynchronous processing or parallel processing and a processor with less 
logic gate and consume less power. 
Distribution: 
Information is distributed to all users in the network.  Every user will contribute 
information to other users.  Different access rights will enable user to contribute information to 
different levels (or wider network: public domains and private/secure).  The data will be pushed 
to other users when needed as it becomes available.  
The C2 architecture network we are proposing is of a push model or Just In time 
Information (JITI), where the user is updated with the information he wanted when the event 
happens or when he needed the information so that he is decision fit. As compared to the time 
driven model (on demand), the user only gets the information when he ask for it. The 
information sought is likely obsolete or taken over by events by the time he found the 
information and that makes the user decision unfit.  
Secure: 
To prevent unauthorized access, the system will depend on Two Factor Authentication 
for identity management.  For data a new user to access the system, a known user will have to 
vouch for its identity.  The system will leverage on Access Control Lists (ACLS) enforcing 
Mandatory Access Control (ACL) according to the Bell-LaPadula Security Model.  It will also 
fully segregate unclassified (internet) and classified information.  Access to classified 
information by coalition partners to be restricted based on Principle of Least Privilege (POLP). 
Strong encryption based on accepted standards of the day will be implemented to ensure 
confidentiality.  Current standards dictate cryptography equivalent to AES 256. The system will 
segregate duties to be enforced to prevent single point of failure, inclusive of at least one 
technical member and one management member. 
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Since the system allows open data input, it needs a mechanism to prevent unauthorized 
modifications.  All requests and responses to requests to the system will be signed with Nonces 
(One-Time Unique Key) leveraging on PKI infrastructure to ensure authenticity and non-
repudiation.  Audit Logs will be maintained to facilitate analysis and aid the inference engine in 
its input validation.  System hashing will be based on accepted standards of the day.  The Biba 
security model will be enforced by the model 
Since the system is critical to mission commanders ability to make fit decisions, it should 
be continuously available.  This requires 100% redundancy for identified critical subsystems 
(network, servers, power systems).  The critical subsystems should use High Availability (HA) 
equipment.  To prevent jamming of and disruptions of service, frequency agile spread spectrum 
techniques should be incorporated into the system. 
Manage: 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) to be established to determine the functional 
requirements of the C2 system.  Each mission to have its own unique SOP which is made open-
source for coalition collaboration and subjected to continued review and improvement.  The SOP 
serves as a document that details what management has decided upon in order to prosecute a 
mission successfully.  Each mission characteristic will determine the type and extent of C2 
support required, which will then translate to the actual network to be established. The SOP is to 
include, but not limited to the following areas: 
• Stakeholder List:  
A list of interested parties and their role in a process as well as the established hierarchy 
is available which will determine access to a particular systems. 
• Process Flow:  
To direct the flow of information and corresponding actions between stakeholders to 
achieve a particular task.  
• Standards:  
To set a minimal performance standard for each task in terms of outcome, duration and 
other aspects as determine by a mission’s specific Methods of Effectiveness (MOE). 
• Procedures:  




• Supporting Elements:  
To list the types of hardware and software required to complete the mission and 
acceptable alternatives. 
C2 System Optimization: 
When implementing the Phase Zero C2 system, three different metrics should be 
optimized.  Speed of information, level of uncertainty, and connectivity simultaneously place 
conflicting demands on the system.  For each mission, the demands on the C2 system vary with 
speed of information to provide the Phase Zero forces with timely and relevant information. 
Highest level of speed of information for a Phase Zero mission means that the C2 Architecture 
must be able to identify and filter out the required information, and make it available to the Phase 
Zero force near instantaneously for it to execute its mission.  
The level of uncertainty describes a lack of conclusive evidentiary information as to 
when, where, and how a monitored event would take place.  Highest level of uncertainty means 
that the Phase Zero force has to work with minimum amount of definitive information available, 
and has to rely on C2 system to propose alternatives and next best course-of-action.  The C2 
system does that based on computer simulators or data gathered from past events.  
Network connectivity provides Phase Zero force, partners, and the general public with 
network connection and information access to database.  Security mechanisms will be 
implemented to restrict information access based on security clearance levels and need-to-know 
basis (e.g. in self defense scenarios).  The highest level of network connectivity means that the 
mission requires increased level of information transfer from multiple sources, and often access 
of information beyond the allocated security clearance. 
The following three tables illustrate the levels of requirements of the thirteen primary 














Highest 1 SelfDef 
- 2 ShIntel 
- 3 ATO 
- 4 Piracy 
- 5 Fish 
- 6 Smug 
- 7 NEO 
- 8 FON 
- 9 BuildRel 
- 10 EquipLcl 
- 11 TrainLcl 
- 12 Infra 
 Lowest 13 Civil 




Highest 1 ATO 
- 2 Piracy 
- 3 Smug 
- 4 NEO 
- 5 Fish 
- 6 BuildRel 
- 7 TrainLcl 
- 8 EquipLcl
- 9 Civil 
- 10 Infra 
- 11 ShIntel 
- 12 FON 





Highest 1 ATO 
- 2 ShIntel 
- 3 BuildRel 
- 4 Infra 
- 5 Civil 
- 6 TrainLcl 
- 7 EquipLcl
- 8 Smug 
- 9 Piracy 
- 10 Fish 
- 11 NEO 
- 12 SelfDef 
Lowest 13 FON 
Table 102:  Speed of Information Priority              Table 103:  Level of Uncertainty Priority             Table 104:  Network Connectivity Priority 
 
Summary: 
We need to consider the initial conditions of the Phase Zero force architecture. Other 
entities may have existing and operating information sharing systems.  Consider: CENTRIXS for 
the 5 COCOMSs, 77-nations, NATO and U.S. ships; Cooperating Nation Information Exchange 
System (CNIES) 164 for U.S. Southern Command; Maritime Safety and Security Information 
System (MSSIS) 165 for the U.S. Navy Sixth Fleet; Nationwide Automatic Identification System 
(NAIS) 166 for the U.S. Coast Guard. Additionally, there are systems being demonstrated today, 
                                                 
164 Defense Link: “DoD Briefing with Deputy Assistant Secretary Douglas from the Pentagon Briefing Room, 
Arlington, Va” 24 April 2007 http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3947 accessed on 
29 May 2009 
165 Atlantic Council of the United States: “Improving our Maritime Vision” 2 December 2008.  
http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/improving-our-maritime-vision accessed on 29 May 2009 
166 United States Coast Guard: “Nationwide Automatic Identification System” http://www.uscg.mil/acquisition/nais/ 
accessed on 29 May 2009.   
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including Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC) 167 for the U.S. European 
Command; Comprehensive Maritime Awareness tool (CMA) 168 for US NORTHCOM; and 
Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) 169 for the International Maritime Organization. 
Additionally, the Malacca Strait Initiative has linked Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia for 
maritime domain awareness.  However, none of these systems (either operational or proposed) 
have open channels to all sources or support JITI concepts and protocols.  
The key architectural issues are autonomous computing and JITI. Autonomous computer 
is the indigenous capability of each of the nodes in the partnership to build their own database 
from a wide range of information sources. Each node can be connected to an Indigenous 
Autonomous Processor (IAP), Figure 3 that supports the decision fitness of a particular Phase 
Zero Force Coalition Partner. Each partner is provided JITI from the network knowledge base, 
distributes information and knowledge from their own Indigenous Autonomous Processor (IAP), 
and shares their decision fitness. 
The two main advantages of the JITI Phase Zero Force Architecture over existing 
architectures are scalability and adaptability. The JITI Phase Zero Force Architecture is scalable 
simply by adding FEPs and adaptable to all sources of information.  
The technology required for the C2 system should be built incrementally.  Starting with 
currently available techniques and technology, system response time might be on the order of 
several seconds.  As the design and technology matures, response times will decrease.  Using a 
modular interface will assist with the incremental design process.  A common core can be 









                                                 
167 Acquisition, Office of the Secretary of defense. “Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations” 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/jctd/descript.htm accessed 29 May 2009 
168 Acquisition, Office of the Secretary of defense. “Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations” 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/asc/downloads/JCTD_ACTD_Quotes.pdf accessed on 29 May 2009 
169 Wikipedia: “LRIT” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LRIT accessed on 29 May 2009 
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A. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND REGIONAL STABILITY 
In any design it is necessary to have standards from which to compare effectiveness.  
This is particularly difficult for the Phase Zero force.  The primary goal of the force is to 
promote regional stability.   Stability is not a physical property that can be directly measured.  
This made it difficult to judge the effectiveness of the Phase Zero force.   Two major studies of 
regional stability were identified.  Each attempted to score the stability of a region based on a 
large series of statistics.  The first study was developed by the World Bank to measure the 
effectiveness of loans made by the bank.  The second study is entitled “Proposal for a Stability 
Matrix” by Dr. Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan.  We found Dr. Al-Rodhan’s study to be a more 
comprehensive study and proposed using his method for judging the effectiveness of the force in 
a region.  All of the indicators are lagging indicators.  It would take up to 18 months to measure 
results of the forces presence. 
Dr Al-Rodham’s study identified several hundred indexes that can be reliably measured.  
They were broken down into several broad categories including Economic, Environmental, 
Military and Security, Political, and Societal.  The indicators and variables included in Dr. Al-
Rodnan’s study that the integrated study team identified as being able to be directly influenced 
by a Phase Zero Force are listed at the conclusion of this section. 
 In the event of the deployment of a Phase Zero force, it would be easy to measure the 
effect that force would have on the indicators that are directly linked.  For example it would be 
easy to tie a decrease in illegal fishing to the arrival of a Phase Zero force.  Unfortunately, it 
would be more difficult to measure the change in an indirect factor after the deployment of a 
Phase Zero Force.  For example, it would be harder to attribute a rise in a nation’s GDP to the 
arrival of a Phase Zero force.  However, the argument can be made that a Phase Zero Force 
would decrease instances of illegal fishing allowing a nation to receive more money for the fish 







Broad Sectors Original Stability Matrix Additional Variables 
Military and 
Security 
• Total Armed Forces (Subsumed under 
d#/dP) 
• Military Expenditure 
• Arms Availability 
• Society(Civil) Military Relation 
• Confidence in Police Prosecution 
/Courts of Law (Subsumed under 
Confidence of Judicial System) 
• Arbitrary Application of Law 
• Public Perception of Security 
• Armed Internal Conflicts 
• Regional Conflicts 
• International Conflicts (All 3 conflicts 
subsumed under Internal and External 
Conflicts) 
• Border Dispute (Subsumed under 
Territorial Disputes under Societal) 
• Bordering Countries in Civil or 
Regional Wars (Subsumed under 
External Conflicts) 
• Terrorism 
• Operational Ability  
• Weapons Availability 
• WMD 
• Aggression 
• Participation in Exercises 
with foreign militaries 
Unlawful Acts 
(Additional 





 • Vices 
• Violent Crimes 
• Smuggling 
• Illegal Fishing 
• Terrorist Acts 
• Piracy 
• Crime Rate (from Military 
and Security) 
Economy • Black Market 
• Living Standard 
• Conflict Induced Poverty 
• GDP 
• Investments 
• Value of Currency 
• Inflation 
• Loans 
• Infrastructure (from 
military & security) 
• Price of Energy 
• Price of Coco Cola 
• # of Starbucks 
• # of McDonalds 
Environmental • Resource Dispute 
• Natural Disaster 
 
Political • Confidence in Government 
• Integrity of Elections 
• UN Membership 
• Tenure Length 
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• Changing Alliance 
• Social Unrest 
• Trustworthiness of Media 
• Sources of News 
• Public Servies 
• Corruption 
 
Societal • Territorial Dispute 
• Freedom of Movement (From 
Political) 
• Inter-Group Violence 
• Civility 
• Radio (subsumed under News 
Sources) 
• # of Schooling Institutions 
• Access to Sanitation 
• Infant Mortality 
• Maternal Mortality (Subsumed under 
Life Span) 
• HIV/AIDS Prevalence 
• Internet Users 













A. CURRENT PLATFORM CAPABILITIES 





Draft (Ft) 27 
Endurance (nm) 9,500 




Organic Boats 1 LCPL and 1 RHIB (7m) 
Well Deck Capability 322ft long x 50ft wide x 28ft high 
3 LCAC  
or  
2 LCU 1610 
 or   
6 LCM(8)   
or  
12 LCM (6)  
or  
40 AAV 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) 109,000 





Helo Capable Yes 
Help Spots 9 CH-53 Spot 
Organic Aircraft 6 AV-8B, 4 AH-1, 12 CH-46, 9 CH-53, 
or 
 4UH-1 or 6 AV-8B 12 CH-46, 9 CH-53  
or                   
42 CH-46 or 20 AV-8B, 6 ASW 
Helicopters 
Operating Rooms 6 
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101/sys/ship/docs/slcp-lhd-3/index.html viewed 01 May 2009 




Beds 36 Bed Ward, 600 bed surge 
Dental Facilities Yes 
Self Defense 
Weapons  
(2)MK-49 RAM,  
(2)MK-29 Sea Sparrow,  
(3)MK-15 CIWS,  
(4) MK-38 Bushmaster,  
(4) M2HB .50 cal machine guns 
Offensive Weapons  N/A 
Radar  SPS-48E Air search,  
SPS-49 Air search  
SPS-64 Navigation,  
SPS-67 Surface search 
Sonar N/A 
EW / Intel SLQ-32, SLQ-25A, SRS-1 Joint Services 
Imagery Processing System-Navy (JSIPS-
N) 
Communications SHF,EHF,UHF,HF, VHF YS-2(V)5. 
USQ-119(V)11 Naval Tactical Command 
System,(URC-109) integrated 
communications system, SMQ-11 weather 




Ship Signals Exploitation Space, Flag 
Plot, Landing Force Operations Center, 
Joint Intelligence Center, Supporting 
Arms Coordination Center, Tactical-
Logistical Group, Helicopter Logistics 
Group, Tactical Air Control Center, 
Helicopter Direction Center, and 
Helicopter Coordination Section 




















Draft (Ft) 26 
Endurance (nm) 10,000 




Organic Boats 2 LCPL  
Well Deck Capability 249ft long x 76ft wide x 26ft high 
1 LCAC  
or  
4 LCU 1610  
or  
7 LCM(8)  
or  
17 LCM(6)  
or  
45 AAV 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) 105,900 





Helo Capable Yes 
Help Spots 9 CH-53 Spot 
Organic Aircraft 30 CH-46/CH-53 + 6 AV-8B 
Operating Rooms 3 
Beds 48 Bed Ward, 300 bed surge 
Dental Facilities Yes 
Self Defense 
Weapons  
(2)MK-49 RAM,  
(2)MK-15 CIWS,  
(4) MK-38 Bushmaster,  
(2) M2HB .50 cal machine guns 
Offensive Weapons  N/A 
Radar  SPS-48E Air search,  
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SPS-40 Air search  
SPS-64 Navigation,  
SPS-67 Surface search 
Sonar N/A 
EW / Intel SLQ-32, SLQ-25A, SRS-1 Joint Services 
Imagery Processing System-Navy (JSIPS-
N) 
Communications SHF,EHF,UHF,HF, VHF YS-2(V)5. 
USQ-119(V)11 Naval Tactical Command 
System,(URC-109) integrated 
communications system, SMQ-11 weather 




Ship Signals Exploitation Space, Flag 
Plot, Landing Force Operations Center, 
Joint Intelligence Center, Supporting 
Arms Coordination Center, Tactical-
Logistical Group, Helicopter Logistics 
Group, Tactical Air Control Center, 
Helicopter Direction Center, and 
Helicopter Coordination Section 





























Draft (Ft) 24 
Endurance (nm) 7,700 




Organic Boats 2 LCPL, 1 RHIB (7m),1 utility boat 
Well Deck Capability 168ft long x50ft wide x 20ft high 
2 LCAC  
or  
1 LCU 1610 & 3 LCM(6)  
or      
9 LCM(6)  
or  
4 LCM(8)  
or  
28 AAV 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) 40,000 





Helo Capable Yes 
Help Spots 2 CH-53 Spot/ 4 extended spots 
Organic Aircraft 4 CH-46/CH-53 
Operating Rooms 1 
Beds 12 Bed Ward 
Dental Facilities Yes 
Self Defense 
Weapons  
(2)MK-15 CIWS,  
(2) MK-38 Bushmaster,  
(2) M2HB .50 cal machine guns 
Offensive Weapons  N/A 
Radar     SPS-40 Air search,  
SPS-64 Navigation  
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SPS-67 Surface search 
Sonar N/A 
EW / Intel SLQ-32, SLQ-25A, SRS-1 Joint Services 
Imagery Processing System-Navy (JSIPS-
N) 
Communications SHF,EHF,UHF,HF,VHF  
Command/Flag 
Space 
Ship Signals Exploitation Space, Flag 
Plot, Landing Force Operations Center,  
Supporting Arms Coordination Center 









































Draft (Ft) 23 
Endurance (nm) 8,000 




Organic Boats 2 LCPL, 1 RHIB (7m), 1 utility boat 
Well Deck Capability 188ft long x50ft wide x 31ft high 
2 LCAC  
or  
1 LCU 1610 plus 14 EFV 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) 30,000 





Helo Capable Yes 
Help Spots 2 CH-53 Spot/ 6 extended spots 
Organic Aircraft Two CH-53s,  
or  
Four AH/UH-1s,  
or  
Four CH-46s,  
or  
Two MV-22s,  
or  
One AV-8B Harrier 
Operating Rooms 2 
Beds 24 Bed Ward 
Dental Facilities Yes 
Self Defense 
Weapons  
(2) MK-49 RAM,  
(2) MK-38 Bushmaster,  
(2) MK-26 12.7mm machine guns 
Offensive Weapons  N/A 
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Radar  SPS-48E Air search,  
SPS-73 Navigation/Surface search  
Sonar N/A 
EW / Intel SLQ-32, SLQ-25A, SRS-1 Joint Services 
Imagery Processing System-Navy (JSIPS-
N) 
Communications SHF,UHF,HF,VHF  
Command/Flag 
Space N/A 









































Draft (Ft) 20 
Endurance (nm) 8,000 




Organic Boats 2 LCPL, 1 RHIB (7m), 1 utility boat 
Well Deck Capability 180ft long x 50ft wide x 30ft high 
2 LCAC  
or  
1 LCU 1610  
or  
9 LCM(6)  
or    
4 LCM(8)  
or  
15 AAV 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) 50,700 





Helo Capable Yes/Landing only, no hanger 
Help Spots 2 CH-53 Spot 
Organic Aircraft Two CH-53/ CH-46 
Operating Rooms 1 
Beds 5 Bed Ward 
Dental Facilities Yes 
Self Defense 
Weapons  
(2)MK-49 RAM,  
(2)MK-15 CIWS,  
(2)MK-38 Bushmaster,  
(6)MSHB .50 cal machine guns 
Offensive Weapons  N/A 
Radar     SPS-49 Air search,  
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SPS-64 Navigation,  
SPS-67 Surface search 
Sonar N/A 
EW / Intel SLQ-32, SLQ-25A 
Communications SHF,UHF,HF,VHF  
Command/Flag 
Space N/A 











































Draft (Ft) 20 
Endurance (nm) 8,000 




Organic Boats 2 LCPL, 1 RHIB (7m), 1 utility boat 
Well Deck Capability 440ft long x 50ft wide x 27ft high 
4 LCAC  
or  
3 LCU 1610  
or  
21 LCM(6)  
or    
10 LCM(8)  
or  
64 AAV 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) 5,100 





Helo Capable Yes/Landing only, no hanger 
Help Spots 2 CH-53 Spot 
Organic Aircraft Two CH-53/ CH-46 
Operating Rooms 1 
Beds 5 Bed Ward 
Dental Facilities Yes 
Self Defense 
Weapons  
(2)MK-49 RAM,  
(2)MK-15 CIWS,  
(2)MK-38 Bushmaster,  
(6)MSHB .50 cal machine guns 
Offensive Weapons  N/A 
Radar     SPS-49 Air search,  
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SPS-64 Navigation,  
SPS-67 Surface search 
Sonar N/A 
EW / Intel SLQ-32, SLQ-25A 
Communications SHF,UHF,HF,VHF  
Command/Flag 
Space N/A 











































Draft (Ft) 37 
Endurance (nm) Undefined 
Speed (Knts) 30 
Officers 160 (Crew), 320 (Air wing), 25 (Flag) 
Enlisted 3040 (Crew), 2160 (Air wing), 45 (Flag) 
Troops 26 
Organic Boats 2 RHIB (7m), 2 utility boat 
Well Deck Capability N/A 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) Note 1 





Helo Capable Yes 
Help Spots 7 
Organic Aircraft 4 SH-60F, 2 HH-60H, 9 SH-60B, 44 F-18, 
4 EA-6B, 4 E-2C 
Operating Rooms 1 
Beds 65 Bed Ward 
Dental Facilities Yes 
Self Defense 
Weapons  
(4) MK-15 Phalanx 
(3) MK-29  
(2) RIM-116 RAM  
(4) RIM-7 
Offensive Weapons  N/A 
Radar  SPS-48E Air Search 
SPS-49 Air Search  
Hughes MK-23 TAS Air Search 





SPS-64 Navigation  
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(3) MK91 FC 
Sonar N/A 
EW / Intel SLQ-32 
SLQ-25 Nixie 
WLR-1H ESM 
Communications ACDS Block 0; Links 4A, 11, 16; 
Satellite Tadil J. GCCS; SATCOMS; 
SSR-1; UHF, SHF, SHF EHF, SSR-
2A(GBS); SSDS MK-2 
Command/Flag 
Space 
Ship Signals Exploitation Space, Flag 
Plot, Joint Intelligence Center, Tactical 
Air Control Center, Helicopter Direction 
Center, and Helicopter Coordination 
Section 
Table 112: CVN 68 Nimitz Class 
Note 1: Specific cargo and vehicle capacity unknown and assumed to be zero available for Civil Support 

































Draft (Ft) 31 
Endurance (nm) 6000 




Organic Boats 2 RHIB (7m) 
Well Deck Capability N/A 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) Note 1 





Helo Capable Yes 
Help Spots 1 
Organic Aircraft 2 SH-60B 
Operating Rooms N/A 
Beds N/A 
Dental Facilities N/A 
Self Defense 
Weapons  (2)MK-15 CIWS 
Offensive Weapons  (2)MK-45, (2) 25mm HMG 
(2) .50 cal HMG 
(2) MK-32 Tubes for MK-46/50 torpedoes 




Radar  SPY-1B Air Search/FC 
SPS-49 Air Search  
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EW / Intel SLQ-32 
SLQ-25 Nixie 
Communications CEC; NTDS w Links 4A, 11, 14; GCCS; 




Table 113: CG 47 Ticonderoga Class 
Note 1: Specific cargo and vehicle capacity unknown and assumed to be zero available for Civil Support 









































Draft (Ft) 31 
Endurance (nm) 4400 




Organic Boats 2 RHIB (7m) 
Well Deck Capability N/A 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) Note 1 





Helo Capable Yes/ Landing only, No hanger 
Help Spots 1 
Organic Aircraft N/A 
Operating Rooms N/A 
Beds N/A 
Dental Facilities N/A 
Self Defense 
Weapons  (2)MK-15 CIWS 
Offensive Weapons  (1)MK-45, (2) 25mm HMG 
(2) .50 cal HMG 
(2) MK-32 Tubes for MK-46/50 torpedoes 




Radar  SPS-64 Navigation 
SPS-67 Surface Search  
SPY-1D Air Search/FC 
Sonar SQQ-89 
EW / Intel SLQ-32 
SLQ-25 Nixie 
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Communications CEC, Link 4A, Link 11, Link 16, HF, 
VHF, UHF, SATCOM 
Command/Flag 
Space N/A 
Table 114: DDG 51 Arleigh Burke Class (Flight I/II) 
Note 1: Specific cargo and vehicle capacity unknown and assumed to be zero available for Civil Support 













































Draft (Ft) 31 
Endurance (nm) 4400 




Organic Boats 2 RHIB (7m) 
Well Deck Capability N/A 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) Note 1 





Helo Capable Yes 
Help Spots 1 
Organic Aircraft 2 SH-60R 
Operating Rooms N/A 
Beds N/A 
Dental Facilities N/A 
Self Defense 
Weapons  (2)MK-15 CIWS 
Offensive Weapons  (1)MK-45, (2) 25mm HMG 
(2) .50 cal HMG 
(2) MK-32 Tubes for MK-46/50 torpedoes 




Radar  SPS-64 Navigation 
SPS-67 Surface Search  
SPY-1D Air Search/FC 
Sonar SQQ-89 
EW / Intel SLQ-32 
SLQ-25 Nixie 
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Communications CEC, Link 4A, Link 11, Link 16, HF, 
VHF, UHF, SATCOM 
Command/Flag 
Space N/A 
Table 115: DDG 51 Arleigh Burke Class (Flight IIE) 
Note 1: Specific cargo and vehicle capacity unknown and assumed to be zero available for Civil Support 













































Draft (Ft) 22 
Endurance (nm) 4200 




Organic Boats 1 RHIB (7m) 
Well Deck Capability N/A 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) Note 1 





Helo Capable Yes 
Help Spots 1 
Organic Aircraft 2 SH-60 
Operating Rooms N/A 
Beds N/A 
Dental Facilities N/A 
Self Defense 
Weapons  (2)MK-15 CIWS 
Offensive Weapons  (1)MK-75, (2) 25mm HMG 
(2) .50 cal HMG 
(2) MK-32 Tubes for MK-46/50 torpedoes 
 
Radar  SPS-49 Air Search 
SPS-55 Surface Search 
Sperry MK-92 Fire Control 
Furuno Navigation 
URN 25 TACAN 
Sonar SQQ-89 
EW / Intel SLQ-32 
SLQ-25 Nixie 
Communications Link 11,14; SATCOM; SRR-1; UHF; 
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Table 116: FFG 7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class 
Note 1: Specific cargo and vehicle capacity unknown and assumed to be zero available for Civil Support 














































Draft (Ft) 12.1 
Endurance (nm) 3500 




Organic Boats 1 RHIB (7m) 
Well Deck Capability N/A 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) Note 1 





Helo Capable Yes 
Help Spots 1 
Organic Aircraft 2 MH-60R or 1 MH-60R & 3 UAVs 
Operating Rooms N/A 
Beds N/A 
Dental Facilities N/A 
Self Defense 
Weapons  1 RIM-116 
Offensive Weapons  (1) BAE MK-2  
(2) M2 .50 cal machine gun 
MK-50 Torpedo 
Radar  EADS TRS-3D Air/Surface Search 
FABA DORNA FC 
Sonar TBD 
EW / Intel TBD 
Communications HF,VHF,UHF, SATCOM 
Command/Flag 
Space N/A 
Table 117: LCS 1 Freedom Class 
Note 1: Specific cargo and vehicle capacity unknown and assumed to be zero available for Civil Support 
mission    
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Draft (Ft) 14.8 
Endurance (nm) 3500 




Organic Boats 1 RHIB (7m) 
Well Deck Capability N/A 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) Note 1 





Helo Capable Yes 
Help Spots 1 
Organic Aircraft 2 MH-60R or 1 MH-60R & 3 UAVs 
Operating Rooms N/A 
Beds N/A 
Dental Facilities N/A 
Self Defense 
Weapons  1 RIM-116 
Offensive Weapons  (1) BAE MK-2  
(4) M2 .50 cal machine gun 
MK-50 Torpedo 
Radar  Ericcson Sea Giraffe Air Search 
Sperry Bridgemaster Navigation 
Sonar TBD 
EW / Intel EDO ES-3601 ESM 
Communications HF,VHF,UHF, SATCOM 
Command/Flag 
Space N/A 
Table 118: LCS 2 Independence Class 
                                                 
194 Defense – Littoral Combat Ship, Austal, http://www.austal.com/index.cfm?objectid=8CB536ED-65BF-
EBC1-29D0BD06A94CC667, viewed 01 May 09 









Draft (Ft) 27.6 
Endurance (nm) 4500 




Organic Boats 2 RHIB (7m) 
Well Deck Capability N/A 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) Note 1 





Helo Capable Yes 
Help Spots 1 
Organic Aircraft 2 MH-60R  
or  
1 MH-60R & 3 UAVs 
Operating Rooms N/A 
Beds N/A 
Dental Facilities N/A 
Self Defense 
Weapons  (2) MK-15 CIWS, Evolved Sea Sparrow 




(2) 155mm Advanced Gun System  
(2) 57mm CIGs 
Anti-Terrorism System 
Radar  SPY-3 Air Search 
SPY-1D 
Sonar Bow-Mounted Active Search/Attack; 
Passive Towed Array; ISMA 
                                                 
196 GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/dd-x-specs.htm, viewed 01 
May 09 




EW / Intel ESM 
ECM 
Torpedo Decoys 
Communications HF,VHF,UHF, SATCOM 
Command/Flag 
Space N/A 
Table 119: DDX Zumwalt Class 
Note 1: Specific cargo and vehicle capacity unknown and assumed to be zero available for Civil 








































Draft (Ft) 11.5 
Endurance (nm) 2500 




Organic Boats 3 RHIB (7m) 
Well Deck Capability N/A 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) Note 1 





Helo Capable No 
Help Spots N/A 
Organic Aircraft N/A 
Operating Rooms N/A 
Beds N/A 
Dental Facilities N/A 
Self Defense 
Weapons  (2) M2HB .50 cal machine guns 
Offensive Weapons  N/A 
Radar  ISC Cardion SPS-55; I/J-band. 
Sonar Raytheon/Thomson Sintra SQQ-32(V)3; 
VDS; active minehunting; high frequency. 
EW / Intel N/A 
Communications SATCOM SRR-1; WSC-3 (UHF). 
GEC/Marconi Nautis M in last two ships 
includes SSN 2 PINS command system 
and control. USQ-119E(V), UHF Dama 




                                                 
198 Norman Polmar, Naval Institute guide to the ships and aircraft of the U.S. Fleet Eighteenth edition, 
Naval Institute Press Annapolis, Maryland, 2005 




Table 120: MCM 1 Avenger Class 
Note 1: Specific cargo and vehicle capacity unknown and assumed to be zero available for Civil 












































Draft (Ft) 27 
Endurance (nm) 13,500 
Speed (Knts) 22 
Officers 35 Crew, 72 Flag 
Enlisted 587 Crew, 185 Flag 
Troops N/A 
Organic Boats 3 LCPL, 2 LCVP 
Well Deck Capability N/A 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) Note 1 





Helo Capable Yes/ Landing only, No hanger 
Help Spots 1 
Organic Aircraft N/A 
Operating Rooms N/A 
Beds N/A 
Dental Facilities N/A 
Self Defense 
Weapons  
(2) MK-15 CIWS,  
(2) MK38 Bushmaster 
Offensive Weapons  N/A 
Radar  SPS-40E air search,  
SPS-48C 3-D search,  
SPS-64(V)9 navigation,  
SPS-65(V)1 surface search 
Sonar N/A 
EW / Intel SLQ-32(V)3, SLQ-25A 
Communications SSR-1, WSC-3 UHF, WSC-6 SHF, and 
USC-38 SHF, Link 4A, Link 11, Link 14, 




ACIS (Amphibious Command 
Information System); NIPS (Naval 
                                                 
200 Norman Polmar, Naval Institute guide to the ships and aircraft of the U.S. Fleet Eighteenth edition, 
Naval Institute Press Annapolis, Maryland, 2005 




Intelligence Processing System); , 
photographic laboratories and document-
publication facilities. Command facilities 
include a Ship Signals Exploitation Space 
(SSES), Flag Plot, Landing Force 
Operations Center (LFOC), Joint 
Intelligence Center (JIC), Supporting 
Arms Coordination Center (SACC), 
Helicopter Logistics Support Group 
(HLSG), Tactical Air Control Center 
(TACC), Helicopter Direction Center 
(HDC), and Helicopter Coordination 
Section (HCS). 
Table 121: LCC 19 Blue Ridge Class 
  
Note 1: Specific cargo and vehicle capacity unknown and assumed to be zero available for Civil 
Support mission    
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Draft (Ft) 7.9 
Endurance (nm) 2,000 




Organic Boats 1 RHIB (7m) 
Well Deck Capability N/A 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) Note 1 





Helo Capable No 
Help Spots N/A 
Organic Aircraft N/A 
Operating Rooms N/A 
Beds N/A 
Dental Facilities N/A 
Self Defense 
Weapons  
(4) M2HB .50 cal machine guns, 
 (2)M60 7.62mm machine guns 
Offensive Weapons  (2) MK38 Bushmaster 
Radar  2 Sperry RASCAR 2500 surface search 
Sonar Wesmar side scanning 




Table 122: PC 1 Cyclone Class 
 
Note 1: Specific cargo and vehicle capacity unknown and assumed to be zero available for Civil 
Support mission    
 
                                                 
202 Norman Polmar, Naval Institute guide to the ships and aircraft of the U.S. Fleet Eighteenth edition, 
Naval Institute Press Annapolis, Maryland, 2005 









Draft (Ft) 29 
Endurance (nm) 14,000 
Speed (Knts) 20 
Officers 
Enlisted 
123 civilian + 13 Navy + 36 aviation det. 
Troops N/A 
Organic Boats N/A 
Well Deck Capability N/A 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) 214,557 





Helo Capable Yes 
Help Spots 1 
Organic Aircraft 2 MH-60S 
Operating Rooms N/A 
Beds N/A 
Dental Facilities N/A 
Self Defense 
Weapons  N/A 
Offensive Weapons  N/A 
Radar  Navigation 
Sonar N/A 










                                                 
204 http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4400&tid=500&ct=4, accessed on 3/9/2009 









Draft (Ft) 36 
Endurance (nm) 6,000 
Speed (Knts) 20 
Officers 
Enlisted 
81 civilian + 21 Navy  
Troops N/A 
Organic Boats N/A 
Well Deck Capability N/A 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) 59,000 





Helo Capable Yes 
Help Spots 1 
Organic Aircraft None 
Operating Rooms N/A 
Beds N/A 
Dental Facilities N/A 
Self Defense 
Weapons  N/A 
Offensive Weapons  N/A 
Radar  Navigation 
Sonar N/A 
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Draft (Ft) 39 
Endurance (nm) 6,000 
Speed (Knts) 20 
Officers 
Enlisted 
176 civilian + 27 Navy  
Troops N/A 
Organic Boats N/A 
Well Deck Capability N/A 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) 200,000 
Fuel Capacity Diesel Fuel Marine (DFM) 1,965,600 gal 
JP-5 Fuel 2,620,800 gal 
Lube Oil, 500 55 gallon drums 





Helo Capable Yes 
Help Spots 1 
Organic Aircraft 3 UH-46 
Operating Rooms N/A 
Beds N/A 
Dental Facilities N/A 
Self Defense 
Weapons  N/A 
Offensive Weapons  N/A 
Radar  AN/SPS-67 Surface Search Radar  
AN/SPS-64(V)9 Navigation Radar  
MK 23 Target Acquisition System  
Sonar N/A 




Table 125: TAOE 6 Supply Class 
                                                 
208 http://navysite.de/ships/aoe6.htm, accessed on 3/9/2009 




21. SH-60B SEAHAWK 210 
 
Max Range (NM one 
way) 
300 
Cruise A/S (KNTS) 126 
Max A/S (KNTS) 180 
Speed with external 
load (KNTS) 
80 
Inflight Refueling No 
Max Gross Wt (Lbs) 21,700 






Normal sling lift 
(Lbs) 
4,500 
# of passengers 2 
Surface Radar Yes 








Dipping Sonar No 
Table 126: SH 60B Seahawk 
                                                 
210 Jane’s All the Worlds Aircraft.  Available online http://www.janes.com May, 15, 2009 
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22. SH-60F  SEAHAWK 211 
 
Max Range (NM one 
way) 
500 
Cruise A/S (KNTS) 147 
Max A/S (KNTS) 180 
Speed with external 
load (KNTS) 
80 
Inflight Refueling No 
Max Gross Wt (Lbs) 21,884 






Normal sling lift 
(Lbs) 
4,500 
# of passengers 2 
Surface Radar No 








Dipping Sonar Yes 
Table 127: SH 60F Seahawk 
                                                 
211 Jane’s All the Worlds Aircraft.  Available online http://www.janes.com May, 15, 2009 
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23. HH-60H SEAHAWK 212 
 
Max Range (NM one 
way) 
500 
Cruise A/S (KNTS) 147 
Max A/S (KNTS) 180 
Speed with external 
load (KNTS) 
80 
Inflight Refueling No 
Max Gross Wt (Lbs) 21,884 






Normal sling lift 
(Lbs) 
4,500 
# of passengers 5 
Surface Radar No 








Dipping Sonar No 
Table 128: HH 60H Seahawk 
                                                 
212 Jane’s All the Worlds Aircraft.  Available online http://www.janes.com May, 15, 2009 
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24. MH-60S KNIGHT HAWK 213 
 
Max Range (NM one 
way) 
200 
Cruise A/S (KNTS) 147 
Max A/S (KNTS) 180 
Speed with external 
load (KNTS) 
80 
Inflight Refueling No 
Max Gross Wt (Lbs) 22,000 






Normal sling lift 
(Lbs) 
4,500 
# of passengers 12 
Surface Radar No 








Dipping Sonar No 
Table 129: MH 60S Knight Hawk 
                                                 
213 Jane’s All the Worlds Aircraft.  Available online http://www.janes.com May, 15, 2009 
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25. MH-60R SEAHAWK 214 
 
Max Range (NM one 
way) 
300 
Cruise A/S (KNTS) 126 
Max A/S (KNTS) 180 
Speed with external 
load (KNTS) 
80 
Inflight Refueling No 
Max Gross Wt (Lbs) 23500 






Normal sling lift 
(Lbs) 
4,500 
# of passengers 2 
Surface Radar Yes 








Dipping Sonar Yes 
Table 130: MH-60R Seahawk 
                                                 




26. CH-53E SUPER STALLION 215 
 
Max Range (NM one 
way) 
540 
Cruise A/S (KNTS) 150 
Max A/S (KNTS) 170 
Speed with external 
load (KNTS) 
80 
Inflight Refueling Yes 
Max Gross Wt (Lbs) 73,500 






Normal sling lift 
(Lbs) 
27,000 
# of passengers 55 
Surface Radar No 








Dipping Sonar No 
Table 131: CH 53E Super Stallion 
                                                 




27. CH-46 SEA KNIGHT 216 
 
Max Range (NM one 
way) 
360 
Cruise A/S (KNTS) 145 
Max A/S (KNTS) 145 
Speed with external 
load (KNTS) 
80 
Inflight Refueling No 
Max Gross Wt (Lbs) 24300 






Normal sling lift 
(Lbs) 
3,000 
# of passengers 15 
Surface Radar No 








Dipping Sonar No 
Table 132: Ch 46 Sea Knight 
                                                 




28. MV-22 OSPREY 217 
 
Max Range (NM one 
way) 
880 
Cruise A/S (KNTS) 240 
Max A/S (KNTS) 305 
Speed with external 
load (KNTS) 
100 
Inflight Refueling Yes 
Max Gross Wt (Lbs) 60,500 






Normal sling lift 
(Lbs) 
10,000 
# of passengers 24 
Surface Radar No 








Dipping Sonar No 




                                                 
217 Jane’s All the Worlds Aircraft.  Available online http://www.janes.com May, 15, 2009 
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B. FUTURE PLATFORM CHARACTERISTICS 





Draft (Ft) 27 
Endurance (nm) 9,500 




Organic Boats 2 RHIB 
Well Deck Capability N/A 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) 145,963 
Vehicle Space (ft2) 19,112 
Helo Capable Yes 
Help Spots 9 CH-53 Spot 
Organic Aircraft 10 - F-35B STOVL aircraft  
12 - MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft  
4 - CH-53K Heavy-lift helicopters  
 8 - AH-1W Super Cobra  
4 - MH-60 Night Hawk 
Operating Rooms 2 
Beds 24 Bed Ward, 300 bed surge 
Dental Facilities Yes 
Self Defense 
Weapons  
2 - Mk-29 NATO Evolved Sea Sparrow 
launchers 
2 - MK49 Rolling Airframe Missile 
[RAM] 
3 - 20mm Phalanx CIWS mounts 
7 - .50 cal. machine guns 
Offensive Weapons  N/A 
Radar  AN/SPS-48 Radar, AN/SPS-49 Radar, 
AN/SPQ-9B  
Sonar N/A 
EW / Intel SLQ-32, SLQ-25A, SSR-1 Joint Service 
Imagery Processing 
Communications SHF,EHF,UHF,HF, VHF, YS-2(V)5. 
                                                 




USQ-119(V)11 Naval Tactical Command 
System,(URC-109) integrated 
communications system, SMQ-11 weather 
satellite receiving system 
Command/Flag 
Space 
Ship Signals Exploitation Space, Flag 
Plot, Landing Force Operations Center, 
Joint Intelligence Center, Supporting 
Arms Coordination Center, Tactical-
Logistical Group, Helicopter Logistics 
Group, Tactical Air Control Center, 
Helicopter Direction Center, and 
Helicopter Coordination Section 
Estimated Cost per 
Ship 
 $3.1 Billion219 




Table 134: LHA (R) 
The Navy’s LHA(R) will replace the ageing Tarawa-class amphibious assault 
ships.  The fist LHA(R) is LHA 6 which is an aviation enhanced type of LHA(R).  LHA 
6 will have no well deck, instead it will have and extended hanger bay, increased aviation 
maintenance facilities, increased cargo space, and increased JP-5 storage capacity.  The 
LHA-6 design is optimized to support new aircraft such as the V-22 Osprey and the Joint 
strike Fighter. 
The LHA 6 was funded in FY07 and is scheduled to be delivered to the fleet in 
2012.  LHA 6 will begin to replace the Tarawa class LHAs which are scheduled to be 
decommissioned between 2011 and 2015. 
  
Suitability for missions: 
• Anti-smuggling:   
The LHA(R) will be able to support Anti-smuggling operations through the use of 
the organic air assets to aid in detection and identification of smugglers.  The ship does 
have several RHIBs which could be used as intercept boats but the use of an LHA in this 
                                                 
219 Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. March 2008 Government Acountability 
Office Report [GAO-08-467SP] 
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role is unlikely.  The LHA also brings a large command and control capability as well as 
an intelligence gathering capability with can be used in the anti smuggling mission. 
• Civil Support:   
The LHA(R) will have extensive air assets capable of transporting material from 
ship to shore.   The LHA 6 is optimized for the MV-22  and has an increased storage 
capacity of approximately 145,000 ft3.  LHAs and LHDs have been often used in the 
Civil Support and humanitarian assistance role.   On September 6, 2007 USS Wasp 
arrived off the coast of Nicaragua to assist with disaster relief efforts following Hurricane 
Felix.220  
• Information sharing:  
 LHA(R) has extensive command and control capabilities as a flag configured 
ship.  These systems could be used to manage and disseminate information to the other 
ships in the force, other agencies and other nations.  
                                                 








Draft (Ft) 11 
Endurance (nm) 3500 
Speed (Knts) 45 
Crew 40 
Troops 107+87 
Organic Boats 2 RHIB 




Helo Capable Yes 
Help Spots 2 (MH-60) 
Organic Aircraft N/A 
Operating Rooms 1 (foldable operating table) 
Beds N/A 




Offensive Weapons  Mk 96 Stabilized Weapon System  
(25mm Bushmaster Cannon & 
Mk 19 40mm Grenade Launcher); 
Mk 45 40mm Grenade Launcher System 
Radar Type 
Sonar 
EW / Intel 
Assume to include equivalent systems as 





2 Conference Room, 2 Staff Rooms 
Estimated Cost per 
Ship 
$171 million 




Table 135: HSV 2 Swift 
                                                 




The HSV-2 (High Speed Vessel) Swift is a high-speed, wave-piercing catamaran. 
Its high speed, shallow draft, mission flexibility and modularity, and hull design offer the 
Navy an opportunity to see, first hand, what effect emergent technologies will have on 
future ship design and development. There are currently three HSV ships in active 
service: HSV-X1 Joint Venture was the initial prototype. It served with the US Navy 
from November 1998 through March 2004 when it was stricken from the Naval Vessel 
Register and assigned to the US Army, where it serves as a high-speed supply vessel. 
TSV-X1 Is a Theater Support vessel assigned to the US Army for high speed, in theater 
logistical support, and HSV-2 is currently under contract with the US Navy. 
As part of the Swift's conversion from a civilian to military craft, a helicopter 
flight deck was added, the vehicle deck was strengthened to accommodate military 
vehicles (the rear mounted loading ramp is M1A2 capable), and the Swift was equipped 
with the capacity to launch small boats as well as unmanned, remotely operated 
submersibles. 
Suitability for missions: 
• Anti-smuggling:   
The HSV has organic RMIBs on-board, but its lack of a well deck would not 
allow it to carry surface craft of a larger tonnage.  
• Civil Support:  
 The HSV is particularly well-suited in the role of a Global Fleet Station. Its large 
cargo capacity, vehicle space, and modularity allows it to be quickly converted for 
specialized support in times of need. Its performance in various humanitarian missions 
during its current least to the US Armed Forces is testament to its suitability for Civil 
Support missions.  
• Information sharing:   
The HSV can be augmented with the necessary C4I systems for it to operate 
efficiently as an Intelligence node. With its large helo deck, it can also support a 
complement of UAVs for additional real time intelligence.  
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The Swift's modular system construction facilitates mission reconfiguration and 
retrofitting without lengthy shipyard stays.  This modular design also facilitates system upgrading 
as new technologies become available. 222 To date, four modules have been designed, as listed 
below. 223 
 
                                                 
222 Military.com, HSV-2 Swift, May 1 2009 http://tech.military.com/equipment/view/127898/hsv-2-
swift.html 





3. HIGH SPEED VESSEL (HSV) / THEATER SUPPORT VESSEL (TSV) 
ACTD MODULES 
The commercial sector has already developed and demonstrated a number of 
relevant technologies and capabilities; specifically, high-speed ships (45+ kts), long range 
at endurance speeds (30 kts, >4000 nm), good sea keeping ability (30 kts in 4.5-5 meter 
seas), shallow draft (12-14 ft) and ease of rapid modular adaptability to multiple 
missions. A singular baseline configuration, depicted here, with a dedicated crew of 20, 
remotely injected with a tailorable and versatile C4I capability could allow rapid mission 
reconfiguration (within hours) and the embarkation of roll on / roll off mission specific 
equipment or modules, with specific staffs and personnel tailored to meet a wide variety 
of military tasks.  
These rapidly adaptive characteristics create opportunities for adopting 
transformational alternative operational concepts for bringing military power to bear at 
responsive speeds from long range. The current Joint Venture HSV-XI experimentation 
series will support the development and refinement of these missions using Network 
Centric principles and existing and proposed fleet modular capabilities.  
Specifically, the HSV technology has the potential to better balance and transform 
the Fleet for operation in the information age over a wide variety of missions including 
assuring access in the littorals. Our future will rely on and most certainly require a mix of 
traditional forces along with the emerging HSV capabilities in order to successfully 
accomplish the full spectrum of future missions from Humanitarian Assistance, Logistic 
Support to NEO and Power Projection capabilities to gain, maintain and sustain access in 
the littorals. Assuring access to the world's littorals by Navy striking forces and Army / 
Marine combat elements is clearly a fundamental imperative for our 21st century Navy.  
The modular adaptive concept of the HSV brings into focus four significant 21st century 
realities:  
• The emergence and development of Expeditionary Sensor Grid (ESG), 
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), Global Information Grid 
(GIG), and FORCE NET all supporting the tenets of Network Centric 
Operations (NCO), will sharply increase combat power at the 
individual ship and force levels. The electronic keel or data bus of the 
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HSV which provides the information back-plane that ensures C4ISR 
connectivity and shared awareness required for the information age, 
will create the design and investment trade space to allow HSV the 
ability to rapidly reconfigure, much as our multi mission F/A-18 does 
today.  
• Sustained access to the world's oceans and littorals, to space, and to 
cyberspace remain a strategic, operational, and a tactical imperative. 
The ability of HSV to rapidly reconfigure ensures that those rapidly 
developing missions such as NEO, MCM, responsive Logistics 
support and sustainment, required and demanded by the Joint Force 
commander, will be immediately tailorable and responsive by a 
maritime force structure to better meet his operational needs and 
commitments.  
• Current acquisition strategies and fiscal choices that result in the 
concentration of combat power at the expense of robustness and force 
size (numbers) could truncate force utility while sharply increasing 
risk and vulnerability. Numbers count; the real cost of a baseline HSV 
is commercially proven to be an order of magnitude less than current 
existing programs including the cost of development and acquisition 
(estimated costs are $70-100 million for baseline militarized vessel).  
• Demonstrated new technologies such as modern composite materials, 
vessels with high speed (> 45 kts.), and shallow draft (12-14 ft fully 
loaded), and long range (> 4000 nm at > 30 kts) enable a considerably 
expanded trade space yielding increased robustness, flexibility of 
employment, and mission effectiveness. With regard to surface 
combatants, the three key elements of combat power, sustainability, 
and robustness under stress are no longer clearly coupled to 
displacement. Proven composite ship construction and the 
development of new hull forms allows for the construction of entirely 
different classes of ships capable of sea-worthiness and payload 
fractions (30-50%) unachievable by the traditional construction 
techniques.  
The future war fighting environment will place higher value on maneuver, 
sensing, signature control, speed, battle space preparation, numbers, modularity, 
adaptability and risk tolerance in addition to and coupled with the robust power 
projection capabilities of our current force. Each of these characteristics of a future force 
will directly impact the U.S. Navy's ability to respond to crises while we secure, 
maintain, and exploit access. While analysis continues to validate the foregoing, the 
confluence of analysis to date points to the increasing combat value of smaller, faster, 
reconfigurable, and modularly adaptable surface vessels for the future Navy.  
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Figure 39: HSV Diagram 
 
HSV is part of a larger concept for sizing, shaping, operating, and continuously 
transforming the Navy to meet evolving challenges. A clear operational vision and the 
strategy to achieve it must be in consonance with the evolving nature of war, the 
principles of combined joint operation, and emerging technologies and concepts. Some 
examples of mission possible reconfigurability are constructed within these pages.  
A preeminent characteristic resident in the emerging High Speed Vessel (HSV) 
concept is the flexibility to modularly adapt and reconfigure to meet a number of mission 
profiles from a singular cost effective baseline vessel configuration. Instrumental is the 
capacity of the baseline configuration to accept and integrate existing modular suites, 
containers, and readily mobile transportable mission specific equipment onto its 
reconfigurable cargo spaces and to rapidly plug them into a standardized electronic keel. 
Simultaneously, with rapid reconfiguration, the HSV can embark the requisite staff 
assigned to meet the assigned missions. This operational scheme may allow the fullest, 
most flexible and adaptable design for employing a vessel for several different 
requirements and provide the fleet with the most responsive capability at the lowest total 
system cost. The small core crew size is also easily accommodated with a forward 
deployed Blue / Gold or "Horizon" manning scheme.  
285 
 
Resident in the proposed total mission baseline would include key features such 
as; a helicopter deck, aircraft/cargo elevator, multi-function command and control suite 
along with vehicle ramps and vehicle stowage areas for roll-on and roll-off containers, 
vehicles, mission planning cells, crew quarters, living spaces as well as weapon modules, 
adding to its enormous versatility.  
The Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), along with partner 
commands, has attempted to ensure that developing HSV concepts developing through 
HSV-XI Joint Venture are compatible with existing and proposed mobile units and 
systems. NWDC along with industry has developed an initial baseline configuration that 
could serve as a starting point for a modularly adaptable vehicle based on an off-the-self, 
112 meter, 12 foot draft design. Illustrated below are some of the possibilities;  





Figure 40: HSV Mine Warfare Configuration 
 
The HSV’s demonstrated seakeeping characteristics and ability to quickly 
integrate modularized mine warfare capabilities would provide a more responsive, stable, 
seaworthy, and tailorable C2 platform for the MIWC, capable of coordinating MCM 
operations from the sea.  
Proposed MCW load out would include:  
 
• 60 additional staff and personnel  
• Four SH/MH-60S helos  
286 
 
• Six berthing trailers (10 berths per trailer)  
• Two hotel services trailers (toilet/shower)  
 
By 2010 MCM assets could be "assigned" to the CVBG, ARG, or forward based 
available for tasking by the MIWC. This organic capability is currently planned to be 
deployed from CVN, DDG, and SSN assets. The proposed deployment of the assigned 
MCM systems from these current platforms may have negative impact on their primary 
missions which sub optimizes their use in several mission areas. Use of a MCM 
configured HSV as the mission need arises would eliminate those conflicts at affordable 
costs. Experimental objectives will include the C2 concept as well as suitability of the 
HSV to launch and recover future MCM vehicles and sensors (HSV (MIW) as MCM-X 
augment. The militarized HSV would be able to quickly deploy a variety of MH HELO / 
RHIB / UUV / USV in support of MIW with a covert internal "launch between the hulls" 
capability.  
Current experimentation objectives include:  
• Utilize the HSV as a MCM-X platform with future MCM Unmanned 
Underwater Vessels tasked by the MIWC. 
• Two Unmanned Underwater Vehicles, provided by the Office of Naval 
Research, to operate from the HSV examining launch and recovery 
suitability as well as data download and insertion into the Common 
Tactical Picture CTP. These UUVs are Battlespace Planning 
Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (BPAUV) and REMUS.  
• EOD Det embarked and deploy from the HSV to execute a Raise, Tow 
and Beach Mine Exploitation mission about 60 NM away from the 
GOMEX AOA which will be conducted between UUV launch and 
recovery missions.  
• Embarked MIWC on MCS. A command center with a full C4ISR suite 
installed on the HSV, which will provide C4ISR capabilities of a 
MICFAC.  
• GCCS-M/MEDAL, NMWS and SIPRNET connectivity will be used 
to input UUV data into the CTP as well as allow the MIWC to observe 
the GOMEX tactical picture and support tactical decision making.  
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Figure 41: HSV Medical Support Configuration 
 
Future High Speed Vessels may be the preeminent choice for these humanitarian 
mission areas because of is rapid reaction in speed of delivery as well as its adaptability 
and modular refitting of cargo. Initially evaluated by the Royal Australian Navy 
experience in East Timor, with a significantly less capable platform, the high speed, 
RO/RO capability and twelve foot draft enabling access to shallow water austere ports, 
provided the capabilities to ingress / egress easily and quickly, care for large numbers of 
personnel, transport them to a safe haven and return to the scene at high speed in order to 
continue the effort. These rapidly loadable vessels can effectively switch from an 
employment role to a sustainment role for a deployed force almost immediately.  
A Single baseline HSV can be configured to carry:  
 
• Six semi-trailers with fully-equipped operating rooms  
• Four water tankers  
• Four food trailers  
• Four toilet/shower trailers  
• Six HUMVEES  
• Eight to Twelve passenger busses  
• Radiological services  
• Medical laboratory to include; pharmacy, optometry lab, and cat scan  
• Mobile oxygen producing plant  
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• Portal between twin Hulls providing a lee in order to take on patients 
at sea  
• Four Semi-Trailers hospital bed facility  
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Figure 42: HSV MIO Configuration 
 
A single HSV configured for the Anti-Terrorism Force Protection role could 
provide a significant capability to operate a scalable force protection augmentation 
package in support of U.S. Navy port visits and force protection requirements. Within the 
Homeland Security (HLS) scenarios, it is envisioned that maritime forces, both US Navy 
and USCG, will be required to investigate, query, intercept and potentially board high-
risk vessels. These missions will be rapid in nature, often directed on short notice but at a 
sufficient distance from CONUS to prevent danger to the continental US. To support this 




HSV configured for ATFP / Maritime Intercept Operations (MIO) package:  
• Augments ship’s force protection capabilities and provides a full 
spectrum of landside/waterside security functions for ship port visits.  
• Force level protection is rapidly scalable and tailored to threat and host 
nation considerations.  
• Minimizes high cost airlift and local civilian contracting requirements 
by bringing organic mission support capabilities with the vessel (C2, 
berthing/messing, barriers, etc.)  
o 44 additional personnel  
o Two 21' RHIBs rapidly deployed via "Moon Pool" with 
boarding/security party  
o Team of working dogs (cage area on vehicle deck 20'x20')  
o Four HMMWVs  
o Mammal pool (20'x20'x4' total weight 3500 pounds) deployed 
through "Moon Pool"  
o Support USCG HH-60J JayHawk involved in SAR/Armed 
Recon/Drug Interdiction  
• Notional Homeland Security (HLS) package:  
• 22 additional personnel  
• Two 21' RHIBs rapidly deployed via "Moon Pool" with 
boarding/security party  
• Two USCG HH-60J or Special Forces (MH-6) on deck (up to Six in 










Draft (Ft) 7.5 
Endurance (nm) 2,300 
Speed (Knts) 35 
Crew 43 (Total) 
Troops N/A 
Organic Boats N/A 
Well Deck Capability N/A 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) N/A 
Vehicle Space (ft2) N/A 
Helo Capable 1 
Help Spots 1 
Organic Aircraft N/A 
Operating Rooms N/A 
Beds N/A 
Dental Facilities N/A 
Self Defense 
Weapons  
Umkhonto (Air Defense Missile) 
Offensive Weapons  Saab Bofors Dynamics RBS 15 
Mk2/MK3  
Anti-Ship Missile; 
Saab 40mm Grenade Launchers; 
Saab Underwater Systems Tp 45 Torpedo; 
Bofors 57mm 70 SAK MK3 GPMG  
Radar Type SaabTech  CEROS 200 / Fire Control; 
Saab Sea Giraffe AMB / Air Search; 
Celsius Tech Pilot I-band Surface Search; 
CEROS 200 MK3 I/J-band Fire Control 
Radar 
Sonar Hydra Multi-Sonar Suite 
EW / Intel CS-3701 TRSS; 
MASS Decoy System; 
 




                                                 




Estimated Cost per 
Ship 
$184 million 
Special Features  
(e.g. Mission 
Modules) 
ASW, AS, MCM mission modules 
Table 136: Visby Class Corvette 
 
 
Currently undergoing sea trials, and due for commissioning in 2010, the Visby is 
the latest addition to the Swedish Navy aimed at fulfilling the ASW, MCM and Anti-
Surface Warfare role. Setting it apart from past vessels of the same class is its Stealth 
capabilities through the minimization of optical, infrared signatures, above water acoustic 
and hydroacoustic signature, underwater electrical potential, and magnetic, pressure 
signature, radar cross section and actively emitted signatures. It has been designed to 
leverage on the geographical features of Sweden, consisting of many Fjords for 
concealment, to wage hit-and-run operations against a numerically superior enemy. The 
relatively short endurance of the Visby has been criticized in view of the shift of 
maritime operations from short static defense to a more dynamic expeditionary approach. 
There will be 6 ships by 2010. The 7th has been cancelled. 225 
Suitability for missions: 
• Anti-smuggling Operations:  
Equipped with organic anti-personnel weaponry inclusive of a General Purpose 
Gun and a Grenade Launcher. Max speed of 35 knots may limit performance in pursuit 
engagements.  Small crew may limit any possible ground operations. Improved speed 
will serve as a possible enhancement. 
• Civil Support:  
The Visby has limited cargo capacity, and serves best as a mobile platform for 
helicopters, albeit a single one, when confronted with a Civil Support mission. It has also 
limited endurance. 
                                                 





• Information Sharing:  
It is limited to the support of a single Firescout UAV, and hence has limited 
influence on Information Sharing operations. But its stealth capabilities may render it 





5. GREEN WATER PATROL CRAFT - COMBAT PATROL CRAFT (PC) 226 
Characteristics Low cost variant of the Cyclone class 





Draft (Ft) Not available 
Endurance (nm) Not available 
Speed (Knts) 35 
Officers 30(crew), 30(combat crew) 
Enlisted N/A 
Troops N/A 
Organic Boats N/A 
Well Deck Capability N/A 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) N/A 
Vehicle Space (ft2) N/A 
Helo Capable No 
Help Spots N/A 
Organic Aircraft N/A 
Operating Rooms N/A 
Beds N/A 
Dental Facilities N/A 
Self Defense 
Weapons  
Zero, based on assumption that its top 
speed of 35 knots can effectively defend 
against one incoming missile through 
evasion 
Offensive Weapons  2 ASCMs, 25mm Guns 
Radar Type N/A 
Sonar N/A 





Estimated Cost per 
Ship 
$60 million 




Table 137: Green Water Patrol Craft (PC) 
                                                 
226 NPS Thesis: LITTORAL COMBAT VESSELS: ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF DESIGNS by 
Bryan J. Christiansen - Table 1, dated Sep 2008 
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The introduction of new technologies force navies to adapt and the introduction of 
surface-to-surface anti-ship cruise missiles from a large number of small coastal 
combatants created vulnerability in the Navy’s force structure of large, expensive, 
nonexpendable warships. To counter this threat, the adoption by the U.S. Navy of small, 
inexpensive, missile bearing vessels is recommended.  
Utilizing the Salvo Model developed by Captain Wayne Hughes, USN (Retired) 
of the Naval Post Graduate School, four candidate vessels were compared in a 
mathematical simulation of combat scenarios and Combat Patrol Craft, a variant of the 
Cyclone class patrol craft augmented with offensive and defensive weaponry is one of 
them. 
Equal cost force structures for the four candidate vessels are developed, and then 
these forces are “fought” in simulated battles against a missile-firing opponent force of 
variable strength. Additional roles such as maritime interdiction and theater security 
cooperation are considered and the candidate vessels are qualitatively compared for their 
ability to perform in these missions.227  
Suitability for: 
• Anti-smuggling Operations:  
Patrol craft as its name suggests, was designed for patrol purposes but not missile 
combat. Thus it will be more appropriate to carry out patrolling operation in green water 
environment against Anti-smuggling operation assuming smuggling ships are lightly 
armed. But in the scenario where a heavier armed hostile smuggling ship is being 
engaged, patrol craft may proved incapable as it was lightly armed with only 2 ASCMs & 
25mm guns. Thus carrying out patrolling operation in pairs or more can be viable. 
• Non-Combatant Evacuation: 
Being small in size, it can only support up to 30 crews & 30 combat crews and 
thus, limited capability for large scale evacuation. To improve the patrol craft capability, 
expanding the size can be an option but not a recommended one as it reduces its mobility 
in terms of speed (heavier). Thus it may be just a case of a chicken & egg issue.  





• Freedom of Navigation: 
Being light in weight & fast in speed (35knots) with greater mobility, gave it an 

















Draft (Ft) 3 
Endurance (nm) 500 
Speed (Knts) 50 
Officers 0 
Enlisted 3 
Troops Up to 12 
Organic Boats 11m RHIB 
Well Deck Capability N/A 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) Internal capacity for troops and equipment 
Vehicle Space (ft2) N/A 
Helo Capable No 
Help Spots N/A 
Organic Aircraft Small UAV capable landing pad 
Operating Rooms N/A 
Beds N/A 
Dental Facilities N/A 
Self Defense 
Weapons  
Currently none however, space provisions 
have been made for future weapons  
Offensive Weapons  Currently none however, space provisions 
have been made for future weapons 
Radar  Navigation Radar 
Sonar N/A 
EW / Intel Currently none however, space provisions 
have been made for future systems 





Estimated Cost per 
Ship 
$12.5 million* 
Special Features  
(e.g. Mission 
N/A 
                                                 





Table 138: M80 Stiletto 
Note: * Based on 10 million dollar price estimate plus 2.5 million dollars for mission 
related equipment 
 
The M-80 is a low-profile, high-speed multiple-hulled, carbon fiber, vessel which 
was built by M Ship company on behalf of the US Department of Defense's Office of 
Force Transformation. The Stiletto features an M-shaped hull that allows it to cut 
smoothly through the water while remaining stable. The size of the vessel also gives 
room to carry troops or equipment (1,996 ft2) and also to mount electronic sensors.229 
The M80 has participated in Trident Warrior joint-force exercises as well as tests 
conducted by the U.S. Navy SEALs off the California coast and was deployed to 
Colombia to help fight the U.S. war on drugs where it made a high-speed, shallow-water 
drug interdiction that resulted in the capture of 1,800 lbs. of cocaine.230 
The ship is 88.6 feet (27.0 m) in length, with a width of 40 feet (12 m) and a 
height of 18.5 feet (5.6 m), which makes it possible to fit two M80s in a LPD-17 class 
ship, two in a LSD-49 class ship and three in a LHD-1 class ship, with minor 
modifications to the well deck of the amphibious ships. 
Suitability for missions: 
• Anti-smuggling:   
M80 can and has acted as a high speed intercept vessel in an Anti-smuggling 
mission.  The low draft allows the M80 to pursue contacts into much shallower water 
than a conventional U.S. Navy ship and the high speed of the M80 gives a higher 
probability of intercepting high speed contacts. 
• Civil Support:   
Based on the assumptions made in the Civil Support mission scenario, in 
particular that all transport of goods will be conducted by air assets, the M80 will have 
limited usefulness in the Civil Support mission.   The Stiletto will be able to assist in the 
                                                 
229 M Ship Company, Military M80 Stiletto. 30 April 2009 <http://www.mshipco.com/military_m80.html> 
230 M Ship Company Press Release September 16, 2008.  “M Ship's Stiletto Nabs Smugglers After High-
speed Chase”  30 April 2009 http://www.mshipco.com/news/press_releases/2008/pr_091608.html 
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information sharing portion of the Civil Support mission and could aid in providing 
security afloat for a force conducting Civil Support. 
• Information sharing:   
M80 will be capable of launching and recovering small UAVs which can act as a 
communications relay or mobile surveillance platform.  The Stiletto will be outfitted with 
a cluster supercomputer onboard, and satellite communications. 231   In 2006 the M80 
participated in naval exercises where it acted as a command and control ship with 40 
people on board. 
                                                 
231 M Ship Company Press Release March 8 2006. “M80 Stiletto Completes Successful Sea Trial, Will 









Draft (Ft) 9.5 
Endurance (nm) 4230 (at 10 kt) 




Organic Boats Short Range Prosecutor (SRP) patrol craft, single 
7.9 m rigid-hull inflatable boat 
Well Deck Capability N/A 
Cargo Capacity (ft3) N/A 
Vehicle Space (ft2) N/A 
Helo Capable No 
Helo Spots N/A 
Organic Aircraft N/A 
Operating Rooms N/A 
Beds N/A 
Dental Facilities N/A 
Self Defense 
Weapons 
4 x 12.7mm-caliber machine guns 
Offensive Weapons 1 x 25mm remote operated weapon system 
Radar Type Navigation Radar 
Sonar N/A 
EW / Intel N/A 
Communications Interoperate with CG, DHS, DOD, RESCUE 21 
Command/Flag 
Space 
Integrated bridge with 360º visibility 







Table 139: Fast Response Cutter (FRC) 
The Fast Response Cutter (FRC) is capable of independent deployment in support 
of law enforcement, port security, search and rescue, and defense operations missions. 
                                                 
232 Press Release by Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Coast Guard, “Fact Sheet: Fast Response Cutter-B”, 
accessed on 4/1/2009, from http://www.piersystem.com/go/doc/786/150632/&printerfriendly=1 
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Typical missions include offshore fishery protection, choke point interdiction, barrier 
patrols, and presence in high-risk areas. Design features include reduced signature 
through shaping, active fin stabilisation system, an integrated bridge with 360º visibility 
and a stern ramp to launch new Short Range Prosecutor (SRP) patrol craft. 
The $24-billion, 25-year post-9/11 Deepwater Implementation Plan calls for 58 
FRC A and B class end-state assets, in order to close an existing patrol boat operational 
hour gap and to replace the aging legacy 110-foot patrol boat fleet. Prior to the 11 
September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks in New York and Washington DC, the US Coast 
Guard's (USCG's) planned to replace the Island class with a 147 ft FRC by 2018. 
Following 9/11, a sweeping review of the coastguard's Deepwater acquisition strategy 
accelerated the FRC program by almost a decade. On 26 September 2008, Bollinger 
Shipyards won an USD88 million contract to design and build the US Coast Guard's 
(USCG's) first Sentinel-class Fast Response Cutter (FRC). The USCG said that up to 34 
of the 153 ft (47 m) vessels - worth USD1.5 billion - could be built over six to eight years 
if all options are exercised. Eventually the USCG intends to procure a total of 58 FRCs, 
at a projected cost of USD3.3 billion, to replace its fleet of 110 ft Island-class cutters. The 
first-of-class will be built at Bollinger's yard at Lockport, Louisiana, and is scheduled for 
delivery to Coast Guard District 7 in Miami, Florida, in the first quarter of Fiscal Year 
2011. It will complete a comprehensive operational test and evaluation period before 
entering service in the Caribbean region. The 12th FRC is due to for delivery in 2013. 
Fast Response Cutter is based on the Stan Patrol 4708 design from Dutch 
shipbuilder, Damen. Three such patrol crafts are already in government service in South 
Africa since 2004. They have conducted operations similar to those that the Sentinel 
Class patrol boat is required to perform. Using a proven (or parent craft) design will 
ensure that the Coast Guard receives new patrol boats capable of performing the required 
missions as soon as possible.  
Suitability for missions: 
• Anti-smuggling:  
It will be capable of operating independently at sea for five days at a time and 
completing 2,500 hours underway per year. It will be able to conduct missions in 
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conditions up to Sea State 4 (SS4) and remain on station in conditions up to SS6. It is 
suitable for close-quarter maneuvers having equipped with a bow thruster and active fin 
stabilization. Furthermore, it will be equipped with weapons that could effective subdue 
armed smugglers. 
• Civil Support:  
It is not design for this mission, thus it has limited cargo and passenger-carrying 
capacity. However, it could be used to offer ports, waterways and coastal security to the 
Phase Zero force conducting Civil Support operations.  
• Information Sharing:  
It is equipped with a communication system that could interoperate with various 
communication systems, thus facilitating mutual exchange of information with other 




8. CH-53K 233 
Max Range (NM one 
way) 
454 
Cruise A/S (KNTS) 170 
Max A/S (KNTS) 190 
Speed with external 
load (KNTS) 
100 
Inflight Refueling Yes 
Max Gross Wt (Lbs) 84,700 






Normal sling lift 
(Lbs) 
27,000 
# of passengers 55 
Surface Radar No 








Dipping Sonar No 
Estimated Cost per 
Unit234 
$76 Million 
Table 140: CH 53K 
The CH-53K program was developed to replace the Marine Crop’s aging fleet of 
CH-53E aircraft.  The CH-53K’s maximum gross weight will increase from 73,000 
                                                 











pound to 84,700 pounds.  It will carry a cargo load of 27,000 pounds, sling loaded, 110 
nautical miles, at an altitude of 3,000 feet.  This capability is nearly double the capacity 
of the current CH-53E.  This allows for a 220 nautical mile round trip with a 30 minute 
loiter at the landing zone.  The maximum external load, hook rating will be 36,000 
pounds. 235 
Suitability for missions: 
• Anti-smuggling:  
The CH-53K could be used in the Anti-smuggling mission area doing a barrier 
patrol.  With a 454 nautical mile range the CH-53K would have limited on station time 
therefore, the use of this aircraft would be inefficient way of accomplishing this mission.  
The CH-53K is not designed with this mission in mind and has limited sensors onboard, 
other than the eyes of the crew,  to aid in the search of an area. 
• Civil Support:  
The CH-53K will be able to lift a heaver cargo load than any other vertical takeoff 
aircraft currently under development.  The 27,000 pound mission sling load capacity will 
allow a CH-53K to transport up to two up-armored HMMWV or one MRAP.  This 
increased vehicle lift capacity can also be valuable in the Phase Zero mission area of 
rebuilding infrastructure.  The CH-53K would be able to carry a Caterpillar 450E 
Backhoe weighing approximately 27,000 pounds or Caterpillar D5 track type crawler 
dozer weighing 21,000 pounds.236 The large number of passengers that can be carried as 
well as the internal cargo capacity can be valuable in this mission area. 
• Information Sharing:  
It is equipped with a communication system that could interoperate with various 
communication systems, thus facilitating mutual exchange of information with ships and 
with shore. 
                                                 
235 Defense Industry Daily, “CH-53K: The U.S. Marines’ HLR Helicopter Program” April 21 2009, May 5 
2009  http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/ch53k-the-us-marines-hlr-helicopter-program-updated-01724/ 
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Phase Zero Perception Survey 
During this survey you will be judging how similar or different a number of Phase Zero 
missions or tasks are. You will be comparing them two at a time. For us to know how 
similar or different you find each pair to be we will have you mark a form for us.  
You can see that on the form there is a line with the words exact same at one end and 
most different at the other. If you find no difference between the two missions or tasks 
make a mark at the end of the line by exact same. If you find there is a difference make a 
mark somewhere along the line showing how much difference you find. Most different is 
in the setting of the group of Phase Zero missions or tasks. When making a similarity 
determination, try to think of the capabilities, platforms or equipment that would be 
required to complete the mission or task. We also realize that the mission requirements 
may differ depending on location. If necessary select an AOR of your choosing and make 
all of your similarity judgments in that context. In order for you to get an idea of how 
much difference there is in Phase Zero missions or tasks, please read though the list of 
missions and tasks first. 
One thing we would like you to remember is that different people judge things in 
different ways. This means that there are no right or wrong answers. Two missions that 
are very similar to one person may be quite different to another. Both results are 





Apples «» Oranges 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
 
Phase Zero Missions and Tasks for Comparison: 
(1) Enforce Freedom of Navigation  
(2) Build Relations with Local Governments 
 (3) Conduct Anti-terrorism Operations 
(4) Train Local Defense Forces 
(5) Conduct Non-combatant Evacuation 
(6) Share Intelligence with Partners 
(7) Reduce Smuggling 
(8) Prevent Illegal Fishing 
(9) Support Equipping of Local Defense Forces 
(10) Restore Critical Infrastructure 
(11) Provide Civil Support (water, food, medical, etc.) 
(12) Combat Piracy 







(13) Provide for Force Self Defense «» (1) Enforce Freedom of Navigation 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(12) Combat Piracy «» (2) Build Relations with Local Governments 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(11) Provide Civil Support (water, food, medical, etc.) «»  (3) Conduct Anti-terrorism Operations 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(10) Restore Critical Infrastructure «» (4) Train Local Defense Forces 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(9) Support Equipping of Local Defense Forces «» (5) Conduct Non-combatant Evacuation 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(8) Prevent Illegal Fishing «» (6) Share Intelligence with Partners 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(9) Support Equipping of Local Defense Forces «» (7) Reduce Smuggling 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(10) Restore Critical Infrastructure «» (6) Share Intelligence with Partners 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(11) Provide Civil Support (water, food, medical, etc.) «» (5) Conduct Non-combatant Evacuation 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(12) Combat Piracy «» (4) Train Local Defense Forces 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(13) Provide for Force Self Defense «»  (3) Conduct Anti-terrorism Operations 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(5) Conduct Non-combatant Evacuation «» (7) Reduce Smuggling 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(8) Prevent Illegal Fishing «» (4) Train Local Defense Forces 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(9) Support Equipping of Local Defense Forces «»  (3) Conduct Anti-terrorism Operations 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(10) Restore Critical Infrastructure «» (2) Build Relations with Local Governments 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(11) Provide Civil Support (water, food, medical, etc.) «» (1) Enforce Freedom of Navigation 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(13) Provide for Force Self Defense «» (5) Conduct Non-combatant Evacuation 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(12) Combat Piracy «» (6) Share Intelligence with Partners 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(11) Provide Civil Support (water, food, medical, etc.) «» (7) Reduce Smuggling 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(10) Restore Critical Infrastructure «» (8) Prevent Illegal Fishing 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(9) Support Equipping of Local Defense Forces «» (1) Enforce Freedom of Navigation 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(8) Prevent Illegal Fishing «» (2) Build Relations with Local Governments 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(7) Reduce Smuggling «»  (3) Conduct Anti-terrorism Operations 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(6) Share Intelligence with Partners «» (4) Train Local Defense Forces 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(11) Provide Civil Support (water, food, medical, etc.) «» (9) Support Equipping of Local Defense Forces 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(12) Combat Piracy «» (8) Prevent Illegal Fishing 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
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(13) Provide for Force Self Defense «» (7) Reduce Smuggling 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(5) Conduct Non-combatant Evacuation «»  (3) Conduct Anti-terrorism Operations 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(6) Share Intelligence with Partners «» (2) Build Relations with Local Governments 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(7) Reduce Smuggling «» (1) Enforce Freedom of Navigation 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(13) Provide for Force Self Defense «» (9) Support Equipping of Local Defense Forces 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(12) Combat Piracy «» (10) Restore Critical Infrastructure 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(5) Conduct Non-combatant Evacuation «» (1) Enforce Freedom of Navigation 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(4) Train Local Defense Forces «» (2) Build Relations with Local Governments 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(13) Provide for Force Self Defense «» (11) Provide Civil Support (water, food, medical, etc.) 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
 (3) Conduct Anti-terrorism Operations «» (1) Enforce Freedom of Navigation 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(7) Reduce Smuggling «» (6) Share Intelligence with Partners 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(8) Prevent Illegal Fishing «» (5) Conduct Non-combatant Evacuation 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(9) Support Equipping of Local Defense Forces «» (4) Train Local Defense Forces 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(10) Restore Critical Infrastructure «»  (3) Conduct Anti-terrorism Operations 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(11) Provide Civil Support (water, food, medical, etc.) «» (2) Build Relations with Local Governments 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(12) Combat Piracy «» (1) Enforce Freedom of Navigation 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(8) Prevent Illegal Fishing «» (7) Reduce Smuggling 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(9) Support Equipping of Local Defense Forces «» (6) Share Intelligence with Partners 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(10) Restore Critical Infrastructure «» (5) Conduct Non-combatant Evacuation 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(11) Provide Civil Support (water, food, medical, etc.) «» (4) Train Local Defense Forces 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(12) Combat Piracy «»  (3) Conduct Anti-terrorism Operations 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(13) Provide for Force Self Defense «» (2) Build Relations with Local Governments 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(10) Restore Critical Infrastructure «» (1) Enforce Freedom of Navigation 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(9) Support Equipping of Local Defense Forces «» (2) Build Relations with Local Governments 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(8) Prevent Illegal Fishing «»  (3) Conduct Anti-terrorism Operations 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(7) Reduce Smuggling «» (4) Train Local Defense Forces 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(6) Share Intelligence with Partners «» (5) Conduct Non-combatant Evacuation 
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Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(9) Support Equipping of Local Defense Forces «» (8) Prevent Illegal Fishing 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(10) Restore Critical Infrastructure «» (7) Reduce Smuggling 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(11) Provide Civil Support (water, food, medical, etc.) «» (6) Share Intelligence with Partners 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(12) Combat Piracy «» (5) Conduct Non-combatant Evacuation 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(13) Provide for Force Self Defense «» (4) Train Local Defense Forces 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(5) Conduct Non-combatant Evacuation «» (4) Train Local Defense Forces 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(6) Share Intelligence with Partners «»  (3) Conduct Anti-terrorism Operations 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(7) Reduce Smuggling «» (2) Build Relations with Local Governments 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(8) Prevent Illegal Fishing «» (1) Enforce Freedom of Navigation 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(13) Provide for Force Self Defense «» (6) Share Intelligence with Partners 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(12) Combat Piracy «» (7) Reduce Smuggling 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(11) Provide Civil Support (water, food, medical, etc.) «» (8) Prevent Illegal Fishing 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(10) Restore Critical Infrastructure «» (9) Support Equipping of Local Defense Forces 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(4) Train Local Defense Forces «»  (3) Conduct Anti-terrorism Operations 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(5) Conduct Non-combatant Evacuation «» (2) Build Relations with Local Governments 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(6) Share Intelligence with Partners «» (1) Enforce Freedom of Navigation 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(13) Provide for Force Self Defense «» (8) Prevent Illegal Fishing 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(12) Combat Piracy «» (9) Support Equipping of Local Defense Forces 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(11) Provide Civil Support (water, food, medical, etc.) «» (10) Restore Critical Infrastructure 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
 (3) Conduct Anti-terrorism Operations «» (2) Build Relations with Local Governments 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(4) Train Local Defense Forces «» (1) Enforce Freedom of Navigation 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(12) Combat Piracy «» (11) Provide Civil Support (water, food, medical, etc.) 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(13) Provide for Force Self Defense «» (10) Restore Critical Infrastructure 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(2) Build Relations with Local Governments «» (1) Enforce Freedom of Navigation 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
(13) Provide for Force Self Defense «» (12) Combat Piracy 
Exact Same-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Most Different 
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D. PHASE ZERO RESEARCH 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“We seek to shape the world, not merely to be shaped by it; to influence 
events for the better instead of being at their mercy.” 
      -President George W. Bush 237 
The military has long been seen as a sharp tool used in conflicts both for offensive 
and defensive means. Wars were fought over contrasting ideology, conflict of space, self-
serving national ambitions, and at times for a country’s national existence. Over the 
years, the role of the military has been confined to the prosecution of war and nothing 
more.  However, as the sociopolitical issues have evolved, so too has the role of the 
armed forces.  While the historical mission statement of the United States military has 
been to prosecute and win wars, the current mission includes operations to ensure peace 
and stability of the nation without the use of armed conflict.     
In the current context of military operations, operations are sub divided into 
phases. Phasing is similar to an arrangement of operations to facilitate sub-unit planning 
and preparation in terms of forces, resources, time, space and purpose. It is a logical 
sequence of smaller yet related operations.   Joint Publication 3-0 “Joint Operations” 
defines the phasing model to include six distinct phases. Each phase represents military 
operations that are synchronized across the entire military effort. Traditionally, the 
military has constantly trained and honed its capability for a military confrontation. 
Specific military confrontations can be related to Phases 1 through 6 of the phasing 
model shown in the figure below.  
 
                                                 
237 “The White House African American Newsletter”,  
http://www.aaenvironment.com/WhiteHouseAANewsletter/WhiteHouseAANewsletter2.pdf, Accessed on 





Figure 43: Phasing Model from JP 3-0 
Of particular interest for this project is the emphasis on Phase Zero and the 
conduct of operations to prevent future conflicts.  Despite being introduced almost fifteen 
years ago, the evolution of the term Phase Zero is unclear and the concept often 
misunderstood.  And while the term “Phase Zero” is still not fully integrated into the 
military lexicon, Phase Zero has been loosely defined as “encompassing everything than 
can be done to prevent conflicts from developing in the first place.” 238  To further 
understand the requirements of a force capable of accomplishing Phase Zero operations, a 
clearer understanding is required of the phase and its associated operations.  
2. WHAT IS PHASE ZERO 
Traditionally, a military campaign comprises four phases: “deter/engage, seize 
initiative, decisive operations and transition”. 239  This model is well suited for 
conventional enemies, in a conventional conflict.  However, modern conflict is far more 
complex and time-consuming.  For much of the world, modern combat is not a new 
phenomenon.  Many countries have experience with domestic and international terrorists 
waging war in their country.  However, for the United States, the war on terror began 
with a symbolic terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, and combating terrorism appears 
to be an indefinite enterprise. Terrorist acts can occur at any time and the threat of a 
                                                 
238 General Charles F Wald , “Phase Zero Campaign”, Joint Force Quarterly Issue 43, 4th quarter 2006. 
239 Journal of International Peace Operations Volume 3, Number 3 Nov-Dec 2007, 
http://peaceops.com/web/images/pdf/journal_2007_1112.pdf, Accessed on 26 May 2009 
Accessed on 26 May 2009 
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terrorist attack is present globally. The hunt for Al Queda, the terrorist group responsible 
for the attack on September 11, 2001, began in Afghanistan.  Al Queda may have ties 
around the world, within Europe, Asia, Africa and even linking back to the United States.  
A terrorist attack can be in the form of a car bomb or plane hijacking.  Therefore, the four 
phase model is inadequate in today’s context.  We must consider shaping operations as an 
integral aspect to the warfare model.   
Phase Zero operations are military operations or endeavors occurring before the 
first bullet is fired, before the first offensive, before the first invasion and especially 
before the declaration of war.  Phase Zero is therefore a vast spectrum of operational and 
logistical support encouraged by governmental, social, economic and security 
considerations to reduce or eliminate violence and conflict and promoting humanitarian 
efforts.  Phase Zero is the mapping of considerations and courses of actions both 
proactive and reactive to prevent conflicts from developing and expanding.  It can be in 
the form of physiological and personal actions to promote peace and security.  Other 
actions of Phase Zero can be the forming of relations between government and non-
government organizations to promote humanity and cooperation in military defense, 
social defense, economic defense, civil defense and physiological defense.  
Phase Zero can also take the form of education and information exchange within 
society.  In countries where literacy is low and there is a low level of trust in the 
government, the population may be easily influenced by rumors, ill-reporting, and by 
word-of-mouth thus inculcating ill feeling against an organization or governmental body. 
Terrorist organizations are adept at blending within a population to capitalize on this 
form of weakness. 
The utmost objective of Phase Zero is to maintain stability and security prior to 
conflict.  
3. TRANSITION TO PHASE ZERO OPERATIONS 
Twenty years ago, the United States’ strategic objective has been one of 
containment: to stop the spread of communism; the primary enemy was the Soviet Union.  
The Navy held strong roles of power projection and sea control during the Cold War.  
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Heavily armed ships such as Battleships and Aircraft Carriers ruled the seas and held 
distinction as mighty war ships that could deter enemy forces.  Diplomacy and their 
presence was sometimes enough to influence a nation’s decision to befriend the United 
States.  Ballistic Missile submarines maintained the critical role of strategic deterrence 
where at any point in time, if nuclear war were to break out; the enemy country would 
know their certain doom was imminent.  The term, mutually assured destruction, was 
coined from this concept.  It was very easy to validate the size and cost of the United 
States Naval forces.   
The 1980’s began a period of rebuilding the Navy to combat other forces.  Ronald 
Reagan’s Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, called for a 600 ship Navy to combat the 
Soviet Union’s 3000 ship Navy.  President Reagan said,  
 
"Our nation needs a superior Navy to support our Military forces and vital 
interests overseas.  We're now on the road to achieving a 600-ship Navy 
and increasing the amphibious capabilities of our Marines...  This adds up 
to a major effort, and it isn't cheap.  It comes at a time when there are 
many other pressures on our budget and when American people have 
already had to make major sacrifices during the recession.  But we must 
not be misled by those who would make defense once again the scapegoat 
of the federal budget."  240   
 
His statement illustrates the importance of having a strong deterrent force in our 
Navy to win America’s wars.   Robert F. Dorr defines Ronald Reagan’s idea of 
deterrence as:  
 
“simply this:  making sure any adversary who thinks attacking the United 
States, or our Allies, or our vital interests, concludes that the risks to him 
outweigh any potential gains.  Once he understands that, he won't attack.  
We maintain the peace through our strength; weakness only invites 
                                                 
240 http://www.reagan.navy.mil/about_reagan.html  Accessed on 26 May 2009. 
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aggression.  This strategy of deterrence has not changed.  It still works.”  
241 
 
In the 1980’s, it made sense to build up U.S. Naval Forces to combat the Soviet 
powerhouse Navy.  A great challenge and goal for Reagan’s Presidency was to influence 
the fall of the Soviet Union and he made this goal clear a number of times with his 
famous speech from June 12, 1987, “General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if 
you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization: 
Come here to this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this 
wall!” 242  On November 9, 1989, the Berlin came down.  This event symbolized the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and allowed the Navy to shift focus from combating 
communism and the Soviet Union to spreading U.S. influence to the rest of the World.   
The fall of the Soviet Union left the U.S. fleet without a formidable adversary.  It 
is markedly easier to prepare for war with an enemy whose size and capabilities are 
known.  The 1990’s were an era of transformation where the US fleet began a severe 
downsizing campaign.  All the services felt the budget cuts after the cold war weapons 
build-up but the Navy found itself in a more sobering identity crisis.  The Clinton 
Administration, as part of its 1993 Bottom Up Review (BUR) of U.S. military forces, 
planned a Navy of 346 ships and following the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, the 
plan was for only 305 ships in the fleet.  To illustrate the extent of the downsizing of the 
U.S. navy, at its peak at the end of Fiscal Year 1987, the Navy had reached the size of 
568 ships and by February 25, 2002 the Navy had only 318. 243  The primary missions of 
the Navy during the Cold War were power projection from the sea, strategic deterrence, 
and sea control.  Today, those missions have splintered into peacekeeping operations and 
many can be considered Phase Zero operations. 
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4. NECESSITY OF PHASE ZERO 
Two wars, a violent regime change, and wide spread violence and insecurity have 
left Iraq in a continuous state of instability.  The problem is accentuated by the lack of 
basic facilities such as sanitation, water, electricity, food, proper employment and distrust 
of the U.S. and its coalition forces. The pro-Saddam supporters together with the pro-
Islamic fighters and terrorist factions present in the general population also contribute to 
the country’s instability and insecurity. The situation is further aggravated when different 
factions and ethnic groups have their own agenda.  
On the African continent, a different situation exists.  In West and Central Africa 
there are threats to the maritime security in Gulf of Guinea that include: illegal fishing, 
human smuggling, drug trafficking, oil theft and piracy.  In countries like Somalia, there 
is wide-spread civil war and piracy in the Gulf of Aden.  The problems may seem 
prevalent only in the affected countries of the African continent, but implications are felt 
globally. Approximately 16,000 ships a year navigate the Gulf of Aden, which, as the 
southern gateway to the Suez Canal, is one of the most important trade routes in the 
world.  Piracy in the Gulf of Aden disrupts trade and increases the cost of shipping as 
some ships may choose to take a longer and safer route.  From 15 September 2008 to 12 
January 2009 there were 62 pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden of which 20 were 
successful.  244  In all of the cases, ransom money was the objective of the pirates and the 
only answer was for the shipping companies to pay.  Figure 2 is from the United Nations 
Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) Operational Satellite Applications 
Programme (UNOSAT).  The growth of piracy in Somalia can be directly tied to the 
instability in the country.  
                                                 
244  “Reported Incidents of Somali Pirate Attacks and Hijackings in the Gulf of ADEN for 2008”, 12 
January 
2009,http://www.unosat.org/freeproducts/somalia/Piracy/UNOSAT_Piracy_Gulf_Aden_2008_Lowres_v7.




Figure 44: UNOSAT documentation of Piracy activity in Gulf of Aden 
A major effort of Operation Iraqi Freedom is to win the hearts and minds of the 
Iraqi people.  This involves creating infrastructure, providing clean water, sanitation 
answers, security, and a government.  The United States military is actively involved in 
these “Phase Zero” efforts.  In Africa, particularly the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of 
Guinea, the threat of piracy and oil theft prevails.  Before declaring war on piracy or the 
oil thieves, the U.S. could potentially deter and defeat these threats with a maritime Phase 
Zero force.  If the presence of U.S. and coalition vessels in the region could provide more 
stability, larger conflicts may be avoided.   
The problems described above lead to a series of interesting questions.  Can a war 
be avoided by having the presence of coalition naval vessels patrolling the gulf?  Can a 
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show of presence and force deter the pirates from harassing the shipping vessels?  If a 
shipping vessel is threatened by pirates, can the naval vessels quickly respond to the 
distress or dispatch helicopters quickly to dispel the tension?  If the answer to these 
questions is yes, then clearly the Phase Zero concept of a small naval presence without 
use of deadly force can be useful to make the shipping lanes safe. 
5. COST REDUCTION 
The other impetus of embarking on Phase Zero is the relatively high cost of armed 
conflicts and wars. The chart below shows the US military spending in the last six major 
conflicts as of September 2005.   
 
Figure 45: Costs of U.S. Wars  245 
President Obama’s approval of the current spending on the Global War on Terror 
will make it the largest expenditure ever on United States conflict - the cost of the wars in 
                                                 
245 David R. Francis, “More Costly than the ‘war to end all wars’”, information source from “War with 
Iraq”, America Academy of Arts and Sciences,  http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0829/p15s01-
cogn.html#chart , accessed on 26 May 2009. 
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Iraq and Afghanistan as of 15 June 2009 is $868 billion. 246 It is therefore very clear that 
any plan recommending lower spending is of vital interest to the United States and its 
policy makers.  Phase Zero operations, which will seek to avoid war and positively affect 
the global environment, are in most cases much more cost effective than armed conflict 
and may in many cases avert armed conflict.   
Any savings realized by avoiding war are beneficial to the national interests of the 
United States.  Phase Zero operations offer an alternative to the costly endeavor of war.  
Historically, the United States has entered a major conflict every fifteen to twenty years.  
Minor conflicts occur slightly more often: approximately every five to ten years.  The 
cost of a major conflict starts at approximately 100 billion and can climb quickly.  A 
relatively minor conflict such as peace keeping operations in the Balkans quickly added 
up to over 16 billion dollars. 247  For contrast, the proposed force for this project has an 
annual budget of 1.5 billion dollars.  If Phase Zero operations were to eliminate small 
conflicts, they would be financially justified.  This supposition is quite reasonable.  
Additionally it is reasonable to believe that the Phase Zero force will be able to reduce 
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The table below outlines the loss of life from each of the last five conflicts in 





Korean War 3.5M 
Vietnam War 5M 
Gulf War ~150k 
 
Table 141: List of U.S. Wars Death Toll  248 
Although the death toll generally decreases as the conflicts pass chronologically, 
the value of the human life does not change, and war is always a costly endeavor.  A 
Phase Zero concept of peacetime operations aiming to prevent or avoid armed conflict 
can reduce the loss of life associated with war.   
Prevent conflict: 
An additional aspect of Phase Zero operations is extending medical assistance.   
From March 17-20, 2009, the Department of Defense (DoD) medical team embarked 
aboard USS Nashville (LPD 13) for Africa Partnership Station (APS) to assist local 
doctors with several medical procedures at Obiseam Medical Center Apapa and at the 
medical clinic at Ojo Naval Base in Lagos, Nigeria.  This friendly gesture is a 
humanitarian effort that deployed a small team to help improve and share medical 
expertise.  The far reaching effect is improved proficiency of the organization being 
helped and also an experience gained by the medical team.  The force deployed created 
an impression of foreign military presence in the location of interest, but did not show 
any form of intimidation.  It is very difficult to measure the effects of the medical 
                                                 
248“List of Wars and Disasters by Death Toll”, Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_wars_and_disasters_by_death_toll, accessed on 26 May 2009. 
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exercise on the stability of the region.  However, it can be said that the region is as stable 
and secure as it was before the Africa Partnership Station and no use of force was 
necessary.  One could argue the humanitarian effort created strong friendships and allies 
within the region.     
6. PHASE ZERO OVERVIEW 
A far larger representation of Phase Zero is the formation of United Nations.  
There are 192 Member States of the United Nations, following the admission 
Montenegro on 28 June 2006. 249  A member state has to fulfill the basic principles of 
international relations with the following purposes: maintain international peace and 
security; develop friendly relations among nations; cooperate in solving international 
problems and in promoting respect for human rights; to be a center for harmonizing the 
actions of nations.  
As the United Nations is not a world government, it does not make laws. It 
provides the center stage for Member States to come to an assembly to help resolve 
international conflicts and formulate policies on global and regional affairs.  Each 
member state owns a right to voice their opinion and a vote on policy changes.  This body 
also lays down the framework for Justice, Human Rights and International Law.  It also 
has the authority to dispatch coalition officers from member states into troubled or 
affected countries to maintain and uphold the peace and stability that is crucial for 
humanity. 
The United Nations prepares for natural disasters and will quickly mobilize 
manpower and organizations like the “Red Cross” into disaster hit areas to help deliver 
food, medical aids or support and temporary shelters. This is a partial framework for 
Phase Zero because of intervention and preparedness prior to a possible conflict or 
disaster. 
To summarize the term, Phase Zero, is to carry out the activities to promote 
peace, stability and security without the use of force, using the most cost effective 
                                                 




resources involving partnership nations or organizations. The objective is to leverage cost 
effective resources to achieve an optimal goal that is the pareto-optimum solution.  Phase 
Zero goals avert situations where the onset of the event would present an even larger cost 
or scale of operation to resolve a problem.  
7. EVOLUTION OF PHASE ZERO 
 The first official mention of Phase Zero is in the 13 April 1995 revision of Joint 
Publication Five (JP 5-0) where Phase Zero was labeled as “shaping”.  From JP 5-0,  
 
The shape phase will contain military security cooperation activities to be 
coordinated with other interagency activities. When contingency and crisis 
action planning are conducted in a region with security cooperation 
activities, both military operational and security cooperation planning 
must be closely coordinated and linked with interagency plans. In 
addition, early flexible deterrent activities by all instruments of national 
power may begin during this phase. 250 
 
 JP 5-0 however does not elaborate on what is required for Phase Zero.  JP 5-0 
limits comments to,  
 
Planning that supports most “shaping” requirements typically occurs in the 
context of day to-day security cooperation, and combatant commands may 
incorporate Phase 0 activities and tasks into the SCP. Thus, these 
requirements are beyond the scope of JP 5-0. 251 
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The concept of Phase Zero operations was not further developed until 17 
September 2006 in Joint Publication 3-0 (JP 3-0).  The updated phasing model includes 
Phase Zero as well as provided further guidance on what constitutes Phase Zero 
operations.  JP 3 states: 
 
Shape. Joint and multinational operations — inclusive of normal and 
routine military activities — and various interagency activities are 
performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or 
solidify relationships with friends and allies. They are executed 
continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain 
multinational cooperation in support of defined military and national 
strategic objectives. They are designed to assure success by shaping 
perceptions and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and allies, 
developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self defense and 
coalition operations, improving information exchange and intelligence 
sharing, and providing US forces with peacetime and contingency access. 
“Shape” phase activities must adapt to a particular theater environment 
and may be executed in one theater in order to create effects and/or 
achieve objectives in another. 252 
 
                                                 
252 Joint Publication 3-0, 17 September 2006, Joint Operations, 




Figure 46: Phase vs. Level of Military Effort JP 3-0 
Despite the additional guidance, Phase Zero remains a nebulous concept.  Phase 
Zero missions cover a wide array of ideas that span governments, military, NGO, and 
civilian actions.  It implies not only military actions but also social and economic actions 
to affect the beliefs and desires of country citizens as well as their leaders.   
Shaping the battle space is not a new concept.  In fact, it is a traditional concept 
that has existed for centuries.  Sun Tzu spoke of shaping the battle by carefully choosing 
the place of battle in The Art of War written in the 6th century BC.  The first impression 
of shaping operations involves the initial kinetic operations used to prepare the battle 
field for an assault.  A couple examples include shore bombardment before an 
amphibious landing or an aerial bombardment of bridges and highways to hinder the 
movement of the enemy.  While the term “shaping” has new meaning with regards to 
Phase Zero operations, the United States has been engaged in these types of functions for 
years.   
Historical Shaping: 
The Foreign Assistance and Arms Export Act of 1961 (FAA) is a continuation of 
the Marshall Plan that expired in 1951.  The Kennedy administration recognized the need 
for both military and civilian aid to help the developing world and to guarantee stability.  
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In 1961, President Kennedy said the collapse of developing countries "would be 
disastrous to our national security, harmful to our comparative prosperity, and offensive 
to our conscience."  253   The FAA evolved out of this idea as a method to provide 
material support governments and none governmental organizations.  The FAA states 
that:  
 
“In enacting this legislation, it is therefore the intention of the Congress to 
promote the peace of the world and the foreign policy, security, and 
general welfare of the United States by fostering an improved climate of 
political independence and individual liberty, improving the ability of 
friendly countries and international organizations to deter or, if necessary, 
defeat aggression, facilitating arrangements for individual and collective 
security, assisting friendly countries to maintain internal security, and 
creating an environment of security and stability in the developing friendly 
countries essential to their more rapid social, economic, and political 
progress.” 254 
 
The stated goal of the FAA is “to promote peace and security”. Section 545.777 states: 
 
“Training in Maritime Skills The President is encouraged to allocate a 
portion of the funds made available each fiscal year to carry out this 
chapter for use in providing education and training in maritime search and 
rescue, operation and maintenance of aids to navigation, port security, at-
sea law enforcement, international maritime law, and general maritime 
skills.” 255 
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The traditional naval guidance including: Forward From the Sea,  From Sea to 
Land,  and Sea Power 21 do not mention shaping. The sole focus of these literature 
pieces is the ability of the Navy to project its power through the use of force.  Sea Power 
21 brought the concepts of Sea Shield, Sea Strike, and Sea Basing.   The focus remained 
on having superior weapons and sensors in theater to “create shock, confusion, and chaos 
in enemy ranks.” 256 No mention is made of preventing the need for these forces. 
The Naval Operations Concept 2006 (NOC 2006) exemplifies a major change in 
US strategies.  The NOC 2006 recognizes the changes in the world structure.  Instead of 
focusing solely on power projection the NOC identifies new strategic goals of securing 
the United States from direct attack, securing strategic access, retaining global freedom of 
action, strengthening existing and emerging alliances and partnerships, and establishing 
favorable security conditions.  These represent a strategic shift from the Sea Power 21 
strategic goals of projecting precise and persistent offensive power, projecting global 
defensive assurance, and projecting joint operational independence.  The NOC 2006 
maintains the traditional Navy missions of forward naval presence, sea control, air and 
missile defense, counter proliferation, and deterrence.  However, it introduces a host of 
new missions including maritime security operations, security cooperation, civil-military 
operations, counterinsurgency, counter terrorism, information operations, and crisis 
response. The identification of the new missions was a response to the rise of irregular 
challenges from both state and none state actors. 
The missions identified in NOC 2006 represent operations that affect day to day 
operations by the U.S. Navy.  The goal of these operations is to promote stability and 
peace by preventing or limiting conflicts.  The general idea is to build relationships with 
governments and people through the provision of training, medical support, disaster 
relief, and infrastructure repair to foreign nations.  The intent is to avoid conflict by 
building stable governments with good will towards the United States and its coalition 
partners. 
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8. NEWLY DEFINED MISSIONS BY NOC 06 
In NOC 2006, a host of missions were included into the core mission capabilities 
of the Navy in response to the evolving threats in the 21st century. These missions include 
maritime security operations, security cooperation, civil-military operations, 
counterinsurgency, counter terrorism, information operations, and crisis response. 
Each of these missions is explained to provide greater understanding of the various over-
arching guiding principles that will influence the type of operations that will be 
considered “Phase Zero”. 
Maritime Security Cooperation: 
  
“We will secure the maritime domain from nation-state threats, terrorism, 
drug trafficking and other forms of transnational crime, piracy, 
environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration.” 257  
 
 The Maritime Security Cooperation (MSC) mission identifies new threats to the 
national security of the United States as well as threats to the stability of other countries.  
The threats are by no means new.  However, they have been seen traditionally as a police 
issue instead of a military issue.  On the surface it would appear that domestically this 
would run contrary to the Title Ten restrictions on the military.  However this is not the 
case.  The MSC mission recognizes that no organization alone has the capacity to stop 
these threats.  A partnership bringing together the partnership of governmental 
organizations at all levels and the branches of the armed service is required to protect our 
national security.  
 MSC is not limited to domestic concerns.  Today 90% of the world’s commerce 
travels on or involves the oceans. 258  Threats to this system of global commerce 
potentially have a large destabilizing effect on everyone.   Examples can be found in the 
illegal fishing off the Somalia coast and Piracy in the Straits of Malacca.  Policing the 
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258 Robert Kaplan, “Center Stage for the 21st Century: Rivalry in the Indian Ocean”, Foreign Affairs 
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world’s waterways is substantially more than the U.S. wants to perform or can handle 
alone.  In order to effectively secure sea lines of communications we must partner and 
cooperate with other nations.  In most instances local forces are the best choice to patrol 
areas.  They have a geographic advantage allowing short logistical lines as well as short 
lines of communication.  Local forces also have the advantage of being familiar with the 
local terrains and populations and presumably, their maritime forces are well suited to 
their mission.  This gives insight that no outside force will have.   
However, it is not as simple as convincing countries to join the coalition.  Most 
countries do not have the training, equipment or experience to fully capitalize on their 
position.  In order for local forces to work to their maximum efficiency they must be 
prepared to leverage the other members of the coalition.  Examples of this might include 
gaining maritime situational awareness from foreign radar or Intelligence, Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, receiving training in intercept and boarding techniques, 
or using none organic air cover.  Each of these examples greatly increases the strength of 
the local forces.  However, they are not without cost, effort and commitment.  In order for 
all coalition members to work effectively the forces must be trained and equipped to 
utilize the resources.  These skills are also perishable so continuous training and exercises 
are required.  The pay off however is a disproportionate increase in safety and efficiency 
in the maritime environment. 
Security Cooperation: 
 The NOC lists Security Cooperation as its own mission.  However it really is the 
more general form of MSC.  The Navy’s role in global stability is not limited to the sea.  
As a member of the joint combat team, the Navy and Marine Corps have substantial 
capabilities outside the maritime environment.  For example, the Marines and Special 
Forces operating in Iraq may never see amphibious operations.  Also, naval aircraft fly 
missions in direct support roles for the Army troops in combat on land.  All of the 
benefits of cooperation realized on the high seas can be leveraged in other theaters as 





Civil Military Operations (CMO): 
 Organizationally, Phase Zero missions might benefit from the structure and 
activities of the CMO and Information Operations IO.   
“[CMO are] activities of a commander that establish collaborative 
relationships among military forces, governmental and nongovernmental 
civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a 
friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military 
operations are nested in support of the overall US objectives. CMO may 
include performance by military forces of activities and functions 
normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government.” 259   
Civil Military Operations (in Joint terms), also known as Civil Affairs (CA) 
operations in the Army, or generally categorized as Civil Military Relations (CMR), is 
anything that is done by the military, with any non-military organization in the effort to 
support stability, counterinsurgency and operations dealing with threats.  A typical CMO 
sees people from military (e.g. medical, engineer corp, military police, legal and civil 
affairs department) and non-military organizations.  Non-military organizations can 
include government or non government entities such as the local government, law 
enforcement agencies, indigenous populations and institutions, intergovernmental 
agencies, nongovernmental agencies, host nations, foreign nations and even private 
sectors providing a specific service. The parties involved can be summarized in the 
diagram below: 
                                                 





Figure 47: Composition of a CMOC 
This relatively new type of operation is planned to be the cornerstone of ensuring 
mission success since the traditional military operations of invade and conquer are only 
good against conventional conflict, and has shown quite useless against recent conflicts, 
especially those dealing with terrorism or non-state enemies.  These new civil related 
operations are designed to not only win battles, but also the hearts and cooperation of the 
local populace. CMO is considered holistic, cumulative, integrative, and synergistic, 
working in the seams of power and gaps in organizations, phases, and processes.  CMO 
need to take into consideration the culture of the indigenous population since they 
involves engaging the population and building relationships with the local populace.  
CMO are inherently joint, interagency, and multinational affairs.  At all levels, CMO use 
political bargaining, collaboration, consensus, and relationship-building to create 
favourable situations for success.” 260   
CMO Organization: 
In US military context, CMO are typically centrally coordinated via a CMO 
center (CMOC).  Its organization is mission and theater dependent and is usually flexible 
in size and composition.  The main purpose of the CMOC is to prepare and coordinate all 
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CMO planning teams support.  The planning teams will determine the number and 
expertise of the Civil Affairs (CA) personnel needed for the specified missions. CMOC 
also provide and direct CA augmentation requirements as necessary.  The definition of 
CA is: 
 
“The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or 
exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both 
governmental and non-governmental, and the civilian population in a 
friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military 
operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may 
include performance by military forces of activities and functions 
normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may 
occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may 
also occur, if directed, in the absence of military operations.” 261 
 
Within the CMO, the Civilian Affairs (CA) personnel perform six functions: 
• Law 
• Economic Stability 
• Governance 
• Public Health and Welfare 
• Infrastructure 
• Public Education and Information 
 
Depending on the type of missions that have been identified, experts with the 
right skill sets will be brought in for the mission. 
Purpose of CMO: 
 
“The purpose of CMO is to facilitate military operations, and to 
consolidate and achieve operational US objectives, through the integration 
of civil and military actions while conducting support to civil 
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332 
 
administration (SCA), populace and resources control (PRC), foreign 
humanitarian assistance (FHA), nation assistance (NA), and civil 
information management (CIM)”. 262 
 
• Support to Civil Administration:   
This involves helping and stabilizing the governance of a foreign nation’s civil 
structure by establishing a government or military authority over an occupied population.  
• Populace and Resource Control:   
This involves helping the hosting nation to retain control over the population 
centers and resources which are necessary for joint operations. 
• Foreign Humanitarian Assistance:   
This involves operations that help hosting nations relieve or reduce the effects and 
results of any natural, man-made or endemic disasters.   
• Nation Assistance:   
This involves military assistances rendered to nations during peacetime within the 
host nation’s territories, e.g. security assistance and foreign internal assistance.  
• Civil Information Management:   
This involves collection and dissemination of data regarding civil areas to 
organizations such as other governmental agencies or NGOs. 
CMO at different phases of Operations: 
CMO are present in all phases of operations, the figure below summarizes the 
CMO emphasis at the various phases of operations: 
                                                 




Figure 48: Phasing Model Civil Affairs 263 
The level of involvement might not be as great in some operations (e.g Panama, 
Bosnia, Kosovo) as it is in operations which are mainly CMO driven (the later phases of 
Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts). 
Counterinsurgency: 
If left unchecked, all the underlying issues of instabilities can lead to insurgencies.  
When a country’s stability degrades to the point where an outside country needs to 
intervene to guarantee the safety of a population and human rights, then the beginnings of 
an insurgency can be born.   
Insurgency and counterinsurgency are complex subsets of warfare.  Joint doctrine 
defines an insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted 
government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. 264  Stated another way, an 
insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the 
control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political 
authority while increasing insurgent control. 265  Counterinsurgency is military, 
                                                 
263 “Joint Publication 3-0 – Joint Operations”, 17 September 2006. 
264 “Joint Publication 1-02 – Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms”, 12 
April 2001. 
265 “Counterinsurgency (Field Manual (FM) No. 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 
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paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government 
to defeat insurgency. 266 
The United States possesses overwhelming conventional military superiority.   
The strength of the U.S. military, while adequate to win the war, may be mismatched 
when securing peace, as adversaries often resort to asymmetric and unconventional 
operations such as insurgency and terrorism. 
All insurgencies use different methods, but historical trends point to the common 
factors motivating insurgents.  Often, insurgents and terrorists are the hardest teachers.  
First, they test, before you are allowed to learn.   
 
“The strategy of guerrilla war is to pit one man against ten, but the tactic is 
to pit ten men against one.”  
- Mao Tse-Tung 
 
This statement best describes the strategy and tactics of insurgents.  A small 
number of insurgents, highly motivated, with simple weapons, good operations security, 
and even limited mobility can undermine security over a large area. 267  Therefore, 
maintaining security in an unstable environment requires vast resources.  In addition, 
these asymmetric and unconventional operations also extend beyond military means.  
Insurgents aim to win by undermining and outlasting morale; public support and 
exhausting our national will. 268   
History shows that most insurgencies follow a similar course of development and 
the tactics useful in successfully defeating them are likewise similar in most cases. 269  
For example, in Maoist-style guerrilla movements, serious guerrilla activity emerges only 
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after a revolutionary organization is already in place.  Similarly, history also shows that 
the same tactics that are usually successful against conventional foes may fail against 
insurgents. 270  One common occurrence of insurgencies is that the government or 
occupying force that is being targeted generally takes too much time to recognize that an 
insurgency is happening. 271  The insurgents take advantage of that time to build strength, 
such as pruning and developing leadership cadres and gathering support.  In addition, the 
insurgents engage in a pattern of attack and counterattack.  This is similar to classic 
guerrilla warfare, in which the weaker enemy launches surprise attacks with superiority 
in numbers in the setting of his choosing then withdrawing into the population before 
counter reinforces can be sent.  The harder an occupying force hits back, the more they 
alienate the populace and create communities that accept, if not actively support, the 
armed resistance. 272  Americans found this response the hard way in Vietnam, the 
Russians in Afghanistan, and the British in Northern Ireland. 273   
Another common feature is that forces conducting counterinsurgency operations 
usually begin poorly.  Governments and militaries often falsely believe that armies 
trained to win large conventional wars are automatically prepared to win small, 
unconventional and asymmetric ones.  In fact, some capabilities required for 
conventional success, the ability to execute operational maneuver and employ massive 
firepower, may be of limited utility and may even be counterproductive in 
counterinsurgency operations.  Nevertheless, conventional forces beginning 
counterinsurgency operations often try to use these capabilities to defeat insurgents; they 
almost always fail.   
Counterinsurgency is waged, won, and lost at a grassroots level.  This is because 
guerrillas, in the face of a dominant conventional force, are usually unable to establish a 
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reliable system of countrywide networks of command and control.  Consequently, tactical 
decisions are delegated to the separate regions and towns, where there is a need to adapt 
to local realities.  Also, in order to survive and succeed in their insurgency, the insurgents 
need to have good intelligence of where the enemy is, what their strengths are, what they 
are likely to do and what the enemy thinks about the insurgents. 274  This localization can 
be witnessed in the Philippine War from 1899 to 1902, perhaps the most successful 
counterinsurgency campaign waged by a Western army in the past 200 years, and Iraq in 
2003, where American soldiers encounter drastically different challenges between 
regions and towns. 
In the Philippine War, an inevitable consequence of the dispersion and isolation 
of American forces on the islands forced them to become well acquainted with their area 
and the local population.  This, in turn, gave them good, local intelligence, the 
prerequisite for effective counterinsurgency operations. 275 
A prerequisite of counterinsurgency is to encourage innovative, adaptive military 
leadership at the local level, rather than trying to manage the conflict from afar.  This 
enables the local military leaders to develop a handful of semi-autonomous regional 
counterinsurgency plans to counter the insurgents.  For example, in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, pacification tactics that are effective in Mosul may be radically inappropriate 
for Basra.  Cultivating a network of informers and gauging the public mood cannot be 
accomplished at a distance or on the fly.  Instead, the first rule of counterinsurgency 
operations requires troops to be physically present on the ground to engage in sustained, 
personalized interaction with the local population and to build trusted networks.  This 
helps the local population understand the troops as real people who they can trust and 
with whom they can conduct business.  As mentioned in the Army Field Manual No. 3-
24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication MCWP No. 3-33.5, this is the true meaning 
of the phrase “hearts and minds,” which comprises two separate components. 276  
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“Hearts” means persuading people that their best interests are served by 
counterinsurgency success.  “Minds” means convincing them that the force can protect 
them and that resisting it is pointless. 
 
“Counterinsurgency is almost certain to be a long, hard slog.”  
– Donald Rumsfeld 277 
 
This quote is especially true in the face of a hostile or apathetic population.  
Therefore, successful counterinsurgency operations often require a high ratio of security 
forces to the number of insurgents.  For that reason, counterinsurgency operations are 
usually protracted operations and are difficult to sustain.   Defeating such enemies 
presents a huge challenge as the effort requires a firm political will and substantial 
patience by the government, its people, and the countries providing support. 278  The side 
that learns faster and adapts more rapidly will usually win.  The military forces that 
successfully defeat insurgencies are usually those able to overcome their institutional 
inclination to wage conventional war.  
Long-term success in counterinsurgency depends on the people taking charge of 
their own affairs and consenting to the government’s rule.  The success of 
counterinsurgency is ultimately defined by the degree and intensity of indigenous support 
it is able to secure.  Progress is neither measured by the number of engagements with the 
enemy nor the number of casualties inflicted or sustained.  Rather, the path to victory is 
best marked by gradual transfers of power from the occupying force to responsible and 
sustainable institutions of self-governance. 
Leaders should never underestimate the scale or complexity; moreover, they 
should recognize that the military force cannot succeed in counterinsurgency alone.  
Almost everything in counterinsurgency needs interagency cooperation. Everything from 
policing to intelligence to civil military operations involves working with interagency and 
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host nation (HN) partners.  These agencies are not under military control, but their 
success is essential to accomplishing the mission. 
Counter Terrorism: 
Counter-terrorism refers to offensive strategies intended to prevent a belligerent, 
in a broader conflict, from successfully using the tactic of terrorism. The U.S. military 
definition for counter-terrorism, compatible with the definitions used by NATO and 
many other militaries, is "Operations that include the offensive measures taken to 
prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.” 279  In other words, counter-terrorism 
is a set of techniques for denying an opponent the use terrorism-based tactics, just as 
counter-air is a set of techniques for denying the opponent the use of attack aircraft. 
International terrorism threatens the United States, its allies and interests, and the 
world community. Defeating the terrorist requires sound policies, concerted U.S. 
Government effort, closely coupled with international cooperation.  The key aim of the 
counter-terrorism strategy is to reduce the risk faced from international terrorism so that 
people can go about their business freely and safely. 
Information Operations: 
Information is an important factor to military operations.  Operations depend on 
correct information for many simultaneous and integrated activities.  Information 
Operations (IO) has evolved from the concepts of Command & Control and Information 
Warfare and now represents a class of operations that seeks to gain a tactical, operational 
and strategic advantage over an opponent by the use and management of information.  
IO has been broadly classified to 3 main capabilities: core, supporting and related 
capabilities. These capabilities define primary means of conducting IO and the supporting 
and related tasks for the conduct of such operations.  
Core Capabilities: 
IO has been defined as the employment of psychological operations (PSYOP), 
military deception (MILDEC), operations security (OPSEC), electronic warfare (EW) 
and computer network operations (CNO)  in concert with specified supporting and related 
capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated 
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decision making while protecting our own. 280 The 5 capabilities represent the core 
capabilities for the conduct of IO are:  
• PSYOP:   
Operations that are conducted with the objective of conveying information to 
potential adversaries and foreign audiences to influence and manipulate their motives, 
emotions, behavior of individuals and governments.  They are conducted with the intent 
of inducing a favorable behavior towards an objective.  
• MILDEC: 
 Actions that are executed to purposefully mislead potential adversaries on U.S. 
military capabilities, intentions, operations thereby causing an adversary to take specific 
courses of action.  These courses of action will directly or indirectly contribute to the 
success of U.S. objectives and missions.  
• OPSEC:  
 The process of identifying key information in any military operation and 
determining the potential advantage it might pose to the adversary in the event they had 
access to that information.  This information will present potential adversary decision 
makers’ critical information about friendly forces and intentions and in a broader context 
of operations.  The security of this information could affect the U.S.’s ability to execute a 
mission successfully.  In the realm of IO, MILDEC and OPSEC serve similar functions.  
MILDEC seeks to deceive the adversary by forcing them to make incorrect analysis of 
data thereby causing them to arrive at false conclusions about U.S. forces while OPSEC 
seeks to deny real information to the adversary.   
• EW: 
 EW represents a suite of actions involving the use of electromagnetic (EM) and 
directed energy to control or attack the adversary.  There are three main subdivisions of 
EW: Electronic Attack (EA), Electronic Protection (EP) and Electronic Warfare Support 
(ES).  EA is an offensive use of the EM spectrum to attack, neutralize and destroy 
adversary combat capability.  EP uses the EM spectrum for primarily defensive means 
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and is used for protection of assets and personnel.  ES consists of actions undertaken to 
intercept, identify and locate sources of EM radiation, both intentional and unintentional 
for the purpose of recognition, targeting and future operations.  
• CNO: 
 With the increased prevalence of information technology, CNO has been 
developed as an operation to attack, deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, exploit, and defend 
electronic information and infrastructure.  CNO is divided into CNA (Computer Network 
Attacks), CND (Computer Network Defense) and CNE (Computer Network 
Exploitation). CNA involves actions to disrupt and deny adversary computing while 
CND seeks to protect, monitor and detect attacks on information systems in the military. 
CNE is the set of actions to further improve intelligence collection capabilities through 
the use of computer networks to gather information from adversary information 
networks. 
Supporting Capabilities: 
In addition to the core capabilities for IO, several supporting capabilities contribute to 
the effective execution of IO.  These capabilities have an impact on the mission 
information environment.  The supporting capabilities include Information Assurance 
(IA), Physical Security, Physical Attack and Counterintelligence (CI).   
• IA:   
IA is the practice of managing information related tasks for data and information 
systems to ensure their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and no 
repudiation. These goals are relevant whether the data is in storage, processing or transit. 
281  IO and IA have a symbiotic relationship with IO primarily focused on influencing a 
certain type of military activity.  IA is concerned with the protection of the delivery of the 
information particularly against adversary intelligence efforts that are directed towards 
military information and information systems. 
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• Physical Security: 
 Physical security deals with the physical aspects of security to safeguard storage 
data, information and information systems against possible espionage, damage and theft. 
Physical security is at times considered a sub section of IA, ensuring the physical 
availability of information and information systems. 
• Physical Attack:  
 Physical attacks are directed offensive actions taken against adversary command, 
control and communications (C3) nodes and information systems to hinder the 
adversary’s ability to exercise command and control.  This capability is often used in 
tandem with other capabilities such as PSYOP to maximize the effect of attack on the 
adversary.  
• CI: 
 Consists of activities conducted to protect information against espionage and 
other intelligence activities that may attempt to compromise information systems.  CI is 
part of the overall security effort.  Together with IA, physical security and OPSEC, CI is 
an effort to protect information and information systems. CI gives commanders an 
understanding of adversary’s information gathering methodology.  This insight will allow 
commanders to develop security measures for the information systems, hindering 
adversary’s efforts to obtain or compromise vital information.  
Related Capabilities: 
 Three military functions (public affairs (PA), civil military operations (CMO) and 
defense support to public diplomacy) are commonly used in conjunction with IO.  These 
functions have several other roles that are not limited solely to IO, but are defined as 
related capabilities as they make significant contributions to IO when their execution is 
coordinated with other IO efforts. 
• Public Affairs (PA): 
 PA is information, activities and community relations that are developed for 
external and internal audiences in DOD. PA and IO must be coordinated for consistent 
theme and messaging.  PA’s primary focus is to inform domestic and external audiences 
on operations and to support the command public information needs.  PA is essential to 
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the commander’s mission and important in maintaining public liaisons both in theater and 
in country. 
• Civil Military Operations: 
 CMO are activities that are conducted in an effort to establish, maintain, 
influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and the civilian 
population.  These activities span a wide range and include activities such as assistance in 
reconstruction of buildings in third world countries, providing medical aid to 
impoverished nations and training of homeland forces.  All these actions aim to address 
the root causes of instability with the intent of avoiding future military action.  CMO can 
be particularly effective in pre/post combat operations.  
• Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD): 
 DSPD is part of the DOD’s contribution to the U.S. government’s public 
diplomacy and foreign policy efforts as it seeks to understand foreign nations by 
broadening the relationship between American civil and military organizations with their 
foreign counterparts. 
Information Environment: 
Military forces operate in an information environment that is rapidly changing 
and evolving.  This adds another layer to an already complex operating environment for 
which factors affecting this environment have to be carefully studied and resolved to 
ensure IO can be used effectively.  There are 3 types of factors that affect the information 
environment: long, medium and short term factors for which military operations are 
planned and executed.  
• Long-term factors which may shape the information environment 
include the various ways by which humans/organizations: 
o Organization (nation states, tribes, families, etc.) 
o Governance 
o Interaction as groups (culture, sociology, religion, etc.) 
o Regionally influences (stability, alliances, economic 
relationships, etc.) 
o Technological advancements 
 
• Medium-term factors include: 
343 
 
o Rise and fall of national/political leaders 
o Competition between groups/factions over resources of goals 
in the area of operations 
o Employment of resources by organizations to take advantage of 
information technology and infrastructure 
• Short-term factors include: 
o Weather 
o Availability of resources for support 
o Ability to extend/maintain sensors and portable information 
infrastructure to the specific location of distant military 
operations. 
 
 Information Operations are executed at each levels of warfare, tactical, 
operational and strategic, with guidance given by the task force commander.  All IO 
efforts have to be coordinated to ensure a consistent theme and credible messaging.  In a 
multi-effort, unilateral mission, the responsibility to coordinate IO across different 
commands is the responsibility of the United States Strategic Command 
(CDRUSSTRATCOM). For multilateral effort missions, the multinational force 
commander is responsible for the coordination of all IO efforts.  The multinational force 
commander is responsible to resolve potential conflicts between each nation’s IO 
programs and the IO objectives and it is vital to integrate allies and coalition partners into 
IO planning as early as possible so that an integrated and achievable IO strategy can be 
developed early in the planning process.  Coupled with CNO, IO activities are an 





Figure 49: Elements of a typical Joint IO Cell 
IO planning must begin at the earliest part of a campaign or operations planning.  
The use of IO during early phases can significantly influence the amount of effort 
required for the remaining phases. 
Examples of Phase Zero IO: 
 For Phase Zero operations, there is not the same demand for many parts of the 
traditional IO mission.  Phase Zero forces may not necessarily conduct electronic attack 
or military deception operations since the objective of Phase Zero is to increase stability 
in a region and EA and MDO tend to decrease stability.  However, IO may be one of the 
most important Phase Zero missions.  The main focus of IO in a Phase Zero force will be 
establishing command and control and an information network and in public affairs.
 One of the missions of Phase Zero is to establish access.  In the modern age, 
access to information and command and control systems is as important as physical 
access.  This is always difficult to achieve.  The problem becomes how much information 
is sharable, with whom do we share this information, and how to protect vital information 
from our adversaries or potential adversaries.  A solution that the U.S. currently uses to 
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address protecting information from adversaries while still allowing allies access is the 
Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange (CENTRIX) network.  CENTRIX 
is a global architecture used by U.S. Central Command and the U.S. Pacific Command 
that allows U.S. forces to share information and operational planning with allies.  
According to Monica R. Shephard, the director of Task Force Web for the CNO, “That 
[capability] has an ongoing transformational effect because it makes us one force. This 
isn’t a science fair project. It’s real; it’s deployed; and it’s in theater. And it’s providing 
capability because a number of operations, including maritime intercept, are being 
supported by the allies. The CENTRIX architecture is the system that allows us to work 
with them very seamlessly.” 282  Currently, all US forces that deploy have CENTRIX 
installed.  CENTRIX can maintain secure information sharing with many units from 
Japan, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and Germany.   While it is extremely 
useful for multinational operations, CENTRIX is not easy to setup, maintain or learn.  In 
order to be useful, users must spend a fair amount of time getting to know the system to 
feel comfortable using it.  In order for CENTRIX to provide shared operational 
capability, the system must be in daily use and not something that is only utilized in crisis 
response.  This is true of any centrally organized and sustained network solution, not just 
CENTRIX.  The SEA Integrated Project team proposed an alternative command and 
control network for Phase Zero that is easy to access, simple to use and efficient in 
sharing data, information and knowledge.  See section VI. 
 A Phase Zero force that is able to interact with other countries and demonstrate 
the capabilities of the system through training and exercises can prove the importance of 
sharing information and through expanding the number of users. 
 Another example of potential IO is broadcasts for information purposes.  This 
function supports the shaping mission.  Mass media including radio, television, the 
Internet, and the World Wide Web reach the world’s populace.  This is perfectly in 
concert with the concept of Phase Zero.  By opening up access to the broad population, 
our strategic policies and goals may be achieved with less expense and greater ease.   
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 An example of mass media broadcasting is Radio Rajo, a radio station established 
during the peacekeeping operation, Restore Hope, in Somalia.  Several PA operations 
were conducted including loud speaker operations, leafleting, and operating a radio 
station.  The loud speaker operation was used as a means of communicating directly with 
the civilian population.  It informed the locals of when and where missions where being 
performed so civilians could avoid these areas.  It was also used to spread positive 
information about the UN forces working in the area.  Major General Wilhelm, the 
Commander of the US Marine Forces in Somalia, is quoted as saying, "The PSYOP 
loudspeaker teams were a combat subtractor…. They reduced the amount of unnecessary 
bloodshed by convincing Somali gunmen to surrender rather than fight." 283   Radio 
RAJO conducted a 45-minute Somali language broadcast twice daily on AM, Midwave 
FM, and shortwave. The program included a reading from the Qur'an, a reading of the 
RAJO newspaper articles, selections of Somali poetry and short stories, news about 
Africa, significant events throughout the world, and Somali music. 284  It also broadcast 
anti-warlord information in response to the local war lords’ propaganda and 
intimidations. 
Crisis Response: 
Crisis response has been an integral part of the military mission for quite some 
time.  The Navy has provided assistance to countries in need of humanitarian relief since 
shortly after World War I.  As part of the crisis response activities, the Navy supports 
both government and private organizations with aid in the event of a crisis or natural 
disaster.   
The war fighting capabilities of the Navy and Marine Corps lend themselves well 
to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.  As a result the armed forces have been 
conducting humanitarian missions regularly as a response of good will.  Humanitarian 
missions are in line with what the FAA, 1961, and the U.S. Navy now plan for such 
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operations as part of their primary mission.  The Navy possesses a large sea lift capacity 
and a significant amount of man-power and by virtue of its forward presence around the 
world can respond quickly to many situations.  The Navy is also self sufficient for long 
periods of time allowing them to move into a crisis without adding additional burdens on 
the local populace.  The Marine Corp ground equipment meant for combat operations can 
be easily reconfigured for civilian operations.  The Marines also possess significant 
capacities to move material from sea to land via air and surface transport without the 
need for improved harbors or other infrastructure.  This capability can be critical when 
disasters strike remote areas. 
These capabilities were demonstrated after the 2004 South East Asian Tsunami.  
The BONHOMME RICHARD ESG and ABRAHAM LINCOLN CSG and USNS 
MERCY responded to the crisis and provided support as part of Operation Unified 
Assistance.  These ships provided vital airlift, command and control functions, 1000 
hospital bed as well as production of 90,000 gallons of potable water a day.  The disaster 
struck December 24th and the first American assets arrived in theater days later.   
Domestically, the Navy’s response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the ability 
of the Navy to quickly respond to a domestic humanitarian crisis.  Hurricane Katrina 
made landfall on the gulf coast of the United States on 29 August 2005.  The storm 
landed as a category five hurricane with sustained winds of 125 mph causing extensive 
damage over a wide swath of the southern United States.  Within twenty four hours of 
Katrina’s land fall the Navy was moving resources into the area.  The USS BATAAN and 
HSV SWIFT were dispatched from Ingleside Texas and were some of the first assets to 
arrive on scene.  The BATAAN brought with it over 100,000 pounds of relief supplies 
and 8000 gallons of potable water. The BATAAN brought an entirely staffed and 
supplied hospital with 600 beds and 6 operating rooms to provide support to the residents 
of New Orleans.  Additionally, the BATAAN was able to serve as the base for two fly 
away teams of eighty four medical personnel who were able to utilize the BATAAN’s 
organic air assets to deliver medical services to remote and isolated areas.  The BATAAN 
also brought with it a helicopter squadron of four MH-53s and two HH-60s helicopters.  
The helicopters were used by Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for 
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initial damage assessments as well as flying numerous medical evacuation and supply 
missions.  The USNS COMFORT was dispatched to provide an additional 250 hospital 
beds and 270 medical staff to replace medical services destroyed by the Hurricane. 
The Navy also made several of its USNS supply ships available for hurricane 
relief.  The USNS BELLATRIX, ALTRAX, PILLIPAU, BOB HOPE, and ARGOL were 
dispatched to move supplies into the region.  On average each of these vessels can carry 
40,000 tons of supplies including containerized cargo and vehicles.  Each also has the 
capacity to transfer cargo to shore via heavy airlift.  This capacity was useful as most of 
the improved harbors were damaged or destroyed. The USS TRUMAN CV 75 moved 
into the Gulf of Mexico to serve as the command and control center for FEMA.  The 
USNS GRAPPLE, a maritime salvage ship, was dispatched to aid in harbor salvage 
operations and to assist in reopening regional harbors.  The Marines aboard USS 
WHIDBEY ISLAND used their amphibious skills and materials to build floating 
causeways to replace the downed bridges leading into New Orleans.  In total, 28 Navy 
ships and 60,000 soldiers and sailors where involved in the relief operations. 285 
The scale of the Hurricane Katrina Operation is outside the normal planning range 
for Phase Zero operations.  It would be almost impossible to maintain the number of 
assets available to support this type of operation globally.  However, the operation 
highlighted the capabilities of the military in crisis response.  No other organization on 
the planet can bring anything close to the number and variety of resources to a problem. 
In testimony before the Armed Services committee General James T Conway 
stated:  
“Today … we have far fewer installations overseas.  When conflict is 
imminent or crises occur, which may require land-based forces, we must 
conduct political, social, or economic pressure even courtiers friendly to 
the United States decline to host or place conditions on basing US forces.” 
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General Conway expressed a fundamental reality of modern age - access is becoming 
more difficult to come by. Access comes in multiple forms.  The traditional access is 
physical access to bases located overseas, to maintain over-flight rights, and logistical 
support from other countries.  In the face of modern information warfare, the most import 
access often includes access to information and networks of a foreign country. Under the 
heading of security cooperation the NOC states:  
“Marines will be critical members of the joint and inter-agency team that 
interacts with an expanding set of international partners to build defense 
relationships, develop friendly capabilities for self-defense and 
multinational operations, promote cultural awareness and regional 
understanding, and enhance strategic access. Always conducted with the 
utmost respect for individual national sovereignty, these cooperative 
activities will include assisting host nation governments in freeing and/or 
protecting their societies from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.” 
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The purpose of the Crisis Response mission is three-fold.  First by developing 
partnerships we assure access to other countries.  Second, by preventing the need for 
armed conflict all together.  By preventing insurgencies, subversion, and lawlessness it is 
assumed that stable governments are created and sustained.  A stable government is a 
rational actor that ideally can be dealt with without resorting to force.  A stable 
government will also not harbor terrorists or other non-governmental organizations that 
are a threat to its national security.  And third, by partnering to defray the cost of war if it 
is unavoidable.   
9. CURRENT PHASE ZERO EQUIVALENT OPERATIONS 
There are many similar terms and concepts substituted for Phase Zero Operations 
such as Theater Security Cooperation, Global Fleet Station, and Operations Other Then 
War.  However, none of these cover the full range of Phase Zero operations.  The military 
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has traditionally conducted a wide range of operations that can be included under the 
umbrella of Phase Zero operations.  These include the naval exercises UNITAS and the 
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) cruises.  Although these exercises 
do not cover the entire range of Phase Zero missions, they present a good platform to 
gauge the requirements of current day Phase Zero operations and facilitate a projection of 
mission requirements for 2020.  
A. UNITAS 
“We cannot afford to let Latin America and the Caribbean become a 
backwater of violent, inward-looking states that are cut off from the world 
around them by populist, authoritarian governments. We must reward and 
help those governments that are making difficult, disciplined choices that 
result in the long-term wellbeing of their people. The challenges facing 
Latin America and the Caribbean today are significant to our national 
security. We ignore them at our peril.” 288 
       -General Craddock 
UNITAS is an annual five month long multination naval exercise sponsored by 
US SOUTHCOM.  The exercise usually takes place along the Atlantic and Pacific coast 
of South America.  The goals of the exercise are to enhance security cooperation and 
improve coalition operations. 289  Despite starting in 1960 long before the terminology of 
Phase Zero was in vogue, UNITAS is a clear example of a Phase Zero operation. 
UNITAS is Latin for Unity. 290  It is representative of the coalition that the US is 
trying to build in South America.  Originally UNITAS was a bilateral exercise between 
the US and varies Latin America and Caribbean countries.  The exercise has evolved into 
a major multilateral exercise including almost a dozen nations including allies from 
Europe as well as South and Central America.  It is involves a five month 
                                                 
288 Extract from General Bantz J. Craddock statement to Senate Armed Services Committee dated 15 
March 2005, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-
english/2005/March/20050316170548ASrelliM0.2706873.html ,  accessed on 27 May 2009. 
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circumnavigation of the South American continents.  Table 1 shows a list of participants 
for recent years.  Each participating South American country take a turn in hosting the 
fleet as it travels.   
Each year the exercise has a specific focus.  Recent UNITAS missions have 
focused on training in anti-terrorism, anti smuggling techniques, as well as traditional 
skills such as anti submarine warfare.  In addition to the formal training, multiple 
receptions are held to allow the member nations to connect on a personnel level.  This 
develops social networks that are important in the information age.  While in port sailors 
also take part in community relation projects to develop ties with the local communities.  
The purpose of these projects is to demonstrate the good will of the United States.  The 













2009 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Canada, and Germany 
2008 Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador Mexico, and the United 
States 




2006 Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Spain and the United 
States 
2005 Panama, Chile, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, and the United States 
2004 Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and the United States, and observers 
from Mexico 
2003 Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Spain, Uruguay 
2002 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Great Britain, and the 
Netherlands 
2001 Brazil, Colombia, Chile, France, Uruguay, and Spain 
2000 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela Canada, Great Britain, and 
the Netherlands 
Table 142: UNITAS Participants 
B. Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) 
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) is an annual series of 
bilateral military exercises between the United States and various Southeast Asia nations. 
Participants historically include the navies of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The exercises include at-sea maneuvering; 
command, control, and communications; naval gunnery; diving and salvage; visit, board, 
search and seizure drills; airborne maritime patrol; force protection/anti-terrorism; and 
medical and community projects.  
While the focus of the each bilateral exercise depends on the goals of the 
participating countries, the general focus of the exercise is on interoperability of the 
various navies in areas such as operational planning, command and control, tactics, 
logistics support and community service projects. The purpose of the exercise series is to 
improve military readiness and interoperability with each CARAT partner in a variety of 
mission areas of mutual benefit.  
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CARAT began in 1995 with the concept of scheduling several previously existing 
bilateral exercises with Southeast Asia nations into one series of sequential exercises. 
Doing so resulted in a more efficient use of assets and forces. Over the years, the exercise 
has focused on many different aspects of maritime exercises from humanitarian relief to 
the fight against terrorism. This exercise enhances cooperation between the various 
navies and builds professional and personal relationships between each country’s 
participating forces and the U.S. sea services. 
In addition to the conduct of military exercises, humanitarian efforts and 
community relations were conducted within each series of exercise. This included 
activities by combined local and U.S. military teams of doctors, dentists, veterinarians, 
and engineers. Local medical personnel and other community service personnel worked 
closely with their U.S. counterparts to serve each participating community. 
Approximately 1,400 U.S military personnel participate in the annual 6 week long 
exercise. The task configuration of the assets involved in the exercise depends on the 
focus of training for that year. On the average, five ships are involved in the exercise with 
additional assets added based on the type of exercise configuration.  
CARAT exercises are sponsored annually by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. 
Pacific Fleet, and scheduled by the Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet. 
2006 Task Group: 
• Dock landing ship  USS Tortuga (LSD 46) 
• Guided missile destroyer  USS Hopper (DDG 70)  
• Guided missile frigate  USS Crommelin (FFG 37)  
• High endurance cutter  USCGC Sherman (WHEC 720)  
• Rescue and salvage ship  USS Salvor (ARS 52).    
 
 
Also included in CARAT 2006: 
• One Navy SH-60B Seahawk helicopter  
• One Navy P-3C Orion maritime surveillance aircraft 
• Mobile Security Squadron Seven 
• BQM-74E drone det 
• Naval Mobile Construction Battalion One 
• Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Forty 
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• U.S. Marine training team from 3rd Marine Division 
• Naval Criminal Investigative Service 
• Beachmaster Unit One 
• Assault Craft Unit Five 
• U.S. Army veterinarians 
• 7th Fleet Band 
 
2003 CARAT Task Group: 
• Guided missile cruiser USS Vincennes (CG 49) 
• Dock landing ship USS Harpers Ferry (LSD 49) 
• Guided missile frigate USS Curts (FFG 38) 
• Rescue and salvage ship USS Safeguard (ARS 50) 
• 400-personnel Landing Force CARAT, a U.S. Marine Air Ground 
Task Force. 
C. Southeast Asia Cooperation  Against Terrorism (SEACAT)  
SEACAT is a weeklong at-sea exercise designed to highlight the value of 
information sharing, cooperation and multi-national coordination within a scenario that 
gives participating navies practical maritime interception training opportunities. 
Participants include the navies of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand. The first SEACAT was held in 2002.  
The multifaceted exercises present participants with realistic situations involving 
criminal and terrorist threats requiring international coordination, communication and 
decision-making. SEACAT also provides participants with practical maritime 
interception training opportunities to enhance the maritime security and interoperability 
of the participating forces. 
Commander Logistics Group Western Pacific/Commander Task Force 73, who 
operates from Singapore, is the U.S. Navy's executive agent for both CARAT and 
SEACAT. 
2007 Assets: 
• USS Tortuga (LSD 46) 
• USS Crommelin (FFG 37) 
• Destroyer USS Hopper (DDG 70) 
• Coast Guard cutter USCGC Sherman (WHEC 720) 
• Rescue and salvage ship USS Salvor (ARS 52) 
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• Military Sealift Command ship MV Sgt. William R. Button (T-AK 




• USS Tortuga 
• USS Howard (DDG 83) 
• USS Ford (FFG 54) 
• USCGC Morgenthau (WHEC 722) 
• U.S. military sealift command ships USNS Safeguard (T-ARS 50) 
• USNS 1st Lt. Baldomero Lopez (T-AK 3010) 
• USNS Cpl. Louis J. Hauge (T-AK 3011).  
• U.S. P-3C from VP-16  
D. Africa Partnership Station (APS) 
The Africa Partnership Station (APS) is a collaborative strategy designed to work 
cooperatively with U.S. and international partners to improve maritime safety and 
security in West and Central Africa to achieve safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea 
as part of United States Africa Command’s (USAFRICOM or AFRICOM) Security 
Cooperation program.  The strategy of the U.S. Navy is to keep out undesirables by 
deploying a rotation of ships tasked with assisting West Africa's maritime forces to take 
control.  The United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM or AFRICOM) is a Unified 
Combatant Command of the United States Department of Defense that is responsible for 
U.S. military operations and military relations with fifty-three African nations - an area of 
responsibility covering all of Africa except Egypt.  Africa Command was established 
October 1, 2007 as a temporary sub-unified command under U.S. European Command, 
which for more than two decades was responsible for U.S. military relations with more 
than forty African nations. Africa Command was formally activated October 1, 2008, 
during a public ceremony at the Pentagon attended by representatives of African nations 
posted in Washington, D.C. 
The idea for APS began in 2006 during a series of maritime conferences in West 
and Central Africa when African leaders stated their desire to improve maritime 
governance and to create a stable maritime environment.  The coast of West Africa, 
known as the Gulf of Guinea, is one of the most dangerous waterways in the world.  
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Recent incidents include attacks by militants on Nigeria's oil industry not to mention a 
growing armada of cocaine smugglers, human traffickers, and illegal immigrants and 
rogue trawler men.  Hence, the APS partners have created a set of shared goals, including 
improving maritime security, making sure African coastal nations are better able to 
protect their own resources and citizens, and increasing the African nations’ capabilities 
and capacity.  Working together, APS partners hope to achieve safety and prosperity in 
the Gulf of Guinea.  
Since the APS is typically based aboard a ship, it does not require a permanent 
base in Africa.  The ship functions as a mobile university, moving from port to port, 
providing training and long-term collaboration between American, European, and 
African nations.  During each of these port visits, APS offers tailored training to build 
partnerships and achieve common goals through collaboration.   
The first official APS mission was deployed in November 2007 for a period of six 
months.  APS missions consist of joint exercises, port visits, hands-on practical courses, 
professional training and community outreach with the coastal nations of Africa.   The 
focus is to build maritime capacity of the nations and increase their level of cooperation 
to improve maritime safety and security. The goal is to improve the ability of the nations 
involved to extend the rule of law out to sea.  Their intent is to stop maritime crime and 
the movement of illegal goods at sea such as illegal fishing, human smuggling, drug 
trafficking, oil theft and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea region. APS also works to increase 
safety by teaching skills that enhance a nation's ability to respond to mariners in distress.  
APS provides a unique venue to share efforts being made by various agencies and non-
governmental organizations from Africa, the U.S. and Europe.   
In the first APS deployment from November 2007 to April 2008, the Chief of 
U.S. Africa Command assigned the USS FORT MCHENRY and HSV SWIFT to the 
APS initiative.  The ships sailed to Spain to take on officers for the internal APS staff 
from several European partners — Spain, the United Kingdom, Portugal and Germany, 
among them — before heading to the Gulf of Guinea.  Her full complement included 
representatives of U.S. and partner nations' government agencies and non-governmental 
organizations, all working together to help African nations increase their ability to 
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provide maritime security.  In addition to the U.S. military, several U.S. agencies 
participate including the State Department, Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. 
Agency for International Development, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration and the U.S. Coast Guard.  In between major deployments, there were 
mobile training team visits, maritime patrol aircraft exercises, and port visits by 
individual naval vessels.  Countries visited included Senegal, Togo, Ghana, São Tomé 
and Principe, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea.  
USS NASHVILLE was underway to APS between February 2009 to May 2009. 
The USS Nashville is the largest APS ship in 2009 and will visit Senegal, Ghana, Gabon, 
Cameroon, and Nigeria, spending one to two weeks in each port.  USS NASHVILLE's 
embarked staff has a large international contingent with military members from Nigeria, 
Cameroon, Senegal, Ghana, Gabon, Italy, Portugal, Cape Verde, Sierra Leone, Togo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, UK, France, Germany, Spain, Denmark and Brazil. 
In February 2009, APS expanded to South and East Africa when the USS 
ROBERT G. BRADLEY visited Mozambique, Tanzania and Kenya.  Other than officers 
from European countries such as France and the UK, there were 1,500 participants from 
Nigeria, Cameroon, Senegal, Ghana, Liberia, São Tomé e principe and Gabon.  However, 
generally, very few people in Africa know about this initiative and how it affects their 
country or their personal lives.  Based on many news reports regarding U.S. interests in 
Africa, many people have misconstrued that APS was created to protect U.S. oil interests 
in Africa, as this region is estimated to supply a quarter of US oil imports by 2015.  Much 
of it will be pumped by US companies such as Exxon Mobil and Chevron operating off 
Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea.  Through public outreach, media coverage, and 
talking with the locals about the mission, APS can become the prestigious initiative by 
the U.S. that it was founded to be. 
To date, APS missions have trained thousands of foreign military personnel in 
subject areas like seamanship, search and rescue operations, law enforcement, medical 
readiness, environmental stewardship, and small boat maintenance. 
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10. SEA 15 PHASE ZERO GOALS 
For the purpose of this project, SEA-15 reviewed the over arching military 
guidance that has been promulgated throughout the fleet.  The documents of particular 
interest are the National Security Strategy 2005, National Defense Strategy 2008, the 
Quadrennial Defense Review 2006, the Naval Operations Concept 2006, Joint 
Publications 1, and Joint Publication 3.  None of these documents defined what Phase 
Zero is in explicit terms.   Reviewing and consolidating the above guidance SEA-15 
developed a mission statement for a Phase Zero force: 
 
A Phase Zero force will work closely with multinational, interagency and 
other partners to maintain or enhance stability, prevent or mitigate crises 
and set the conditions for access and responsive crisis intervention. 
 
The goals of the SEA-15 Phase Zero force are: 
• To enhance the stability of a region 
• To save resources and funding 
• To reduce the loss of lives and equipment 
• To build coalitions 
• To increase probability of interdiction of drug trafficking from South 
America to U.S. 
 
The idea of Phase Zero is to use “soft power” to build coalitions to avoid the need 
for conflict.  Soft power includes a broad range of missions ranging from presence, 
disaster relief, community relations, infrastructure construction, networking, training, and 
financial spending.   This list is by no means all inclusive; almost any non-kinetic mission 
could be included in soft power.  While many of these missions have no direct military 
purpose, they serve and influence the stability of governments and populations.  When 
conflict is unavoidable, the Phase Zero force will have laid the ground work for a 
successful operation.   
The mission statement has several different areas of interest.  The first 
requirement to be an interagency operation comes directly from Joint Publication Three 
and Five and is in keeping with the concepts of joint operations.  The inclusion of 
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multinational and none government organizations is an extension of the Navy’s thousand 
ship concept as expressed by Admiral Mullen. 
 
“No matter how large or small your navy or coast guard may be, we all 
face similar internal constraints like shrinking budgets, aging equipment, 
and populations that may not be attracted to military service. Our level of 
cooperation and coordination must intensify in order to adapt to our shared 
challenges and constraints. We have no choice in this matter, because I am 
convinced that nobody - no nation today - can go it alone, especially in the 
maritime domain.” 291 
 
In his quote, Admiral Mullen expresses the belief that no nation can cover the 
entire ocean alone.  The inclusion of others allows for the burdens, financial, political, 
and physical to be spread over a larger area.  It also prevents the impression of the Phase 
Zero force being an imperial entity or only serving the political interest of the United 
States.   This aids in the acceptance of the force.   The use of multinational forces also is 
in line with the NOC and NSS goal of enhancing relationships with partner nations. 
 The National Military Strategy 2004 states “the United States must adopt a global 
posture and take action to prevent conflict and surprise attack.” 292  The most likely 
source of a surprise attack is a act of terrorism perpetrated by a none state actor.  The 
most obvious example of this is the September 11th attacks by Al Qaeda. A method for 
preventing this is to maintain and develop regional stability.   Unstable or ungoverned 
regions such as Afghanistan and Somalia are breeding ground for dangerous none state 
actors.  The reduction or elimination of these regions directly affects the security of the 
United States.   
  The requirement to maintain physical access is drawn directly from the NOC 
2006.  SEA-15 expanded this mission to include access to information.  Information is a 
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College, Newport RI, September 21 2005. 
292 National Military Strategy of the United States, 2004,   pg 2. 
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vital currency in the modern combat environment.  Access to intelligence is as important 
as physical access.  Through developing ties and relationships with other nations the 
force will ensure that the access is available when it is needed. 
 While the Phase Zero force is a non-kinetic force that uses soft power to achieve 
its goals, ultimately the military is a war fighting organization.  If the Phase Zero force 
cannot achieve its goals of preventing crises it must prepare the way for a combat force.  
This idea has already been mentioned in relation to securing physical and informational 
access.  However it is much more extensive and involves many other aspects of war 
fighting, diplomacy and presence.  It involves having coalitions developed and working 
together cohesively and having up to date intelligence. 
 The NOC 2006 specifies crisis response as a primary mission of the Navy.  By 
virtue of its presence and soft power influence it is appropriate to include crisis response 
in the mission statement of the Phase Zero force.  The SEA integrated project team 
performed a functional decomposition to identify additional missions that contribute to 
accomplishing Phase Zero goals.  The list of possible missions is not all encompassing, 
however it develops a well rounded force that meets the current goals of Phase Zero 






The missions that comprise Phase Zero operations are: 
• Civil Support 
• Train the local defense force 
• Equip the local defense force 
• Build relations with foreign nations 
• Restore critical infrastructure 
• Anti-smuggling operations 
• Anti-terrorism operations 
• Anti-illegal fishing operations 
• Force protection against threats 
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• Anti-piracy operations 
• Information sharing 
• Freedom of navigation 
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E. NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS 
1. ROLES OF PERSONNEL & ORGANIZATIONS 
US Ambassador:  
 
NEO occurs at times when American citizens may become endangered in 
locations outside of the United States.  This is usually due to civil unrest or war.  
However, it may also be due to a natural disaster.  The U.S. Ambassador, who is the 
senior in-country authority, has the responsibility, according to law, to request a NEO.  
Once the request is made, the U.S. government will determine whether or not the 
evacuation should be done with civilian resources, such as the Civil Reserve Air Fleet 
(CRAF) or with military forces.  Even if military forces conduct the evacuation, the 
Ambassador remains in charge of the evacuation.  An Ambassador is a diplomatic agent 
of the highest rank.  Variations of the title Ambassador includes senior DOS diplomatic 
agent or chief of mission (COM). 293   
The Ambassador is responsible for the preparation and maintenance of the 
Emergency Action Plan (EAP) which normally starts with an evacuation using scheduled 
airlines, chartered flights, or surface transportation before employing a military NEO.  
The military is often viewed as the last resort in a series of evacuation options.  EAPs 
include the following information: evacuation sites; anticipated number of evacuees; 
assembly areas and major supply routes; command posts; key personnel; description of 
the Embassy communication system, transportation fleet, and warden system; quantity of 
Class I supplies on hand at the Embassy; and standard map products of the local area with 
annotations identifying critical landmarks. The emergency planning handbook is a 
consolidated source of guidance for Foreign Service posts for planning and dealing with 
certain emergency situations.  In situations where evacuation operations in a hostile 
environment are required, the provisions of Joint Pub 3-18, “Joint Doctrine for Forcible 
Entry Operations,” will apply.  
                                                 
293 United States Military Joint Publication 3-07.5, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 




Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF):  
The Civil Reserve Air Fleet is a United States mobility resource.  Selected aircraft 
from U.S. airlines, contractually committed to Civil Reserve Air Fleet, support United 
States Department of Defense airlift requirements in emergencies when the need for 
airlift exceeds the capability of military aircraft.  The airlines contractually pledge aircraft 
to the various segments of CRAF and are ready for activation when needed.  The CRAF 
includes both passenger and cargo aircrafts serving the function of international long-
range and short-range and national and aero-medical evacuation.  294 
US Military / Coast Guard: 
NEOs usually involve swift insertions of a force, temporary occupation of an 
objective, and a planned withdrawal upon completion of the mission.  Military forces 
could include sealift, airlift or even road evacuation.  The geographic combatant 
commanders are responsible for planning and conducting NEOs to assist the DOS.  Once 
requested, approved, and directed, the combatant commander will order supporting, 
assigned, and/or attached forces to conduct evacuation operations. It is imperative that the 
Ambassador’s evacuation plan and the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) plan for the NEO 
be supportive, coordinated, and fully integrated. Although a single-Service or Service 
department may be tasked to conduct a NEO, a joint task force (JTF) may also be formed 
to conduct a NEO.  When a JTF is formed, the commander, JTF (CJTF) is responsible for 
all phases of the military operation including intermediate staging bases (ISBs) and 
temporary safe havens. The size of the JTF depends on the number of evacuees, 
evacuation sites, assembly areas, and the tactical situation.  During evacuation operations, 
it may be difficult or impossible to insert and establish the support functions for the JTF, 
but medical, dental, joint rescue, mortuary affairs, public affairs, psychological 
operations, civil affairs, special operations, and information operations must be planned, 
coordinated and implemented. 
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Due to its reputation as humanitarian service, the Coast Guard may be called upon 
to play a vital role in certain emergency evacuation situation.  The relatively non-
belligerent nature of Coast Guard makes them a suitable force option in cases where 
military presence may exacerbate a potentially hostile environment. 295 
US Organizations and Foreign Agencies: 
NEOs are usually conducted in an environment where political concerns and 
constraints are key considerations.  The Washington Liaison Group ensures the national-
level coordination of planning and implementation of plans of the DOS and the 
combatant commanders for the protection or evacuation of noncombatants abroad.  The 
Regional Liaison Groups ensure coordination of planning in the field and provide advice 
and guidance in planning and executing NEOs.  The Emergency Action Committee is the 
focal point for DOS and Department of Defense evacuation site interface while briefing, 
coordinating, and planning for the evacuation.  
The US Embassy representatives include the Ambassador, deputy chief of 
mission, security assistance officer, chief of station, Defense Attaché Office, 
administration officer, political officer, commercial and/or economic officer, consular 
officer, regional medical officer, regional security officer, public affairs officer, US 
Marine Corps security guard, Country Team, and other agencies outside the DOS. US 
military commands, private voluntary organizations, non-governmental organizations, 
and international organizations often require and provide assistance, and such assistance 
should be coordinated. 296 
2. OPERATION PROCEDURES 
Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures: 
Once the Secretary of State approves an evacuation, the chief of mission (COM) 
has the authority to implement the plan in a crisis. As early as possible in the planning, 
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the JFC forms the advance party and requests permission to send it to the site of the 
operation. The advance party may consist of two elements: the forward command 
element (FCE) and the evacuation site party. The FCE coordinates with in-country DOS 
personnel and host country authorities and establishes a communication link among the 
CJTF, geographic combatant commander, and DOS. The evacuation site party conducts 
reconnaissance to evaluate, validate, and confirm assembly areas and evacuation sites. 
The CJTF, in conjunction with the Ambassador or his designated representative, 
determines the size and composition of the FCE and evacuation site part. 297  
Evacuee Processing:  
 
The evacuation control center (ECC) supports the DOS, which conducts 
processing, screening, and selected logistic functions associated with emergency 
evacuation of noncombatants. Size and composition of the ECC will be determined by 
the number of evacuees, evacuation environment, and location of the evacuation area. 
The JTF’s primary duty is to assist the COM in protecting and evacuating the evacuees. 
This duty may include providing security and other support in caring for the evacuees as 
requested. Shelter, safety, interpreters, local immigration, embassy, support liaison, and 
medical personnel should be present during processing. The three guiding principles for 
any ECC are accuracy (everyone is accounted for), security, and speed (processing is 
accomplished quickly and efficiently). 298 
Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) / Temporary Safe Haven Operations: 
The use of an Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) during deployment provides the 
JFC many advantages over deploying directly from the home station.  The ISB may be 
located in another country close to where the evacuation is taking place or may be any 
ship under US control. The ISB becomes more important as the distance from the home 
station and the likelihood of hostilities increase. When an ISB is located in a country 
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other than the United States, the DOS is responsible for coordinating with the 
government of that country. Since ISBs are typically airfields or seaports, the geographic 
combatant commander needs to be aware of on-hand information related to facilities and 
sites being considered as likely ISBs. 
A temporary safe haven, designated by the DOS and controlled by the CJTF, is a 
location in an area or country to which evacuees may be moved quickly and easily; 
ideally, the safe haven would be in the United States. On occasion an intermediate safe 
haven may be needed, such as a US Navy ship, yet evacuees should be removed from the 
ship to land-based safe havens as quickly as possible. Coordination for the use of 
facilities, customs requirements, security, transportation, and billeting is required. A 
limited security force can provide necessary internal and perimeter security. 299 
3. MILITARY PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 
Military forces employed in a NEO may be comprised of units from more than 
one Military Department.  Once ordered to support the combatant commander’s decision 
to employ JTF, a CJTF will be designated to exercise overall control of operations (initial 
planning, deployment to an ISB, conduct all military aspects of the evacuation, and 
operations at the safe haven).  The CJTF may also need to consider the possibility of 
employing multinational forces.  The CJTF should consider a flexible force option that 
provides both early response to a developing situation and a capability to quickly expand 
should the operational environment become hostile. 
Operational Environments:  
Evacuation operations are characterized by uncertainty because of sudden 
changes in country’s government, reoriented political or military relationships with the 
US, or a sudden hostile threat to US citizens from a force within or external to a host 
country.  Operational environments can be broadly characterized into three main groups, 
namely: 
                                                 
299 United States Military Joint Publication 3-07.5, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 




• Permissive Environment:  Under this condition, no resistance to 
evacuation operations is expected, and thus the operation would 
require little or no assembly of combat forces in country.  JTF can 
expect host nation concurrence and possible support.  The JTF’s 
primary concerns may be logistic functions involving emergency 
medical treatment, transportation, administrative processing and 
coordination with DOS and other agencies involved in the evacuation.  
Minimum number of security forces should be used during the NEO. 
 
• Uncertain Environment:  An operational environment in which host 
government forces, whether opposed or receptive to the NEO, do not 
have total effective control of the territory and population in the 
intended area or country of operations. Because of the uncertainty, the 
CJTF may elect to reinforce the evacuation force with additional 
security units or a reaction force. The ROE developed are 
disseminated early to ensure that the JTF has had sufficient training 
and is proficient in application of the ROE.  It is possible for a NEO 
conducted in such uncertain environment to be escalated to a hostile 
environment.   
 
• Hostile Environment:  Personnel may be evacuated under conditions 
ranging from civil disorder or terrorists action to full-scale combat.  
The CJTF may elect to deploy a sizeable security element with the 
evacuation force or position a large reaction force, either with the 
evacuation force or at an intermediate staging base (ISB).  In addition 
to normal functions associated with personnel evacuations 
(embarkation, transportation, medical, and services), the JTF may be 
required to conduct a forced entry, establish defensive perimeters, 
escort convoys, participate in personnel recovery operations, and 
perform the screening of evacuees. 300  
 
Intelligence: 
The National Imagery and Mapping Agency provides selected US missions with 
specific maps, charts and other geographical material to support evacuation planning and 
operations.  Both the Atlantic Intelligence Command and Joint Intelligence Center Pacific 
produce NEO intelligence support handbooks (NISH).  NISH are all-source studies that 
directly support joint operational and tactical planning.  They consist of annotated aerial 
imagery and ground photos of embassy grounds, helicopter landing zones, assembly 
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areas, airfields, and seaports, along with encyclopedic data.  Information includes post 
emergency communications listing and country profile.  Weapon and ammunition; and 
force size requirements are based on threat assessment.  Other considerations include 
medical, translator and linguistic requirements. 301  
Logistics: 
The logistic support provided should be limited to the minimum essential support 
required for the evacuation.  Considerations should include: characteristics of evacuation 
area (eg. availability of resources/facilities for support to the JTF such as facilities for 
storage & distribution of supplies, transportation means, airfields, fuel points, medical 
facilities & supplies, food, water and consumables); climate, weather and terrain; number 
of evacuees and their needs; potential threats to the evacuation; strength and composition 
of the JTF; time constraint and duration of operation; availability and suitability of host-
nation support as an alternative to deploying US military logistic support. 302   
Psychological Operations: 
PSYOPS can greatly facilitate NEOs in uncertain or hostile environments.  
PSYOP efforts can facilitate the passage of pertinent information to noncombatant 
evacuees, and PSYOP efforts and assets can execute programs and disseminate products 
that induce an attitude and/or behavior toward the NEO among the local populace.  
Prudent employment of PSYOP can prevent the degeneration of a permissive or uncertain 
environment into a hostile environment. 303 
Rules of Engagement (ROE): 
The rules of engagement for NEOs reflect the limited military objective to be 
accomplished.  NEO ROE limit the use of force to that force which is necessary to 
successfully complete the mission and provide for the self-defense of US military 
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personnel and defense of noncombatant evacuees.  The use of force is normally a 
measure of last resort.  When time and conditions permit, the hostile forces should be 
warned and given the opportunity to withdraw or cease threatening actions.  Employment 
of PSYOP assets and capabilities should be considered toward this end. 304 
4. PAST OPERATIONS 
 
• 1976 - Lebanon  
• 1990 Operation Sharp Edge - Liberia: 
 
Background Information:   
In mid-1990’s, increasing internal unrest threatened U.S. diplomats and civilians 
in Liberia.  Since December 1989, civil war had raged between rival Liberian factions, 
and the safety of American citizens could no longer be guaranteed.  Tension grew as 
rebel leader Prince Johnson said he would begin rounding up foreigners to force foreign 
intervention in his fight against Liberian President Samuel Doe.  Johnson threatened to 
attack U. S. Marines at the embassy if the United States did not intervene on the rebel 
side.  
Despite the efforts of a force of 11,500 sent by the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) in 1990, and numerous subsequent diplomatic initiatives and 
peace conferences, fighting continued, fueled by exploitation of the country's natural 
resources by the faction leaders and shadowy international business associates.  As the 
war spread from the interior toward the Liberian capital of Monrovia amid widespread 
death and destruction, the US responded to the deteriorating situation by dispatching its 
military forces to conduct NEO.  The US decided not to intervene to contain the 
unfolding catastrophe. 
Method of Evacuation / Operational Information:  The US Navy dispatched four warships 
with 2,300 marines to evacuate Americans and other foreigners who were in the country. 
Elements of a Marine Expeditionary Unit embarked in the USS Saipan (LHA-2) 
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amphibious ready group provided support to the US Embassy and stood by to evacuate 
American citizens and others from 2 June to 5 August. They evacuated a total of 2,609 
people between 5 August 1990 and 9 January 1991.  Airlift evacuation was performed 
using CH-46 Sea Knight and CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters. 305  
Other operational units involved:  
• 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit - 2 Jun to 5 Aug 1990 
• 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit - 5 Aug to 9 Sept 1990 
• FAST Company 5th Platoon of the Marine Corps - 9 Sept 1990 to 9 
Jan 1991. 
• 1991 Operation Eastern Exit - Somalia: 
 
Background Information:  
During 1980s the authoritarian regime of President Mahammad Siad Barre 
abandoned the previous government's policy of scientific socialism on Marxist-Leninist 
lines and implemented market-oriented structural reforms of economy, while 
consolidating personal political authority. Broad-based national opposition met escalating 
government repression and provoked armed revolt in 1988. The resulting civil war 
caused the eventual defeat of government forces and exile of Siad Barre in January 1991. 
Following the fall of the Siad Barre regime in January 1991, Somalia fell under an 
interim provisional government established by Executive Committee of United Somali 
Congress (USC) and headed by provisional president Ali Mahdi Mahammad. As of 
September 1991, the country was effectively under control of as many as twelve rival 
clans and sub-clans. The central government authority at Mogadishu challenged by 
Somali National Movement (SNM), which in June 1991 declared independent Republic 
of Somaliland in former territory of British Somaliland.  
On 1 January 1991, the US Ambassador to Somalia requested military assistance 
to evacuate the Embassy. Americans and other foreign nationals had sought shelter in the 
Embassy compound that day as the reign of Somali dictator Siad Barre disintegrated into 
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a confused battle for control of Mogadishu. The next day, Operation EASTERN EXIT 
was initiated.  
Method of Evacuation / Operational Information:   
Responding to the deteriorating situation, Operation Eastern Exit was conducted 
between 2 -11 January 1991, participating units included USS Guam (Amphibious 
Assault Ship, LPH9), USS Trenton (Amphibious Transport Ship, LPD14), 4th Marine 
Expeditionary Bde, Air Force AC-130 (intelligence gathering and fire support, and 9-man 
Navy SEAL team), 2 squadrons of CH-46 Sea Knight medium transport helicopters, 2 
CH53-E Sea Stallion heavy transport helicopters, and ground combat elements (one rifle 
company, 81mm mortar platoon, one military police platoon, landing support and 
medical/dental detachment).  Total of 281 noncombatants evacuated from the US 
Embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia. 306 
 
• 1994 Operation Tiger Rescue - Yemen: 
 
Background Information:   
Operation Tiger Rescue was the evacuation of United States citizens by the 
United States Air Force from Yemen following the outbreak of civil war in May 1994.  
Yemen had only recently been formed by the unification of North Yemen and South 
Yemen in 1990. After unification, North Yemen dominated the new country and the 
southern part of the country attempted to secede.  While the south bore the brunt of the 
fighting, the capital of Sana'a came under missile and air attack.  As fighting intensified, 
the United States State Department requested the immediate evacuation of U.S. citizens, 
both civilian and government employees, from Yemen. 
Method of Evacuation / Operational Information:   
Airlift evacuation using C130s of 41st Airlift Squadron.  E3 AWACS and F15s 
were also used as supporting aircrafts for the NEO. 307 
 
• 1996 Operation Assured Response - Liberia: 
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Background Information:   
In 1996, the US Military assisted in safeguarding and evacuating Americans from 
Liberia when that nation's civil war reignited into factional fighting and general violence 
in Liberia. During the first week of April 1996, as a result of intense street fighting during 
the ongoing civil war in Liberia, about 500 people sought refuge on American Embassy 
grounds and another 20,000 in a nearby American housing area.  On 6 April, the 
president approved the US ambassador's request for security, resupply and evacuation 
support. 
Method of Evacuation / Operational Information: 
Between 9 April and 18 June, a US Joint Task Force Operation Assured Response 
evacuated 2444 people (485 Americans and 1959 civilians representing 68 countries).  
The bulk of forces were from Special Operations Command Europe, and the last elements 
redeployed 3 August.  Liberia was a very small scale operation. It could have turned in to 
a very large operation. Overnight about 180 soldiers came out of Southern European Task 
Force [SETAF] and evacuated almost 2,000 civilians out of Monrovia to safety.  Air 
Force special operations forces led the evacuation effort, Operation Assured Response.  
Three Air Force KC-135 tankers (for refueling) and 2 C-130 transports were deployed to 
deliver critical medical supplies, food, water, fuel and communications gear.  A Flying 
Ambulance Surgical Team was also deployed.  On 9 April, in less than 72 hours after the 
decision to deploy U.S. forces, the first non-combatants were safely evacuated by MH-53 
and MC130 helicopters under the cover of AC-130 gunships using Freetown, Sierra 
Leone and Dakar, Senegal as safe havens.  In early April, after initial NEO, a Joint Task 
Force-Assured Response (JTF-AR) which included Air Force, Navy and Marine forces 
was established.  With additional support from an HC-4 MC-53E helicopter detachment 
and other Navy-Marine Corps aircraft, embassy security and transportation were 
provided and 309 noncombatants were evacuated, including 49 U.S. citizens.  The US 
Navy deployed the USS Ponce (Amphibious Transport Ship, LPD 15) within 10 days 
response time, carrying special-purpose Marine air-ground task force, to the coats of 
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West Africa in support of JTF-AR.  The USMC elements, while supporting NEO in 
Liberia, also conducted similar operations in Bangui, Central African Republic. 308       
   
• 1996 Operation Quick Response - Central African Republic: 
 
Background Information:   
In response to civil unrest and rebellion by rogue military elements in Bangui, 
capital of the Central African Republic, USMC elements of Joint Task Force Assured 
Response, which was responding in Liberia, successfully provided security to the US 
Embassy and evacuated 448 people (including between 190 and 208 Americans). 309 
  
• 1997 Operation Noble Obelisk - Sierra Leone  
• 1998 Operation Safe Departure - Eritrea  
• 1998 Operation Shepard Venture - Guinea-Bissau: 
 
Background Information:   
On 10 June 1998, United States European Command deployed forces to Dakar, 
Senegal as part of contingency planning in response to the deteriorating situation in 
Guinea-Bissau. Joint Task Force (JTF) Shepherd Venture was formed to enhance the 
military's ability to ensure the security of U.S. citizens in the region.  
Method of Evacuation / Operational Information:  
JTF Shepard Venture - 130 personnel, 10 June 1998 to 17 June 1998. 310 
 
7. 2002 Operation Shepard Sentry - Central African Republic: 
 
Background Information:   
In October of 2002, the former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in the Central 
African Republic coordinated and directed rebel attacks in several locations in Bangui, 
CAR. The potential for increased rebel activity and the CAR government’s inability to 
                                                 








ensure the safety of the expatriate community, led the American Embassy Ambassador to 
request U.S. assistance. 
United States European Command under the direction of the Chairman Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and at the request of the Department of State, agreed to send a EUCOM 
Security Assessment Team to Bangui, CAR. On October 30, 2002 the mission changed 
with an execution order for the NEO operation due to continued unrest in the region.  
Method of Evacuation / Operational Information:  
A total of 39 individuals were evacuated to a safe haven without incident, 
completing the NEO. 311 
 
8. 2002 Operation Autum Return - Côte d'Ivoire: 
 
Background Information:   
Cote d'Ivoire, a West African country of 16 million, was once touted as a pillar of 
stability in western Africa. Although the Cote d'Ivoire prospered for 33 years under 
President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, political, economic, and social strains became more 
pronounced under President Henri Konan Bedie, resulting in a coup against him on 24 
December 1999. These strains increased under junta leader, General Robert Guei, 
resulting in his electoral defeat in October 2000. President Laurent Gbagbo inherited this 
volatility along with an economy in decline. On 19 September 2002, Guei led a revolt in 
an attempt to overthrow the government, but Gbagbo survived while Guei was killed in 
the clash.  The political and military crisis led to fighting throughout the country that 
threatened hundreds third-country nationals and a significant number of American 
citizens, most notably students at the International Christian Academy located in Bouake. 
In response to the crisis, the American ambassador to Cote d’Ivoire, requested an 
evacuation of American citizens.  
Method of Evacuation / Operational Information:   
The USMC deployed C-130 Hercules transports, Sikorsky CH-53E Sea Stallion 
and UH-60L Blackhawk helicopters crewed by special forces to evacuate foreign 




nationals from Korhogo.  From 24 September to 4 October 2002, more than 300 
American citizens and others were evacuated. 312 
 
9. 2003 Operation Shining Express - Liberia: 
 
Background Information:   
As violence in Liberia increased in mid June 2003, the UN, together with the US, 
had called on Liberian President Charles Taylor to step down from power.  However, 
tensions continued to escalate in Liberia, military chiefs of the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) pledged on 04 July 2003 to raise 3,000 troops from 
member countries for an intervention force to restore peace in Liberia.  Attributing to 
financial and logistical constraints, the Chairman of ECOWAS requested the US to 
spearhead the peace efforts.  The US responded by sending a 32-man military civil affairs 
assessment team to evaluate conditions for deployment of peacekeepers in Liberia but 
forces loyal to Liberian President Charles Taylor prevented the team from assessing 
security and humanitarian needs.  In early July 2003, the US Ambassador to Liberia 
requested military aid in the event that embassy personnel and American citizens had to 
be evacuated from the country.   
Method of Evacuation / Operational Information:  Operation Shining Express includes 
special operations forces, Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps and Reserve 
components. Operation Shining Express personnel are augmented security forces at the 
US Embassy in Monrovia and supported State Department officials who were conducting 
an orderly departure of US citizens wishing to leave the country. The USS Kearsarge 
(LHD3), then returning to the United States after serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
was directed to join forces in support of Operation Shining Express, to aid in the potential 
evacuation of U.S. citizens from the country of Liberia.  Force composition onboard the 
USS Kearsarge included elements from the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, a 
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company of light armored reconnaissance, a squadron each of medium and heavy marine 
helicopter and detachment of air logistics support. 313 
 
10. 2006 - Lebanon: 
 
Background Information:   
The 2006 Lebanon War, known in Lebanon as the July War, and in Israel as the 
Second Lebanon War was a 34-day military conflict in Lebanon and northern Israel. The 
principal parties were Hezbollah paramilitary forces and the Israeli military. The conflict 
started on 12 July 2006, and continued until a United Nations-brokered ceasefire went 
into effect in the morning on 14 August 2006, though it formally ended on 8 September 
2006 when Israel lifted its naval blockade of Lebanon.  The conflict began when 
Hezbollah militants purposely fired rockets at Israeli border towns as a diversion for an 
anti-tank missile attack on two armored Humvees patrolling the Israeli side of the border 
fence. Of the seven Israeli soldiers in the two jeeps, two were wounded, three were killed, 
and two were kidnapped and taken to Lebanon. Five more were killed in a failed Israeli 
rescue attempt. Israel responded with massive airstrikes and artillery fire on targets in 
Lebanon that damaged Lebanese civilian infrastructure, including Beirut's Rafic Hariri 
International Airport (which Israel alleged that Hezbollah used to import weapons and 
supplies), an air and naval blockade, and a ground invasion of southern Lebanon. 
Hezbollah then launched more rockets into northern Israel and engaged the Israel 
Defense Forces (IDF) in guerilla warfare from hardened positions.  
Method of Evacuation / Operational Information:   
 The US began to evacuate some citizens from Lebanon on Jul 16, 2006 using 
Marine Corps CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopters (from the 24th MEU).  A total of 42 US 
citizens voluntarily departed from the US Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon.  In subsequent 
days, the US Navy continued to employ CH-53E helicopters (up to six) to ferry special 
needs people out of Beirut.  Up till July 19, approximately 300 people per day were 
                                                 





evacuated by air.  On July 17, the Pentagon announced that it had chartered a cruise ship, 
Orient Queen, to evacuate US citizens.  US sailors and Marines from the Iwo Jima 
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) were 
directed to assist in the NEO.  The Iwo Jima Strike Group includes the amphibious ships 
Iwo Jima, USS Nashville (LPD 13) and USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41). USS Trenton 
(LPD 14) and High Speed Vessel Swift (HSV 2) have also joined the strike group.   The 
commander of US Naval Forces Central Command indicated that people were evacuated 
on both US Navy ships (e.g. USS Nashville, carrying capacity up to 1,000 people) and 
chartered cruise ships (e.g. Orient Queen being escorted by USS Gonzalez (DDG 66)).  
About 7,000 Americans were to be evacuated July 19-20.  There are estimated 25,000 
Americans living in Lebanon.  The US Navy employed Landing Craft Utility (LCU) for 
transporting evacuees from the Lebanon shore to the US Navy ships in the Eastern 
Mediterranean Sea.  Each LCU can carry an estimated 300 personnel.  On board the 
LCUs were also Marines which had been tasked to assist secure and orderly departure.  
The evacuees were then transported to safe havens in Turkey and Cyprus. On July 23, the 
total number of Americans evacuated from Lebanon reached 10,000. A total of 3,994 
American citizens left Lebanon on the 22nd. Navy and contract ships lifted 1,815 from 
the embattled country on the 23rd. The USS Whidbey Island transported 792, and the 
contract carriers Orient Queen and Rahmah took 983 and 933 Americans, respectively, to 
Cyprus.  The NEO, which began in mid Jul till early Sept 2006, evacuated a total of 
approximately 15,000 American citizens out of Lebanon. 314 
5. REGION OF OPERATION (FOR APPLICABLE SCENARIO)  
Latin America is a region of the Americas where Roman Languages (i.e. those 
derived from Latin) – particularly Spanish and Portuguese – are primarily spoken.  Latin 
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Table 143: Latin America Country Groups 
Based on recent US military operations, West/Central Africa and the Middle East 
have been identified as NEO hot spots. 315   
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F. COUNTRY STUDIES 
The following appendix discusses countries and various threats to regional 
stability and a Phase Zero force that existed at the time that this study was conducted. 
1. ANTIGUA 
Antigua and Barbuda are a pair of islands located in the Caribbean between the 
Caribbean Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean.  It is South and East of Puerto Rico.  At 2.5 
times the size of Washington DC, they are one of the most prosperous nations, thanks to 
its tourism industry and offshore financial services.  It benefits a great deal from tourism, 
marketing itself as a paradise in the Caribbean. Barbuda is less developed compared to 
Antigua.  As such Barbuda is home to smaller and more exclusive resorts. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
As with most islands in the Caribbean, Antigua and Barbuda are susceptible to 
tropical storms and hurricanes.  Its most challenging environmental issue is managing the 
water resources on the islands, because of the scarcely limited fresh water sources.  Rapid 
and almost complete deforestation also causes rainfall to run off, and thus further limit 
the water resources on the islands.  Desalination has offered an alternative to the type of 
fresh water resources available.  The islands are marketed as an offshore financial hub 
and are a popular place where money laundering activities occur.  These activities are 
troubling because such monies may be the source of funding for threat organizations 
elsewhere. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
Drug trafficking remains a major problem which troubles the government.  Its 
nominal defense force, as well as law enforcement agencies, allows these illegal activities 
to proliferate at its shores.  The mode of operation of the drug traffickers leverages on the 
extensive shorelines of the two islands, which are impossible to patrol and guard tightly.  




There are no particular threat organizations which base their operations in the 
touristy islands of Antigua and Barbuda.  Mostly, those organizations use the two islands 
as an alternative transit point for their illegal activities. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
The twin islands are typically plagued by tropical storms and hurricanes in the 
months of July to October.  Periodic droughts affect their livelihoods, which are primarily 
agriculture based.  Bad weather also severely hampers the tourist sector, which is a major 
source of income for the country.  It is more well known as an offshore financial center, 
and hosts internet gambling portals which are not considered illegal in the country. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
Under the current leadership of the Spencer government, corruption scandals 
came to a stop.  Spencer took over office in March, 2004, after a landslide victory over 
the incumbent Lester Bird government, which was allegedly involved in a series of 
corruption scandals.  In March, 2009, Baldwin Spencer again led his United Progressive 
Party to victory, albeit with a smaller majority victory as compared to that in 2004.  His 
continued leadership will lend stability to the country, with the economy being his utmost 
priority. Since taking office, he has been successful in reducing the public debt to GDP 
ratio from 120% in 2004 to about 90% in 2009.  Given this situation, Antigua is currently 
a reasonably stable nation. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
With the focus on economic and fiscal reforms, it is likely that the bulk of the 
efforts of the government will be focused on the economy and tourism, at the same time 
maintaining status quo with regards to its policy on illegal activities taking place in the 
country.  As such, the threats facing Antigua and Barbuda are likely to continue, but are 
unlikely to escalate further. 
2. ARGENTINA 
In 1816, the United Provinces of the Rio Plata declared their independence from 
Spain. After Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay went their separate ways, the area that 
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remained became Argentina. The country's population and culture were heavily shaped 
by immigrants from throughout Europe, but most particularly Italy and Spain, which 
provided the largest percentage of newcomers from 1860 to 1930. Up until about the 
mid-20th century, much of Argentina's history was dominated by periods of internal 
political conflict between Federalists and Unitarians and between civilian and military 
factions.  After World War II, an era of Peronist populism and direct and indirect military 
interference in subsequent governments was followed by a military junta that took power 
in 1976. Democracy returned in 1983 after a failed bid to seize the Falkland (Malvinas) 
Islands by force, and has persisted despite numerous challenges, the most formidable of 
which was a severe economic crisis in 2001-2002 that led to violent public protests and 
the resignation of several interim presidents. 
Argentina benefits from rich natural resources, a highly literate population, an 
export-oriented agricultural sector, and a diversified industrial base. Although it was one 
of the world's wealthiest countries 100 years ago, Argentina suffered during most of the 
20th century from recurring economic crises, persistent fiscal and current account 
deficits, high inflation, mounting external debt, and capital flight.  A severe depression, 
growing public and external indebtedness and a bank run culminated in 2001 in the most 
serious economic, social, and political crisis in the country's turbulent history.  Then 
interim President Adolfo Rodriguez declared a default, the largest in history, on the 
government's foreign debt in December of that year, and abruptly resigned only a few 
days after taking office.  His successor, Eduardo Duhalde, announced an end to the peso's 
decade-long 1-to-1 peg to the US dollar in early 2002. The economy bottomed out that 
year, with real GDP 18% smaller than in 1998 and almost 60% of Argentines under the 
poverty line. Real GDP rebounded to grow by an average 9% annually over the 
subsequent five years, taking advantage of previously idled industrial capacity and labor, 
an audacious debt restructuring and reduced debt burden, excellent international financial 
conditions, and expansionary monetary and fiscal policies.  Inflation also increased, 
however, during the administration of President Nestor Kirchner, which responded with 
price restraints on businesses, as well as export taxes and restraints, and beginning in 
early 2007, with understating inflation data. Cristina Fernandez De Kirchner succeeded 
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her husband as President in late 2007, but was stymied by protesting farmers in her 
efforts to hike export taxes still further.  Her government nationalized private pension 
funds in late 2008, which bolstered government coffers, but failed to assuage investors' 
concerns about the direction of economic policy. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
Threats specific to Argentina are international disputes, terrorism, human rights, 
illicit drugs and trafficking in persons. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
In South America, the tri-border confluence of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay 
boasts a large melting pot of Middle Eastern ethnicity.  Moreover, Hamas, Hezbollah and 
al-Qaeda extremists are all represented in the region, and Hezbollah has already left its 
murderous mark on South American soil.  In 1992, they bombed the Israeli Embassy in 
Buenos Aires, killing 29 persons.  In 1994, they struck again, killing 95 people at the 
Argentine Jewish Cultural Center.  As a result, and due to extremists present in the tri-
border region, Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency has a large contingent in Argentina. 
Threat Organizations: 
It is clear that Hezbollah, Hamas and al-Qaeda have similar, even mutual, agendas 
regardless of their own identities and mindset.  Consequently, they are a unified ideology 
of hatred and murder in the global terrorism arena.  More specifically, terrorist acts are 
their stratagem and modus operandi by virtue of their extremist mindsets. 
The terrorist has many faces, with each led by their respective organization’s 
mission or jihad.  Some elements operate as overtly political, and others are the muscle or 
brawn on the ground.  Their agendas, ego and influence may often collide, but the 
networks and cells can and do cooperate, with Shi’a and Sunni joining together to 
accomplish common goals. 
In Latin America the terrorism threat has to be assessed from the standpoint of a 
training and launching or deployment base of operations.  Additionally, sinister acts are 
fueled by drug revenue, weapons, intricate knowledge of county-border distinctions and 




Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
Argentina continues to assert its claims to the UK-administered Falkland Islands 
(Islas Malvinas), South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands in its constitution, 
forcibly occupying the Falklands in 1982.  In 1995, Argentina agreed no longer to seek 
settlement by force.  Territorial claim in Antarctica partially overlaps UK and Chilean 
claims.  The unruly region at the convergence of the Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay borders 
is a locus of money laundering, smuggling, arms and illegal narcotics trafficking as well 
as fundraising for extremist organizations.   
An uncontested dispute between Brazil and Uruguay over Braziliera/Brasiliera 
Island in the Quarai/Cuareim River leaves the tripoint with Argentina in question.  In 
2006, Argentina went to the ICJ to protest, on environmental grounds, the construction of 
two pulp mills in Uruguay on the Uruguay River, which forms the boundary.  Both 
parties presented their pleadings in 2007 with Argentina's reply in January and Uruguay's 
rejoinder in July 2008.  The joint boundary commission, established by Chile and 
Argentina in 2001, has yet to map and demarcate the delimited boundary in the 
inhospitable Andean Southern Ice Field. 
• Current Threat Environment 
Argentina is a transshipment country for cocaine headed for Europe, heroin 
headed for the US, and ephedrine and pseudoephedrine headed for Mexico.  Some 
money-laundering activity exists, especially in the Tri-Border Area.  There is a great deal 
of law enforcement corruption.  Argentina is also a source for precursor chemicals, and 
there is an increasing domestic consumption of drugs in urban centers, especially cocaine 
based and synthetic drugs. 
Argentina is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and 
children trafficked for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation and forced labor.  
Most victims are trafficked within the country, from rural to urban areas.  Child sex 
tourism is a problem; foreign women and children, primarily from Paraguay, Brazil, and 
the Dominican Republic, are trafficked to Argentina for commercial sexual exploitation.  
Argentine women and girls are also trafficked to neighboring countries, Mexico, and 
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Western Europe for sexual exploitation.  A significant number of Bolivians, Peruvians, 
and Paraguayans are trafficked into the country for forced labor in sweatshops, 
agriculture, and as domestic servants. 
Despite some progress, Argentina remains on the CIAs Tier 2 Watch List for the 
third consecutive year for its failure to show evidence of increasing efforts to combat 
human trafficking.  In particular, no progress has been made in terms of providing 
adequate assistance to victims and curbing official complicity with trafficking activity, 
especially on the provincial and local levels.  The Argentine Congress has demonstrated 
progress by enacting much-needed and first-ever federal anti-trafficking legislation. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
Argentina has drawn increasingly close to Venezuela's anti-American dictator 
Hugo Chavez.  Nearly $800,000 in Venezuelan money was smuggled into Argentina, 
likely for an illegal campaign contribution to Cristina Kirchner's successful presidential 
bid.  Argentina's new president, Cristina Kirchner, has voiced a new claim to the Falkland 
Islands, stirring up a dormant territorial dispute that led to war in the 1980's with US ally 
Great Britain. 
3. ARUBA 
Aruba is an island in the Caribbean Sea, north of Venezuela.  The land mass is 
slightly larger than Washington DC.  The terrain is mostly flat with a few hills and scant 
vegetation.  The geography of the region is flat, river-less island renowned for its white 
sand beaches.  Its tropical climate is moderated by constant trade winds from the Atlantic 
Ocean, and the temperature is almost constant at about 27 degrees Celsius (81 degrees 
Fahrenheit).  The location lies outside the Caribbean hurricane belt, so is rarely 
threatened by hurricanes.  The population is about 103,065 people.  The commonly 
spoken languages are Papiamento, Spanish, English and Dutch.  Aruba is a member 
country of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.  Tourism, gold mining and oil refining are 
the key industries of the small, open Aruban economy.  
Aruba has no regular military forces.  The Netherlands maintains a detachment of 
marines, a frigate, and an amphibious combat detachment in the neighboring Netherlands 
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Antilles (2009).  Military defense is the responsibility of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.  
Aruba is a transit point for US and Europe-bound narcotics, with some accompanying 
money laundering activities.  There is a relatively high percentage of population who 
consumes cocaine. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
There is no significant threat presence in Aruba, except that it infrequently may be 
used as a transit point for drug smuggling activities as well as money laundering 
activities. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
There is no significant presence of physical threat. 
Threat Organizations: 
The only threat for a Phase Zero force to consider is the possibility of transient 
members of narcotics trafficking organizations, but it is not reported to be prevalent in 
the region, compared to other Central and South American neighbors. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
There is no significant historical threat observed.  Aruba is member country of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, achieved full autonomy in internal affairs obtained in 1986 
upon separation from the Netherlands Antilles.  The Dutch Government is responsible for 
defense and foreign affairs. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
There is no significant threat presence in Aruba currently, except for sporadic use 
as a transit point for drug smuggling activities and money laundering. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
There is no significant anticipated threat. 
4. BAHAMAS 
The Bahamas, officially the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, is an independent, 
sovereign, English-speaking country consisting of two thousand cays and seven hundred 
islands that form an archipelago. It is located in the Atlantic Ocean southeast of the 
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United States; northeast to east of Cuba, Hispaniola (Dominican Republic & Haiti) and 
north to east of the Caribbean Sea; and west to northwest of the Turks and Caicos Islands. 
Its size is almost 14,000 km² with an estimated population of 330,000. Its capital is 
Nassau. It remains a Commonwealth realm. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
Threats specific to the Bahamas are:  piracy, crime, lack of law enforcement, 
cocaine smuggling route, bulk cash, arms smuggling and drug trafficking.  The Bahamas 
are also culpable in the enablement of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing.  
They are one of the top five offenders for the issuance of “flags of convenience”, used by 
opportunistic poachers to disregard the Rule of the Sea. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
Red Forces in Colombia possess numerous and reasonably modern small arms in 
order to control the human, drug and arms trade.  The Bahamas are regularly threatened 
by storm and hurricane activity. 
Threat Organizations: 
In the Bahamas there is currently little to no organized threat facing Americans 
from domestic (Bahamian) terrorism, war or civil unrest. While the threat from 
transnational terrorism is high due to the country’s porous borders, there do not appear to 
be any terrorist groups currently active in the Bahamas. Also, terrorist groups native to 
the western hemisphere do not typically operate in the Northeastern region of the 
Caribbean. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
For decades, the country has been contending with the illicit transit of drugs and 
significant illegal immigration. These two illicit activities have created a platform for the 
other illegal activity, particularly the illegal trafficking in small arms. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
The urbanization situation was exacerbated by the large influx of illegal 
immigrants, mostly from Haiti and Jamaica, and compounded by drug trafficking, which 
introduced the element of violent crime. 
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With the closest island only 45 miles from the coast of Florida, The Bahamas 
often is used as a gateway for drugs and illegal aliens bound for the United States. The 
United States and The Bahamas cooperate closely to address these threats. U.S. 
assistance and resources have been essential to Bahamian efforts to mitigate the persistent 
flow of illegal narcotics and migrants through the archipelago. The United States and the 
Bahamas also actively cooperate on law enforcement, civil aviation, marine research, 
meteorology, and agricultural issues. The U.S. Navy operates an underwater acoustic 
research facility on Andros Island. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
The Caribbean route in transporting cocaine into US will still be used with the 
Bahamas being the transit point and Florida providing the key point of entry. The illicit 
transit of drugs and illegal immigration are assessed to stay. These two illicit activities 
will also continue to create a platform for trafficking in small arms. 
5. BARBADOS 
Located in the North Atlantic Ocean, northeast of Venezuela, Barbados gained 
independence from the British in 1966, following political and social reforms in the 
1940s and 1950s.  It is heavily dependent on tourism and manufacturing as its main 
source of income, although the sugar industry also contributes to a significant amount of 
the economic wealth.  Its population of 285,000 people is one of the highest in the region 
(second only to the Bahamas) with offshore financial and information services being 
important foreign exchange earners.  This is mainly attributed to political, economic and 
social stability in the past 10 years.  Its workforce is also relatively well educated. 
However, its population also has a very high HIV/AIDS infection rates, over 1%. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
Barbados is subjected to infrequent hurricanes and periodic landslides.  
Environmental threats include the pollution of the coastal waters from waste disposal by 
ships, soil erosion and illegal solid wastes disposal which contaminates the water sources 
in the country. Barbados is also one of the top five offenders for allowing poachers to fly 
flags of convenience and engage in IUU fishing. 
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Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
Barbados is used as one of many transshipment points for narcotics bound for 
Europe and the US, even though the main operations of these threat groups are not 
reportedly based in Barbados. 
Threat Organizations: 
Currently, Barbados is not known to be used as a headquarters by any terrorist 
organizations.  Narcotic traffickers use Barbados as a transit point rather than a center to 
conduct their operations. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
Barbados is blessed geographically in that it seldom gets the main brunt of 
hurricanes which occur in the region.  The last hurricane was in 1955.  Other threats are 
minor in comparison with other countries in the Caribbean, but its use as a transshipment 
of cocaine and other drugs remains a problem. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
Barbados is relatively stable as a country, and does not have major problems in 
terms of crime or human trafficking.  It is active in keeping crime rates low as well as 
drug trafficking to a minimum although its vast coastlines (being an island state) make it 
challenging to do so. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
It is unlikely that the threats occurring in Barbados will escalate by 2020.  Good 
governing and affluence will continue to engage the population in productive activities, 
preventing the establishment of street gangs and wayward activities such as drugs and 
smuggling. 
6. BELIZE 
Different cultures are found elsewhere in Belize; Spanish-speaking Mestizos, who 
are of mixed Maya Indian and European ancestry, Creoles, who speak a Creole dialect of 
English and who are often of African and African-European extraction, and Garifuna, 
who are the descendants of Carib Indians and Africans.  Nonetheless, the ethnic make-up 
390 
 
is changing, boosted by an amnesty for many immigrants from neighboring Guatemala, 
Honduras and Nicaragua.  Belize, formerly known as British Honduras, was the UK's last 
colony on the American mainland. 
Belize was the site of several Mayan city states until their decline at the end of the 
first millennium A.D. The British and Spanish disputed the region in the 17th and 18th 
centuries.  It formally became the colony of British Honduras in 1854. Territorial 
disputes between the UK and Guatemala delayed the independence of Belize until 1981. 
Guatemala refused to recognize the new nation until 1992. Tourism has become the 
mainstay of the economy.  Current concerns include an unsustainable foreign debt, high 
unemployment, growing involvement in the South American drug trade, growing urban 
crime and increasing incidences of HIV/AIDS.   
In this small, essentially private-enterprise economy, tourism is the number one 
foreign exchange earner followed by exports of marine products, citrus, cane sugar, 
bananas, and garments. The government's expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, 
initiated in September 1998, led to sturdy GDP growth averaging nearly 4% in 1999-
2007, though growth slipped below 3% in 2008 as a result of the global slowdown.  Oil 
discoveries in 2006 bolstered the economic growth.  Exploration efforts continue, though 
no new production is expected in 2009.  Major concerns continue to be the sizable trade 
deficit and unsustainable foreign debt equivalent to nearly 90% of GDP.  In February 
2007, the government restructured nearly all of its public external commercial debt, 
which will reduce interest payments and relieve liquidity concerns.  A key short-term 
objective remains the reduction of poverty with the help of international donors. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
Threats specific to Belize are international disputes with Guatemala, illicit drugs 
and natural disasters. Belize is also listed by the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) 
as one of the top offenders for Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing.  Belize 
has been engaged in the practice of issuing “flags of convenience”, in which a rouge 
fishing vessel purchases a short-term license to run up a Belize flag and fish near-range 
international waters, with disregard to the Rule of the Seas.  This is the primary enabler 
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of IUU fishing, and the government of Belize profits from large volumes of these 
licenses, for which poachers pay hundreds to thousands of dollars per fishing run. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
On 24 April, 2000, elements of the GAF penetrated deep into Belizean territory 
and, in a carefully planned operation, kidnapped four members of Belize's security forces 
and then purported to submit them to trial in Guatemalan courts for illegal entry.  On 17 
and 18 May, 2000, some 25 members of the Guatemalan Armed Forces illegally entered 
Belizean territory and approached two Belizean villages.  Near the village of San 
Vicente, personnel of the Belize Ministry of Works were accosted by the Guatemalan 
soldiers and threatened with detention if they did not stop working on the road.  The 
soldiers told them that Guatemalan territory extended as far east as the village of Pueblo 
Viejo, deep into Belizean territory, and that this would be reflected on the new 
Guatemalan maps. 
Threat Organizations: 
Other than Guatemalan Armed Forces, there are no known large scale threat 
organizations or terrorist sponsored groups operating inside of Belize. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
In the past, Guatemalan dictatorships used the Belize issue to divert public 
opinion from internal problems. Since the transition to democracy began, this tendency 
has been on the decline.   
• Current Threat Environment 
The Organization of America States (OAS)-initiated Agreement on the 
Framework for Negotiations and Confidence Building Measures saw cooperation in 
repatriation of Guatemalan squatters and other areas, but Guatemalan land and maritime 
claims in Belize and the Caribbean Sea remain unresolved.  The Line of Adjacency 
created under the 2002 referendum serves in lieu of the contiguous international 
boundary to control squatting in the sparsely inhabited rain forests of Belize's border 
region.  Honduras claims Belizean-administered Sapodilla Cays in its constitution but 
agreed to a joint ecological park under the referendum. 
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Belize is one of many transshipment points for cocaine.  There is some small-
scale illicit production of cannabis, primarily for local consumption.  Belize is also used 
as an offshore sector money-laundering activity, related to narcotics trafficking and other 
crimes. 
• Anticipated Future Threats 
Future threats continue to be territorial disputes with Guatemala. Nonetheless, 
although Belize rightfully recognizes no merit whatsoever in Guatemala's territorial 
claims, it is Belize’s position that as a mark of good will, to live in peace and harmony 
with its neighbor, that it is willing to engage in negotiations that will help Guatemala to 
finally renounce its claim and engage with Belize and the region in co-operative action 
for development. 
7. BOLIVIA 
Bolivia is located in central South America, southwest of Brazil. The land mass is 
slightly less than three times the size of Montana. The terrain consists of rugged Andes 
Mountains with a highland plateau (Altiplano), hills and lowland plains of the Amazon 
Basin. The weather patterns vary with altitude; it is humid and tropical to cold and 
experiences low annual rainfall. The northeast area is subjected to flooding in the months 
of March and April. The clearing of land for agricultural purposes and the international 
demand for tropical timber are contributing to deforestation. Other environmental issues 
include soil erosion from overgrazing and poor cultivation methods, desertification, the 
loss of biodiversity and industrial pollution of water supplies used for drinking.  The 
population is estimated to be about 9 million people.  The major infectious diseases are 
food and waterborne related diseases.  95% of the population is Roman Catholic.  The 
three official languages are Spanish, Quechua and Aymara.  The large number of 
different cultures within Bolivia has contributed greatly to a wide diversity in fields such 
as art, cuisine, literature and music.  
Bolivia is one of the poorest and least developed countries in Latin America.  Key 
industries are mining, smelting, petroleum, tobacco, food and beverages. Bolivia is the 
world's third-largest cultivator of coca (after Colombia and Peru),  the third largest 
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producer of cocaine, estimated at 120 metric tons potential pure cocaine in 2007, and is 
the transit country for Peruvian and Colombian cocaine destined for Brazil, Argentina, 
Chile, Paraguay, and Europe. Poverty, unemployment, drug trafficking and money 
laundering are some of the challenges faced today.  In addition, the decline in commodity 
prices in late 2008, the lack of foreign investment in the mining and hydrocarbon sectors, 
and the suspension of trade benefits with the United States will pose challenges for the 
Bolivian economy in 2009. 
Bolivian armed forces consist of the Bolivian Army, Navy and Air Force. There 
are 16 paved runways, 1045 unpaved runways and one inland port Puerto Aguirre on the 
Paraguay/Parana waterway.  Bolivia enjoys free port privileges at maritime ports in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Paraguay. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
 The key threats in Bolivia are political stability, poverty, environmental issues, 
drug trafficking, money laundering, economic and racial tensions. Bolivia’s government 
faces difficult problems of deep-seated poverty, social unrest, and illegal drug production.  
Racial and economic tensions remain between the Amerindian populations of the Andean 
west and the non-indigenous communities of the eastern lowlands. Bolivia's government 
is heavily dependent on foreign assistance to finance development projects. The weak 
border controls have led to the existing money-laundering activity related to the narcotics 
trade. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
Physical threats relate primarily to the drug traffickers and violence arising from 
racial tension.  Poverty drives the Bolivian drug runners to take high risks to smuggle the 
drugs to neighboring countries. 
Threat Organizations: 
Threat organizations within Bolivia are primarily the drug cartels and their 
associates who assist with money laundering. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
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Since democratic civilian rule was established in 1982 in Bolivia, leaders have 
faced difficult problems of deep-seated poverty, social unrest, and illegal drug 
production. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
The current economic condition in Bolivia has gained much growth and stability.  
However, poverty in some areas, racial tension and drug trafficking remain a significant 
concern.  Cocaine trafficking has risen sharply in recent years.  Weak border controls still 
exist and are not effective in combating drug trafficking and money laundering activities. 
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• Anticipated Future Threats 
There have recently been anti-narcotics efforts by the Bolivian government to step 
up in eradication and alternative crop programs, seeking international help and 
cooperation. However, drug traffickers constantly change their routes and strategies. 
They have also diversified their risks by shipping smaller quantities of drugs with more 
people.  It has become more of a social problem to deal with in terms of reducing 
consumption and improving poverty conditions. 
8. BRAZIL 
Brazil, officially the Federative Republic of Brazil, is a country in South America. 
It is the fifth largest country by geographical area, occupying nearly half of South 
America, the fifth most populous country, and the fourth most populous democracy in the 
world. Bounded by the Atlantic Ocean on the east, Brazil has a coastline of over 7,491 
kilometers (4,655 mi). It is bordered on the north by Venezuela, Suriname, Guyana and 
the overseas department of French Guiana; on the northwest by Colombia; on the west by 
Bolivia and Peru; on the southwest by Argentina and Paraguay and on the south by 
Uruguay. Numerous archipelagos are part of the Brazilian territory, such as Fernando de 
Noronha, Rocas Atoll, Saint Peter and Paul Rocks, and Trinidad and Martim Vaz.  
Brazil was a colony of Portugal from the landing of Pedro Álvares Cabral in 1500 
until its independence in 1822. Initially independent as the Brazilian Empire, the country 




has been a republic since 1889, although the bicameral legislature, now called the 
Congress, dates back to 1824, when the first constitution was ratified. Its current 
Constitution defines Brazil as a Federal Republic. The Federation is formed by the union 
of the Federal District, the 26 States, and 5,564 Municipalities. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
Threats specific to Brazils are:  piracy, crime, lack of law enforcement, cocaine 
smuggling route, bulk cash, arms smuggling and drug trafficking. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
Physical threats relate primarily to the capabilities of the smugglers and drug-
runners that take advantage of Brazil for trafficking.  They possess numerous and 
reasonably modern small arms.  In order to control the drug trade, drug-runners began to 
use heavy weaponry such as large-caliber arms.  These were stolen from the army or 
brought in from Europe, particularly from the former Soviet Union, whose ex-bureaucrats 
were selling even anti-aircraft weapons at affordable prices. 
Threat Organizations: 
The Comando Vermelho was formed in 1979, when Brazil was still ruled by a 
military dictatorship. The organization gained control of the cocaine traffic in Rio de 
Janeiro and it grew rapidly as they expanded to include the European market. The 
organization had 6,500 armed men working directly in its operations and close to 300,000 
individuals working indirectly. Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) is an anti-
establishment Brazilian prison gang and criminal organization founded in 1993 by 
inmates of Taubaté prison in São Paulo. Since its inception, PCC has been responsible for 
several criminal activities such as prison breaks, prison riots, drug trafficking, highway 
robbery and terrorist activities.  The PCC is a splinter group of the Comando Vermelho, 
operating primarily in the city of São Paulo and in the coastal region of the state. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats 
Carjacking has been common, particularly in major cities. Local citizens and 
visitors alike are often targeted by criminals, especially during public festivals such as the 
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Carnaval.  More than 500,000 people have been killed by firearms in Brazil between 
1979 and 2003, according to a new report by the United Nations.  
Gang-related violence is also common throughout the Capital Brasilia. Most 
incidents have been directed at police, security officials and related facilities, but gangs 
have also attacked official buildings, set alight public buses and robbed several banks. An 
outbreak of violence began on the night of 12 May, 2006 in São Paulo, Brazil. It was the 
worst outbreak of violence which has been recorded in Brazilian history and was directed 
against security forces and some civilian targets. By May 14 the attacks had spread to 
other Brazilian states including Paraná, Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais and Bahia. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
Brazil has serious problems with crime, especially in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, 
Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Salvador, Porto Alegre and Recife with very high homicides 
rates in the country. With roughly 23.8 homicides per 100,000 residents, muggings, 
robberies, kidnappings and gang violence are common. Police brutality and corruption 
are widespread.  
Organized crime is well established in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, largely due 
to the major criminal organizations like Comando Vermelho, Amigos dos Amigos and 
Primeiro Comando da Capital. In 2006, 46,660 people were murdered in Brazil, a 
reduction when compared to 2005, during which 47,578 people were killed. The year of 
2003 still holds the record for total number of murders in Brazil; that year alone 51,043 
people were murdered.  
Computer hacking and internet fraud have a strong presence in Brazil, with eight 
out of every ten of the world's hackers from Brazil. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
Express kidnappings, where individuals are abducted and forced to withdraw 
funds from ATM machines to secure their release, are common in major cities including 
Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Brasilia,Curitiba, Porto Alegre, Salvador and Recife.  Petty 
crimes like pick-pocketing and bag snatching are common. Thieves operate in outdoor 
markets, in hotels and on public transport. The majority of kidnappings in Brasilia 
continue to be the “quick-nappings.  
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Cases of piracy occur in some coastal areas of Brazil. Brazil has a long coast line 
with hundreds of bays and rivers. Most of these are believed to be without pirates. The 
more dangerous activities seem to be centered around the Amazon river mouth and the 
regions of Santos and Forteleza. 
9. BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS 
The British Virgin Islands (BVI) consists of the main islands Tortola, Virgin 
Gorda, Anegada and Jost Van Dyke, along with over 50 smaller islands and enclaves.  
Tortola is by far the largest of all the islands and is home to more that 75% of the 
population.  Only 16 of its islands are inhabited.  The territories were awarded autonomy 
in 1967 by the British, but territorial rights remain under that of the U.K.  Its tiny 
population of only 25, 000 relies heavily on tourism to support the economy, with 45% of 
its GDP coming from tourism alone.  It is a major offshore financial hub of the Caribbean 
which also leads to a host of money laundering activities happening in the territories. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
Drug trafficking and money laundering, whose purpose may be to support threat 
organizations elsewhere, are the most prevalent threats.  Human illegal migration from 
the BVI to the US is common as citizens of the BVI enjoy British passport privileges 
under the 2002 British Territories Act.  This migration problem has since been mitigated 
by tighter immigration regulations. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
The BVI is susceptible to natural hazards such as hurricanes and tropical storms.  
Money laundering takes place within the finance industry and is difficult to track in the 
country.  Drug trafficking through its shorelines does occur, but not rampantly.  
Therefore, the impact on Phase Zero operations may not be as great as the threats from 
other Caribbean Islands. 
Threat Organizations: 
The BVI does not harbor any specific terrorist or drug trafficking groups.  Rather, 
these groups may infrequently use the BVI as a transshipment point for their members as 
well as goods to other parts of the U.K, Europe and the US. 
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Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
Historically, the main threat that the BVI faces is from nature.  Natural disasters 
threaten the livelihoods of more than half the of the population and can cripple the 
economy overnight.  Other threats such as narcotics transshipment have been kept to 
minimum, even though it still occurs due to its favored location and political status as a 
British territory. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
Political and social stability and economic prosperity have ensured that its citizens 
are kept happy and occupied.  As such, the BVI does not create a significant threat 
environment to our Phase Zero Operations. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
It is predicted that the political stability will continue in time to come, and the 
economy should recover from its current downturn which is linked to the European as 
well as US economies. The threat scenarios are unlikely to escalate in the near future as 
long as the good governance of the country continues. 
 
10. CHILE 
Prior to the coming of the Spanish in the 16th century, northern Chile was under 
Inca rule while the indigenous Mapuche inhabited central and southern Chile.  Although 
Chile declared its independence in 1810, decisive victory over the Spanish was not 
achieved until 1818.  In the War of the Pacific (1879-83), Chile defeated Peru and 
Bolivia and won its present northern regions.  It was not until the 1880s that the Mapuche 
Indians were completely subjugated.  After a series of elected governments, the three-
year-old Marxist government of Salvador Allende was overthrown in 1973 by a military 
coup led by Augusto Pinochet, who ruled until a freely elected president was installed in 
1990.  Sound economic policies, maintained consistently since the 1980s, have 
contributed to steady growth, have reduced poverty rates by over half and have helped 
secure the country's commitment to democratic and representative government.  Chile 
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has increasingly assumed regional and international leadership roles befitting its status as 
a stable, democratic nation. 
Chile has a market-oriented economy characterized by a high level of foreign 
trade and a reputation for strong financial institutions and sound policy that have given it 
the strongest sovereign bond rating in South America.  Exports account for 40% of GDP, 
with commodities making up some three-quarters of total exports.  Copper alone provides 
one-third of government revenue.  During the early 1990s, Chile's reputation as a role 
model for economic reform was strengthened when the democratic government of 
Patricio Aylwin, which took over from the military in 1990, deepened the economic 
reform initiated by the military government.  Growth in real GDP averaged 8% between 
1991 and 1997, but fell to half that level in 1998 because of tight monetary policies 
implemented to keep the current account deficit in check and because of lower export 
earnings.  The latter was a result of the global financial crisis.  A severe drought 
exacerbated the situation in 1999, reducing crop yields and causing hydroelectric 
shortfalls and electricity rationing, and Chile experienced negative economic growth for 
the first time in more than 15 years.  In the years since then, growth has averaged 4% per 
year.  Chile deepened its longstanding commitment to trade liberalization with the 
signing of a free trade agreement with the US, which took effect on 1 January 2004.  
Chile claims to have more bilateral or regional trade agreements than any other country.  
It has 57 such agreements with the European Union, Mercosur, China, India, South 
Korea, and Mexico, although not all of them are full free trade agreements.  Over the past 
five years, foreign direct investment inflows have quadrupled to some $17 billion in 
2008.  The Chilean government conducts a rule-based countercyclical fiscal policy, 
accumulating surpluses in sovereign wealth funds during periods of high copper prices 
and economic growth, and allowing deficit spending only during periods of low copper 
prices and growth.  As of September 2008, those sovereign wealth funds, which are kept 
mostly outside the country and separate from Central Bank reserves, amounted to more 
than $20 billion. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
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Threats specific to and most prevalent in Chile are international disputes and 
illicit drugs.  Chile is also vulnerable to environmental issues such as drought and water 
and power resource crises. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
Physical threats in Chile are associated with the small arms and other capabilities 
of the drug smugglers who traffic drugs through Chile.  From a threat standpoint, Chile 
has a fairly stable government and economy, with limited physical threats to a Phase 0 
force. 
Threat Organizations: 
Although small organizations have operated within Chile in the past, research did 
not uncover any major terror or crime groups currently affiliated with major backers of 
organized crime or terror. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
Previously, several independant terrorist groups have acted sporadically within 
Chile.  These are the pro-Cuban Movement of the Revolutionary Left, the United Popular 
Action Movement, the Lautaro Youth Movement, the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front, 
and Maoist-oriented Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front.  None of these were or are a 
serious threat to national security, but each is capable of occasional acts of terrorism.   
• Current Threat Environment: 
Chile and Peru rebuff Bolivia's reinvigorated claim to restore the Atacama 
corridor, ceded to Chile in 1884, but Chile has offered instead unrestricted but not 
sovereign maritime access through Chile to Bolivian gas and other commodities.  Chile 
rejects Peru's unilateral legislation to change its latitudinal maritime boundary with Chile 
to an equidistance line with a southwestern axis favoring Peru. On October 2007, Peru 
took its maritime complaint with Chile to the ICJ.  There is also a territorial claim in 
Antarctica on the part of the Chilean government, which partially overlaps Argentine and 
British claims.  The joint boundary commission, established by Chile and Argentina in 
2001, has yet to map and demarcate the delimited boundary in the inhospitable Andean 
Southern Ice Field (Campo de Hielo Sur).  
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Currently, the CIA lists Chile among the many transshipment countries for 
cocaine destined for Europe and the region.  There is evidence of some  associated money 
laundering activity, especially through the Iquique Free Trade Zone.  Domestic cocaine 
consumption is on the rise, making Chile a significant consumer of cocaine in the South 
American continent. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
Chile has very few internal or external military threats, and any historical disputes 
with its neighbors have been relegated to diplomatic solutions.  The Chilean procurement 
program is raising concerns among the country’s neighbors, particularly Bolivia and 
Peru, which have resurrected arguments over borders, with both countries laying claim to 
Chilean territorial waters and its copper-producing areas.  Copper mining rights and the 
subject territory were won by Chile in the War of the Pacific in the 19th century.  The 
new Bachelet administration has renewed efforts to normalize relations, with the new 
Bolivian president Evo Morales showing some signs of reconciliation.  Regardless of the 
nature of Chilean military procurements, they will continue to generate distrust among 
neighboring states. 
11. COLOMBIA 
Columbia is the only South American country with coastlines on both the North 
Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea. The Central American peninsula divides these two 
coastlines, so maritime transit between the North Pacific to the Caribbean requires use of 
the Panama Canal.  The land mass of Colombia is slightly smaller than twice the size of 
Texas. The diverse geography ranges from tropical coastal areas and rainforests to rugged 
mountainous terrain. It has tropical weather patterns along the coast and eastern plains, 
cooler in highlands. The highlands are subjected to volcanic eruptions, and there are 
periodic droughts and occasional earthquakes. The current environmental issues include 
deforestation, soil and water pollution and quality damage from overuse of pesticides.  
The population is about 46 million people.  170,000 people in Colombia are living with 
HIV/AIDS, and the major infectious diseases are food and waterborne related diseases.  
90% of the population is Roman Catholic.  The official language is Spanish.  
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Unemployment and drug trafficking are significant challenges.  Colombia is the key 
producer of coca derivatives and supplies cocaine to nearly all US markets and the 
majority of the international drug markets. Most of the heroin produced is destined for 
the US.  A significant portion of narcotics proceeds are either laundered or invested in 
Colombia through the black market peso exchange. 
Colombia has a national military force. The Army is organized into four divisions 
with twelve infantry brigades, Special Forces and logistic support brigades, four 
specialized battalions, and a mechanized cavalry regiment.  The Navy is organized into 
four fleet commands with five marine battalions, the Coast Guard, and a naval air arm. 
Air forces are organized into three combat air commands; one tactical air support 
command, one military air transport command and one training command.  There are 103 
paved runways, 831 unpaved runways, two heliports and five major ports in the country.  
4th Fleet maintains port operations in Colombia.  The country of Colombia receives the 
third largest portion of foreign military aid provided by the U.S., and the U.S. has been 
actively involved in drug interdiction inside Colombia for nearly three decades. 
The seaports handle around 80 percent of international cargo. In 2005 a total of 
105,251 metric tons of cargo were transported by water. Colombia’s most important 
ocean terminals are Barranquilla, Cartagena, and Santa Marta on the Caribbean Coast and 
Buenaventura and Tumaco on the Pacific Coast. Exports mostly pass through the 
Caribbean ports of Cartagena and Santa Marta, while 65 percent of imports arrive at the 
port of Buenaventura. Other important ports and harbors are Bahía de Portete, Leticia, 
Puerto Bolívar, San Andrés, Santa Marta, and Turbo. Since privatization was 
implemented in 1993, the efficiency of port handling has increased greatly. There are 
plans to construct a deep-water port at Bahía Solano. 
The main inland waterways total about 18,200 kilometers, 11,000 kilometers of 
which are navigable by riverboats. A well-developed and important form of transport for 
both cargo and passengers, inland waterways transport approximately 3.8 million metric 
tons of freight and more than 5.5 million passengers annually. Main inland waterways are 
the Magdalena–Cauca River system, which is navigable for 1,500 kilometers; the Atrato, 
which is navigable for 687 kilometers; the Orinoco system of more than five navigable 
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rivers, which total more than 4,000 kilometers of potential navigation (mainly through 
Venezuela); and the Amazonas system, which has four main rivers totaling 3,000 
navigable kilometers (mainly through Brazil). The government is planning an ambitious 
program to more fully utilize the main rivers for transport. In addition, the navy’s riverine 
brigade has been patrolling waterways more aggressively in order to establish safer river 
transport in the more remote areas in the south and east of the country that are controlled 
by rebel groups. 
Port Cartagena served as a major port for the trade of slaves, gold and shipping 
cargo. The Marine Terminal has the capacity to receive ships with a depth of up to 21 
meters and 270.000 TIM.  It can move more than fourteen million metric tons a year, 
representing 75% of the Cartagena traffic.  There is plenty of local water taxi traffic 
going through the anchorage. 
Colombia was of special interest to the Modeling Team, who, in the development 
of three mission scenarios, identified anti-drug smuggling as one of the three critical 
missions representative of a Phase Zero operation.  To further narrow the scope of the 
model, three ports were selected in Colombia to be included in the model.  Specific data 
about the ports of Cartagena, Tumaco and Buenaventura was provided by the Red Team 
to assist in modeling.  A summary of physical and threat data is included in this country 
study. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
There is strong presence of violence in many urban cities such as Bogota, 
Medellin, Barranquilla, and Cartagena. The level of violence in Buenaventura remains 
high. Small towns and rural areas of Colombia can be extremely dangerous due to the 
presence of narco-terrorists.  Common crime remains a significant problem in many 
urban and rural areas. 
Threats specific to Colombia are:  natural disasters, food and water-borne disease, 
crime, kidnapping, political violence, political corruption, guerrilla, paramilitary 
activities, illegal migrants, drug trafficking and money laundering.   
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
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Physical threats relate primarily to the capabilities of the FARC, drug traffickers 
and criminal organizations in Colombia.  FARC has an estimated 9,000-12,000 armed 
members, gaining political support among the rural population.  They possess numerous 
assault weapons, including AK-47 assault rifles, M60 machine guns, M16 rifles, RPG-7 
rocket-propelled grenades, M79 grenade launchers, and land mines. It allegedly acquires 
weapons from Cuba and from rogue elements of the Venezuelan army. It also reportedly 
purchases weapons from international criminal organizations in Brazil and Mexico. 317 
Threat Organizations: 
The most notable guerrilla group operating in Colombia, which engages in 
activities that could be considered terrorism, is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC).  Colombia is also notorious for the presence of powerful drug cartels.  
 There have been four entrenched and powerful cartels in Colombia:  the Medellin Cartel, 
the Cali Cartel, the North Valley Cartel, and the North Coast Cartel.  The first two have 
been nearly wiped out by the cooperative efforts of the Colombian and U.S. governments, 
and fragments of those groups have strengthened the latter two in the last decade, 
particularly the North Valley Cartel.  Many other smaller criminal organizations are 
based in Colombia, laundering money and carrying out organized criminal activities. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
The primary historical threat is the long conflict between government forces and 
anti-government insurgent groups, principally the FARC. The insurgency and political 
violence have been continuing for the past decades, affecting civilians, and large rural 
areas are under guerrilla influence. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
The current economic and political environment in Colombia has led to high 
crime rates and safe haven for drug trafficking.  The continued existence of FARC and 
the criminal organizations is largely due to their mutually beneficial relationship.  The 




guerrillas provide lab and airfield security and assist in crop harvest for drug traffickers, 
in exchange for money and weapons. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
Despite efforts by the Colombian government in combating drug trafficking and 
criminal activities, the presence of the FARC and criminal organizations will still be 
prevalent.  This is in addition to the political corruption the Colombian government is 
facing, which enhances FARC’s political advantage and helps them gain support from the 
rural population.  There is a need to identify the dynamics of this strategic alliance of the 
FARC and the criminal organizations, and devise a strategy to deal with it.  Until this gap 
is filled, no positive change to current threats may be expected. 
12. COSTA RICA 
Costa Rica, officially the Republic of Costa Rica, is a country in Central America, 
bordered by Nicaragua to the north, Panama to the east and south, the Pacific Ocean to 
the west and south and the Caribbean Sea to the east. Costa Rica is located on the Central 
American isthmus, 10° north of the equator and 84° west of the Prime Meridian. It 
borders both the Caribbean Sea to the east and the North Pacific Ocean to the west, with a 
total of 1,290 kilometers (802 mi) of coastline (212 km / 132 mi on the Caribbean coast 
and 1,016 km / 631 mi on the Pacific. 
Costa Rica also borders Nicaragua to the north (309 km / 192 mi of border) and 
Panama to the south-southeast (639 km / 397 mi of border). In total, Costa Rica 
comprises 51,100 square kilometers (19,730 sq. mi) plus 589,000 square kilometers of 
territorial waters. Costa Rica also comprises several islands.  Cocos Island stands out 
because of its distance from continental landmass (24 km² / 9.25 sq mi, 300 mi (480 km) 
from Puntarenas coast), but Calero Island is the largest island of the country (151.6 km² / 
58.5 sq mi). 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
Threats specific to Costa Rica are:  human trafficking, arms smuggling and drug 
trafficking. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
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Smugglers possess numerous and reasonably modern small arms in order to 
control the human, drug and arms trade. 
Threat Organizations: 
Costa Rica is the Central American country with the longest history of 
democracy.  Indigenous terrorist organizations are non-existent. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
Costa Rica is a country of origin, transit and destination for trafficking in persons 
for sexual and labor exploitation, affecting women, men and children. As a country of 
origin, Costa Rican girls and women are trafficked to the USA, Canada and Europe for 
prostitution, through Central America and Mexico. As a transit country, trafficked 
victims are brought through Costa Rica from Nicaragua, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, the 
Dominican Republic, Cuba and Asia en route to the USA and Canada. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
Organized crime and drug trafficking have invaded Costa Rica.  High profile 
organized crime cases include Chinese smuggling rings and Colombian and Mexican 
drug cartels operating in Costa Rica. Organized sex trafficking in children is growing as 
well. It would appear that children have become a commodity for the tourist trade, and 
like any other business based on trade, there is the issue of supply and demand. 
Prostitution is legal in Costa Rica for those over 18, but billboards and signs throughout 
the San Jose airport serve as reminders that it is a serious crime to buy and sell the sexual 
services of children and minors. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
Crime rates are still low on a comparative basis; in 2007, the murder rate was 6.6 
murders per 100,000, the lowest in Central America. However, violent crime is rising 
rapidly, with the government stating in early 2008 that robbery rates have risen by 700 
percent since 1990, while drug-related crime is up 280 percent in the same period. 
Moreover, crime is becoming more visible. 
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Since 1989, legal gun sales have quadrupled in the country. It is estimated that 
100,000 guns have been legally sold since that date, while the number of illegal guns 
coming into the country is unknown. 
With a rise in car theft and mugging, families feel the need for self-defense.  
Shootings are reported on a daily basis, either as part of a robbery, or drunken disputes 
between friends and strangers. With the increase in civilians holding guns, simple fights 
are more likely to turn deadly. 
13. CUBA 
Cuba became independent from the United States in 1902, as a result of the of the 
Treaty of Paris, partly assisted by the Spanish-American war in 1898, which freed Cuba 
from Spanish rule.  It is the largest country in the Caribbean, with a population of about 
11.5 million people.  Currently, Cuba is led by a one-party government headed by Raul 
Castro, who took over the reins from his ailing brother, Fidel Castro, in February, 2008.  
Since the fall of US-backed dictator Fulgencio Batista in 1959, Cuba has been subjected 
to US sanctions intended to topple the communist government of Fidel Castro. 
Withdrawal of former Soviet subsidies, as well as continued US sanctions, threw the 
country into a severe economic downturn in the 1990s, which still continues today.  The 
people are plagued by low wages, and high prices of basic commodities.  The economy 
survives from investments by Canadian, European and Latin American companies, 
mainly the sector of tourism.  Communist rule in the country has somewhat limited the 
diversification of the economy as well as trade affluence for both the people and the 
county.  She relies heavily on monies sent back from Cubans working and living abroad, 
mainly in the city of Miami.  The Guantanamo Naval Base on the eastern tip of the island 
is leased and operated by the US Navy. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
Cuba continues to publicly oppose the US led coalition of the War on Terror.  It is 
reported that Cuba continues to provide a safe haven for members of ETA, FARC and the 
ELN, and maintains close links to other state sponsors of terrorism.  The Cuban 
government does not attempt to track, block or seize terrorist assets and is known to 
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harbor US fugitives as a sign of resistance to the US policy towards Cuba.  Cuba is also 
well known for its lack of respect for human rights.   The government refuses to 
acknowledge or denounce the problem of human trafficking.  Prostitution, corruption, 
black market operations and defectors are common sights within the country due to 
severe hardship under communism rule.  Due to the promise of a better life elsewhere, 
illegal migration of Cubans into the US using homemade rafts, human smuggler entities, 
air flights or via the southwestern border continues to be a problem.  Anti-US sentiment 
remains high within the country, although its peoples are more concerned with everyday 
issues of survival than making aggression against American property.  Cubans are 
exposed to an intermediate risk of food and waterborne diseases such as bacterial 
diarrhea and Hepatitis A and the vector borne disease, dengue fever. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
Illegal migration using homemade rafts and illegal border crossings into Florida 
are a perennial problem.  In 2007 alone, more than 2,600 Cubans were caught attempting 
to cross the Straits of Florida.  Droughts are common occurrences and Cuba averages one 
major hurricane every other year. 
Threat Organizations: 
Cuba continues to be a safe haven for terrorist groups such as ETA, FARC, and 
ELN with no signs of changing their policy against these terrorist groups, or enforcing 
their Law 93 against Acts of Terrorism. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
Historically, Cuba has been plagued by natural disasters such as hurricanes and 
earthquakes.  Communist rule since 1959 has imposed considerable hardship on its 
people and severely restricted the freedom of the people.  Basic internet and mobile hand 
phone services are permitted only by special restricted access.  Less than 2% of its 
population has access to the internet which restricts the dissemination of information 
severely.  Domestic hardships have driven people to seek a livelihood (sometimes fatally) 
elsewhere through means of human smuggling, drug trafficking and prostitution.  Its anti-
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US sentiments also promote a safe haven for terrorist groups who operate relatively 
freely within the boundaries of Cuba. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
Cuba continues to be plagued by the threats aforementioned.  The War on Terror 
has restricted the activities of the various terrorist groups in Cuba somewhat, but they are 
likely to continue to operate underground within the country. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
The threat environment within Cuba is unlikely to be abated by policy changes, 
due to no anticipated change in the government in the near future.  The Castro 
government is likely to continue its anti-US stance and continue to be a state sponsor for 
terrorist activities.  Although widespread crime is not a main concern due to the intolerant 
Communist government, human trafficking is likely to continue if not escalate due to 
worsening economic conditions.  Even though Cuba is unlikely to become a nation of 
aggression against the US, any US military intervention into Cuba’s domestic affairs or 
policies is likely to be met by huge resistance due to its relatively (as compared to other 
Caribbean countries) well-armed and rugged military force. 
14. CURACAO 
Curacao is an island in the Southern Caribbean.  The nearest neighbor on the 
South American continent is Venezuela.  It is normally grouped as one of the Lesser 
Antilles.  Historically, the small island was under Spanish, and then Dutch control.  
Unlike other conquests, where the Spanish exterminated the entire population, they 
instead exported the indigenous residents to other colonies as forced labor.  The Dutch 
used Curacao as a major transshipment point for the slave trade, a profitable venture that 
made the islanders very rich. 
With the end of slavery in 1863, the island became impoverished and many 
residents and former slaves moved elsewhere in Latin America, seeking a living.  The 
economy turned around again in the early 1900s with the discovery of oil.  The Dutch 
controlled both the island and the associated oil refinery until the 1980s.  Today, it is 
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owned by the local government and leased to Venezuela as a refinery, but is falling into 
disrepair. 
Curacao is a popular tourist destination, with particularly attractive beaches and 
reefs which also attract scuba enthusiasts.  Crime rates and threat levels remain 
acceptably low and resorts and cruise ships both operate successfully on the island. 
Curacao enjoys the highest standard of living in the Caribbean.  They have 
economic ties with many US and Venezuelan businesses, and, allegedly, their banking 
industry thrives by providing tax shelters for large US corporations. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
There are no notable threats active in Curacao. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
Curacao is situated south of the hurricane belt and a major hurricane has not made 
landfall there since recording began.  
Threat Organizations: 
No known organized crime or terror organizations are currently operating in 
Curacao. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
The amenable natural harbor and popularity for trade under Dutch rule led to 
many problems with piracy. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
The economy and society are both fairly stable; yet the social infrastructure is 
showing trends of decline and erosion.  The demographic has also been slowly changing, 
with many more affluent citizens immigrating back to the Netherlands. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
Near proximity to Venezuela, the only South American state recommended as a 
“Sponsor of Terror” by the US State Department, and the presence of many American 
and EU tourists, may have some potential to attract terror activity in the future. 
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15. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
The Dominican Republic lies in the eastern two-thirds of the island of Hispaniola, 
between the Caribbean Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean, east of Haiti. The land mass is 
slightly more than twice the size of New Hampshire. The geography consists of rugged 
highlands and mountains with fertile valleys interspersed, and it shares the island of 
Hispaniola with Haiti. It has tropical maritime weather patterns, little seasonal 
temperature and rainfall variation. The location lies in the middle of the hurricane belt 
and is subject to severe storms from June to October, as well as occasional flooding and 
periodic droughts. The current environmental issues include water shortages, soil erosion 
into the sea, which damages coral reefs, and deforestation. The population is about 9 
million people.  The HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate is about 1.1% in the Dominican 
Republic. Other major infectious diseases are food and waterborne related diseases.  95% 
of the population is Roman Catholic.  The official language is Spanish.  Unemployment, 
money laundering, human and drug trafficking are significant challenges the country 
faces.  The country has been viewed primarily as an exporter of sugar, coffee, and 
tobacco, but in recent years the service sector has overtaken agriculture as the economy's 
largest employer, due to growth in tourism and free trade zones. Although the economy is 
growing at a respectable rate, high unemployment and underemployment remain an 
important challenge.  The population also suffers from marked income inequality. The 
Dominican Republic is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and 
children trafficked for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation and forced labor, 
as well as a transit shipment point for South American drugs destined for the US and 
Europe. 
The Dominican Republic has armed forces consisting of the Army, Navy and Air 
Force. There are 15 paved runways, 19 unpaved runways, and five ports (Boca Chica, 
Caucedo, Puerto Plata, Rio Haina, Santo Domingo) in the country.   
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
The key threats identified are human and drug trafficking, money laundering, 
social issues of poverty, income inequality and illegal immigration.  Haitian migrants 
cross the porous border into the Dominican Republic to find work and illegal migrants 
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from the Dominican Republic cross the Mona Passage each year to Puerto Rico to find 
better work. The Dominican Republic is a source, transit, and destination country for 
men, women, and children trafficked for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation 
and forced labor.  A large number of Dominican women are trafficked into prostitution 
and sexual exploitation in Western Europe, Australia, Central and South America, and 
Caribbean destinations. A significant number of women, boys, and girls are trafficked 
within the country for sexual exploitation and domestic servitude.  It has become a trans-
shipment point for South American drugs destined for the US and Europe, and a trans-
shipment point for ecstasy from the Netherlands and Belgium destined for US and 
Canada.  In addition, there is also substantial money laundering activity, in particular by 
Colombian narcotics traffickers. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
Physical threats relate primarily to the capabilities of the human and drug 
traffickers in the Dominican Republic. Generally, the traffickers possess small and heavy 
arms.  The lack of gun control makes such possession easy.  The AIDS rate in Dominican 
Republic is also high with a prevalence rate of 1.1%. 
Threat Organizations: 
There are many organizations operating within the Dominican Republic for the 
purpose of kidnapping, trafficking and sales of humans for the purpose of sex or labor.  
Smuggling organizations also traffic in several types of narcotics, along routes to both the 
US and Europe. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
Historical threats have been primarily linked to social issues induced by poverty 
and illegal immigration. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
The Dominican Republic is a source and a transit country for human and drug 
trafficking.  Money laundering via the Dominican Republic is favored by Colombian 
drug cartels for the ease of illicit financial transactions.  In 2004,it was estimated that 8% 
of all cocaine smuggled into the United States had come through the Dominican 
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Republic.  The Dominican Republic responded with increased efforts to seize drug 
shipments, arrest and extradite those involved, and combat money-laundering.  However, 
it fails to show evidence of increasing efforts to combat human trafficking, particularly in 
terms of not adequately investigating and prosecuting public officials who may be 
complicit with trafficking activity, and inadequate government efforts to protect 
trafficking victims.  The government has taken measures to reduce demand for 
commercial sex acts with children through criminal prosecutions, but these measures 
have not as yet proven to be effective. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
Illegal immigrants and human and drug trafficking issues will continue to exist in 
the near future. The government needs to step up measures and efforts in combating these 
issues more effectively. 
16. ECUADOR 
Ecuador is a representative democratic republic in South America, bordered by 
Colombia on the north, by Peru on the east and south, and by the Pacific Ocean to the 
west.  It is one of only two countries in South America (with Chile) that does not have a 
border with Brazil.  The country also includes the Galápagos Islands in the Pacific, about 
965 kilometers (600 mi) west of the mainland.  Ecuador has three main geographic 
regions, plus an insular region in the Pacific Ocean.  La Costa, or “the coast”, comprises 
the low-lying land in the western part of the country, including the Pacific coastline.  La 
Sierra, or "the highlands", is the high-altitude belt running north-south along the center of 
the country, its mountainous terrain dominated by the Andes mountain range.  La 
Amazonía, also known as El Oriente ("the east"), comprises the Amazon rainforest areas 
in the eastern part of the country, accounting for just under half of the country's total 
surface area, though populated by less than 5% of the population.  The Región Insular is 
the region comprising the Galápagos Islands, some 1,000 kilometers (620 mi) west of the 
mainland in the Pacific Ocean. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
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Threats specific to Ecuador are:  crime, cocaine smuggling route, bulk cash 
smuggling route, corruption, domestic drug-use, and Colombian drug trafficking. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
Physical threats relate primarily to the capabilities of the smugglers and drug-
runners that take advantage of Ecuador for trafficking.  They possess numerous and 
reasonably modern small arms, including IR equipped assault weapons.  They have 
begun to use small submersibles, about 50 feet in length, to transport drugs.  For surface 
transport, small boats, also about 50-60 feet long, are employed most commonly.   
Threat Organizations: 
Ecuadorian groups sympathetic to the FARC.  The Grupo de Combatientes 
Populares (GCP) and the Milicias Revolucionarias del Pueblo (MRP) conduct terrorist 
acts in the country.  The GCP and the MRP have detonated hundreds of pamphlet bombs 
and other improvised explosive devices outside Ecuadorian government buildings and in 
close proximity to U.S. government facilities. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
Ecuador is a significant transit country for cocaine originating in Colombia and 
Peru, with over half of the US-bound cocaine passing through Ecuadorian Pacific waters.  
Other prevalent threats are:  importer of precursor chemicals used in production of illicit 
narcotics; attractive location for cash-placement by drug traffickers laundering money 
because of dollarization, a weak anti-money-laundering regime; increased activity on the 
northern frontier by trafficking groups and Colombian insurgents. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
Murder, rape, kidnapping, carjacking, armed assault and burglary are becoming a 
normal part of everyday life throughout the country. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
In addition to a rise in violent crime, criminal acts involving weapons are also 
increasing.  Fortunately, in the majority of these cases, the weapon is used for 
intimidation purposes only; cooperative victims are seldom injured.  Gratuitous violence 
is rare throughout the country. 
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17. EL SALVADOR 
El Salvador is a country bordering the North Pacific Ocean, and geographically 
situated between Guatemala and Honduras.  It is the smallest Central American country, 
occupying only 21,040 square kilometers, and the only one without a coastline on the 
Caribbean.  In 1992, the government and leftist rebels signed a treaty which brought to an 
end a 12 year civil war.  The treaty provided for military and political reforms.  The 
country has hydropower, geothermal and petroleum as natural resources, with 31% of the 
land being used for agriculture.  With a population of 7.2 million people, the median age 
in the country is about 22.5 yrs old, which signals a relatively young population with a 
life expectancy of 72 years.  0.8% of its adults are infected with HIV/AIDS, which 
translates to about 35000 people. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
Threats such as natural disasters afflict the nation state consistently.  Crime is 
blatant in the country, with relatively little law enforcement.  Drugs traffic through the 
country as a transshipment point to other parts of the Americas.  The economy, although 
the 3rd largest in the Caribbean, relies heavily on monies sent back from Salvadorians 
working in Continental USA. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
El Salvador is susceptible to volcanic activity, earthquakes and hurricanes.  She is 
plagued with environmental threats such as deforestation, soil erosion, water pollution 
and soil contamination from illegal disposal of toxic wastes.  These toxic wastes are not 
tightly controlled by the local government.  Infectious diseases are prevalent in the 
country, with a high degree of risk of being infected by bacterial diarrhea, Hepatitis A, 
Typhoid fever, dengue fever, and leptospirosis. 0.8% of its population is afflicted with 
the HIV/AIDS disease. 
Threat Organizations: 
El Salvador continues to be a transshipment point for cocaine.  Small amounts of 
marijuana are produced for reportedly local consumption.  There is significant use of 
cocaine in the country itself.  Known organized crime or drug traffickers are unavailable 
416 
 
from open literature as there is no one particular group who dominates.  Rather, the threat 
organizations consist of several small groups operating independently. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
In 1980, El Salvador went into a civil war sparked by the inequality between the 
small and wealthy elite population which dominated the government and the economy, 
and the overwhelming majority of the population whom were poor and destitute. Over 12 
years, 75,000 lives and two billion dollars were lost, until the UN-brokered peace treaty 
to bring political and military reforms was signed in 1992. The country has been ravaged 
frequently by natural disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
Teens continue to be attracted to street gangs to lead a life of crime and 
lawlessness.  Today, it remains one of the most crime-ridden countries in the Americas.  
The streets are ruled by violent gangs known as “maras”, and the relatively weak law 
enforcement agencies do little to secure the streets.  Natural disasters are a common 
occurrence, with the most recent Hurricane being Mitch in 1998, and several earthquakes 
in 2001 which left at least 1200 people dead and more than a million homeless.  
Government aid to help the people recover from these disasters was limited and 
inefficient. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
The new left-wing (first time since 1992) government to be led by Mauricio Funes 
will take office in June, 2009, and he had campaigned on a platform of change for El 
Salvador.  He won by the slimmest of margins, 2% vote majority.  It will be the first time 
a Marxist guerrilla linked FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) party will 
be leading the country since fighting the US-backed government during the civil war in 
the 1980s. Economic policy change and greater political and economic ties with the U.S. 
is anticipated in the near future.  Although economic change seem promising, whether the 
status of law enforcement within the country will take a turn for the better remains to be 
seen.  If lawlessness continues, it is unlikely that economic policies will have a 
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significant effect on the economy of El Salvador, and the current threats will continue to 
prevail. 
18. GUYANA (BRITISH GUINEA) 
Officially called the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, Guyana was formerly 
known as British Guinea.  It was originally a Dutch colony in the 1600s, and then a 
British colony, settled in 1840.  It is situated on the North Atlantic coast, with Suriname 
to the East and Venezuela to the West, and is bordered to the South by Brazil.  It is the 
fourth smallest South American state, about the size of Idaho.  English is the official 
language.  The mountainous rainforest in the South of the country is alleged to have been 
the inspiration behind Doyle’s “Lost World” novel.  Guyana has many climates, 
including marshland, savannah, mountains, and most importantly, the largest unspoiled 
rainforest on the continent. 
The demographic distribution in Guyana is 51 percent Indo-Guyanese (descended 
from immigrants from India), 42 percent Afro-Guyanese (of African or partial African 
descent), 4 percent Amerindian (descended from indigenous population), and less than 3 
percent European or Chinese.  English is the official language and is spoken by almost all 
Guyanese.  Some Amerindian languages are spoken, as well as Portuguese near the 
Brazilian border.  Approximately 96 percent of adult population was considered literate 
in the 1990s. 
Agriculture and mining make up the majority of the GDP, and steady growth in 
these industries has kept the economy reasonably stable in recent years. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
The dominating threats in Guyana are drug smuggling, human trafficking and 
crime, particularly murder, armed robbery and kidnapping.  Sporadic social unrest often 
leads to mobs and rioting.  Disease and natural disasters also present a threat. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
The largest physical threat in Guyana comes from armed bandits equipped with 
sub-machine guns, AK47’s and handguns. The promoters of such violence get their 
supplies of weapons regardless of actions taken by the authorities to control the 
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acquisition of weapons.  Illegal gun-running is commonplace where the state machinery 
is overwhelmed by crime, a situation similar to that found in Jamaica, Haiti, Trinidad and 
Suriname. 
The portion of the adult population infected by AIDS is severe, at 2.5%, and 
many other diseases are prevalent.   Flash flooding is the primary natural disaster 
afflicting Guyana.  Other physical threats are a result of political and social unrest, 
leading to outbreaks of violence.   
Guyana is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children 
trafficked for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation and forced labor.  Most 
trafficking appears to take place in remote mining camps in the country's interior.  
Women and girls are trafficked from northern Brazil and there are suggestions that 
Guyanese women and girls are trafficked for sexual exploitation to neighboring countries 
while Guyanese men and boys are subject to labor exploitation.  Human trafficking 
victims are transported from Guyana en route to Caribbean destinations.  Guyana has 
done little to reduce the demand for commercial sexual exploitation of children and 
adults. 
Guyana is also a transshipment point for drugs en route to the US and Europe, 
mostly for drugs moving out of Venezuela. 
Threat Organizations: 
There has been no evidence of prominent criminal or terrorist organizations 
operating within the country.  Among the criminal population are deportees from North 
America, with the capacity to mobilize illegal guns and other weapons and operate a 
sophisticated networking system in their reign of criminal terror. 
Much violence in Guyana stems from the divisions along party lines, which 
mirrors ethnic divisions in the population.  Other organized threats are not state affiliated, 
but small groups which profit from smuggling humans and other contraband. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
In the past, Guyana has had border disputes with both Suriname and Venezuela, 
which have been arbitrated successfully.   
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Jim Jones and the People’s Temple cult operated from Jonestown in Guyana, until 
the mass suicide that Jones and his cult are infamous for.  Congressman Leo Ryan was 
also murdered in Guyana when he came to investigate the People’s Temple.   
Guyana experienced bitter, costly fratricidal warfare in the pre-independence 
years of the 1960s, when some 176 persons fell victim to the guns, bombs and other 
weapons of the purveyors of racial and political hatred.  At the best of times, Guyana is 
not a country whose 83,000 square miles can easily be policed, not even along its densely 
populated coastland.  There are miles of farmlands and cattle lands stretching from the 
main highway, and these parallel the sea defenses from the Atlantic Ocean. 
Political and racial divisions are deep.  There is an unfortunate mix of 35 percent 
poverty and 15 percent unemployment.  The common crimes of narco-trafficking and 
gun-running, strident anti-government attacks from the main opposition People's National 
Congress (PNC) and on the police blend with that party's rhetoric to make the country 
"ungovernable".  These problems all combine to convey the depth of the crisis. 
The American CIA has a long history of involvement in and preservation of the 
stability of Guyana, and sees it as a valuable ally and safe haven in South America.  
Political rioting and violence have been common since the 1970s, even prompting 
former President Carter to proctor national elections in 1992.   
• Current Threat Environment: 
The American intelligence community maintains an interest in Guyana, 
particularly with its proximity to the socialist state of Venezuela. 
The electricity infrastructure is very obsolete and electricity is unreliable and 
expensive.  A Phase 0 force operating in Guyana must be able to provide reliable power 
independently.  The same is true for water and sanitation. 
Disease is an acute problem in Guyana, with malaria ranked as the number one 
cause of death in the country. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
The current levels of social violence and the threats from drug and human 
smuggling have been at a steady level for many years.  The current government does not 
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show any promise for making changes in these areas, and lacking intervention, the 
current threat environment is likely to carry forward for some time. 
Guyana will see an increase in criminal activities concentrated on the East Coast 
of Demerara and Georgetown.  There has also been an increasing trend in kidnapping and 
extortion.  Serious crime has continued to affect urban centers.  More specifically, 
Georgetown has experienced an increased rate of crime that includes home invasions, 
kidnappings, car-jacking and shootings.  Moreover, there has also been a significant 
increase in criminal activity such as assaults, armed robberies, and random shootings in 
public places in urban districts of Guyana, particularly in Buxton and Georgetown.  
Without a strengthening of the rule of law, there is no indication that this increase in 
crime will abate. 
19. GUYANE (FRENCH GUINEA)  
Bordered by Suriname to the West, and sharing a southern and eastern border 
with Brazil, Guyane, also called French Guinea, is what the French refer to as a DOM (an 
overseas “Department”, translated from French).  It is one of 26 regions that make up the 
French republic, and trades with the Euro, as France does.  The greatest population 
density lives along the northern Caribbean coast, and a more sparse population dwells in 
the dense rainforest that makes up the majority of the country.  The nations holds claim to 
a number of nearby islands.  Hydrodynamic power is generated at a dam and artificial 
lake in the North, and this facility is a critical structure in the country.  Guyane was 
settled by the French as a penal colony in the 1800s.  The southern jungle region has been 
disputed with Brazil in the past, but the border not currently disputed.  A large number of 
immigrants from Laos live in Guyane, and nearly a third of today’s population is 
naturalized from Laos, Haiti and other nations.  There have been some calls, as recently 
as the 1980s, for more independence from France. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
Threats specific to Guyane are an upsurge in illegal fishing which threatens the 
economy, as fishing provides the primary export, and rising unemployment.  Guyane is 
very dependent on the European economy, as there are few opportunities for farming or 
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other commerce in the dense jungle and rainforest.  Deforestation may become an 
emerging threat in the future. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
Physical threats to Guyane are from illegal immigration, unregistered gold 
prospectors and IUU fishing of its waters.  Natural resources such as gold, forest timber 
and game fish may be threatened by the rise in uncontrolled activities such as these. 
Threat Organizations: 
Nearly all the threats to Guyane are unaffiliated opportunists seeking to profit 
from the poor oversight of precious natural resources.  No mention was found in our 
research of well organized crime or terror groups. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
The greatest historical threats have arisen from border disputes, and the social 
instability that comes from increased unemployment.  Social and economic issues have 
been tempered by ties with France. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
French Guinea is one of the more stable states in region of the Caribbean and 
South America.  The current threats are largely from poachers, illegal fishing, and an 
economic structure that is nearly entirely dependent on France and Europe. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
Unless tighter controls are emplaced on the natural resources of Guyane, groups 
of poachers and other opportunists may lay waste to the fish, forests and gold mineral 
deposits, further crippling the tenuous economy. 
20. GUATEMALA 
Guatemala is located in Central America, bordering the North Pacific Ocean 
between El Salvador and Mexico and bordering the Gulf of Honduras (Caribbean Sea) 
between Honduras and Belize. The land mass is slightly smaller than Tennessee. The 
terrain consists of mostly mountains with narrow coastal plains and rolling limestone 
plateau, with no natural harbors on the west coast.  It has tropical weather patterns, hot 
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and humid in lowlands, and cooler in highlands.  There are numerous volcanoes in the 
mountains, with occasional violent earthquakes. The Caribbean coast is extremely 
susceptible to hurricanes and other tropical storms.  The current environmental issues 
include deforestation in the Peten rainforest, soil erosion and water pollution.  The 
population is about 13 million people.  The HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate is about 
0.8% in Guatemala.  Other major infectious diseases are food and waterborne related 
diseases.  The main religions include Roman Catholic, Protestant, indigenous Mayan 
belief systems.  Spanish and Amerindian languages are the main languages.  The 
distribution of income remains highly unequal with more than half of the population 
below the national poverty line.  Other ongoing challenges include curtailing drug 
trafficking and rampant crime.  
Guatemala armed forces consist of the Army, Navy and Air Force.  There are 12 
paved runways, 390 unpaved runways, and three ports (Puerto Quetzal, Santo Tomas de 
Castilla) in the country.   
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
This developing country is still facing social problems such as poverty and 
immigration.  The distribution of income remains highly unequal with between 30 to 50 
percent of the population living below the poverty line and just over 3.2% unemployed.  
Guatemala is a source, transit, and destination country for Guatemalans and Central 
Americans trafficked for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation and forced 
labor, and a major transit country for cocaine and heroin.  Its proximity to Mexico makes 
Guatemala a major staging area for cocaine.  Money laundering is a serious issue, with 
corruption adding on to the severity of problem.  Guatemala has the second highest crime 
rate in Latin America. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
Physical threats relate primarily to the capabilities of the human and drug 




Threat organizations within Guatemala are mostly human and drug trafficking 
organizations, and other criminal organizations that contribute to high domestic violent 
crime rates. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
During the second half of the 20th century, Guatemala experienced a variety of 
military and civilian governments, as well as a 36-year guerrilla war which created about 
a million refugees.  The end of the civil war removed a major obstacle to foreign 
investment, and Guatemala since then has pursued important reforms and 
macroeconomic stabilization.  However, concerns over security, the lack of skilled 
workers and poor infrastructure have continued to hamper foreign participation. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
Guatemala is a source, transit, and destination country for Guatemalans and 
Central Americans trafficked for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation and 
forced labor.  Human trafficking is a significant and growing problem in the country.  
Thus far, Guatemala has failed in its efforts to combat trafficking in persons, particularly 
with respect to ensuring that trafficking offenders are appropriately prosecuted for their 
crimes.  While prosecutors have initiated trafficking prosecutions, they continue to face 
problems in court with application of Guatemala's comprehensive anti-trafficking law.  
Although the government made modest improvements to its protection efforts, assistance 
remained inadequate overall.   
Guatemala is also a major transit country for cocaine and heroin and its proximity 
to Mexico makes Guatemala a major staging area for drugs, particularly cocaine.  Money 
laundering continues to be a serious problem, in addition to corruption. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
The existing current threats such as money laundering, corruption, human and 
drug trafficking issues will still be prevalent. To date, the efforts put in by the 




The nation of Haiti has a land mass slightly smaller than the size of Maryland.  It 
shares a 360 km border with the Dominican Republic.  It has tropical weather patterns 
and mostly mountainous terrain.  Haiti is subject to a number of natural disasters, among 
them hurricanes, earthquakes, flooding and occasional drought.  Issues of soil erosion and 
deforestation are prominent.  The population of about 9 million people is desperately 
poor, with 80 percent of the population living below the poverty line and 70 percent 
unemployment.  120,000 people in Haiti are living with AIDS.  95% of the population is 
black.  The official language is French, but Creole is also spoken. 
Haiti does not have an organized state military.  There are only four paved 
runways and one port in the country.  4th Fleet does not maintain port operations in Haiti.  
The UN has 8,000 peacekeepers conducting Phase Zero stability efforts in Haiti. 
Functional Threats:  
Threats specific to Haiti are:  natural disasters, food and water-borne disease, 
crime, lack of law enforcement, political violence, cocaine smuggling route, bulk cash 
smuggling route, corruption, domestic drug-use, and “favored nation status” for 
Colombian drug trafficking.  
Physical Threats: 
Physical threats relate primarily to the capabilities of the smugglers and drug-
runners that take advantage of Haiti for trafficking.  They possess numerous and 
reasonably modern small arms, including IR equipped assault weapons.  They have 
begun using small, home-made submersibles, about 50 feet long, to transport drugs.  For 
surface transport, small boats about 50-60 feet long are employed most commonly.  
Small aircraft is seldom used for transporting drugs now because of the effectiveness of 
E-3 surveillance.   
Threat Organizations: 
Colombian drug cartel traffickers have long preferred Haiti.  According to News 
blog “Strategypage”, Al Qaeda is taking advantage of lawless conditions in Haiti to 
establish small cells close to the United States.   
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
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• Historical Threats: 
Haiti was a major smuggling route for slavery, and became the first black republic 
after winning independence in 1804.  Its greatest historical threats have been poverty 
induced crime and corruption, natural disasters, and internal instability leading to military 
takeovers and a breakdown in the rule of law.  Haiti is the perfect environment for 
smugglers of all kinds because of its lawlessness and location in the central Caribbean. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
The current economic and political environment in Haiti has led to a continuation 
of drug use, crime, smuggling, violence and, possibly, safe haven for terrorist groups.  
This is despite the fact that world powers have long realized that Haiti is in this 
vulnerable situation, and despite the presence of UN peacekeepers.   
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
Without intervention, no change for the better may be anticipated in Haiti.  There 
have been some discussions among world leaders to forgive much of Haiti’s national debt 
and help stabilize the economy, but direct intervention by the US military would be 
closely scrutinized by other nations.   
Recommendations for future threat mitigation are:  add support to the current UN 
stability mission, increase the number of Special Operations forces in country to curtail 
terror organizations seeking a near-US base; and continue to develop tools and methods 
to combat the illicit drug trade through Haiti. 
22. HONDURAS 
Honduras has El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala for neighbors, and has had 
border disputes with El Salvador.  It has a large Northern coastline interfacing the 
Caribbean, and a smaller section of Southern coastline on the Pacific.  The Northeastern 
shoreline, also called the “Mosquito Coast”, is virtually uninhabited.  The coastal plains 
areas are narrow and much of the country is temperate mountain ranges.  Nearly 500km 
of waterways are navigable by small craft only.  Independent from Spain since 1821, it is 
a democratic republic and the primary race is a European Amerindian mix.  It is among a 
handful of countries where women typically stay in school longer and have a higher 
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literacy rate than men.  Honduras is the second poorest Central American economy and is 
highly dependent on exports to the United States, so slowing economic conditions in the 
U.S. have an immediate effect on the economy of Honduras.  Unemployment is about 
30%. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
Honduras is a drug trafficking node, and there have also been reports of 
corruption and money laundering.  Guerilla groups, mainly Sandinistas and Salvadoran 
leftists shelter and train in the Honduran mountains.  The threat from Hurricanes and 
natural disasters is significant, and Honduras is not well-equipped for humanitarian 
response. 
The Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) lists Honduras as one of the top 
three offenders for Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing.  Two of the three 
worst offenders are in the 4th Fleet AO.   
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
Like many nations in the Southern Command area, Honduras is prone to extreme 
weather and is located in “Hurricane Alley”.  In 1998, Hurricane Mitch killed nearly 
6,000 people and devastated the country’s infrastructure and economy.   Honduras is also 
prone to earthquakes and killer mudslides.  Unregulated deforestation is diminishing 
natural resources very quickly and polluting many drinkable water sources as a result.  
The risk of infection from malaria, typhoid and dengue fever are very high in Honduras 
Threat Organizations: 
Organizations operating in Honduras are mostly politically motivated contras 
employing guerilla tactics.  Sandinistas and Salvadoran exiles are more prevalent.  Drug 
gangs are mostly a transient problem.  Non-affiliated groups also kidnap people, 
particularly children, to profit from ransom. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
Historical threats are border disputes, drug running, governmental corruption, 
poverty and crime, and natural disasters. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
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Former land disputes have been successfully mediated, and U.S. involvement 
over the last thirty years has helped to reduce the amount of small-plane drug traffic, 
although were vigilance lifted in that area, the cartels would quickly re-establish 
Honduran routes.  The current threat environment is the great need for humanitarian aid 
after disasters strike.  Phase Zero aid workers would need to exercise good force 
protection measures to avoid disease and prevent becoming the target of kidnappers. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
The success of the Honduran economy is closely tied to the U.S. economy, as 
Honduras is a primary exporter of coffee and bananas.  A U.S. economic downturn would 
cause greater economic instability, an increase in unemployment and related crime. 
23. JAMAICA 
When the Spanish settled Jamaica in the 15th century, they completely 
exterminated the indigenous population, and replaced them with black slaves.  When the 
English later took control of the island, they established an agricultural economy based 
on slave labor.  When abolition came, the former slaves became independent landowners 
and farmers, and formed the basis of today’s demographic.  Jamaica was not fully 
independent from England until 1962. 
The population of 2.8 million people lives on the narrow coastal plains of an 
island a little smaller than Connecticut.  The remainder of Jamaica is comprised of 
mountainous tropical forest. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
Crime and violence associated with rival political parties has steadily increased 
since Jamaica became independent in the 1960s.   
Environmental threats endanger the natural resources of Jamaica.  Deforestation, 
oil spills, water and air pollution and coral reef devastation are all present and increasing. 
Small-scale incidents of piracy have begun to be reported in Jamaica, with the 
most recent confirmed incident taking place in 2005. 
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Jamaica is a major transshipment point for human trafficking as well, moving 
women, men and children to Europe and other countries for exploitation in the sex trade 
or as forced or indentured labor. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
Poverty, violent crime and drug trafficking are the more serious threats present in 
Jamaica.  Jamaica is also in the center of the Hurricane belt, and is prone to severe 
weather for roughly half of every year.  Physical threats, then, are associated with the 
small arms employed by the crime organizations, and with natural hazards. 
Threat Organizations: 
Jamaica hosts many powerful organized crime groups who deal in the human and 
drug smuggling trades and money laundering. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
The two greatest historical threats to Jamaica were piracy and disease.  The 
British stepped in to severely intervene and their punishing stance towards piracy did 
much to rid the Caribbean of the threat.  Now that the U.K. has granted independence to 
the island and added them to the Cooperation of the West Indies, it remains to be seen if 
this threat will re-emerge.  Jamaica is in a perfect strategic location, nearly equidistant to 
the Panama Canal, the US, and major shipping lanes for departure to Europe. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
The threat environment in Jamaica today is one of contrasts.  Large portions of 
the coastline are relatively safe and crime-free, and have become popular tourism and 
cruise destinations.  The wealthier ruling class also manages to distance itself from much 
of the social unrest and effects of poverty.  However, the grasp of power is tenuous, and 
political and criminal factions continue to strive for dominance, while the remainder of 
the population lives with poverty and social insecurity.  A Phase Zero force operating in 
Jamaica must be aware of the local environment, and alert for the threats of crime, 
disease, drug smuggling, money laundering and natural disasters. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
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Because of its location in the center of the Caribbean, piracy could reemerge as a 
threat by 2020 or 2050, especially if the rule of law and political stability are not 
improved.  The current threats associated with crime and drugs will only increase as well. 
24. MARTINIQUE 
Martinique is a relatively stable region, and hosts one of the 4th Fleets 31 port 
operations.  It is a small island department of the French government, in the Caribbean.   
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
Martinique exhibits no major threats to a Phase Zero force, and has below average 
crime. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
There are no notable physical threats to be encountered in Martinique.  Even the 
volcanic mountains that dominate the topography are extinct and inactive. 
Threat Organizations: 
There are no known threat organizations present in Martinique. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
No information could be located about this.  Martinique did host slaves at one 
point, but has not been the scene of war, disease, natural disasters or other typical 
historical threats. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
The only travel danger warnings that could be found about Martinique are sun 
exposure, falling coconuts and the high cost of living. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
No particular threats seem to be emerging.  The only possible future concern may 
be that terrorism is unpredictable and indiscriminate, and the twin conditions of tourism 




Mexico is situated atop Central America, and has borders east and west with the 
Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico.  Their southern neighbors are Guatemala and 
Belize, and the U.S. is on its northern border, as well as the North Pacific.  Mexico is 
about three times the size of Texas.  Much of the terrain is desert, with only 12% arable.  
The northern border with the U.S. is long and porous, and has been the source of much 
political, economic and social upheaval, as well as increasing violence at the border and 
in infamous border towns such as Juarez.  Immigration enforcement into the U.S. is 
virtually impotent, and estimates of the numbers of unauthorized border crossings vary 
widely depending on the political goals of the organization publishing the numbers.  
Noting whether the word “illegal” or “undocumented” is used to describe these crossings 
is a good clue to the political bias, more conservative or liberal, respectively.  Many 
would-be immigrants die attempting to cross, either from exposure or at the hands of 
unscrupulous “coyotes” hired to smuggle them across.  Estimates, in our research, of 
successful crossings range from “thousands” to more than 3 million each year.  By some 
accounts, 0.03 percent of the population shifts to the U.S. each year.  Mexico itself faces 
severe immigration problems on its south border, as impoverished Guatemalans and 
Central Americans pour into Mexico looking for work or for passage to the U.S. 
The economy of Mexico has see-sawed in the last few decades.  They went into a 
critical recession in 1994, and were making an impressive recovery until 2007-2008, 
when the U.S. economical downturn caused a domino effect in Mexico. 
Mexico is prone to earthquakes, and is squarely in the path of storm activity from 
both oceans, subject to tsunamis, cyclones and hurricanes.  The more impoverished 
southern region has fewer resources for disaster recovery, not to mention having less 
stable infrastructure to begin with.   
Water is a major environmental factor.  Water sources are scarce, about 731 cubic 
meters per year per capita.  Northern waters are polluted by large population centers, and 
access to fresh water in the south is very tenuous.  For a population of over 111,200,000, 
this is a very important stability and support issue.  It will become more critical in the 
next few decades, as the birth rate is more than five times the death rate in Mexico.   
431 
 
The illegal drug industry has great impact on Mexico, because drug lords from 
South and Central America favor Mexico as the easiest medium for moving narcotics into 
the U.S.  “Black tar” heroin and marijuana are also grown domestically in Mexico and 
moved into the U.S.  Unless the border becomes more secure, this trend will continue, 
making smuggling of both contraband and human “cargo” the most critical issue facing a 
Phase 0 force in or near Mexico. 
Mexico was of special interest to the Modeling Team, who, in the development of 
three mission scenarios, identified anti-drug smuggling as one of the three critical 
missions representative of a Phase Zero operation.  To further narrow the scope of the 
model, three ports were selected in Mexico to be included in the model.  Specific data 
about the ports of Ensenada, Manzanillo and Salina Cruz was provided by the Red Team 
to assist in modeling.  A summary of physical and threat data is included in this country 
study. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
The types of threats present in Mexico are:  drug smugglers, human smugglers, 
illegal immigration, gangs, crime, natural disasters, and possible domino effects from 
lack of water and other necessary resources. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
The small arms carried by smugglers are similar to those employed by U.S. 
ground forces in conventional ground combat.  In fact, many of the weapons carried by 
smugglers and coyotes are the very same weapons, smuggled into Mexico from the 
United States.  It is the numbers of these weapons rather than sophistication in weaponry 
that is the issue.  There is ready access to machine guns, with and without night scopes, 
grenades, handguns, and shoulder fired anti-armor and anti-aircraft launchers. 
Smugglers have been developing small submarines to carry drugs, but as of yet, 
none of the captured mini-subs have been outfitted with any weaponry.  They are very 
crude; many do not even have latrine facilities that would reduce space available for 




Local urban gangs, as well as cartel sponsored gangs can be found in most border 
and port cities.  Competing coyote groups vie for the profit from escorting illegal 
immigrants, and often form co-operations with drug gangs in order to use the immigrants 
as packhorses to move drugs over the border.  Unfortunately, because of widespread 
corruption in public offices, police and military officers present as a threat as well, 
usually in the form of small-scale extortion and bribes. 
No organized terror groups are reportedly based in Mexico, and Mexico continues 
to be an ally in the war against terror. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
Mexico has faced several severe economic depressions in the last decades.  
Because of its shared border with the United States, it has been the primary conduit for 
the movement of illegal drugs.  The drug industry has created many fall-out threats, such 
as money laundering, smuggling gangs and an increase in crime.  The threat of thinning 
resources, especially water, has steadily developed, especially in the more urbanized 
north.   
• Current Threat Environment: 
The current threat environment is characterized by the drug trade, and by illegal 
immigration.  Mexico struggles with immigration difficulties on its southern border with 
Belize and Guatemala.  Mexico also has several environmental and health vulnerabilities.  
Rural areas have a low standard of health care, and population densities, such as Mexico 
City, make the population susceptible to outbreaks of disease.  Mexico has been 
identified as the epicenter of the so-called “swine flu virus”, which is currently listed as a 
severity of 5 out of 6 on the CDC pandemic scale. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
Drugs and immigration will be on the radar for many years to come.  Even if the 




Possibly of greater importance in the future, tensions over water resources could 
cause a strain to the US-Mexico relationship, and create severely poor living conditions 
in Mexico’s poorest areas. 
26. NICARAGUA 
Nicaragua is situated in Central America, and has coastlines with the North 
Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea to the West and East, respectively, and shares a 
northern border with Honduras and a southern border with Costa Rica.  Nicaragua was 
initially a Spanish colony, and then resisted English occupation during the period when 
the UK ruled most of the Caribbean region.   
Today, Nicaragua is considered a poor nation, and experiences 47% 
underemployment, meaning that although 97% of the adult population has jobs, their 
wages are not suitable to make a living. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
Nicaragua is inside the hurricane belt.  In 1998, Hurricane Mitch caused 
widespread devastation, from which the country in only now recovering.  Although AIDS 
is not very prevalent, other infectious diseases are rampant, and risk of infection is high. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
Threats in Nicaragua include:  hurricanes, rebel guerillas, illicit drug smuggling, 
flooding, mudslides, volcanoes, deforestation, water pollution, and disease.  Water 
pollution is critical, because Nicaragua contains the largest fresh water source in Central 
America. 
Threat Organizations: 
The Marxist Sandinista guerilla group came to power following a civil war at the 
end of the 1970s.  Organized drug lords and drug gangs operate in Nicaragua, moving 
both drugs and weapons. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
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Both natural and human threats have ravaged Nicaragua.  It is prone to a great 
number of natural disasters, and has also been a hotbed of Marxism, political and social 
schisms, and guerilla activities. 
Nicaragua has had recently settled territory disputes with Colombia, Costa Rica 
and Honduras. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
Nicaragua has had a relatively recent civil war, and disgruntled Marxist groups 
still pose a threat in the country.  The most recent democratic election was won by a 
member of the Sandinista Contras. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
The issues that have plagued Nicaragua in the past, and are only just under the 
surface today, could break out into new threats at any time.  Marxist rebels, high crime 
and underemployment, international disputes and real and perceived government 
corruption may be setting the stage for civil unrest to reemerge at any time. 
Illicit drug use and drug smuggling are likely going to continue to erode stability, 
as long as demand remains high and enforcement remains ineffective. 
27. PANAMA 
Panama is located in  Central America, bordering both the Caribbean Sea and the 
North Pacific Ocean, between Colombia and Costa Rica. The land mass is slightly 
smaller than South Carolina.  The terrain interior is mostly steep with rugged mountains 
and upland plains.  The geography lends itself to a strategic location on the eastern end of 
the isthmus forming a land bridge connecting North and South America.  More 
importantly, Panama controls the Panama Canal, which links the North Atlantic Ocean 
via the Caribbean Sea with the North Pacific Ocean.  It has tropical maritime weather 
patterns and is hot, humid and cloudy with a prolonged rainy season.  There are 
occasional severe storms and forest fires in the Darien area.  The current environmental 
issues include water pollution from agricultural runoff, which threatens fishery resources, 
deforestation of tropical rain forest, land degradation and air pollution in urban areas.  
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Depletion of natural resources through mining and soil erosion threaten the siltation of 
the Panama Canal.   
The population is about 3.4 million people.  1% of the people in Panama are 
living with HIV/AIDS, and the major infectious diseases are food and waterborne related 
diseases. The religion of 85% of the population is Roman Catholic.  The official language 
is Spanish.  Panama is one of the fastest growing economies in Central America.  
Because of its key geographic location, Panama's economy is mainly service based, 
depending on services such as banking, commerce, tourism and trading.   
Human and drug trafficking remain significant challenges.  Panama is a source, 
transit, and destination country for women and children trafficked for the purpose of 
commercial sexual exploitation.  Panama is also a major cocaine trans-shipment point 
and a primary money-laundering center for narcotics revenue. 
Panama has no regular military forces.  The Panamanian public forces include the 
Panamanian National Police, the National Air-Naval Service and the National Border 
Service.  There are 54 paved runways, 63 unpaved runways, two heliports and three ports 
(Balboa, Colon, Cristobal) in the country.   
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
There is evidence of the presence of organized illegal narcotics operations from 
Colombia who operate within the remote border region with Panama.  The specific key 
threats in Panama are human and drug trafficking, money laundering and official 
corruption.  Panama is a major cocaine trans-shipment point and primary money 
laundering center for narcotics revenue and money-laundering activity is especially heavy 
in the Colon Free Zone.  Human trafficking is also a severe issue whereby the majority of 
victims are Panamanian women and children trafficked within the country into the sex 
trade.  Rural children in Panama may also be trafficked internally to urban areas for labor 
exploitation.  To aggravate the problems further, official corruption leads to failure in 
prosecuting, convicting, and sentencing human traffickers for their crimes. 
The Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) lists Panama as one of the top three 
offenders for Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing.  Two of the three worst 
offenders are in the 4th Fleet AO.  Panama has been engaged in the practice of issuing 
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“flags of convenience”, in which a rouge fishing vessel purchases a short-term license to 
run up a Panamanian flag and fish near-range international waters, with disregard to the 
Rule of the Seas.  This is the primary enabler of IUU fishing, and the Panamanian 
government profits from large volumes of these licenses, for which poachers pay 
hundreds to thousands of dollars per fishing run. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
Physical threats relate primarily to the capabilities of the human and drug 
traffickers in Panama.  The AIDS rate in Panama is also high, with a prevalence rate of 
1%. 
Threat Organizations: 
The most significant threat organizations in Panama are those associated with the 
drug cartels and trafficking rings, and those groups who engage in human abduction and 
trafficking. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
The primary historical threat was attributed more to the Panama’s nationalist 
protest movement.  In 1964, riots broke out in the Canal Zone.  Panamanian protestors 
who carried out their protest movement near the Canal Zone were fired upon by United 
States soldiers stationed there as part of the US Southern Command.  Violence escalated 
in the areas bordering the Canal Zone with scenes of bloodshed, fires, and looting.  
Panama was also the scene of the U.S. Operation Just Cause, which removed Manuel 
Noriega from power in the late 1980s.  Ownership and control of the Panama Canal has 
transferred from the U.S. to Panama, under a contract agreement enacted by the Carter 
Administration. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
Because the U.S. no longer exerts control over the Panama Canal, the stability in 
Panama, particularly in the Canal Zone, is critical for a Phase Zero force, which may 
need to utilize this key infrastructure.  Panama has thus far maintained close security ties 
to the United States.  A bilateral military assistance pact and Panama Canal treaties are in 
place between the United States and Panama.  The two countries pledged themselves to 
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the joint defense of the Panama Canal.  However, current threats exist within Panama 
with severe human and drug trafficking issues.  Panama fails to show evidence of 
increasing efforts to combat human trafficking, particularly with respect to prosecuting, 
convicting, and sentencing human traffickers for their crimes, and for failing to provide 
adequate victim assistance.  Panama is also a major cocaine trans-shipment point, and 
money laundering continues to be a serious problem in addition to official corruption. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
Barring a change in policy, the existing threats such as money laundering, 
corruption, human and drug trafficking issues will still be prevalent.  To date, the efforts 
put in by the government in combating these problems are not adequate or effective.  
Panama plans to expand the Canal in the coming years, with completion expected in 
2014-2015.  This would double the Canal’s capacity and may result in it being more 
attractive as a trans-shipment point for drug trafficking if no effective border controls are 
put in place. 
28. PARAGUAY 
Paraguay, which is roughly the size of the US state of California, is a land-locked 
country in the very heart of the South American continent.  It has borders with Bolivia, 
Argentina and Brazil, and is home to nearly seven million people.   
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
Paraguay is most susceptible to flooding, and also has environmental issues such 
as deforestation, water pollution and poor waste disposal infrastructure.  The AIDS rate is 
low, the same 0.6% that is found in the US.  Other major infectious diseases also pose 
only an intermediate threat.   
The communications infrastructure is very minimal, and cell phones have 
supplanted other forms of communication, outnumbering land lines ten to one.  A Phase 
Zero force will need to come equipped with its own communications, and not rely on the 
existing equipment. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
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Threats in Paraguay come from the protective measures employed by those 
involved with drug crops and shipments, money laundering and extremist group 
fundraising. 
Threat Organizations: 
Small extremist groups, particularly in the tri-border region with Argentina and 
Brazil, are active in fundraising, recruitment and protests. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
Historically, Paraguay has been held in the sway of communism, and has engaged 
in many bitter wars with its neighbors, as well as a civil war in the 1940s.  Towards the 
end of the 19th century, Paraguay lost over two thirds of its male population to the 
devastation of war.  Paraguay has spent the first half of this century working to rebuild 
and strengthen its economy, and to undo the damage of decades of human rights abuses.  
Democracy in Paraguay is only 20 years old, and former military extremists still exist 
within the country, although they currently hold little sway over public opinion.   
• Current Threat Environment: 
Political corruption has led to economic stagnation in this mostly agricultural 
democracy.  Small extremist groups are present.  As much as half of the population lives 
in poverty, and poverty is often the harbinger of social instability. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
Corruption of public officials could weaken the tenuous hold democracy has held 
in Paraguay for two decades, leaving room for social or military uprisings.  An 
atmosphere of dissatisfaction may make room for the advancement of already-existing 
extremists.  An economically unbalanced treaty with Brazil, dealing with the use and sale 
of hydroelectric power, expires in 2023, and is already the source of much discontent and 
heated debate.  Brokering the peace between these two countries could be a necessity. 
29. PERU 
Peru is a country rich in natural resources of copper, silver, lead, zinc, oil and 
gold.  Politically, it has alternated between military dictatorship and democracy in past 
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years.  It is deeply divided politically and economically.  President Alberto Fujimori 
headed Peru from 1990 to 2000, before resigning suddenly following allegations of a 
series of scandals involving his top aide.  During Fujimori’s tenure, he did much to bring 
under control destabilizing factors such as terrorism, drug trafficking, hyper-inflation and 
border disputes.  However, he also created constitutional crises and his efforts to remain 
in power eroded democratic institutions.  Following new elections in 2000, Alejandro 
Toledo was elected as President.  He promised to wage a “head-on war on poverty”, but 
struggled to improve the lives of the poor; nor did he manage to create a million jobs over 
five years.  Currently, President Alan Garcia, who campaigned in 2006 on promises to 
tackle poverty and boost economic growth, leads the Popular Revolutionary Alliance 
(APRA) to govern Peru.  On taking office, as a show of commitment, he announced a cut 
in his own salary and has thus far shown a robust macroeconomic performance scorecard.  
In a country of 28.2 million people, a small Spanish descended elite controls most of the 
wealth and power in the country.  The rest of the country, who make up mostly 
indigenous Peruvians numbering in the millions, live in continued poverty.  Peru is also 
one of the biggest producers of coca, the raw material for cocaine, and most of the 
pickers of these coca plants are children in the north-east and south-east areas.  Peru is 
among the top three providers of cocaine, and is also a major offender when it comes to 
human trafficking, because many children are trafficked to Peru for forced labor in the 
coca fields. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
Corruption and poor social and economic planning feature high on the threat list.  
Just recently, in October 2008, the entire Apra Cabinet resigned after members of the 
party were implicated in a corruption scandal.  Leadership’s preoccupation with political 
power struggles have resulted in neglect of the economy and basic infrastructure in the 
country.  This has led to Peru’s clash with guerrilla insurgencies.  In the 1980s and 1990s, 
Peru waged a brutal civil war against Maoist rebels, which left 69,000 people dead.  
Although the two main guerrilla groups of Shining Path (the Sendero Luminosa) and 
Tupac Amaru have largely been decimated, violence in the form of murders and gang 
warfare has taken its place.  This violence has been linked to the drug trade.  The media 
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has also been a target of violence.  Reporters are subjected to great risk of certain “death” 
if they report unfavorably of corruption, drug-trafficking and activities of Shining Path 
rebels. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
Recently, the Peruvians have come under fire from environmental and human 
rights campaigners over plans to auction off parcels of the Amazon to oil and gas 
companies.  The country is also plagued by natural disasters such as earthquakes, 
tsunamis, flooding, landslides and mild volcanic activity.  Environmental issues include 
deforestation, overgrazing leading to soil erosion, desertification and air pollution in 
Lima and pollution of rivers and coastal waters from municipal and mining wastes.  
Peruvians have an extremely high risk of being afflicted by major infectious diseases.  
Food and waterborne diseases such as hepatitis A, typhoid fever and bacterial infections 
are common.  Also common are vector borne diseases such as dengue fever, malaria, and 
yellow fever.  Leptospirosis has in this year, 2009, begun to surface as a disease of 
concern. 
Threat Organizations: 
Even though the number of Shining Path and Tupac Amaru members has 
dwindled, pockets remain within the country, consolidating and recruiting.  Smaller street 
gangs also roam the streets of Peru, establishing their own territory through their own 
form of “warfare” and violence. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
The civil war from 1980-2000 has shaped the government somewhat to what it is 
today.  It is gradually moving away from the authoritarian regime of the Fujimori era, 
towards democracy and equality.  However, the social divide is still very evident today.  
Also, coastal cities in Peru are much more affluent than inland cities, and wealth 
distribution has historically been very unbalanced. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
Up until 1996, Peru was the largest producer of coca leaf, the source for cocaine.  
But she was taken over by Columbia, not necessary a good thing, when its cultivation 
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declined to 36,000 hectares.  Processed coca (cocaine) is shipped out of Peru to 
international markets, as well as to Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Bolivia for use in the 
Southern Cone.  Increasingly, there are transshipments to Europe and Africa, as well as a 
rise in domestic drug consumption.  Guerrilla cells continue to exist, albeit in smaller 
numbers within the country, to consolidate and recruit.  Street violence  and crime 
remains a threat in urban areas. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
The present government seems to be more focused on economic development 
rather than curbing the rising drug usage and crime in the country.  Until such problems 
reach a critical trigger point, and the government decides to do something, if anything, 
the current threats will continue to proliferate at a steady pace.  Threats which will likely 
continue and possibly increase by 2020 are crime, drug smuggling, lack of 
communications infrastructure in large portions of the country, diseases, natural disasters, 
environmental issues and terrorism.  And groups who engage in domestic terror acts have 
declined, but are making concentrated efforts at reconsolidation and recruitment, and so 
well may emerge as a greater threat in the future.  
30. PUERTO RICO 
Puerto Rico is composed of an archipelago that includes the main island of Puerto 
Rico and a number of smaller islands and keys, the largest of which are Vieques, Culebra, 
and Mona.  The main island of Puerto Rico is the smallest by land area and second 
smallest by population among the four Greater Antilles (Cuba, Hispaniola, Jamaica, and 
Puerto Rico). 
The majority of Puerto Ricans are descendants from the Spanish settlers that 
settled Puerto Rico in the 16th century.  A large number are from Spain, and other Latin 
American nations.  African, Mestizo, Mulato, and Native Americans also formed a 
significant part of the Puerto Rican population. 
Puerto Ricans had median household income of $17,741 for 2008.  Puerto Rico’s 
public debt has grown at a faster pace than the growth of its economy, reaching $46.7 
billion in 2008.  The island unemployment rate is 12% as of January, 2009. 
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Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
The threat most specific to Puerto Rico is crime; however, drug traffic is 
responsible for most of the violent crimes in Puerto Rico.  As a major smuggling route, 
drug-related violence is mostly related to drug lords shooting each other over control of 
drug points.  There are increasing numbers of illegal migrants from the Dominican 
Republic, who cross the Mona Passage to Puerto Rico each year looking for work.  This 
trend is steadily increasing. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
Physical threats relate primarily to the capabilities of the smugglers and drug-
runners that take advantage of Puerto Rico.  They possess numerous and reasonably 
modern small arms and assault weapons. 
Threat Organizations: 
There has been no evidence of prominent criminal or terrorist organizations 
operating within the country.  Among the criminals are deportees from North America, 
with their capacity to mobilize illegal guns and other weapons, and operate a 
sophisticated networking system in their reign of criminal terror.  Organized crime is not 
known to exist in Puerto Rico in the sense of Mafia families or other similarly organized 
groups. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
During 1994, Puerto Rico was declared a zone of great incidence of drug traffic, a 
political action that represents additional federal aid from the United States of America to 
fight drug traffic crime.  Passionate crimes are frequent.  Many of them are a direct result 
of the machista traditions of Latin Americans. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
Murder, rape, kidnapping, carjacking, armed assault and burglary are becoming a 
normal part of everyday life throughout the country. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
Murder, rape, kidnapping, armed assault and burglary are increasing throughout 
the country.  In addition, criminal acts involving weapons are also increasing.  
443 
 
Fortunately, in the majority of these cases, the weapon is used for intimidation purposes 
only; cooperative victims are seldom injured. 
31. ST KITTS, ST LUCIA, ST MAARTEN 
These Caribbean islands have a similar, reasonable level of stability, and all are 
popular tourist destinations for Americans and Europeans.  Much of the economy and 
employment of these countries depends on tourism.  St Kitts was once a booming sugar 
cane growing and processing island, but with US subsidies of corn crops and the 
replacement of many cane sugar products with corn syrup products, the cane industry has 
all but vanished in the Caribbean. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
These islands are more stable than many Central American nations, and crime 
rates are below or near average for the 4th Fleet region.  Drugs are trafficked to and 
through the islands, as sporadic transshipment points, and tourists themselves may be 
targeted for the sale of drugs. 
The islands are all at the lower part of the Hurricane belt, so although there is 
potential for severe tropical weather, the likelihood of these storms occurring is lower 
than average for the Caribbean. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
There are no above average physical threats in St Kitts, St Lucia, or St Maarten. 
Threat Organizations: 
No threat organizations are currently known to be operating in or based out of 
these islands.  Due to the size of the islands, and their popularity for tourism, terror 
training cells would not likely go unnoticed.  Drug trade and traffic is minimal and 
sporadic, and drug organizations are not based in these islands. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
The islands have weathered several economic slides and comebacks throughout 
history.  Slave trade, followed by agriculture and sugar processing, followed by tourism, 
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have driven the economic and financial health of the islands, and the transition periods 
between these trades has led to some issues with poverty and unrest. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
The current threat environment is low, if relaxed.   
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
The presence of many American and European tourists could possibly make these 
destinations attractive targets for terror groups in the future.  Also, the economies of the 
islands are tied closely to European and Western economic stability, so troubled financial 
times would have a rapid domino effect to these nations. 
32. SURINAME 
Suriname is located on the northern coast of the South American continent.  It 
shares borders with Guyana (British Guinea) to the West, Guyane (French Guinea) to the 
East, and Brazil to the South.  Formerly a Dutch settlement, the port city of New 
Amsterdam is located at a harbor on the North Atlantic Ocean, which favors trade.  Since 
its independence from the Netherlands in the 1970s, power has changed hands between 
military, socialist and democratically elected regimes, and the governing authority is 
currently democratic.  The smallest independent government in South America, Suriname 
has less than half a million citizens, many of African or Indian descent. 
Mining, and some offshore drilling, are the mainstays of the economy, and so 
changing markets have great impact on the GDP and financial stability of Suriname.  The 
country struggles with both high taxes and inflation, and unemployment is currently at 
about 10%. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
Suriname faces environmental threats related to deforestation and mining.   The 
HIV rate is high per capita (based on Latin American average), at 2.4%.   There are no 
specific natural disasters to which Suriname is prone.   
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
Physical threats to a Phase Zero force are those commonly associated with 
smugglers, namely small arms, gangs and guerilla tactics. 
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The prevalence of both AIDS and other diseases within the country requires 
careful force protection measures to reduce likelihood of infection. 
Threat Organizations: 
Small scale drug and money laundering organizations are currently operating in 
the country.  News coverage of rebel groups making threats against infrastructure do not 
even give the small groups names, and tend to treat them dismissively. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
Democratic rule has only been in place for 20 years.  Prior to that both socialist 
and military regimes seized power by force.  A previous attempt at a democratic state 
failed. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
The oil rich waters off of the Suriname coast have led to territory disputes with 
their neighbors to the east and west, which have as yet not been settled, although 
Suriname has appealed to the UN. 
Suriname has a growing problem with smuggles moving both arms and drugs 
bound for Europe.  The Brazil-Suriname-Netherlands drug conduit is fairly well 
established and increasing.  Suriname is listed as a Tier 2 country for the trafficking of 
persons. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
Current international disputes regarding oil and mineral rights have the potential 
to escalate and create larger scale conflicts in the future.  Further devastation of the 
Suriname rainforests may have impacts on water quality and the economy.  The increase 
in cybercrime in Suriname should also be noted and monitored.  Reports in Caribbean 
newspapers indicate that Japan and Suriname are forging a cooperation to establish a 
whaling company.  This partnership may lead to possible IUU fishing issues, as Japan is 
alleged to already be highly culpable for the illegal hunting of whales. 
The movement of illicit drugs, weapons and humans is increasing, and should this 
trend increase, both contraband smuggling, and the fall-out effects of crime and money 




Trinidad is one of many islands colonized by the British for sugar cane 
production.  It is a small island with less than 200 miles of coastline.  Emancipation of 
the slave labor on the sugar plantations, and decreasing demand for sugar cane products 
caused economic setbacks.  Oil was discovered in the early 20th century, which boosted 
the financial standing of the country, but that leveled out in the 1960s when the British 
handed over control and independence to the islanders.  Tourism and oil production 
continue to be the biggest boons to the economy of Trinidad and of nearby Tobago.  The 
US Navy 4th Fleet maintains port operations on Trinidad.  Many international businesses 
take advantage of Trinidad for monetary investment.  The unemployment rate is one of 
the lowest in the Caribbean, at about 5%. 
There has been tension with Barbados regarding fishing rights and boundaries, but 
an initial agreement was reached in 2006. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
Crime is a growing problem that the government is currently having difficulty 
controlling.  Some small scale cannabis production and shipment of drugs does take place 
in Trinidad, but it is considered a minor threat. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
The threat from crime is great, and growing.  There are few natural disasters since 
Trinidad is located outside the hurricane belt, but there are some serious environmental 
problems, mainly water pollution and oil contamination of the coasts and reefs. 
Threat Organizations: 
Although crime is on the rise in Trinidad, the criminal element is not consolidated 
into an organization, nor are there major drug gangs or cartels based in the country. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
Historical threats include minor disputes regarding fishing rights, depressed 
economies and an up-tick in crime. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
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Employment, social stability, and economic health are all in Trinidad’s favor, but 
despite all these successes, the government has been unable to turn back a rise in crime. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
Because some desirable fishing game are in the waters around Trinidad and 
Tobago, there is a potential for the increase of IUU fishing in the future.  And if crime 
continues to increase unabated, it could have a negative impact on the tourism industry 
and the willingness of foreign corporations to invest. 
34. URUGUAY 
Nearly three and a half million people live in this second smallest South 
American country.  It is equivalent in size to the US state of Washington, and is bordered 
by Argentina, Brazil, and the South Atlantic.  The natural harbor near the capital of 
Montevideo helps make Uruguay an excellent trade center.  Uruguay also has fertile 
lowlands, suitable for both crops and livestock. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
The current political stability in Uruguay was long fought and hard won, and the 
relative peace is in a fledgling stage.   
There are some environmental concerns, in that the sanitation infrastructure is 
inadequate.  Severe winds, like the California Santa Ana winds, present seasonal 
difficulties, along with other unpredictable weather and flooding. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
Flooding and severe winds pose an intermittent threat.   
Threat Organizations: 
Although it has been largely put down, the Marxist Party guerillas, Tupamaros, 
have been active in the country since as recently as the 1980s.  Civilian rule has only 
been in place since the 1980s as well, and former military leaders who exercised a 
lengthy rule in Uruguay, have reluctantly ceded control, but are still present.  Military 
cells are not threats in themselves, but should another power void present itself, others 
could be caught in the crossfire as military leaders strive for control. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
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• Historical Threats: 
Uruguay has shown both economic and political resilience.  GDP and growth 
from exports have been very positive over the last decade, and recovered quickly from a 
brief downturn in 2002, when Venezuela and Argentina made bank-runs on deposits in 
Uruguay.  Politically, Uruguay has vacillated between civilian, military and socialist rule, 
but the current ruling civilian government is strong. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
The current political environment is stable, and economic conditions have also 
been steadily improving.  The international community is involved in arbitrating some 
minor land disputes with both Venezuela and Argentina, but these issues don’t seem 
likely to escalate. 
Uruguay is a small scale transshipment point for drugs en route to Europe through 
Montevideo, and some money laundering associated with the drug trade exists.  There are 
also some reports of corruption and abuse of power by law enforcement. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
The trend in Uruguay has been for the better, and if the government continues to 
improve the economic and social conditions in the country, there are no large-scale 
foreseeable threats to contend with in 2020.  Uruguay does border Venezuela, which does 
have issues with terrorism.  
35. US VIRGIN ISLANDS 
The US Virgin Islands are relatively stable, and the 4th fleet maintains port 
operations there.  It is located along a key shipping lane from the Panama Canal.  The 
population is only about 100,000 people, who are US citizens without electoral 
representation.  Tourism is the staple of the economy, as the islands host over 2.5 million 
vacationers a year. 
The largest oil refinery in the world, a critical piece of infrastructure, is located in 
the Virgin Islands.  Other infrastructure is modern.  In 2005, cell phone usage surpassed 
hard-wired telephone communication. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
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These small, tropical islands, located east of Puerto Rico, have few 
anthropomorphic threats, but are subject to forces of nature, such as hurricanes, 
earthquakes drought and flooding.  Neither AIDS nor other disease is particularly 
prevalent. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
Lack of fresh water is a recurring issue, as the weather, particularly rainfall, 
occurs in sporadic patterns.  A Phase Zero force would need to make considerations for 
providing their own potable water, and might even find this an issue for population 
support, if taken to the extreme. 
Threat Organizations: 
No notable crime, drug or terror groups are known to be operating in the US 
Virgin Islands at this time. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
The transition from sugar cane to corn sucrose products proved difficult for the 
economy of the islands, but they have rebounded, and tourism, oil refinement and rum 
distillation, have solidified the economic base. 
• Current Threat Environment: 
The US is responsible for defense of the US Virgin Islands, but there have been 
no serious threats or intrusions on its sovereignty in the recent past.  Drug related issues 
are much less severe in the Virgin Islands (both US and UK) than much of the rest of 
Central America and the Caribbean. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
There are no marked emerging threats at this time.  It can be expected that for the 
most part, the stability of the US Virgin Islands may be linked to the economic and social 
stability of the US. 
36. VENEZUELA 
Venezuela was one of three countries that emerged from the collapse of Gran 
Colombia in 1830, the others being Ecuador and New Granada, which later became 
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Colombia.  For most of the first half of the 20th century, Venezuela was ruled by 
generally benevolent military strongmen, who promoted the oil industry and allowed for 
some social reforms.  Democratically elected governments have held sway since 1959.  
Hugo Chavez, president since 1999, seeks to implement his "21st Century Socialism," 
which purports to alleviate social ills while at the same time attacking globalization and 
undermining regional stability.  Current concerns include a weakening of democratic 
institutions, political polarization, a politicized military, drug-related violence along the 
Colombian border, increasing internal drug consumption, overdependence on the 
petroleum industry with its price fluctuations and irresponsible mining operations that are 
endangering the rain forest and indigenous peoples. 
Venezuela remains highly dependent on oil revenues, which account for roughly 
90% of export earnings, about 50% of the federal budget revenues, and around 30% of 
GDP.  A nationwide strike between December 2002 and February 2003 had far-reaching 
economic consequences.  Real GDP declined by around 9% in 2002 and 8% in 2003, but 
economic output since then has made a strong recovery.  Fueled by high oil prices, record 
government spending helped to boost GDP by about 9% in 2006, 8% in 2007, and nearly 
6% in 2008.  This spending, combined with recent minimum wage hikes and improved 
access to domestic credit, has created a consumption boom but has come at the cost of 
higher inflation, roughly 20% in 2007 and more than 30% in 2008.  Imports also have 
jumped significantly.  Declining oil prices in the latter part of 2008 undermined the 
ability of the Venezuelan government to continue the high rate of spending.  In 2008, 
President Hugo Chavez continued efforts to increase the government's control of the 
economy by nationalizing firms in the cement and steel sectors.  In 2007, he nationalized 
firms in the petroleum, communications and electricity sectors.  In July 2008, President 
Chavez implemented by decree a number of laws that further consolidate and centralize 
authority over the economy through his plan for "21st Century Socialism”. 
Functional Threats (types of threat operations in AO): 
Threats specific to Venezuela are international disputes, illicit drugs and human 
trafficking. 
Physical Threats (physical capabilities of Red Forces in AO): 
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In Latin America, Shia Hezbollah and Sunni Hamas have developed sophisticated 
but little studied financial structures, largely through the unregulated exchange houses 
and free trade zones in specific parts of the region, including Panama’s Colon Free Trade 
Zone, Isla Margarita in Venezuela, Ciudad del Este in Paraguay, the Aruba Free Trade 
Zone and others.  The overarching structure that enables both groups to work alongside 
each other is the international Muslim Brotherhood, the one pan-Islamist group that has 
for several decades served as a bridge between the two factions.  Hugo Chavez's state-
sponsored support of terror groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) has led to congressional calls to designate Venezuela as a state sponsor of 
terrorism. 
Threat Organizations: 
Colombian-organized illegal narcotics and paramilitary activities penetrate 
Venezuela's shared border region.  The FARC organization has safe haven within the 
country, as does the International Muslim Brotherhood.  Venezuela has long been a 
favored location for international terror agents to seek refuge.  Several of those 
responsible for slaying 12 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics were later 
tracked to Venezuela. 
Chronological Threat Analysis: 
• Historical Threats: 
The huge public spending and accumulation of internal and external debts by the 
government and private sector during the Petrodollar years of the 1970s and early 1980s, 
followed by the collapse of oil prices during the 1980s, crippled the Venezuelan 
economy.  As the government devalued the currency in order to face its mounting local 
and non-local financial obligations, Venezuelans' real standard of living fell dramatically.  
A number of failed economic policies and increasing corruption in government and 
society led to rising poverty and crime.  Worsening social indicators and increasing 
political instability resulted in two major coup attempts in 1992. 
In the February 1992 coup, Hugo Chavez, a former paratrooper, attempted to 
overthrow the government of President Carlos Andrés Perez as anger grew against the 
president's economic austerity measures.  Chavez was unsuccessful and was placed in 
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jail.  In November 1992, another unsuccessful coup attempt occurred, organized by other 
revolutionary groups in the Venezuelan Armed Forces and those that remained from 
Chavez’s previous attempt.   
In 1998, Chavez was elected president as a reaction against the established 
political parties and the corruption and inequalities their policies created.  His reform 
program, which he calls the "Bolivarian Revolution", is aimed largely at redistributing 
the benefits of Venezuela's oil wealth to the lower socio-economic groups by using it to 
fund programs such as health care and education.  Agricultural land redistribution has 
also been undertaken on a small scale.  His program has encountered great resistance by 
the previous establishment.  In April 2002, it removed him via a coup d’état.  However, 
he was returned to power after two days as a result of popular demonstrations in his favor 
and action by loyal sections of the military.  He also survived a management-led strike 
and lockout in the state oil company, PDVSA, in December 2002, and a recall 
referendum in August 2004.   
• Current Threat Environment: 
Venezuela is involved in a large number of border disagreements with its 
neighbors.  Venezuela claims all of the area west of the Essequibo River in Guyana, 
preventing any discussion of a maritime boundary.  Guyana has expressed its intention to 
join Barbados in asserting claims before the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) that Trinidad and Tobago's maritime boundary with Venezuela 
extends into their waters.  There is a standing dispute with Colombia over the maritime 
boundary and the Venezuelan-administered Los Monjes islands near the Gulf of 
Venezuela.  In 2006, an estimated 139,000 Colombians sought protection in 150 
communities along the border in Venezuela.  The US, France, and the Netherlands 
recognize Venezuela's granting full effect to Aves Island, thereby claiming a Venezuelan 
EEZ/continental shelf extending over a large portion of the eastern Caribbean Sea.  
Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
protest Venezuela's full effect claim. 
Venezuela is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and 
children trafficked for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation and forced labor.  
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Venezuelan women and girls are trafficked within the country for sexual exploitation, 
lured from the nation's interior to urban and tourist areas.  Child prostitution in urban 
areas and child sex tourism in resort destinations appear to be growing.  Venezuelan 
women and girls are trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation to Western Europe, 
Mexico, and Caribbean destinations as well. 
Venezuela is on the CIA Tier 2 Watch List, up from Tier 3, as it showed greater 
resolve to address human trafficking through law enforcement measures and prevention 
efforts in 2007.  Stringent punishment of offenders and victim assistance remain lacking 
at this time. 
There is the presence of some small-scale illicit production of opium and coca for 
the processing of opiates and coca derivatives.  However, large quantities of cocaine, 
heroin, and marijuana transit the country from Colombia, bound for the US and Europe.  
There is significant narcotics-related money laundering activity, especially along the 
border with Colombia and on Margarita Island.  An active eradication program exists, 
primarily targeting opium, but there are increasing signs of drug-related activities by 
Colombian insurgents on border. 
• Anticipated Future Threats: 
According to information source “worldthreats.com”, Venezuelan President Hugo 
Chavez’s alliance with Iran raises fears that Venezuela could become a base for 
Hezbollah activity.  Venezuela also serves as the corridor for a full third of the 
Colombian cocaine smuggled to the U.S. and Europe.  
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F.  PORTS DATA 
The following appendix shows data on ports that a Phase Zero Force operating 
within the Latin American region may visit. 
1. PORTS DATA OF COLOMBIA 
A. Port of Cartegena 318 
Background: 
The port of Cartagena, Colombia is a state owned port, managed by the Port 
Authority.  Maintenance of a police presence at the port facility is included in the listed 
duties of the Port Authority, but there was no specific mention of drug enforcement, 
boarding operations or inspections other than those of labeled hazardous cargo. 
The Port Authority of Cartagena is founding member and participates as full 
member of the association Med Ports Community.  Med Ports Community is a platform 
made up of the ports of Tarragona, Baleares, Cartagena, Salerno, Bastia, Sète, Livorno 
and Toulon.  This lobby of ports tries to promote the cooperation between Spain, France 
and Italy and promote the cooperation between the public and the private sectors. 
Another of its main aims is the development of sabotage (short sea shipping) between 
countries in the European Union. 
Port Physical Characteristics: 
There are terminals dedicated to different types of cargo and activities:  liquid 
bulk, fruits and vegetables (including an inspection station), general cargo, container 
cargo, and the Yacht Club.  The port is certified by Lloyd’s register standards for 
containers, solid bulk and container goods.  (ISO 9001) 
All of the port premises have a perimeter closure with restricted access, at 
different security levels depending on the terminal, and controlled by the Surveillance 
and Port Police Service. There is a CCTV installation equipped with 43 cameras and is 
connected through a fiber optic network that covers the entire port service area. Each 
access control has a CCTV of its influence area, centralizing the system in the Control 
Centre. There is a permanent digital recording of the entire CCTV system. 





A large portion of port traffic deals with shipping to and from the Mediterranean, 
particularly trade with Spain.  In 2005, the port had 34 cruise calls.  In February of 2009, 
construction of a large cruise terminal began, indicating that cruise ship volume will 
likely increase in the region unless economic factors offset this trend. 
Cargo Volume: 
The cargo volume has an increase of 15% from 23.2 million tons of cargo in year 
2004 to 26.7 million tons or cargo in year 2005. Currently, liquid bulk accounts for over 
20 million tons of annual cargo, or at least 80% of the shipping.   
 
 
Figure 50: Port of Cartagena Data 
 
Weather Conditions (Average Annual): 
The port website reports prevailing wind as S-SW and predominate winds as S-
SE; no average speeds are given.   
Significant wave height for a 50-year return period is 6.3 meters.  Maximum tide 
movement is 6.5 meters.  Height at LLW compared to port zero is -4.3 meters and height 
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at HHW compared to port zero is +0.22 meters.  This means that the depth of the channel 




B. Port of Tumaco 
Background: 
Situated on the Pacific coast in Tumaco Bay, near the border with Ecuador, 
smaller vessels enter the harbor, while the larger tankers use the offshore berth.  The 
water depth, depending on mean tide, varies from 11 to 15 feet, with anchorage limited to 
30 to 35 feet.   
In the late 1980s, transport by water was still very important to Colombia. 
Shipping operated out of five key ports: Santa Marta, Barranquilla, and Cartagena on the 
Caribbean coast and Buenaventura and Tumaco on the Pacific coast (ita.com).  Tumaco, 
positioned west of the Panama Canal, handles a disproportional amount of traffic for its 
size. 
Tumaco is the main Pacific Ocean port in south-west Colombia's volatile Nariño 
department. The region is an epicenter of combat between the national armed forces, 
irregular armed groups and criminal gangs involved in the trafficking of cocaine.  260 
people were murdered during the first nine months of this year in the Tumaco area, which 
numbers some 160,000 people in urban and rural zones. This represents a yearly average 
of 200 homicides per 100,000 people, far above the national figure of 38 murders per 
100,000 inhabitants in 2006 (afro-colombia.org).   
Although this port is located south of the four major Colombian cartels, drug lords 
in Peru and Bolivia, which follow Colombia in cocaine production, often move their 
drugs over land into Colombia before moving them over maritime channels.  Tumaco is a 
good example of the small, out of the way port, with little or no government presence, 
which might easily be exploited to smuggle drugs.   
                                                 
319 http://www.apc.es/general/apc03.asp accessed on 21 May 2009 
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“Colombian Secret Police (DAS) officials, acting on a tip that sparked a six-
month investigation, discovered a virtually complete submarine built by drug-traffickers 
in an apparent scheme to smuggle illicit drugs to the United States. The homemade 
submarine, hidden in a port in Tumaco, near the Colombian border with Ecuador, was 
capable of carrying up to 10 tons of cocaine, worth as much as $300 million on U.S. 
streets. “The ingenuity of drug traffickers is amazing,” Eduardo Fernandez, head of the 
DAS in Valle de Cauca told The Associated Press. “They will do anything to avoid the 
Coast Guard.” Fernandez said the submarine could have been used to carry cocaine 
offshore where it would be transferred to speed boats and transported to the United 
States. Although no arrests were made, authorities suspect the notorious Norte de Valle 
cartel was behind the submarine’s construction. U.S.” 320     
Port Physical Characteristics: 
Tumaco is a very small port compared to the other two Colombian ports in the 
scenario.  It is an open roadstead port, with a turning area and the ability to accommodate 
vessels up to 500 feet in length.  There is limited to no security at this port, and no U.S. 
representation.   
 
Figure 51: Port of Tumaco 
Port Activities: 
                                                 
320 http://www.usofficeoncolombia.com/InfoBrief/032805.htm  accessed on 21 May 2009 
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The port is capable of servicing liquid tankers, mostly for export.  Tug and 
refueling services are available, but maintenance and repair is not. 
Tumaco is also very relevant as the terminus of one of the five major oil pipelines 
traversing Colombia.  The Transandino line carries crude from the Orito field in the 
Putumayo Basin.  The port also provides liquid export service for Ecuador, its neighbor 
to the south. 
Cargo Volume: 
Small tankers and cargo vessels do use this port, including small liquid tankers 
that travel to the U.S. East Coast.  Statistics regarding traffic density were not available in 
detail for this port.  The greatest percentage of vessel traffic to and from the portion of the 
Colombia coastline that is south-west of the Panama Canal is through Buenaventura.  The 
second largest port is at Cartagena, but requires transit through the canal in order to reach 
the west coast of Mexico or the U.S. 321 
The port is associated with a 27-meter-deep crude-oil-exporting private terminal 











                                                 




a. Weather Conditions (Average Annual)322 
 
 
Figure 52: Weather Conditions Tumaco 
 
 
C. Port of Buenaventura 
Background: 
Buenaventura is a Colombian port city with a metropolitan population equivalent 
to Los Angeles.  Buenaventura is the main port of Colombia in the Pacific Ocean.  
Buenaventura has been a hotbed of drug trafficking, violence, and the presence of 
guerrilla and paramilitary groups.  Reported homicides have doubled over the last two 
years to where the murder rate is now 24 times that of New York City.  In an attempt to 
counter the violence, the Colombian government has set up a special marine unit in the 
worst area of the city. 
Buenaventura exports coffee and sugar from the Cauca River valley, wood from 
southwest Colombia’s coastal forests, and gold and platinum from the north. It receives 
                                                 
322 http://www.wunderground.com/cgi-
bin/findweather/hdfForecast?query=colombia&searchType=WEATHER, "Weather Underground", 
accessed 10 Apr 2009 
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oil by pipeline from Puerto Berrio, and it is served by the Puerto Berrio-Popayan railroad. 
323 
Port Physical Characteristics: 
Most of the port information regarding Buenaventura is not translated.  This 
general information was found on the “nuevamodacolombia” site: 
 
Figure 53: Port Characteristics Buenaventura 
Lifting crane capacity is up to 100 tons.  The facilities can move 18 to 28 
containers an hour.  324 
Anchorage information from the World Port Source: 
                                                 
323http://www.worldportsource.com/ports/COL_Port_of_Sociedad_Portuaria_Regional_de_Buenaventura_
122.php  accessed on 21 May 2009 
324 http://www.nuevamodacolombia.com/articulos/buenaventura-port-maritime-terminal.php accessed on 




Figure 54: Anchorage Information Buenaventura 
Port Activities: 
The port has trade alliances in place with Houston, Barcelona, Corpus Christi and 
Miami.  Shipping density is extreme in the port and natural occurrences like mudslides or 
severe weather can cause lengthy backups.  A mudslide in 2006 closed a major road 
leaving the port and clogged operations for over two months. 
According to “Maritime Security” by Michael McNicholas, Port Buenaventura is 
also plagued by pirates.  Ships are vulnerable during the slow, 3-hour trek through the 
channel into the inner anchorage, and acts of piracy are very common.  Pirates also 
boldly plunder ships while they are anchored in the harbor. 
Specifics on port shipping density are hard to find, and satellite photos are 
almost all cloud obscured due to the prevalent rains in the area year round.  The 





Figure 55: Google Earth Buenaventura 325 
Cargo Volume: 
2007 estimate from a research paper by Ricardo Aricapa: 
• Tons:  11 million 
• Ships:  1,600 
The Port of Buenaventura handles a wide range of cargoes, including containers 
and solid and liquid bulks.  It receives crude from a major pipeline.  The container 
terminal can serve vessels of up to 100 DWT. Terminal storage has capacity for handling 
10.5 thousand containers per day.  
Facilities for solid bulks include silos with capacity for storing 160 thousand tons 
and handling 5.5 thousand tons per day.  The solid bulk terminals include sheds covering 
almost 35 thousand square meters and warehouse of about 58 thousand meters.  It also 
has covered parking for 300 vehicles.  
In 2007, the Port of Buenaventura imported almost 2.9 million tons of solid bulk 
cargoes, over 577 thousand tons of general cargo, and 278 thousand tons of liquid cargo. 
The Port of Buenaventura exported over 519 thousand tons of coal, more than 136 
thousand tons of general cargo, and about 70 thousand tons of solid bulk. Over 1200 
vessels moved through the Port of Buenaventura including 843 container vessels, 166 
vessels carrying bulk cargoes, 106 with general cargoes, 102 carrying roll-on/roll-off 
                                                 
325 http://earth.google.com/ accessed on 14 April 2009 
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cargoes, and 67 tankers. Handling over 457 thousand TEUs (8.9 million tons) of 
containerized cargo in 2007, almost 183 TEUs (6.6 million tons were imports, over 180 
thousand TEUs (2.3 million tons) were exports. 
Weather Conditions (Average Annual): 
Buenaventura is one of the rainiest cities in the world with 6000-7000 mm 
precipitation annually. 326 
Custom Search on weather.uk.msn.com: 
 
Figure 56: Weather in Buenaventura 327 
                                                 
326 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buenaventura,_Colombia accessed on 26 May 2009 
327 http://weather.uk.msn.com/local.aspx?wealocations=wc:COXX0007&q=Buenaventura%2c+COL 
accessed on 26 May 2009 
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2. PORTS DATA OF MEXICO 
A. Port of Ensenada 
Background: 
Breakwater built in 1956, ratified as Main Seaport in 1974 and Naval Base inaugurated in 
June 1998. 328 
Port Activities: 
Asian businesses have recently built up in Mexico, accounting for 70,000 
containers a year in cargo traffic. 
Round trip cargo shipping to Southern California is the strongest shipping market 
for Port Ensenada, with 15% annual increases presently. 
Accompanying this file are two spreadsheets from the Ensenada Port Authority:  
one is the cargo volume for the last day reported (Monday) and the overall traffic 
statistics for 2008.  May and August showed the highest traffic volume. 
Cargo Volume: 
Unit:  TEU, for 20-ft equivalent unit, based on standard 20 ft by 8 ft cargo 
container (heights not standardized) 
These numbers include both regional and international cargo traffic and have 
shown a pretty linear trend over at least 5 years: 
• 2005 – 79003  
• 2006 – 127941 
• 2007 – 166000 
• 2008 – 201200 
• 2009 – 241000 
• 2010 – 272800 









                                                 
328 http://puertoensenada.com.mx/english/statistics.htm accessed on 26 May 2009 
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Port Physical Characteristics: 
            
Figure 57: Port of Ensenada_1 
There are five major shipyards associated with the port, a cruise ship terminal, 
two commercial and one sport fishing piers, three bulk material and mineral terminals, 
and several public terminals, along with a maritime customs office. 
The improved channel depth as of September 2008 is 16m. 329 
Weather Conditions (Average Annual): 
Custom Search on Wunderground.com:  330 
                                                 
329 http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/news/ensenada-digs-deep-for-box-
opportunities/1222705937252.htm;jsessionid=A2F1727F0447337F50BB35FD745074C8 accessed on 26 
May 2009 
330 http://www.wunderground.com/cgi-
bin/findweather/hdfForecast?query=Mexico&searchType=WEATHER; "Weather Underground", accessed 





Figure 58: Port of Ensenada 
                
 
B. PORT OF MANZENILLO 
Background: 
The Port is situated in the State of Colima, in the Republic of Mexico, at the 
geographic coordinates: North Latitude: 19 deg, 03 ft, 30 in and 104 deg, 18 ft, 30 in. 




In 1993, operation and oversight of the port was privatized. 
 
Figure 59: Port of Manzenillo 
Manzanillo is the main connection between the Pacific and the most important 
industrial and commercial corridor in the country, made up of the northern, western and 
central zones, where the states of Aguascalientes, San Luis Potosí, Jalisco, Guanajuato, 
Querétaro, Zacatecas, Nuevo León, Coahuila, Morelos, Estado de México and the Federal 
District are located. Given its strategic position, it’s ideal for international commerce with 
the United States, Canada, Central and South America and the countries that make up the 
Pacific Rim. 331 
Port Physical Characteristics: 
Port area is 437 hectares.  Channels and turning basins depth ranges from 14 to 16 
meters. 
Port Activities: 
A tuna fishing enterprise operates out of the port, with four boats.  The port is also 
capable of handling (at least) 4th generation cargo containers, and exports from several 
regional businesses (iron ore, consumables, food). 
Twenty-six shipping lines regularly visit the port.  There are 14 terminals, with 
one dedicated to tourism.  The ports proximity to 6-lane highways, rail lines and airstrips 
would make it an attractive target for persons trying to move illegal cargo. 
Cargo Volume: 
Unit:  TEU, for 20-ft equivalent unit, based on standard 20 ft by 8 ft cargo 
container (heights not standardized) 
Manzanillo handles 90% of the containerized cargo moved on the Mexican 
Pacific. 
                                                 
331 www.puertomanzanillo.com.mx accessed on 26 May 2009 
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Data was available for 2007 and 2008 and is as follows: 
• 2007:  1,409,614 TEU 
• 2008:  1,409,782 TEU 
Cruise ship traffic:  38 ships made regular ports of call in 2007, but only 30 in 
2008.  The decrease may be attributed to a depressed US economy, rising crime rates in 
Mexico, or both.  Both of those conditions remain. 
Gross tonnage moved through port:  21,096,709 in 2007 and 22,294,864 in 2008. 
• Total number of ships making call in 2007:  1,907 
• Total number of ships making call in 2008:  1,871 
a. Weather Conditions (Average Annual) 
From Wunderground.com: 332 
 
Table 144: Manzenillo Weather 
 
 
C. Port of Salina Cruz 
Background: 
The Port of Salina Cruz is classified as a deep-water and coastal shipping port.  Of 
the three ports studied for the Anti-smuggling scenario, this port has the closest proximity 
to Colombia. 
 
Figure 60: Port of Salina Cruz 
                                                 
332 http://www.wunderground.com/global/MX.html?MR=1 accessed on 26 May 2009 
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The port is situated where the greatest concentration of trades is located, across 
eight states, and deals primarily in trade business with China, Canada and the United 
States.  Only one shipping company, the Mediterranean Shipping Company, provides 
these services. 
The city of Santa Cruz is home to one of the major oil refineries in the Mexican 
Pacific, which means that the transportation infrastructure to support the refinery is in 
place and that the port of Santa Cruz has a good amount of liquid petroleum traffic, as 
well as standard cargo. 333 
Port Physical Characteristics: 
The port is in proximity to land transportation routes, both rail and highway.  The 
Mexican Navy has a major shipyard, as well as qualified personnel and equipment to 
safeguard the port of Salina Cruz (10th Navy).  The container terminal has 24-hour 
lighting and surveillance. 
It has a total surface of 150.64 hectares, of which 71.39 hectares are the access 
canals, basin and berthing zones. 
The access canal to the port is oriented to the north, with a length of 70 meters, a 
bottom width of 82 meters, and a depth of up to 13 meters.  The outer harbor is located 
close to the access canal and is 750 meters long.  It is used for anchorage, and it has a 
400-meter diameter for turning and an average depth of up to 12 meters.  The dimensions 
of the typical ship are only 197 meters long by 32 meters wide.  The companionway 
canal links the outer harbor with the inner basin; its axis  is oriented northward, and it is 
70 meters long, 50 meters wide, and 10 meters deep.  Finally, the inner basin is located to 
the north of the port, and is surrounded by repair projects being done by the Navy 
shipyard; fishing docks; and berths, specifically those for Zones I and II, which allow 
berthing of ships up to 180 meters long and 28 meters wide, with a depth of 10 meters. 
Port Activities: 
The port has a general commercial wharf as well as a commercial fishing zone 
that encompasses eight piers and docks.  A Maritime Terminal includes fueling 
                                                 




operations and the handling of liquid petroleum for transport.  The Mexican government 
controls the Naval Sector, which has facilities for ship maintenance and repair and two 
graving docks.   
Cargo Volume: 
With only one international shipping company using the port, the shipping and 
cargo schedule is predictable.  The table below is the most recent shipping schedule from 
the Port Authority. 
 
Weather Conditions (Average Annual): 
From Wunderground.com: 334 
 
 

















                                                 










G.  GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS  
AACER - affordable adaptive conformal electronic-scanning-array radar 
ACL - mandatory access control 
ACLS - access control lists  
ADS - active denial system 
AFSB - afloat forward staging base 
AIS - automatic identification system 
AO - area of operation  
APS - Africa Partnership Station  
APU - auxiliary power unit 
AQD - additional qualification designator 
ARS - alternative remittance systems 
ASW - Anti-submarine Warfare 
ATFP - Anti-Terrorism Force Protection 
C4ISR - Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, and Surveillance 
CA - Civil Affairs  
CARAT - Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training 
CDC - The Center for Disease Control 
CJTF - Commander Joint Task Force 
CMA - comprehensive maritime awareness tool 
CMO - Civil Military Operations 
CMR - Civil Military Relations 
CNIES - Cooperating Nation Information Exchange System 
COE - current operating environment 
COIN - counter insurgency 
COP - common operating picture 
CPI - consumer price index 
CRAF - Civil Reserve Air Fleet 
DAU - Defense Acquisition University 
DCS - direct commercial sales 
DDG - guided missile destroyer 
DSCA - Defense Security Cooperation Agency Strategic Plan 2006-2011 
EAP - emergency action plan 
ECC - evacuation control center 
EDA - European Defence Agency 
EEZ - exclusive economic zone  
EPI – Environmental Performance Index 
FAA - Foreign Assistance and Arms Export Act of 1961  
FCE - forward command element 
FFG - guided missile frigate 
FLIR - forward looking infrared 
FMS - foreign military sales 
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FOC - flags of convenience 
FON - Freedom of Navigation 
FORESTER - foliage penetration reconnaissance, surveillance, tracking, and engagement 
radar  
FOV - field of view 
FRC – Fast Response Cutter 
FTR - Future Transport Rotorcraft 
GAO - General Accounting office 
HADR - Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief  
HMMWV - High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
HSV – high speed vessel 
HTS - high temperature superconductor 
IAP - indigenous autonomous processor 
IEDs - improvised explosive devices  
ISB - intermediate staging base 
IUU - Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported fishing 
IW - Information Warfare 
JITI - just in time information 
JSS - joint support ship 
JTF - Joint Task Force 
LCAC - Landing Craft Air Cushioned 
LCS - littoral combat ship 
LCU - landing craft utility 
LDF - local defense forces 
LFAS - low frequency active SONAR systems 
LHA - landing helicopter assault ship 
LHD - landing helicopter dock ship 
LNG - liquefied natural gas 
LPD - landing platform dock 
LRAD - long range acoustic device 
LR-HEMI - long range human electro-muscular incapacitation  
LRIT - long range identification and tracking  
LSD - landing ship dock 
LTTE - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
MCM - mine counter measures 
MCS - monitoring, control and surveillance systems 
MDA - maritime domain awareness 
MEDUSA - mob excess deterrent using silent audio 
MIO - maritime intercept operations 
MOE - measures of effectiveness 
MOP - measures of performance 
MSP - maritime security partnerships 
MSSIS - Maritime Safety and Security Information System 
NAIS - Nationwide Automatic Identification System  
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NBC - nuclear, biological, and chemical 
NEO - Non-combatant Evacuation Operations 
NGO - non-governmental organization 
NIC - National Intelligence Center  
NOAA - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
NOC - Naval Operations Concept  
NWDC - Navy Warfare Development Command 
PASS - Plasma Acoustic Shield System 
PDE - pulse detonation engine 
PEP - pulsed Energy projectile 
PERMAP - perception mapping 
PIKL - pulsed impulsive kill laser 
PO&S - procurement, operating and support cost 
POA 2007 - Partnership of the Americas 2007 
POLP - Principle of Least Privilege 
PVOs - private voluntary organizations 
PWM - pulse width modulation 
QDR - Quadrennial Defense Review 
REA - rapid environmental assessment 
RFMOs - regional fisheries management organizations 
RHIB - rigid hull inflatable boat 
RMAC - regional maritime awareness capability  
ROE - rules of engagement 
SAS - synthetic aperture sonar  
SEA - Systems Engineering and Analysis 
SEACAT - Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism  
SLOC - sea lines of communication 
SOFs - special operations forces 
SOP - standard operating procedures 
SSLPV - semi-submersible low profile vessel 
SUA - Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation  
T-AKE - dry cargo ship 
T-AO - underway replenishment oiler 
TDSI - Temasek Defense Systems Institute  
TESS - tactical electric solar system 
TQG - tactical quiet generator 
TSC - Theater Security Cooperation  
TSV – theater support vessel 
TWPS - tactical water purification system  
UAVs - unmanned aerial vehicles 
UNCLOS - United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 
UNITAR - United Nations Institute for Training and Research 
USATEC - Army's Rapid Equipping Force and the Testing & Evaluation Command 
VADER - vehicle and dismount exploitation radar 
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VAMOSC -Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Cost  
VTOL - vertical takeoff and landing 
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